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Abstract 
 
Wireline telecommunications infrastructure in the customer access network or CAN is 
undergoing a veritable technological and commercial revolution.  The paired-copper 
CAN is being modernised with optical fibre deployed ever closer to customers, 
culminating soon with fibre-to-the-home networks or some variant thereof.  Although 
bandwidth ceases to be a scarce commodity, the underlying natural monopoly will 
most likely be strengthened. 
 
National competition policy desires open access to multiple service providers yet 
commercial pressure calls for closure.  This has been the recent experience with the 
hybrid fibre coaxial networks delivering pay television and Internet access. 
 
This research asks the question: What are the factors that prevent open access to 
the broadband services of next generation wireline infrastructure?  How can these 
obstacles be overcome?  A particular focus is given to non-price considerations 
which come to the fore due to the unique strategic and technological characteristics 
of optical fibre in the access network. 
 
The methodological approach involves data gathering via three case studies - that of 
the Telstra/Foxtel pay television network, the TransACT broadband network and 
fibre-to-the-home networks in general.  Although the ultimate focus is on the research 
question above, these cases are discussed in a holistic way with consideration of a 
number of contextual factors.  The research also examines the relationship between 
the concepts of ‘open access’ and ‘network neutrality’, visiting the concept of 
‘common carriage’ in doing so. 
 
Several findings are reached that illuminate the field of telecommunications access 
regulation as applied to infrastructure capable of delivering truly next generation 
broadband services.  Since 1993, our politicians have only paid lip service to the 
importance of competition and have deferred to the demands of the dominant builder 
of telecommunications infrastructure.  From the viewpoints of end-users and access 
seekers, the access regime is found to be incapable of dealing with the technical and 
commercial bottlenecks arising from optical fibre in the CAN. 
 
It is concluded that communication between users should be recognised as the prime 
purpose of telecommunications and that the regulatory regime should not reward 
discriminatory practices detracting from the development of a networked information 
economy.  It is also concluded that dominant players should never be rewarded with 
access holidays which could otherwise entrench market dominance through the 
creation of new bottlenecks.  Access regulation is ill-equipped to cope with optical 
fibre in the CAN until it also recognizes the strategic potential of such infrastructure. 
 
D.R.Kelso PhD Thesis, QUT, February 2008: Open Access to Next Generation Broadband {single line spaced version} 
 iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Keywords …………………………………………………………………………………………..…... ii 
Abstract ……………………………………………………………………………………………..…. iii 
Table of Contents ………………………………………………………………………………….…... iv 
List of Figures & Tables ………………………………………………………………………….…... viii 
List of Abbreviations ………………………………………………………………………………..…. ix 
Statement of Original Authorship ……………………………………………………………………… x 
Acknowledgments ………………………………………………………………………     …………... xi 
CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION ................................................................ 1 
1.1 Significance of this Research ....................................................................................................1 
1.2 Structure of Thesis.....................................................................................................................2 
1.3 Summary of Findings ................................................................................................................3 
CHAPTER TWO – LITERATURE REVIEW & RESEARCH PROBLEM.......... 6 
2.1 Literature Review ......................................................................................................................6 
2.1.1 Perspectives on Access ...........................................................................................................6 
2.1.2 Perspectives on Openness .......................................................................................................8 
2.1.3 Control of Access..................................................................................................................11 
2.1.4 US Approaches to Open Access ...........................................................................................13 
2.1.5 EU Approaches to Open Access ...........................................................................................18 
2.1.6 Australian Approaches to Open Access ................................................................................20 
2.1.7 Consumers, Users and Producers..........................................................................................23 
2.1.8 Network Technology ............................................................................................................24 
2.2 Formulating the Research Problem .......................................................................................25 
2.2.1 Issues from Literature Review ..............................................................................................25 
2.2.2 Research Question ................................................................................................................27 
2.3 Untangling the Terminology ...................................................................................................27 
2.3.1 The ‘Broadband’ Dilemma ...................................................................................................28 
2.3.2 ‘Next Generation’ .................................................................................................................34 
CHAPTER THREE – RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.................................... 38 
3.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................38 
3.2 Case Study Research ...............................................................................................................39 
3.3 Case Criteria, Number and Selection.....................................................................................42 
3.3.1 Criteria ..................................................................................................................................42 
3.3.2 Selection................................................................................................................................43 
3.3.3 Discussion of Selection.........................................................................................................46 
3.4 Data Sources.............................................................................................................................47 
3.4.1 Primary Sources ....................................................................................................................47 
3.4.2 Secondary Sources ................................................................................................................48 
D.R.Kelso PhD Thesis, QUT, February 2008: Open Access to Next Generation Broadband {single line spaced version} 
 v
CHAPTER FOUR –TELSTRA/FOXTEL PAY TV NETWORK CASE STUDY49 
4.1 The Birth & Closure of Cable.................................................................................................49 
4.1.1 Ending the moratorium .........................................................................................................49 
4.1.2 The cable guys ......................................................................................................................51 
4.1.3 The coming of closure...........................................................................................................56 
4.1.4 The government decides .......................................................................................................60 
4.2 Potential Bottlenecks with HFC Networks ............................................................................64 
4.3 Opening the Door to Access: Deeming & Declaration..........................................................67 
4.4 Challenge & Counter-Challenge ............................................................................................70 
4.4.1 Validity of deeming and declaration .....................................................................................71 
4.4.2 Sufficient amount of service/channel capacity......................................................................71 
4.4.3 Protected contractual right ....................................................................................................72 
4.5 Arbitration of Access Disputes ...............................................................................................74 
4.6 Access Undertakings & Exemptions ......................................................................................75 
4.6.1 Undertakings of analogue access ..........................................................................................76 
4.6.2 Telecommunications Competition Bill amendments ............................................................77 
4.6.3 Exemptions leading to digital access ....................................................................................78 
4.6.4 Tribunal invalidation of exemption.......................................................................................80 
4.6.5 The sequel .............................................................................................................................81 
4.7 Discussion .................................................................................................................................82 
4.7.1 Limitations of Case Study.....................................................................................................82 
4.7.2 Findings ................................................................................................................................83 
CHAPTER FIVE – TRANSACT NETWORK CASE STUDY .......................... 91 
5.1 Background ..............................................................................................................................91 
5.2 The TransAct Communications Project (1995 – 1999).........................................................93 
5.3 Commercial Operation (2000 onwards)...............................................................................100 
5.4 Designing for Open Access....................................................................................................104 
5.5 Success with Open Access .....................................................................................................106 
5.6 Discussion ...............................................................................................................................109 
5.6.1 Limitations of Case Study...................................................................................................109 
5.6.2 Findings ..............................................................................................................................110 
CHAPTER SIX – FIBRE TO THE HOME NETWORKS CASE STUDY ....... 117 
6.1 The Next Generation of Bandwidth Abundance.................................................................117 
6.2 The Natural Monopoly of Fibre in the Access Network.....................................................122 
6.3 Network Architecture and Design........................................................................................125 
6.3.1 Home Run Architecture ......................................................................................................126 
6.3.2 Active Star Architecture......................................................................................................127 
6.3.3 Passive Star Architecture (PON).........................................................................................129 
6.3.4 Wavelength Division Multiplexed Passive Star Architecture (WDM PON) ......................130 
6.3.5 Advantages and Disadvantages...........................................................................................131 
D.R.Kelso PhD Thesis, QUT, February 2008: Open Access to Next Generation Broadband {single line spaced version} 
 vi
6.4 Designing for Competitive Access ........................................................................................133 
6.4.1 Traditional Regulatory Approaches ....................................................................................133 
6.4.2 Multiplexing Framework ....................................................................................................135 
6.4.3 Layers Framework ..............................................................................................................137 
6.4.4 Commentary........................................................................................................................143 
6.5 FTTH in Australia – Threat or Opportunity? ....................................................................144 
6.5.1 From Technology Trials to Commercial Pilots...................................................................145 
6.5.2 A Mexican Standoff ............................................................................................................148 
6.5.3 The Next Generation CAN Technology..............................................................................150 
6.5.4 Regulatory Certainty ...........................................................................................................153 
6.6 Discussion ...............................................................................................................................157 
6.6.1 Limitations of Case Study...................................................................................................157 
6.6.2 Findings ..............................................................................................................................158 
CHAPTER SEVEN – MOVING GOALPOSTS: FROM OPEN ACCESS TO 
NETWORK NEUTRALITY? ......................................................................... 163 
7.1 Origins of the US Debate.......................................................................................................163 
7.1.1 Uncommon Carriage Rules the Telecosm...........................................................................163 
7.1.2 Alleged Discriminatory Practices .......................................................................................166 
7.2 Neutrality Principles..............................................................................................................168 
7.3 Issues in Contention...............................................................................................................170 
7.3.1 Diversity or Differentiation.................................................................................................170 
7.3.2 Investment Incentive...........................................................................................................171 
7.3.3 Last-mile Competition ........................................................................................................173 
7.3.4 Vertical Integration .............................................................................................................174 
7.4 Settling the Score ...................................................................................................................175 
7.4.1 The Connection with Open Access .....................................................................................175 
7.4.2 Relevance to Australia ........................................................................................................178 
7.5 Conclusion ..............................................................................................................................179 
CHAPTER EIGHT – DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS ............................... 181 
8.1 Rationales for Opening up Access ........................................................................................181 
8.1.1 Any-to-Any Connectivity ...................................................................................................181 
8.1.2 Common Carriage...............................................................................................................184 
8.1.3 Commentary........................................................................................................................185 
8.2 Dominance of CAN Fibre......................................................................................................187 
8.2.1 Naturally a Monopoly .........................................................................................................187 
8.2.2 Strategic Capability.............................................................................................................189 
8.3 Open and Shut Design ...........................................................................................................190 
8.4 The Regulatory Scorecard ....................................................................................................192 
8.4.1 Hybrid Fibre Coaxial Network............................................................................................192 
8.4.2 TransACT Network ............................................................................................................194 
8.4.3 Fibre-to-the-Home Network ...............................................................................................194 
D.R.Kelso PhD Thesis, QUT, February 2008: Open Access to Next Generation Broadband {single line spaced version} 
 vii
8.5 Holidays, Harbours & Incentives .........................................................................................195 
8.5.1 Access Holidays..................................................................................................................196 
8.5.2 Exemptions & their Benefits...............................................................................................197 
8.5.3 A Less Permissive Holiday .................................................................................................199 
8.5.4 Commentary........................................................................................................................200 
8.6 Any-to-Any Connectivity ......................................................................................................201 
8.6.1 Connectivity & Access........................................................................................................201 
8.6.2 Long-term Interests of End-users........................................................................................202 
8.6.3 End-users ............................................................................................................................203 
8.6.4 Telecommunications Legislation ........................................................................................203 
8.6.5 Trade Practices Legislation.................................................................................................204 
8.6.6 Commentary........................................................................................................................206 
8.7 Conclusions.............................................................................................................................207 
8.7.1 What is preventing open access to next generation broadband...........................................207 
8.7.2 How the obstacles to open access could be overcome ........................................................210 
CHAPTER NINE – STUDY LIMITATIONS, FURTHER RESEARCH & 
CONCLUDING REMARKS .......................................................................... 214 
9.1 Study Limitations...................................................................................................................214 
9.2 Further Research ...................................................................................................................215 
9.3 Concluding Remarks .............................................................................................................216 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................... 218 
 
D.R.Kelso PhD Thesis, QUT, February 2008: Open Access to Next Generation Broadband {single line spaced version} 
 viii
List of Figures & Tables 
 
 Caption 
 
Page No. 
Figure 1 Framework for Research Activity 38 
Figure 2 Types of Research 39 
Figure 3 Comparison of Optus Vision and MOCO (Telstra Multimedia/Foxtel) 
Proposals 
62 
Figure 4 Basic Topology of a Hybrid Fibre Coaxial Network 65 
Figure 5 Functional Diagram of a Conditional Access System 65 
Figure 6 Nominal Band Plan of Telstra’s HFC Network 72 
Figure 7 Conceptual Architecture of a Fibre-to-the-Curb Network 97 
Figure 8 Schematic of TransACT Network 105 
Figure 9 Schematic of Traditional Telephony Network 118 
Figure 10 Deployment of Optical Fibre in the CAN 119 
Figure 11 CAN Fibre Bandwidth 121 
Figure 12 Schematic of Home Run Architecture 127 
Figure 13 Schematic of Active Star Architecture 128 
Figure 14 Schematic of Passive Star Architecture (PON) 129 
Figure 15 Schematic of Wavelength Division Multiplexed Passive Star 
Architecture (WDM PON) 
131 
Figure 16 FTTH Competitive Access Relationships 134 
Figure 17 The Seven-Layer OSI Reference Model 138 
Figure 18 Data Link Layer Competition through Unbundling of Optical Fibre 
Cabling 
141 
Figure 19 Data Link Layer Competition through Unbundling of Optical 
Wavelengths  
141 
Figure 20 Service-based Competition through Unbundling of Data Link layer 142 
Figure 21 CAN Optical Fibre Connectivity 146 
Figure 22 Proposed Fibre to the Node Configuration 152 
Figure 23 Changing Industry Structure 182 
   
Table 1 Advertised BigPond Internet Access Speeds 29 
Table 2 Performance & Other Characteristics of Broadband Services 30 
Table 3 Progressive Generations of Carrier Networks 35 
Table 4 Characteristics in choosing the Purposive Case 41 
Table 5 Selection by Criteria 42 
Table 6 Key Events in Australian Pay Television Delivery 50 
Table 7 Channel Programming Line-up 103 
Table 8 Comparison of Business Models 107 
Table 9 Degrees of Openness? 114 
Table 10 Advantages and Disadvantages of Various Architectures 132 
Table 11 US Growth in High-Speed Lines for Internet Access 164 
 
D.R.Kelso PhD Thesis, QUT, February 2008: Open Access to Next Generation Broadband {single line spaced version} 
 ix
List of Abbreviations 
 
ACCC Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission 
 LAN local area network 
ACT Australian Competition 
Tribunal 
 LTIE long-term interests of end-
users 
ACTEW Australian Capital Territory 
Electricity & Water 
 MMDS multichannel multipoint (or 
multipoint microwave) 
distribution service (or 
system) 
ADSL asymmetric digital subscriber 
line 
 NCC National Competition Council 
AFN advanced fibre network  NCP National Competition Policy 
AOL America Online  NGI next generation Internet 
API applications programme 
interface 
 NGN next generation network 
ASX Australian Stock Exchange  NRA national regulatory authority 
ATM asynchronous transfer mode  OFREP optical fibre residential 
engineering pilot 
BPON broadband passive optical 
network 
 OLT optical line termination 
BSEG Broadband Services Expert 
Group 
 ONA open network architecture 
CAN customer access network  ONU optical network unit 
CAS conditional access system  OSI open systems interconnection 
CIRCIT Centre for International 
Research on Communication 
and Information Technologies 
 PC Productivity Commission 
CTV cable television  PON passive optical network 
CPE customer premises equipment  PSTN public switched telephone 
network 
DSL digital subscriber line  QoS quality of service 
DSLAM digital subscriber line access 
multiplexer 
 RFP request for proposal 
EPG electronic programme guide  SAO standard access obligation 
FCC Federal Communications 
Commission 
 STB set top box 
FSAN full service access network  TCP transmission control protocol 
FTTC fibre to the curb  TPA Trade Practices Act 
FTTH fibre to the home  ULL unconditioned local loop 
FTTN fibre to the node  UNE unbundled network element 
FTTP fibre to the premises  VDSL very high rate digital 
subscriber line 
FTTSA fibre to the serving area  WDM wavelength division 
multiplexed/er 
FTTX fibre to the exchange  Wi-Fi wireless fidelity 
GPON gigabit passive optical 
network 
   
HFC hybrid fibre coaxial    
D.R.Kelso PhD Thesis, QUT, February 2008: Open Access to Next Generation Broadband {single line spaced version} 
 x
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statement of Original Authorship 
 
“The work contained in this thesis has not been previously submitted to meet 
requirements for an award at this or any other higher education institution.  To the 
best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published 
or written by another person except where due reference is made.” 
 
 
 
Signature 
 
 
 
Date 
 
 
 
D.R.Kelso PhD Thesis, QUT, February 2008: Open Access to Next Generation Broadband {single line spaced version} 
 xi
Acknowledgments 
 
I especially wish to thank my wife Helena who has greatly supported me during this 
life journey, which ended up fortuitously returning us both to our home state of 
Queensland.  Helena also patiently undertook the proof-reading. 
 
My journey of research and investigation on the broad topic of this dissertation began 
whilst working for Telstra in the early days of developing their pay television 
business.  That experience provided an invaluable grounding in what really 
happened ‘behind the scene’.  Immediately following Telstra I was fortunate to be 
able to undertake an initial research project in this field whilst working for Mark 
Armstrong at the then Media & Telecommunications Policy Group, RMIT. 
 
During subsequent years as a Senior Research Fellow with the Centre for 
International Research on Communication and Information Technologies, later 
CIRCIT@RMIT, I was able to further refine my research skills under the watchful eye 
of its Director, John Burke.  CIRCIT@RMIT provided most valuable opportunities to 
consult for the Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, again in the broad 
area of what eventually became this dissertation topic.  This enabled me to 
appreciate the early days of Australian pay television development from the 
viewpoints of both Telstra as a provider and the ACCC as the regulator.  Supriya 
Singh encouraged me to commence my doctoral studies. 
 
I particularly wish to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Robin Eckermann in 
recounting to me the early days of what became the TransACT network.  Michael 
Cosgrave of the ACCC and John Burke, former director of CIRCIT were most helpful 
as informed sounding boards.  I would like to thank Peter Gerrand, Colin Goodwin, 
Jim Holmes and Paul Brooks for their advice.  Supervisory guidance from Greg 
Hearn was greatly appreciated. 
 
I am sorry that my father William Thomas Kelso, one of Australia’s Bright Sparcs, 
never had the chance to know of this dissertation. 
D.R.Kelso PhD Thesis, QUT, February 2008: Open Access to Next Generation Broadband {single line spaced version} 
 1
CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION 
 
This research is aimed at achieving a greater understanding of the matter of 
providing, controlling and desiring access to the next generation of broadband 
networks and their services - the generation involving significant deployment of 
optical fibre in the access network, where scarcity of capacity should no longer be a 
factor.  In particular, the research asks the questions: What are the factors that 
prevent open access to the broadband services of next generation wireline 
infrastructure?  How can these obstacles be overcome? 
 
The regulation of access traditionally distinguishes between ‘price’ and ‘non-price’ 
considerations, granting primacy to the former whilst drawing heavily on economic 
analyses.  In contrast, this research adopts a more multi-disciplinary approach by 
melding a technical appreciation with strategic, policy, commercial and user-oriented 
perspectives.  Once the access network technology embodies economies of scale 
and scope only possible with optical fibre, non-price considerations come to the fore.  
In a strategic sense it might even be said that non-price considerations outweigh 
price considerations. 
 
1.1 Significance of this Research 
 
The benefits of open access are demonstrable with our roads, railways and airport 
terminals to mention just a few instances of expensive natural monopoly 
infrastructure serving the public.  Open access is no stranger to Australian 
telecommunications, given the public switched telephone network or PSTN and now 
a switched broadband network in the Australian Capital Territory. 
 
Open access provides individual customers with a choice of service providers, 
offering the promise of choice in accessing all types of information and/or 
entertainment services plus the freedom to communicate or publish via channels of 
their choosing.  Choice implies competition in service provision and it is competition 
that offers better value propositions and drives innovation. 
 
The key issue is whether we can preserve the benefits of openness that have long 
characterized the PSTN for telephony and then narrowband Internet services, where 
innovation and competition have increasingly flourished, into the era of the next 
generation broadband.  This dilemma is heightened when appreciating that 
investment in next generation broadband networks and services also brings new 
opportunities to discriminate in the network operator's favour. 
 
The roll-out by Telstra and Optus of hybrid fibre coaxial or HFC networks from 1995 
to 1997 primarily for the delivery of pay television was a watershed in the 
development of Australia’s wireline access network.  The only previous wireline 
infrastructure was that of the paired-copper customer access network or CAN for 
connecting customers with the PSTN.  The paired-copper CAN was and remains 
ubiquitous and continues to be regulated to provide open access to competing 
service providers and to non-telephone customer attachments.  These characteristics 
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were pivotal to telephony service competition since 1991 and to the rapid take-up of 
dial-up access to the Internet during the late 1990s. 
 
Widespread deployment of fibre to the home networks, or their close variants from 
possibly 2007 onwards will mark another watershed that is unlikely to be overtaken 
technologically for many decades.  Fibre to the home offers a quantum change – the 
potential to end the scarcity of communications bandwidth available to residential and 
SME customers and to herald the arrival of a veritable cornucopia of services.  At the 
same time, fibre to the home is likely to reinforce the natural monopoly of much of the 
existing CAN infrastructure. 
 
These watersheds highlight the importance of reassessing the appropriateness of 
Australia’s telecommunications policy and regulatory environments.  If competition 
continues to be central to national economic and social development, then we need 
an access regime that continues to be effective.  It must cope with ongoing 
technological innovation and creative commercial challenges.  However the access 
regime must never lose sight of the fact that the telecommunications industry only 
exists to serve end-users. 
 
The roll-out of HFC networks, the first investment in post-PSTN wireline 
infrastructure, sorely tested the access regime and found it to be seriously wanting.  
Through a mix of political intervention and inappropriate regulatory tools, these HFC 
networks remain effectively closed to competitive access.  The second and for 
decades to come the last investment in post-PSTN wireline investment is now being 
obstructed by Telstra’s threat not to roll out optical fibre in the CAN without an even 
more favourable regulatory regime.  A greater return on capital is envisaged from 
investing in further political intervention. 
 
The seed for this research was planted when I was working for Telstra in the early 
days of developing their pay television business when open access was considered 
the natural way of things, in line with the non-discriminatory principle of common 
carriage. 
 
1.2 Structure of Thesis 
 
The first three chapters provide an introduction to the research undertaken from 
March 2003 to March 2007, detailing a review of literature accessed in the first 
eighteen months and the issues found to be arising.  The research question is 
introduced at this point.  The methodology for the proposed research is explained as 
involving a small number of case studies.  An understanding of what constitutes ‘next 
generation broadband’ starts to be formulated. 
 
The subsequent four chapters constitute the data gathering phase and each 
concludes with a summary of interim findings.  Chapter Four details the 
Telstra/Foxtel pay television network rolled out from 1995 to 1997.  Its business plan 
was to actively discourage third party access.  Scarcity of channel capacity was 
inherent in the original analogue transmission technology.  The case study revisits 
the birth of cable television in Australia and examines the attempts by third parties to 
gain access to this infrastructure so they may deliver their own content and establish 
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their own customer relationships.  Matters such as access to content, mergers within 
the industry and third line forcing are not explicitly addressed. 
 
Chapter Five examines the TransACT broadband network currently servicing 
suburbs within Canberra, Australian Capital Territory.  Conceived in 1996 and 
operational by 2000, it was designed from the outset as an open access network 
capable of connecting a variety of service providers to customers, each with its own 
data stream of up to 52 Mb/s.  TransACT remains unique within Australia and a 
relatively rare occurrence worldwide. 
 
Chapter Six, concerning fibre-to-the home networks, is the third and final case study.  
It bears characteristics that position it between the other two.  Although subject to 
extensive regulatory attempts to be prised open, the Telstra/Foxtel pay television 
network remains effectively closed to third party access despite recent digitisation 
that, in terms of video channel capacity, substantially lessens the original problem of 
bandwidth scarcity.  By a large measure, the TransACT network remains 
substantially open to third party service providers, a situation resulting from original 
choice by those who designed the network and justified its business case. 
 
Whilst the third case study nominally describes fibre to the home networks, many of 
the findings are also applicable to other network variants that substantially extend the 
amount of optical fibre in the customer access network.  Infrastructure involving 
optical fibre in the access network inevitably develops into a natural monopoly, 
thereby negating facilities-based competition.  Existing small scale operation of fibre 
to the home networks involve closed access operation under a vertically integrated 
business model despite the underlying technology providing a relative abundance of 
communications bandwidth capable of supporting a multiplicity of service providers. 
 
One of the issues arising from the literature review was to explore the contention 
that, rather than ‘open access’ to broadband networks and services, the objective 
should be ‘network neutrality’, that is, not favouring one application over another.  
Chapter Seven explores how in the United States of America, network neutrality 
trumped open access from 2002/03 to at least 2006, how the opposing sides in the 
debate have taken network neutrality to mean whatever supports their case and what 
elements of the debate could be of relevance to the Australian scene. 
 
In Chapter Eight, the findings arising from the previous four chapters are discussed, 
common threads gathered and matters of distinction highlighted.  Conclusions are 
then drawn as to the implications for regulating access to services from infrastructure 
more closely approximating the delivery of next generation broadband. 
 
Chapter Nine discusses the limitations inherent in this body of research, identifies 
possible areas for future study and presents the concluding remarks. 
 
1.3 Summary of Findings 
 
This research illuminates the field of telecommunications access regulation as it 
applies to infrastructure capable of delivering truly next generation broadband 
services.  Such infrastructure, involving optical fibre in the customer access network, 
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can create a natural monopoly of an enduring nature – particularly in the Australian 
context.  It is capable of giving rise to complex technical and commercial bottlenecks 
that strongly encourage anti-competitive behaviour.  The first deep penetration of 
optical fibre into the customer access network will be the last installed. 
 
A case is made that the access regime is incapable of dealing with this situation.  
With facilities-based competition being infeasible, the ‘stepping stone’ theory 
collapses and the only alternative to monopolistic service delivery of next generation 
broadband services becomes effective service-level competition.  Unfortunately the 
track record of the access regime as applied to post-PSTN wireline infrastructure 
augers badly for effective service-level competition via optical fibre in the customer 
access network. 
 
The access regime is cumbersome and wide open to gaming.  Delay and lobbying 
become prime weapons in preventing third party access.  Experience with 
unbundling the relatively well known paired copper access network bodes ill for the 
unbundling of future optical fibre.  In any case, competitive access will be stymied if 
unbundling is restricted to incrementally-offered services rather than the underlying 
optical fibre infrastructure.  The regime is now significantly biased in favour of 
investment by network providers and correspondingly against competitive access 
seekers. 
 
The TransACT network in Canberra is living testimony to the fact that Australia’s next 
generation telecommunications infrastructure can readily be open to competitive 
service provision, in both a technical and commercial sense.  Paradoxically, 
TransACT made no call upon the access regime – there was simply a willingness by 
the network provider to be open.  In contrast, Australia’s telecommunications access 
regime has been captured by network providers whose business plans are 
predicated on either closure or highly restrictive openness.  Since 1993, our 
politicians have been spellbound by the image (and reality) of the ‘romantic’ or 
‘heroic’ builder of telecommunications infrastructure and have paid only lip service to 
the importance of competition. 
 
It need not be this way.  Whilst this research identifies what I see as being the key 
problems, it is framed to address a specific research question and not necessarily the 
full gamut of possible solutions.  Realising the economies of scale and scope only 
possible with optical fibre, non-price considerations come to the fore.  The following 
conclusions are reached based upon a detailed assessment of the experience with or 
potential for access to three network types involving post-PSTN infrastructure. 
 
Post-1997 Australian telecommunications policy has effectively removed the 
protection that end-users once had for non-discriminatory connection to other users 
and non-discriminatory carriage of content, a matter now of particular significance to 
next-generation broadband services.  Instead, the interests of end-users have been 
left to be determined by the interests of network providers and access seekers.  The 
spirit of common carriage was only poorly represented by the legislative concept of 
‘any-to-any connectivity’ – a concept which in any case was made greatly 
subordinate to the need to provide incentives for investors.  It is concluded that 
communication between users should be recognised as the prime purpose of 
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telecommunications and that the regulatory regime should not reward discriminatory 
practices detracting from the development of a networked information economy. 
 
Focussing on specific aspects of the regime, it is further concluded that dominant 
players should never be rewarded with access holidays which could otherwise 
entrench market dominance through the creation of new bottlenecks.  Access 
holidays are the very antithesis of open access and experience to date shows them 
to have been counter-productive.  The availability of access holidays simply 
encourages access providers not to cooperate with the regulator and access 
seekers.  Access holidays merely become a tool for securing market dominance. 
 
Finally, the regulatory regime is incapable of dealing with the strategic significance of 
optical fibre extending deeply into the customer access network.  Defensive 
engineering easily prevents effective unbundling and reinforces technical and 
commercial bottlenecks.  Continued focus on access only to services simply 
encourages the squirrelling away of the strategic potential of optical fibre.  There 
particularly needs to be a regulatory mechanism for facilitating industry arrangements 
to invest in a cooperative manner as an alternative to enshrining just one player with 
a natural monopoly.  The conclusion is reached that access regulation is ill-equipped 
to cope with optical fibre in the access network until it also recognizes the strategic 
potential of infrastructure. 
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CHAPTER TWO – LITERATURE REVIEW & RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
This field of research raises issues examinable from legal/regulatory, economic, 
technical or societal viewpoints.  Whilst theoretically self-contained, an evaluation 
against a single-discipline framework may give rise to interpretations that deny or 
undervalue alternative and possibly superior outcomes.  Instead, the approach 
adopted for this research study is multi-disciplinary wherever practicable.  The review 
of literature was undertaken in the first eighteen months of the four year research, 
commencing March 2003.  As a result, it preceded the research of the three major 
case studies – each of which uncovered significant additional literature. 
 
2.1 Literature Review 
 
The following review of existing interpretative or factual analyses in the field is framed 
to both deconstruct the key elements underlying the research question and illuminate 
the diversity of arguments developed and approaches taken across the national 
jurisdictions of the United States, the European Union and Australia.  It discovers 
literature chiefly in the domains of law, information technology, telecommunications 
and computer science.  The analysis is also informed by literature in the areas of 
communication studies, sociology and political science, economics, business and 
management studies. 
 
2.1.1 Perspectives on Access 
Access is an area of continuing contention and controversy where the 
stakes are high and the stakeholders numerous. (Northfield 1999: Ch. 
5 The Heart of the Maze, p.266) 
 
Price (1995: 195) observes that providing access can mean “creating gateways to 
sources of information for listeners who have been deprived of such sources in the 
past or, conversely, providing access for speakers to an audience which has not 
adequately heard them”.  ‘Access’ has dualistic connotations – it can be supplied or 
used, provided or sought.1 
 
The term is commonly used with a more specific descriptor, such as ‘community 
access’, and can take on added meaning according to the particular context, namely, 
regulatory, economic, technical, social & political. 
 
Regulatory & Economic Context 
 
Since the early 1990s, Australia’s electricity, gas, telecommunications, water, rail, air 
services and port services industries have all progressed towards more open 
markets and greater competition.  However, many of these industries involved 
bottleneck infrastructure for which competition becomes difficult if not infeasible.  
Following recommendations in the 1993 Hilmer Review, the Commonwealth 
Government introduced a national access regime for such infrastructure, to be 
implemented via a new Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act 1974. (NCC 2002) 
                                            
1 Competition policy talks of ‘access providers’ and ‘access seekers’. 
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This regime established legal rights for third parties to share the use, on reasonable 
terms and conditions, of certain infrastructure services or facilities deemed of national 
significance.  For example, such a third party could gain the right to access the 
railway line of another company to run its own trains; similarly, a telecommunications 
carrier (such as AAPT) could be allowed to access the telephone network of the 
dominant Australian infrastructure provider (such as Telstra) for the purpose of 
providing telephone services to its own customers.  In this context, ‘third-party 
access’ means that a competitive service provider can gain access to the 
infrastructure or services of another service provider and in so doing establish access 
to a new customer base. 
 
This falls within the generally accepted framework of an effective access regime for 
telecommunications services which Northfield (1999: Ch. 5) describes as comprising: 
 
• Access arrangements between carriers and service providers who own 
infrastructure (also known as ‘interconnection’); 
• Access of service providers and content creators to distribution channels; and 
• End-user access to a range of services and content. 
 
Technical Context 
 
The present analogue ‘free-to-air’ television services are delivered (broadcasted) 
over wireless networks to which access is free, provided each viewer obtains a 
television receiver that is compatible with the relevant service standards.  However, a 
pay television service is not free and the providers of programme materials and the 
service operator (such as Foxtel) understandably desire to be paid for their services 
and intellectual property.  Mead (2000: Ch. 6) describes how the operator must 
ensure that viewers who agree to pay shall be authorised to receive certain services 
and not those who do not pay.  This is effected by establishing systems through 
which viewing access is conditional on payment – an arrangement said to be that of 
‘conditional access’. 
 
The paired copper cabling network used by Telstra to provide telecommunications 
services directly to its customers is known as the customer access network or CAN.  
In contrast, the SingTel Optus satellites constitute a series of wireless access 
networks to regional and rural subscribers for delivering television, Internet, 
telephony and data communication services. (BIS Shrapnel 2001) As such, the usual 
connotation of ‘access network’ is that of a network through which a carrier or service 
provider accesses its customers, though the reverse may also be implied in that it 
provides the means for a user or customer to access the relevant services. 
 
Social & Political Context 
 
With the advent of new information and communication technologies (ICTs) such as 
telephony, television, computing and the Internet, and the belief that information is 
the base upon which future society will develop, the question of physical access to 
such technologies has become a social and political concern. (Lax 2001)  The 
technologies enable many-to-many interactions such as with telephony and the 
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Internet, one-to-many dissemination such as with television or solo working with 
computer applications. 
 
As cable television spread widely throughout the USA from the early 1970s, the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) mandated that cable systems were 
required to provide channels for government, for educational purposes, and for public 
access.2  With public access television, groups or individuals not affiliated with the 
cable operator are able to produce non-commercial programme material at no cost 
and have it distributed free to all subscribers of the particular cable system, that is, 
such channels are bundled within the ‘tier zero’ offering. (Lindner 1999)  Public 
access television is said to open cable television to the public, particularly by way of 
increasing community participation.  The Australian equivalent, as applied to free-to-
air television, is called community access television or simply community television.3 
 
Keller (1995) observes how these terms can have connotations far beyond their 
literal meanings: 
 
By public access we mean not only establishing physical connections to the 
network, but also ensuring that those connections are easy to use, affordable, 
and provide access to a minimum set of information resources.  In particular, 
network use should not be limited to the passive receipt of information.  
Instead, the environment should be open, distributed and easily navigable.  
Even the most basic connection should enable users to act as information 
sources as well as destinations. 
 
2.1.2 Perspectives on Openness 
 
On this topic we enter a domain where the meaning is truly in the eye of the beholder 
– being ‘open’ conjures a variety of strict technical definitions, a multiplicity of policy 
appreciations and many different understandings held across society.  This research 
concerns those perspectives that are common to a consideration of open access to 
broadband networks and services.4 
 
Commencing with technical meanings that directly impact on telecommunications 
policy settings, Shah, Sicker et al (2003) survey usage and definitions of ‘openness’ 
with the goal of extracting some common principles.  Their perspectives include the 
following: 
                                            
2 Collectively this has become known as the ‘PEG’ requirement: standing for public access, 
educational access and government access, each typically occupying at least one television 
channel. 
3 The important distinction between the two being that cable television access requires 
access to the infrastructure of another operator, whereas free-to-air television access only 
requires access to radio-frequency spectrum. 
4 It is important not to lose sight of the fact that the rapid diffusion of dial-up (narrowband) 
Internet services is attributable to the availability of the public switched telephone network 
(PSTN) that was designed and regulated to be ‘open’. Bauer, J. M. and S. S. Wildman 
(2002). "Third Annual Quello Communication Policy and Law Symposium; Rethinking 
Access: Introduction to the Symposium Theme and Framework." Law Review of Michigan 
State University - Detroit College of Law 3: 8. 
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• Unbundled Network Elements (UNEs), Open Network Architectures (ONAs) and 
Interoperability 
 
As a means of creating a more open market, the ONA concept is directed to 
‘modularizing’ or ‘unbundling’ the various elements comprising a carrier’s basic 
network services so that each element is available to a competing carrier or 
service provider. 
 
• End-to-End Design Principles 
 
Said by Shah, Sicker et al to be arguably the broadest application of openness, 
the Internet was designed to comply with non-proprietary standards and 
protocols for message transfer and to rely on network architectures that do not 
impede communications between the end devices. 
 
Farrell and Weiser (2002: 6 & 11) attribute the Internet’s success in exploiting a 
variety of means for physical transport (dial-up modem, wireless, satellite, cable 
modem) and the ongoing development of popular applications such as email, 
the World Wide Web and peer-to-peer working to the openness of its 
architecture. 
 
• Internet Interconnection 
 
Also key to the success of the Internet has been the ability of ISPs to negotiate 
interconnection through peering arrangements or transit agreements, enabling 
any user to connect to all other users independent of their geographical 
location.  Whereas the end-to-end design delivers openness in a technical 
sense, it is commercially achieved through interconnection. 
 
• Network Neutrality 
 
Wu (2003) claims that a network is ‘neutral’ if it does not favour one application 
over another.  Whilst this is inherently the case for the Internet at large, it would 
not apply where a given ISP impedes consumer access to information, products 
and services, such as by blocking or redirecting addresses or adopting differing 
quality of services mechanisms. 
 
• Open Access 
 
Against a commercial background of US mergers, regulatory inquiries and 
policy determinations, ‘open access’ has tended to mean ‘cable open access’ 
whereby cable television companies may be required to provide multiple ISPs 
access to their systems.  In contrast, this dissertation develops a broader 
definition. 
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• Open Source Initiative 
 
Exemplified by the GNU/Linux systems5, this initiative in ‘openness’ enables 
public access to computer source code and the ability to review, use, modify 
and distribute it. 
 
• Open Standards and Reference Models 
 
Under this broad umbrella, Shah, Sicker et al examine the operations of various 
standards bodies which variously promote: 
o Openness between well-specified layers of networks and 
systems; 
o Open participation, non-proprietary standards and widely 
available documentation; 
o Open systems enabling applications to run on a variety of 
platforms from multiple vendors. 
 
• Proprietary Standards 
 
Being owned by a company or individual, such standards are generally 
regarded as being the opposite of ‘open’. 
 
From the above, Shah, Sicker et al conclude that non-discriminatory access is an 
integral aspect defining openness in the context of UNEs, cable open access and 
interconnection but that this concept only makes sense in terms of a scarce resource. 
(Shah, Sicker et al. 2003: Section 2.2)  They propose the following generic tests for 
openness of a resource or process: 
 
1. Is there discrimination in accessing the resource or process? 
2. Is there an alternative to the resource or process? 
3. Is participation in determining the future design or operation of 
telecommunications being impaired? 
 
With US literature and US case history dominating the subject, it is unavoidable that 
the ‘cable open access’ interpretation gains a greater airing.  However through this 
vehicle we can appreciate the extent of what has been implied by the descriptor 
‘open access’.  In US parlance, it has been about multiple ISPs being accessible on 
the networks of cable television companies.  The following is a compilation of policy 
goals that have been proposed by various stakeholders: (Berman, Davidson et al. 
2000: Section IV) (DTIS 2000: 63) (Powell 2004) 
 
Access to content 
 
The ability to access and receive any lawful content via the Internet, or speak and 
post any lawful content to the Internet, free from any limitation imposed by the 
broadband facility owner.  This also implies that consumers should be able to access 
                                            
5 For further details, refer to http://www.gnu.org/gnu/linux-and-gnu.html, accessed 13 May 
2007 
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any Internet content they choose by clicking an icon on their computer desktop 
without having to see content of an affiliated ISP. 
 
Freedom to run any application 
 
Any software application or content delivery technology (such as streaming audio or 
video applications) should be able to be run unless it exceeds service plan limitations 
or harms the facility owner’s network. 
 
Attachment of personal devices 
 
Consumers should be able to attach any device they choose to the connection in 
their homes, including items such as telephones or Web servers. 
 
Carriage of unaffiliated ISPs 
 
The facility owner permits unaffiliated ISPs to offer Internet service over the owner’s 
broadband network, without discrimination by way of technical or support 
functionality.  This includes the ability for an Internet user to obtain service from an 
unaffiliated ISP without also having to purchase Internet service from an ISP that is 
affiliated. 
 
Departing from these more traditional economic and technical appreciations of the 
conditions surrounding ‘open access’, Allen (2001b:10 - 11) posited that there should 
also be a quite different notion of openness, namely, the need for an open approach 
to communities of users in framing policy that results in investment in next-generation 
networks.  The alternative would be to let the market decide. 
 
Perhaps the most telling justification for open access (originally stated in terms of the 
dramatic development of the Internet, initially with narrowband access) is that of Bar, 
Cohen et al (2000: 496) who argue that “open access to the network led to rich 
experimentation by many actors whose ideas had previously been excluded from 
shaping network evolution”. 
 
2.1.3 Control of Access 
Giant media conglomerates and their content providers become the 
‘gatekeepers’ who determine the conditions and terms upon which 
hundreds of millions of human beings secure access to one another 
in the coming era. (Rifkin 2001: 11) 
 
With free-to-air broadcast radio and television, a small number of programme 
channels are transmitted over the airwaves simultaneously.  The viewer simply tunes 
in to the desired channel via a receiver designed to publicly available or ‘open’ 
standards.  According to Galperin and Bar (2001), Owen (1999: Ch 4) and Cowie and 
Marsden (1998: 1), the limited number of channels arising from the shortage of 
effective spectrum create barriers to entry by other providers and hence governments 
worldwide justify regulation, through technical standards and unrestricted access, in 
the public interest. 
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They further explain how the development of multi-channel service provision, initially 
via analogue and now digital technology, essentially removes this spectrum barrier to 
entry but then necessitates introducing a new business model to recover costs of 
programme material and distribution.  Almost exclusively developed by private 
entrepreneurs and in a domain generally unfettered by telecommunications 
regulation, the dominant model involves the collection of subscription fees.  Delivered 
either via satellite or cable, such subscription or pay television systems have become 
closed networks with tight integration between the layers of transmission 
infrastructure, service provision, and terminal equipment. (Galperin and Bar 2001: 7)  
The key to this business model has been control of access by means of technological 
solutions and in general proprietary or ‘closed’ standards. 
 
Describing America Online’s Internet business and interactive television’s ‘t-
commerce’ respectively, both Aufderheide (2002: 518) and Galperin and Bar (2001: 
9) observe how such control strategies have been exploited to capture the attention 
and expenditure of customers within ‘walled garden’ environments.  The points of 
control include a mix of hardware, middleware interfaces and software.  These 
elements directly interact with the delivered signals and services, and are realised in 
the form of a ‘gateway’ device or set top box (STB) interposed between the provider’s 
system and each customer or end user terminal, typically a television receiver or 
computer.  Noting the subsequent convergence between computing, digital and 
broadcasting technologies, Galperin (2002: 6-7) finds that “the user terminal has 
evolved from a simple demodulator/de-scrambler of video signals into a complex 
terminal that allows storage, browsing, and processing of a number of TV-based 
services.  In essence, a digital set-top box is similar to a stripped-down PC”. 
 
A modern subscription television or information delivery business involving a 
centralised ‘Head End’ capability and distributed end user set top boxes relies upon 
three functionally distinct components, each of which may constitute a technical 
bottleneck facility: 
 
Conditional Access System or CAS 
 
Comprising a subscriber management system and access control facility at the Head 
End, and signal decoder/unscrambler and smart card in each STB, the conditional 
access system is effectively a proprietary gateway that enables and disables signals 
(programmes or information) to be delivered to or from a subscriber. (Kelso 1996) 
 
Applications Programme Interface or API 
 
This software, usually proprietary and often categorized as middleware, runs on the 
STB between the operating system and the different applications. (Galperin 2002) 
 
Electronic Navigation Software 
 
Evident to the subscriber as an electronic programme guide or EPG, this software 
enables subscribers to access information about available services and perform 
scheduling functions.  According to Cowie and Marsden (1999: 61) “as the audience 
becomes increasingly fragmented across multiple channels, the navigation software 
will become the crucial tool for influencing viewing patterns”. 
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In the view of Helberger (2002: 1): 
 
The exclusive control over bottleneck facilities, or the standard embodied, 
gives a wide choice of possibilities to impede potential and actual competitors, 
particularly where exercised by powerful, vertically or horizontally integrated 
operators. 
 
Nevertheless, open access needs to be distinguished from open standards, since 
achieving the former only grants network capacity to the requesting provider whereas 
the technical platform involving the conditional access system and the set top box 
constitute the real gatekeeper. (Rosenthal 2003: 8)  Cowie and Marsden (1998: 9-10) 
contend that standardisation of such technical interfaces may provide a route around 
the bottlenecks. 
 
Rather than governments regulating for formally open standards, the USA (Galperin 
and Bar 2001) and Europe (Rosenthal 2003) resolved that industry players should 
endeavour to reach a consensus.  One such example was the European Digital 
Video Broadcasting (DVB) group tasked to produce specifications for all aspects of 
digital television.  Unable to reach a consensus in the case of conditional access, the 
European Commission had to intervene to salvage credibility for the process. (Cowie 
and Marsden 1998: 11)  These authors claim that “the basic problem with achieving a 
common standard on conditional access is that there were too many powerful vested 
interests that were able to block what was not in their own interests”.  A similar 
observation is made by Faulhaber (2002: 22) who notes that competitors may be 
prone to exploit the standards-setting process for their strategic benefit. 
 
2.1.4 US Approaches to Open Access 
 
The debate in the USA over the rights, wrongs and mechanics of ‘open’ access to 
broadband, primarily during the period 1999-2002, has led to polarised positions 
adopted by immediate stakeholders (regulators, cable television companies, 
telephone companies, Internet service providers or ISPs) and lobby groups (some 
being related to the former). 
 
Emotive language has been used, ranging from claims of ‘forced access’ and 
‘infrastructure socialism’ (Thierer and Crews 2003) to predictions of the end of the 
‘end-to-end’ architecture of the Internet. (Lemley and Lessig 2001) 
 
Cable television systems in the USA have been largely unregulated and gained some 
70 per cent of the market share in residential broadband services.6  (Bittlingmayer 
and Hazlett 2002: 295 - 296) (Thierer and Crews 2003: 66 - 67)  Speta (2000a: 975) 
attributes this success to cable not being subject to the unbundling rules of common 
carrier telecommunication companies or ‘telcos’ whose wires are required to 
transport DSL services of other service providers. 
 
                                            
6 The remaining share comprising mainly DSL/ADSL, but also including some wireless and 
satellite means of delivery. 
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Cable operators usually provide Internet access through wholly or partially owned 
affiliated or ISPs. (Rosenthal 2001: 3)  The demands of unaffiliated ISPs to access 
this same broadband infrastructure in a non-discriminatory manner created the push 
for ‘open access’.  A number of municipal franchise decisions and industry mergers 
were instrumental in triggering the debate, which fuelled legal challenges and 
regulatory action in the United States, as well as Europe.  The prime mergers were 
that of AT&T with MediaOne/TCI and then AOL with Time Warner.  (Aufderheide 
2002) (Lee 2000) (Rosenthal 2001) (Speta 2000a) 
 
Consummated and approved during 2000/01, the AOL-Time Warner merger remains 
the most significant focus for open access considerations in the USA.  The case has 
been extensively analysed by various writers with emphasis on factors such as: 
possible incentives for conduit or content discrimination (Rubinfeld and Singer 2001); 
definitional classification by the FCC under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
(Rosenthal 2001); competition effects relating to instant messaging (Faulhaber 2004) 
and interactive television (Galperin and Bar 2001); and the impact of a commons 
strategy as a future regulatory approach (Aufderheide 2002). 
 
In approving the merger, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) decreed that AOL 
Time Warner: (FTC 2000) 
 
• Must make its cable system available to competing (non-affiliated) broadband 
Internet service providers; 
• Be prohibited from interfering with content passed along the bandwidth 
contracted for by unaffiliated ISPs and from interfering with the ability of 
unaffiliated entities to interact with interactive signals, triggers or content; 
• Be required to market and promote its DSL services to subscribers in the Time 
Warner cable areas where AOL cable broadband ISP service or Road Runner 
is available at the same or comparable level and in the same or comparable 
manner as it markets and promotes DSL services to subscribers in areas in 
which neither AOL cable broadband ISP service nor Road Runner is available. 
 
The FCC then added more stringent conditions requiring AOL Time Warner: (FCC 
2001) 
 
• To allow unaffiliated ISPs to have an unimpeded 'first-screen' relationship with 
their subscribers, to have a direct billing relationship with subscribers, to benefit 
equally in technical features such as quality of service mechanisms and 
caching, and to be afforded fair carriage contracts; 
• To open their 'advanced' instant messaging network to one competitor 
immediately and to two others within 180 days thereafter; 
• To avoid any agreement with AT&T that would make AOL Time Warner the 
exclusive ISP on AT&T's high-speed cable-modem platform. 
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The above or similar requirements applied to no other American cable television 
companies7 who, not surprisingly, were united in their opposition to such changes 
being more widely applied – particularly as it would imply wholesale rate regulation 
and devolution into common carrier status.  (Bittlingmayer and Hazlett 2002: 297)  
According to a study by Lee (2000), an open access requirement leads to cable 
modem services being regulated as an essential facility which he contends would 
distort the anti-trust laws and violate the free speech rights of cable operators 
protected by the First Amendment of the US constitution. 
 
Bittlingmayer and Hazlett (2002) examine the political realities of regulating the 
telecommunications industry, the economics of broadband markets and the historic 
application of cable television regulation.  They conclude that open access 
requirements will not increase capacity and innovation, since cable operators take 
defensive measures to counter possible regulation by restricting the bandwidth 
available for broadband and reducing investment in Internet-specific developments.  
Hazlett and Bittlingmayer (2001: 21) cover similar ground and even reveal that “cable 
systems deter appropriation through defensive engineering”, with operators imposing 
‘slow access’ architecture to thwart regulation of increased access.  Furthermore, 
these authors cite evidence of company stock prices increasing with legal and 
regulatory setbacks for open access, and declining with victories.  Such defensive 
attitudes are also noted by O’Donnell (2000: 25) who said “the natural inclination of 
facilities owners could be to build networks so hostile to open access that it would be 
prohibitively expensive ever to open them”. 
 
In “Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile?: A Critique of Open Access Rules for 
Broadband Platforms”, Speta (2000b) argued that “the nature of consumer demand 
for a broadband access platform, which will be strongly responsive to the variety of 
content services made available over the platform, makes open access rules 
unnecessary and potentially counterproductive”.  Demand for broadband access was 
characterized by indirect network externalities, where value was derived from the 
combination of broadband access and the complementary information services made 
available.  He claimed that it was against the platform owner’s interest to attempt to 
monopolize content – even if the platform owner was a monopolist in the 
transmission service. (Speta 2000b: 76)  In concluding his reasons against open 
access, Speta contended that technical standards are not yet established, it may 
decrease incentives to deploy the platforms in the first instance and any broadband 
monopoly held by cable operators would likely be temporary. (Speta 2000b: 87) 
 
The same author continues his analysis of open access in “The Vertical Dimension of 
Cable Open Access” against a backdrop of the then proposed merger between AT&T 
and TCI.  Speta (2000a: 981) notes the concerns that consumers would be obliged to 
purchase Internet service from an ISP affiliated with the carrier, limits on certain 
services would be imposed and that those wanting access to another ISP would be 
forced to pay twice.  With cable television operators being substantially vertically 
integrated across carriage and content, there is a real threat of Internet access over 
                                            
7 In fact, Bar, Cohen et al. describe the measures adopted in the AOL-Time Warner case as 
a ‘policy experiment’ Bar, F., S. Cohen, et al. (2001). The Open Access Principle: Cable 
Access as a Case Study for the Next Generation Internet. The Economics of Quality of 
Service in Networked Markets. L. W. M. J. Wroclawski, MIT Press: 25. 
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cable television wires becoming a substitute for the traditional video programming on 
cable television. 
 
After analysing all of the arguments in favour of open access, Speta again concludes 
that cable operators have no economic incentive to foreclose unaffiliated ISPs and 
suggests that the fight over open access is over something different: (Speta 2000a: 
1007) 
 
• An attempt by ISPs to ensure lower cost access by using the regulatory process 
to garner prices below those that the cable company would otherwise charge; 
• An objection to cable companies having control over both video programming 
and Internet-based information; and perhaps more importantly 
• The fear that cable television companies will prevent ISPs from developing 
direct customer relationships. 
 
Claiming that ‘forced access’ is not competition but leads to ‘mutant markets’, Thierer 
and Crews also document the above points but further argue that such access is 
unnecessary in an environment of proliferating choices, such as satellite, terrestrial 
wireless (Wi-Fi, spread spectrum technologies) and fibre-to-the-home.  Few would-be 
entrepreneurs “will install fiber or deploy sophisticated wireless solutions for 
broadband Internet tomorrow if forced access is a precedent on today’s lesser 
delivery options”. (Thierer and Crews 2003:79 - 89)  They claim that markets have 
natural tendencies towards open access, though on a voluntarily negotiated basis. 
 
In contrast, Katkin (2001: 28) reveals that the issues raised in disputing open access 
to cable television were substantially analogous to those raised in the longstanding 
dispute over ‘direct access’ to the INTELSAT satellite system.  In that instance, the 
FCC implemented ‘direct access’ to INTELSAT even after it was reclassified as being 
a non-dominant carrier and lacking either market power or bottleneck facilities. 
 
Proponents of broadband open access on US cable systems particularly focus on the 
different regulatory regimes traditionally imposed on telephone and cable television.  
“There is no justification in law or policy for giving cable companies special 
treatment”, claim Lemley and Lessig (2001: 2).  Their central argument is 
encapsulated as follows: if cable companies are allowed to dictate a consumer's 
choice of an ISP, and therefore eliminate competition among ISPs in the broadband 
market, prices will increase and innovation will be harmed.  In particular, allowing 
bundling will compromise an important architectural principle that has governed the 
Internet since its inception - the principle of ‘end-to-end’ design. 
 
First adopted for technical reasons as a part of systems design (Saltzer, Reed et al. 
1981), the ‘end-to-end’ design philosophy places ‘intelligence’ in a network at its 
ends, where users put information and applications onto the network, with the 
intervening communications protocols (the ‘pipes’ through which information flows) 
being as simple and as general as possible. (Lemley and Lessig 2001: 4)  The 
authors maintain that with such design “the Internet has enabled an extraordinary 
creativity precisely because it has pushed creativity to the ends of the network”.  
Legacy monopolies with bottleneck control over broadband pipes will improperly 
affect the architecture of the Internet for their own benefit. (Lemley and Lessig 2001: 
3 & 13) 
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This is rebutted by Hazlett and Bittlingmayer who contend that “as a goal, ‘end-to-
end’ provides guidance but no answers”.  Rules that retard infrastructure investment 
or service penetration would restrict functionality and harm consumers, they say. 
(Hazlett and Bittlingmayer 2001: 56 - 61) 
 
In a well argued analysis, MacKie-Mason refutes cable company claims that open 
access will deter investment, saying “carrying out this threat would be irrational and 
contrary to their shareholders’ interests”.  He argues that customers will find the 
increased variety and quality of ISP services more appealing, thereby increasing 
cable operator revenues and reducing the investment risk. (MacKie-Mason 1999)  
Bar, Cohen, et al. (2001: 16 - 20) also dispute the claims by opponents of open 
access that such requirements would prevent broadband cable deployment.  They 
disagree that market forces will naturally bring cable operators to open their networks 
in order to maximise the amount and diversity of content available to their 
subscribers. 
 
But what other forms of discrimination could ‘closed’ cable networks give rise to?  
Examples of ‘gate keeping’ by cable companies are reported as including: (Saltzer 
1999) 
 
• Video limits.  Some access providers limit the number of minutes that a 
customer may use a ‘streaming video’ connection. 
• Server restrictions.  While advertising the benefits of being ‘always on’ the 
Internet, some providers impose an ‘acceptable use’ contract that forbids 
customers from operating an Internet service, such as a Web site. 
• Fixed backbone choice.  The traffic route may cause distance-related delays or 
response-slowing congestion which can significantly interfere with some kinds 
of service, such as video conferencing or interactive file editing. 
• Data packet filtering.  
• No home networks. 
 
In a similar vein, Wu presents findings of a survey showing significant contractual 
and architectural limits imposed by broadband operators on certain classes of 
Internet service applications.  (Wu 2003)  However, he then questions the degree of 
fit between structural remedies like open access and the important goal of a neutral 
network; he proposes that a different type of remedy – a ‘broadband discrimination’ 
norm – may better and more directly promote a neutral network and open 
competition among applications.  “Network neutrality, as a shorthand for a system of 
belief about innovation policy, is the end, while open access and broadband 
discrimination are the means.” (Wu 2003: 3 & 4)  He concludes that the operator is 
ultimately the gatekeeper of quality of service for a given user, because only the 
broadband operator is in a position to offer service guarantees that extend to the 
end-user’s computer (or network).  A neutral network is desirable, but deviations from 
neutrality can be justified, Wu explains. (2003: 25) 
 
In a paper investigating how open access can be achieved in practice, the cost to 
cable network operators and associated operational or management issues, Tseng 
and Gillett note three practical forms of open access: at the physical layer, 
network/data link layer or at the application layer. (Tseng and Gillett 2000) They find 
D.R.Kelso PhD Thesis, QUT, February 2008: Open Access to Next Generation Broadband {single line spaced version} 
 18
open access to be financially trivial to implement (incurring a once-off cost of US$5 – 
$25 per customer) although the real costs may relate to the ongoing operations.  
Open access is technically feasible according to O’Donnell (2000: 3) and if networks 
are built with open access and interconnection in mind, then it is naturally easier to 
implement. 
 
2.1.5 EU Approaches to Open Access 
 
Whereas US attention focusses on the issue of unaffiliated ISPs seeking access to 
cable television networks, the European scene differs with broadband Internet 
service being more commonly delivered via DSL technologies facilitated under the 
well-established regulatory aegis of telephony local loop unbundling.  (Rosenthal 
2003: 5)  Moreover, the prime focus of opening up access has been on dealing with 
dominant providers of subscription television, delivered both terrestrially and via 
satellite. 
 
According to Helberger (2002: 3-7), challenges facing the European Union in 
regulating access in the communications sector concern bottleneck control, vertical 
integration, market foreclosure and dominance.  The difficulty of this task is 
heightened by: 
 
• the need to harmonize the parallel efforts of the various member country 
national regulatory authorities or NRAs; and 
• conflict between the impact of broadcasting and communications regulation 
arising from technical and market convergence. 
 
Observing that convergence has now finally become a reality, with television, 
telephony and Internet access being delivered via DSL, cable television and satellite, 
Rosenthal (2003: 1) claims: 
 
In this converged communications environment in which the same 
communications services can be delivered over a variety of platforms, the 
issue of open access to these platforms, in particular with regard to broadband 
services, is of critical importance. 
 
Digital technology has greatly increased the number of channels and facilitated early 
forms of interactivity, coupled with conditional access systems that allow reception 
only by authorised viewers or listeners.  Cowie and Marsden (1999) describe how 
this introduces the potential for a new series of bottlenecks and consequently higher 
barriers to entry by competitive service providers.  Vertically integrated operators who 
control the content, bundling into channels, channel packaging, the means of 
delivery, conditional access, consumer reception equipment and subscriber 
management greatly increase the potential for market abuse of such bottlenecks. 
(Cowie and Marsden 1998)  According to these authors, there are a number of 
general ways through which competition might be undermined: 
 
• Services that are viewed as potentially competitive with the (vertically 
integrated) service provider’s own offerings may be flatly denied access; 
D.R.Kelso PhD Thesis, QUT, February 2008: Open Access to Next Generation Broadband {single line spaced version} 
 19
• Service providers may exert undue influence to ‘encourage’ independent third 
parties to join the proprietary service package; 
• Access to the facility may only be granted on non-discriminatory terms; 
• Where access is granted on non-discriminatory terms, all users may be charged 
a monopoly access fee; 
• Proprietary services may only be sold when bundled with non-proprietary 
services, thereby leveraging market power to related markets (foreclosure); and 
• Access terms may contain ‘unreasonable’ restrictions, such as platform 
exclusivity clauses, which reduce scope for competition. 
 
The European policy approach to regulating access exercises both general 
competition law and sector-specific regulation.  Regarding the former, Rosenthal 
(2003: 13-20) and Helberger et al (2001: 4-7) report on the few case histories where 
the European Commission has initiated action under Article 82 of the EC Treaty 
(abuse of a dominant position within the common market) as well as under the 
European merger control regime.  These cases relate to non-discriminatory access to 
digital television in broader terms and have not produced situations where access to 
conditional access systems has been unfairly denied.  It is noteworthy however that 
disputes over competitive access to systems delivering interactive services such as 
access to the Internet do fall within the ambit of European competition law. 
 
The latest EU directives concerning a common regulatory framework for access to 
and interconnection of electronic communications networks and services foreshadow 
the intent of progressively reducing ex ante sector specific rules as competition in the 
market develops.8 (EC 2002a) (EC 2002b) 
 
Adopted end-April 2002, the new Framework Directive regulates transmission but not 
the content of services so delivered. (EC 2002b)  A critical assessment by Rosenthal 
concludes that this dichotomy raises classification problems concerning treatment of 
Internet access.  For example, would a claim by an ISP for open access to a network 
depend on whether it is providing access to the Internet at large versus specific ISP-
based content?  (Rosenthal 2003: 4-6)  He also concludes that television service 
providers have no right to claim open access with regard to television programming 
under this Directive. 
 
Within the Framework, the Access Directive presents a new sector-specific approach 
to regulating technical bottleneck facilities in general and of conditional access 
facilities in particular.  It incorporates two sets of rules that deal with bottleneck 
issues at the infrastructure level: (EC 2002a) 
 
• Broadcasters' access to an established conditional access system (Article 6); 
• More general access to technical facilities in the communications sector 
(Articles 9-13). 
 
                                            
8 It has been argued in another jurisdiction that ex post action may not be an effective or 
efficient way of achieving industry competition goals and resolution of access issues; refer to 
Annual Report 2002, Federal Communications Commission, Switzerland 
http://www.comcom.admin.ch/org/00452/00562/index.html?lang=en, accessed 13 May 2007 
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Article 6 refers exclusively to conditional access services for digital television and 
radio broadcasting services, but not to bottlenecks arising beyond the conditional 
access device itself, such as via APIs, EPGs or within the set top box memory or 
operating system, nor even to associated Internet signals. (Helberger 2002)  The 
access obligation is absolute: (EC 2002a: Annex 1) 
 
All operators of conditional access services … are to offer to all broadcasters, on 
a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory basis compatible with Community 
competition law… technical services enabling broadcasters' digitally transmitted 
services to be received by viewers or listeners authorised by means of decoders 
administered by the service operators … 
 
Further, it is not conditional on market power or level of vertical integration but is 
triggered merely by an operator having control over a conditional access facility.  
Interoperability between conditional access systems is strongly encouraged, but not 
enforced, by the Framework and Access Directives which leave the setting of 
standards for interoperability to industry. (Helberger 2002: 10-11) 
 
In contrast, Articles 8-13 reflect a more general approach of establishing throughout 
Europe a common, harmonised framework for access questions at the infrastructure 
level.  Rather than automatically labelling certain facilities as bottleneck facilities, 
which is done under Article 6, Articles 8-13 establish a system of ex ante market 
control in which National Regulatory Authorities are entitled to determine under what 
circumstances which facilities are considered potential bottlenecks to market entry 
and competition.  Having significant market power is a precondition for such 
intervention. (EC 2002a) (Helberger 2002)  
 
2.1.6 Australian Approaches to Open Access 
 
Subscription or ‘pay’ television in Australia commenced in 1995, initially delivered via 
satellite and then also via cable, with the dominant cable provider being Telstra and 
the dominant service provider eventually being Foxtel.  Satellite signal transmission 
is entirely digital but cable (hybrid fibre coaxial or HFC) commenced with a mix of 
analogue (television channels) and digital (telephony and cable modem services). 
(ACCC 2003a: s7.2.5) (Whittle 1996: 61) 
 
As with all HFC networks around the world, the opportunities for competitive service 
providers to gain access to channel capacity are limited as long as signal 
transmission remains analogue. (ACCC 2003a: s2.2.3) 
 
Regulatory Framework 
 
With the introduction of open competition into the Australian telecommunications 
market from 1997 onwards, the Australian Competition & Consumer Commission or 
ACCC gained the power to mandate access to a carriage service by ‘declaring’ that 
service under Part XIC of the Trade Practices Act. (Grant 2004: Ch.4) The object of 
Part XIC includes: the long-term interests of end-users; promotion of competition; 
and "the objective of achieving any-to-any connectivity in relation to carriage services 
that involve communication between end-users". 
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On 1 September 1999, the ACCC declared the analogue pay television service to be 
subject to a range of standard access obligations (SAO), pursuant to sections 
152AL(3) and 152AR of the Trade Practices Act (1974).  In brief, the SAOs require 
an access provider to:  
 
• Supply the declared service; 
• Ensure that the declared service supplied is of equivalent technical and 
operational quality as that which the provider supplies to itself; 
• Ensure that the fault detection, handling and rectification in relation to the 
declared service is of equivalent technical and operational quality as that which 
it provides to itself; 
• Permit interconnection of its facilities with those of the access seeker; and 
• Provide particular billing information to the access seeker. 
 
The scope of the declared service was all-embracing but did not extend to digital 
signal transmission:9 
 
A service for the carriage, by means of lines, of analogue signals used for the 
purposes of transmitting a subscription television service from a facility owned, 
controlled or operated by a carrier or carriage service provider to any point on, 
or in, a line link, customer cabling, or customer equipment connected to that 
facility. 
 
Examples of this service are the delivery of analogue signals used for the 
purposes of transmitting a subscription television service to: 
(i) an end-user’s television set; 
(ii) conditional-access customer equipment of an end-user, or potential end 
user, of a subscription television service; 
(iii) a wall socket at the premises of an end-user, or potential end-user, of a 
subscription television service; 
(iv) a point on a line link from which a lead-in connection may be run to the 
premises of an end-user, or potential end-user, of a subscription television 
service. 
 
Section 152AR(8) has particular relevance to analogue pay television services in that 
it provides a legislated avenue for an access seeker to gain access to the conditional 
access equipment of another provider: 
 
Conditional-access customer equipment 
 
(8) If an access provider supplies an active declared service by means of 
conditional-access customer equipment, the access provider must, if 
requested to do so by a service provider who has made a request referred to 
in subsection (3), supply to the service provider any service that is necessary 
to enable the service provider to supply carriage services and/or content 
services by means of the active declared service and using the equipment. 
                                            
9 For further details, refer to 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/772066/fromItemId/269270, accessed 13 
May 2007 
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In the event that the access seeking and access providing parties are unable to 
agree on the terms and conditions relating to implementing the above obligations, 
either the ACCC can arbitrate and make a determination or the access provider can 
file an access undertaking which, if accepted by the Commission, becomes a legally 
binding obligation. (ACCC 2004a) 
 
Access Outcomes 
 
Two forms of ‘open’ access are possible regarding HFC networks, namely, access by 
competitive ISPs to cable modem capacity (as has been discussed in the US 
context) and access by competitive service or programme providers to television 
channels and associated services (as has been discussed in the EU context). 
 
For the former to occur in Australia, barring voluntary action by cable providers 
Telstra and Optus, the ACCC would need to declare that facet of a cable television 
network.  According to a 2001 interview with an ACCC senior official, “nobody has 
approached us in any concerted way to ask us to look at declaration” and so to date 
cable modem access remains closed. (Chirgwin 2001: 60) 
 
However, television programme access is in the throes of opening up.  During the 
period 2000 – 2003, a complex series of legal challenges ensued involving the 
ACCC, access providers Foxtel and Telstra, and a number of access seekers.  
Rather than leaving the ACCC to finalise its own access determination, both Foxtel 
and Telstra filed a number of access undertakings in 2003 relating to their analogue 
subscription television services involving access to HFC cable infrastructure and set 
top boxes.  These undertakings would enable competitors to provide their own 
programming content to end-users. (Grant 2004: Ch.4)  Foxtel and Telstra also 
sought and gained ACCC approval for a pay television content sharing agreement 
with Optus, and applied for individual anticipatory exemptions in respect of access to 
digital pay television infrastructure.  A commitment to ‘digitise’ their pay television 
network was conditional upon the passing of the Telecommunications Competition 
Bill which was assented to in December 2002. (Jones 2003) 
 
In March 2004 the ACCC accepted the undertakings as revised by Foxtel and 
Telstra.  Importantly, Foxtel undertook that it would construct the infrastructure for its 
digital service to be an 'open access' system, namely, one designed to accommodate 
multiple access seekers and without substantial delay or expense.10 
 
Report on emerging market structures 
 
In the midst of the above activities, the Minister for Communications, Information 
Technology and the Arts asked the ACCC to advise on “the extent to which emerging 
market structures are likely to affect competition across the communications sector, 
including through the provision of bundled pay TV, telephony and broadband 
services”. (ACCC 2003a) By this time, Foxtel and Telstra had already provided 
                                            
10 For further details, refer to 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/786596/fromItemId/269329, accessed 13 
May 2007 
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undertakings relating to third party access to their pay television network in response 
to the Commission’s competition concerns about the impact of the content supply 
agreements with Optus.  Hence it would have been inappropriate for the ACCC to 
revisit such matters in detail on this occasion. 
 
Of relevance to increased opportunities for future competitive broadband access in 
Australia are the Commission’s following recommendations: (ACCC 2003a) 
 
• Significant benefits would result from divestiture of Telstra’s HFC network, and 
its 50 per cent ownership of Foxtel; 
 
This position is argued from the basis of Telstra’s dominance in 
telecommunications and pay television serving to reinforce each other to the 
detriment of competition. 
 
• Legislation is required to increase access to pay television content for 
broadband networks. 
 
Such legislation should enable alternative network providers to re-transmit 
Foxtel and Austar’s basic and tiered programme packages, in addition to 
access being gained to individual premium sports and movie channels. 
 
2.1.7 Consumers, Users and Producers 
It is important to set our eyes on the right prize.  That prize is not the 
Great Shopping Mall in Cyberspace.  That prize is the Great Agora – 
the unmediated conversation of the many with the many. (Benkler 
2000: 565) 
 
As broadcasting, telecommunications and IT-based services converge, so do their 
respective terminologies.  The dominant paradigms of broadcasting (radio, television) 
and the print media embody customers who are passive listeners, viewers or readers 
– all of whom are regarded as ‘consumers’ of pre-packaged information.  With 
telecommunications we have service providers and users, with the latter being 
subscribers to the services. (Fischer 1992) We speak of users of computers as well 
as users of the Internet.  However, in discussing how the Web has allowed every 
user to publish their viewpoints rather than simply consume media, Minar and 
Hedlund (2001) observe a possible trend: “the commercial explosion on the Internet 
quickly fit the majority of traffic into the downstream paradigm already used by 
television and newspapers”. 
 
As the digitally networked environment matures, Benkler (2000: 562) maintains that 
regulatory choices will impact on whether the future network will be one of peer users 
or “one of active producers who serve a menu of pre-packaged information goods to 
consumers whose role is limited to selecting from this menu”. Alluding to the origins 
of the Internet, he says that users can play the roles of producers and consumers. 
 
Analyzing the ‘walled garden’ strategies of AOL prior to their merger with Time 
Warner, Aufderheide sees the model as being old-fashioned in defining “the 
customer as a consumer of the provider’s proprietary services rather than as a user 
who may both consume and create services”. (Aufderheide 2002: 518)  The 
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dichotomy of user as consumer versus user as producer is contrasted by Middleton 
in her evaluation of a Canadian residential broadband network.  For the dominant 
(broadcast-style) paradigm to be successful, service providers must develop content-
based ‘killer applications’ to drive demand for broadband access by consumers. 
(Middleton 2002: 78-79)  On the other hand, analogies with the development of the 
telephone, teletext and videotex (not to mention e-mail) suggest a ‘user in control’ 
model whereby they create their own content. 
 
But how do the above understandings translate to frameworks for achieving open 
access to future broadband networks?  As we have seen from the previous 
Australian, European and US assessments, regulation of open access has only been 
the matter of competing service providers gaining access to the infrastructure and 
services of an incumbent operator.  In defining ‘access’ as referring to operators 
seeking interconnection and/or access to networks or associated facilities, the 
European Access Directive explicitly states that the term “does not refer to access by 
end-users” (EC 2002a: Article 1) 
 
Benkler’s insight into counteracting the ‘walled garden’ outcome does offer some 
hope.  He claims that where the eyeballs of consumers are kept within the bounds of 
proprietary services, then many of them will remain as consumers.  (Benkler 2000: 
579)  However, access for competing ISPs (who, presumably, merely deliver access 
to the Internet at large) will create an environment that will “facilitate the transition of 
users of broadband Internet access over cable from consumers to users”. 
 
2.1.8 Network Technology 
 
The cited Australian, European and US examples considering broadband open 
access relate exclusively to network technologies involving hybrid fibre coaxial (HFC) 
and digital television technologies, the latter being either satellite delivered or 
terrestrially broadcast.  Peripherally cited are instances of DSL technologies which 
are now almost universally legislated for open access. 
 
Confounding claims that multiple ISP access is not possible or technically too difficult 
involving HFC networks, Bahlmann (2000 - 2001) discusses how this can be readily 
achieved in terms of connectivity management, service management and cable 
management, among other key issues.  However he reveals that while this may 
achieve ‘open’ access in terms of multiple ISP’s gaining access to common 
broadband infrastructure, customers are still constrained only to accept the whole 
service package from any one ISP.  “The next generation (or reincarnation) of open 
access must be à la carte – meaning the broadband customer will have the freedom 
to mix and match ISP and third party service provider services to form their 
broadband service”, foreshadows Bahlmann. (2000 - 2001: Part 5 - Transparency) 
 
The pro-market CATO Institute in the US has been the most strident critic of open 
access, calling it ‘forced access’ among other deprecatory labels.  Declaring that 
open access is unnecessary in an environment of proliferating choices, Thierer and 
Crews (2003: 79-89) claim that “numerous facilities-based alternatives are being 
planned or are already in place in today’s market and prove that duplicating facilities 
is not as unthinkable as the natural monopoly theorists would have us believe”.  
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Underpinning these emerging markets, they survey the following network or delivery 
technologies in terms of whether forced-access mandates should be applicable: 
 
• Fibre Optics 
• Cable ‘Overbuilders’ 
• Undersea Fibre 
• Satellite 
• Fixed Terrestrial Wireless and ‘Wi-Fi’ Networks 
• Ultra-Wideband (UWB) and Free Space Optics (FSO) 
 
According to Thierer and Crews (2003: 89), “few (entrepreneurs) will install fiber or 
deploy sophisticated wireless solutions for broadband Internet tomorrow if forced 
access is a precedent on today’s lesser delivery options”. 
 
A closing view here comes from David Reed who has undertaken one of the most 
comprehensive engineering and economic analyses of the extended application of 
fibre optic networks, particularly in residential environments. (Reed 1992a)  In 
examining the future prospects for unbundling both logical and physical elements of 
optical fibre networks, admittedly primarily in the context of telecommunication carrier 
deployment, he drew a link between open access requirements and the design and 
evolution of future networks: “Policies concerning open network access can directly 
affect the design of the network, as well as the long term strategies of network 
evolution …”. (Reed 1992b) 
 
2.2 Formulating the Research Problem 
 
In this section, a series of issues are noted that arise from the literature review.  They 
inform the research question and suggest a candidate framework against which the 
case studies can be assessed. 
 
2.2.1 Issues from Literature Review 
 
The literature review surveys research, analyses and developments in the matter of 
open access to present-day broadband networks and services.  It raises a series of 
issues which offer scope for shaping the direction of this research. 
 
Most of the citations adopt an economic, legal or policy basis and only a few illustrate 
an understanding of what may be technically involved in dealing with actual or 
potential bottlenecks to access.  As a result, an incomplete picture may be gained 
and alternative outcomes may not become evident. 
 
Issue: There is scope for a study that adopts a more multi-disciplinary approach, by 
melding a technical appreciation with the traditional economic, legal/policy and 
commercial perspectives. 
 
The US scene has developed exclusively about competitive access by ISPs to 
(digital) cable modem capacity on cable television systems and in Europe about 
competitive access by service or programme providers to digital television systems, 
both terrestrially and satellite delivered.  The sole Australian example more closely 
D.R.Kelso PhD Thesis, QUT, February 2008: Open Access to Next Generation Broadband {single line spaced version} 
 26
relates to European precedents, though dealing with access to both analogue and 
digital cable television programme capacity.  According to Bahlmann (2000 - 2001), 
“the next generation (or reincarnation) of open access must be à la carte – meaning 
the broadband customer will have the freedom to mix and match ISP and third party 
service provider services to form their broadband service”. 
 
Issue: Consider a broader definition of open access that includes access to all types 
of technology without any restriction on content or service capability. 
 
All of the access examples involve technologies with inherent capacity constraints 
(such as hybrid fibre coax, digital terrestrial, satellite television systems) and hence 
give rise to ‘scarce resource’ arguments.  Shah, Sicker et al (2003) consider that 
non-discriminatory access only makes sense in terms of a scarce resource. 
 
Issue: Understand how the consideration of open access changes when the capacity 
of the transmission or distribution technology involved is relatively unconstrained, 
such as with optical fibre. 
 
Being a case strongly put in the US, but also relevant to the digitisation of Foxtel in 
Australia, it is argued that open access may reduce incentives to deploy broadband 
platforms in the first instance.  In the words of Thierer and Crews (2003), “few 
(entrepreneurs) will install fiber or deploy sophisticated wireless solutions for 
broadband Internet tomorrow if forced access is a precedent on today’s lesser 
delivery options”. 
 
Issue: Examine the relationship between open access regulation and incentives to 
invest in next generation broadband platforms. 
 
Almost all writers approach the issue of access from the viewpoint of one corporation 
seeking to access the assets of another corporation, with the immediate interests of 
the consumer or users being only incidentally noted.  Aufderheide (2002) and 
Benkler (2000) highlight that users should be recognised as producers or creators of 
content in addition to playing the more conventional role of consumers. 
 
Issue: Explore the impact of a more ‘user-centric’ perspective, where customers are 
empowered to become users who generate content; one consequence is that traffic 
flow becomes more symmetrical. 
 
Wu (2003) questions the single-minded focus on open access.  He contends that 
“network neutrality, as shorthand for a system of belief about innovation policy, is the 
end, while open access and broadband discrimination are the means”. 
 
Issue: Explore issues arising from the contention that, rather than open access, the 
objective should be network neutrality, namely, not favouring one application over 
another. 
 
In the view of Rosenthal (2003), open access needs to be distinguished from open 
standards, since achieving the former only grants network capacity to the requesting 
provider whereas the technical platform involving the conditional access system and 
the set top box constitute the real gatekeeper. 
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Issue: Understand the impact of standards on resolving access bottlenecks and 
explore mechanisms for determining standards that are open and timely. 
 
O’Donnell (2000) claims that if networks are built with open access and 
interconnection in mind, then such matters are naturally easier to implement.  In like 
vein, Reed (1992b) contends that open access policies can directly affect the design 
of the network, as well as the long term strategies of network evolution. 
 
Issue: Explore the relationship between open access requirements and the design 
and evolution of future networks. 
 
Hazlett (2001), Bittlingmayer (2002) and O’Donnell (2000) discuss how US cable 
operators are liable to deter open access through ‘defensive engineering’, such as by 
restricting the bandwidth available, imposing ‘slow access’ architecture or reducing 
investment. 
 
Issue: Examine the nature of defensive approaches to thwarting increased access. 
 
2.2.2 Research Question 
 
This research addresses the question: 
 
What are the factors that prevent open access to the broadband services of 
next generation wireline infrastructure?  How can these obstacles be 
overcome? 
 
2.3 Untangling the Terminology 
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means 
just what I choose it to mean – neither more or less.”  “The question is,” said 
Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.”  “The 
question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master – that’s all.” (Carrol 
1960, p.269)11 
 
The research question involves terms such as ‘open access’, ‘broadband’ and ‘next 
generation’ that present a diversity of possible meanings.  Section 2.1 has addressed 
common understandings of ‘access’, ‘openness’ and ‘open access.  The remaining 
terms are more problematical, with differing meanings driven by industry advertising 
and dependent on various social, political, legal and regulatory domains.  The 
following is presented as an aid to a non-technical reader. 
 
                                            
11 In his annotated edition of Lewis Carroll’s two masterpieces, “Alice’s Adventures in 
Wonderland” and “Through the Looking Glass”, Martin Gardner made specific note of a 
related exposition by Carroll on page 165 of his Symbolic Logic Carrol, L. (1958). Symbolic 
Logic and the Game of Logic, Dover. 
 A single-volume reprint of Carroll's two books on logic, both intended for children. in 
which he stated a very ‘Humpty Dumpty’ view on semantics: “I maintain that any writer of a 
book is fully authorised in attaching any meaning he likes to any word or phrase he intends to 
use”. 
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2.3.1 The ‘Broadband’ Dilemma 
 
In telecommunications parlance, ‘broadband’ is a descriptor relating to a type or the 
extent of ‘bandwidth’ and often has an assumed meaning of ‘broad bandwidth’ (in 
contrast to ‘wide bandwidth’ or ‘narrow bandwidth’) or even ‘broad bandwidth 
service’. 
 
Technically, ‘bandwidth’ refers to the difference between two specified frequencies 
(that is, a ‘high’ frequency minus a ‘low’ frequency) on a given transmission medium 
or of a given service.  The unit of bandwidth is expressed in Hertz.  A telephone call 
normally occupies a bandwidth of 4,000 Hertz (4 kHz) while an analogue television 
signal in Australia occupies a bandwidth of 7,000,000 Hertz (7 MHz).  A television 
signal is clearly of significantly greater or ‘broader’ bandwidth than a telephone call. 
 
With the advent of digital transmission of data, commencing with telegraphy, and 
more recently with the popular adoption of the Internet, ‘bandwidth’ has taken on a 
meaning of how much information can be carried in a given time period.  The unit of 
bandwidth is then expressed as the number of bits (of information carrying data) 
carried per second.  For example, a commonly used dial-up modem may have a data 
carrying capacity or bandwidth of 56,000 bits per second (56 kb/s) while an ADSL 
modem may have a bandwidth of 512,000 bits per second (512 kb/s).  An ADSL-
based service clearly offers a broader bandwidth than a dial-up modem.  However, 
as we shall see later, in common parlance an ADSL-based service may be referred 
to as being a broadband service whereas such a descriptor would never be applied 
to a 56 kb/s modem.  In digital terms, bandwidth refers to a measure of the 
throughput or information carrying capacity of a particular communications media, 
service or device. 
 
Depending on the particular transmission and information coding protocol employed, 
there is a mathematical relationship for a given service between the amount of 
information carried expressed in bits per second and the media bandwidth occupied 
expressed in Hertz.  That relationship is beyond the scope necessary here to 
appreciate the relevant applications of the term ‘broadband’. 
 
It is generally accepted that ‘narrowband’ refers to a service occupying a 4 kHz 
bandwidth and hence a service capability offered through a 56 kb/s dial-up modem 
would also be said to be narrowband.  Anything other than narrowband (that is 
greater than 4 kHz or more than 56 kb/s) could be said to be ‘wideband’ although that 
term is not as commonly used nowadays.12  In contrast, ‘broadband’ refers to a 
specific wideband (or non-narrowband) service or capability of a nature such that it 
may be claimed to be broader or better than another.  This open-ended use of the 
term should make Humpty Dumpty proud.  The range of topical descriptions can be 
seen from the following snapshot of how major players appreciate broadband. 
 
                                            
12 As an indication of how these definitions have changed over time, one authoritative source 
reported that in the 1980s and early 1990s, ‘broadband’ referred to rates greater than 45 
Mb/s and ‘wideband’ referred to rates between 1.5 and 45 Mb/s. CSTB (2002). Bringing 
Home the Bits. Washington, DC, National Research Council, Computer Science and 
Telecommunications Board: 320. 
  This was a time before mass market adoption of the Internet. 
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Service Providers & Marketers 
 
Australia’s dominant carrier Telstra offers a variety of Internet plans and services 
under the ‘BigPond’ product range.13  Beyond the conventional dial-up modem 
service, BigPond advertises that broadband can be delivered via ADSL, Cable or 
Satellite, with ISDN also able to provide Internet access at a ‘higher speed’ than with 
a dial-up account (inferring that ISDN is not considered to be as fast as broadband). 
 
A closer examination reveals the following Internet access speeds were being offered 
for residential users at the time of writing: 
 
Table 1: Advertised BigPond Internet Access Speeds 
 
Advertised Speed# Big 
Pond 
Service 
Downstream Upstream 
Comment 
ADSL 256 -1500 
kb/s 
64 – 256 kb/s The popular 500MB Residential Plan 
offers a 256 kb/s downstream/64 kb/s 
upstream mix, whereas the significantly 
more expensive 10GB offering gives 
1500/256. 
Cable uncapped 128 kb/s or 
uncapped 
An ‘uncapped’ speed is said to be 
unrestricted and is the maximum 
network speed available at any given 
time, yet remains unspecified.  The 
popular 500MB Residential Plan offers 
an uncapped/128 mix, whereas the 
significantly more expensive 10GB 
offering is uncapped in both directions. 
Satellite 64 – 256 - 
400 kb/s 
Dial-up or 64 
– 256 kb/s 
The One-Way Satellite offering promises 
downstream speeds of mainly 64 kb/s 
for most residential users but 400 kb/s 
for ‘Giga’ or frequent users.  The 
upstream is Dial-up, i.e. not broadband.  
Two-way users get 64 or 256 kb/s in 
both directions. 
ISDN 64 or 128 kb/s 64 or 128 
kb/s 
 
# ‘Downstream’ refers to data flowing from the ISP to the user; ‘Upstream’ refers to data from the user 
to the ISP. 
 
In explaining ‘Just how fast is Broadband?’, Big Pond presented comparative 
demonstrations of a video clip being played at dial-up or 56 kb/s speed, then 
Broadband at 512 kb/s and finally Broadband at 1500 kb/s.  Not surprisingly, as the 
(download) speed increases, the viewability of the clip improves.  Big Pond was 
noncommittal as to what could be an ‘uncapped’ speed although a user-focussed 
‘Whirlpool’ Web site14 comments that a Cable connection “is shared with others in 
your street, so speed is not ‘guaranteed’, but in practice, Cable does run substantially 
                                            
13 Refer to http://www.bigpond.com/internetplans/broadband/default.asp, accessed 31 May 
2004 
14 Refer to http://www.whirlpool.net.au/, accessed 31 May 2004 
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faster than ADSL”.15  In fact, it is revealed that Cable-delivered Internet can operate 
at up to about 6 Mb/s whereas ADSL has a maximum speed of 1.5 Mb/s. 
 
Hence it appears that Big Pond (in reality Telstra) is deploying technology that is 
capable of a variety of speeds for providing Internet access at a higher speed than 
with a dial-up modem but that either network conditions restrict what can be actually 
achieved or, as is the more usual case, certain services are deliberately restricted to 
lower speeds for the sake of product differentiation.  Regardless, the marketing 
strategy implies that for mass market residential usage, ‘broadband’ typically equates 
to downstream speeds in the region of not less than 256 kb/s and upstream speeds 
in the region of 64 kb/s or more. 
 
In the United Kingdom, British Telecom offered its broadband service utilizing ADSL 
technology under the banner of ‘BT Yahoo!’.  The prime benefit of broadband was 
claimed to include being “up to 10 X faster than a standard dial-up connection”.16  
The offered speed was said to be up to 500 kb/s downstream and up to 250 kb/s 
upstream, with the qualification: “Speeds will vary depending on various factors 
including the number of other users online at the time and the overall usage across 
the Internet.”17 
 
Despite the focus here on the speed or bandwidth of broadband services, Table 2 
introduces the relationships with other defining characteristics. 
 
Table 2: Performance & Other Characteristics of Broadband Services ø 
 
Speed The degree to which broadband can provide increased bandwidth 
has already been discussed.  However, the effective speed for 
interacting with an Internet host depends not just on the 
performance of the local access link, but also on the backbone 
data network and the speed of data routers and switches.  Any 
one element can create a ‘bottleneck’ by restricting the overall 
end-to-end speed.  For dial-up connections, the bottleneck is 
typically caused by the 56 kb/s modem over the telephone line.  
With broadband, any bottleneck is less likely to be due to the 
local access link (ADSL, cable modem). 
Down/upstream 
symmetry 
Although a dial-up connection may offer near symmetry between 
downstream and upstream capacity, this is not usually the case 
with current broadband technologies and services for residential 
users.  Broadband ISPs have traditionally engineered asymmetry 
into their network designs and pricing models for technical and 
commercial reasons.  New applications such as video-
conferencing, peer-to-peer data transfer and content hosting are 
increasingly demanding symmetrical bandwidth.  The provision of 
only downstream capacity to an end-user, regardless of the 
speed or bandwidth, constitutes only broadcasting and is not 
regarded here as providing a broadband service enabling 
interaction with the Internet. 
                                            
15 Refer to http://www.broadbandchoice.com.au/isp-info.cfm?id=1, accessed 31 May 2004 
16 Refer to http://www.btyahoo.com/broadband/features, accessed 31 May 2004 
17 Refer to http://www.btyahoo.com/broadband/help/0,8452,692412|SPEED|cat,00.html, 
accessed 31 May 2004 
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Always-on By eliminating the need to establish a telephone line connection 
with a dial-up modem for each session, users are offered the 
prospect of communications being initiated on an as-required 
basis.  This ‘always available’ characteristic is more a result of 
avoiding the delays of dial-up connection than the speed of 
broadband per se. 
Latency A measure of the delay in effecting data transmission – the lower 
the delay the closer the approximation to ‘real-time’ 
communication which can be of importance to applications such 
as video, voice, games, etc.  Latency tends to be less of a 
problem with higher speed services, although the performance of 
other devices in the overall connection can also have a significant 
impact. 
Addressability This refers to each user’s computer having its own globally 
addressable Internet Protocol (IP) address.  (Dial-up connections 
are typically provided dynamically-assigned addresses.)  With 
broadband, addressability is more a derivative of being ‘always 
on’. 
User network 
sharing 
By virtue of its always-on nature and greater speed, it is more 
practicable for a broadband service to be connected to more than 
one computer or other device at a user’s premises.  In contrast, it 
has been generally impractical for more than one computer to 
share the same dial-up connection. 
ø - Loosely adapted from “Broadband: Bringing Home the Bits” (CSTB 2002) 
 
Regulators & Policy Analysts 
 
It is often said that regulatory bodies are creatures of the industries they regulate, in 
that they have to reflect the realities of those industries and the legislation which they 
govern.  Government-sanctioned inquiries and policy analyses may have some 
scope to speculate on an emerging industry environment, although in reality this is 
often tempered by political constraints.  The first three broadband inquiries of the US 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) are a case in point. 
 
Section 706(b) of the 1996 Telecommunications Act defines advanced 
telecommunications capability as “high-speed, switched, broadband 
telecommunications capability that enables users to originate and receive high-
quality voice, data, graphics, and video telecommunications using any technology”.  
The Act requires the FCC to initiate regular inquiries concerning the availability of 
advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans and determine whether 
such capability is being deployed in a reasonable and timely fashion. (US 
Telecommunications Act 1996, Sec. 706) 
 
By the time of its second Inquiry report, the FCC had declined to further use the term 
‘broadband’ and instead adopted the following nomenclature: 
‘high-speed’ - services with over 200 kb/s capability in at least one direction 
(either downstream or upstream); and 
‘advanced telecommunications capability or advanced services’ 
 - a subset of the above, with a capability of 200 kb/s or more in 
both directions. 
The data so gathered was intended to “measure what is happening in the current 
market, not to drive the market” but the measures of advanced telecommunications 
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capability and advanced services “may change as technology continues to evolve”. 
(FCC 2002, section 10) Recognizing the emerging requirements of services such as 
high-definition video, the FCC also sought data on services with over 2 Mb/s in both 
directions.  Despite these semantics, the FCC Inquiries are widely regarded as 
reporting on the availability of ‘broadband’ services of 200 kb/s or greater. 
 
Within Australia, regular snapshots of broadband deployment are published by the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. (ACCC 2003b)  Customer 
figures are in terms of cable, satellite, ADSL, other DSL and miscellaneous offerings 
by carriers who contribute the data.  The ACCC similarly takes broadband as any 
high speed connection greater than 200 kb/s over a mix of media.  Such a definition 
excludes dial-up connections running at 56 kb/s as well as ISDN connections at 64 or 
128 kb/s.  The federal government’s Broadband Advisory Group (BAG) also 
accepted this as a workable definition for ‘second generation’ Internet services but 
went further by recognising a ‘third generation’ of services “with connection speeds of 
10 Mb/s or greater on the basis that it is only at these speeds that broadband 
becomes something more than a faster version of today’s Internet services”. (NOIE 
2003, p.7) 
 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in an 
assessment of the development of broadband access throughout member countries, 
took note of the FCC definition but then applied its own modification.  Recognising 
current usage by various network operators and OECD governments, the threshold 
for a service considered as broadband was taken to be 256 kb/s for downstream 
access, whereas upstream speeds could be as low as 64 or 128 kb/s. (TISP 2001, 
p.6)  This is despite an admission that the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU) Recommendation I.113 (ITU-T) defines broadband as being faster than primary 
rate ISDN, that is, above 1.5 or 2 Mb/s. 
 
A more expansive appreciation was given by the Canadian National Broadband Task 
Force which adopted the following key aspects of what defines ‘broadband’: (National 
Broadband Task Force 2001, p.10) 
 
• A two-way link between end user and access network suppliers capable of 
supporting full-motion interactive video applications; 
• Currently (the year 2001) this would require a minimum symmetrical speed of 
1.5 Mb/s per individual user; 
• Up to 2004 and beyond, new applications such as peer-to-peer file interactions 
and video conferencing will increase individual user demand for symmetrical 
bandwidth in the 4 to 6 Mb/s range; 
• Public and commercial facilities will require much higher bandwidth, ranging 
from this minimum to several hundred times more, depending on their size and 
user needs. 
 
Although all of the above assessments have been applied equally to wireline and 
wireless delivery technologies or applications, an Australian House of 
Representatives inquiry into the use of wireless technologies for broadband 
communication adopted a range from as low as 64 kb/s but with the FCC figure of 
200 kb/s being more common, and as new applications arise, up to the Canadian 
figure of 4 to 6 Mb/s. (House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
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Communications Information Technology and the Arts 2002, pp.2-3) The inquiry also 
noted that equipment designed to the IEEE standard 802.11 (Wi-Fi) can now provide 
bandwidths up to 11 Mb/s, though in reality actual performance may be less. 
 
Netheads18, Researchers & Visionaries 
 
‘Greenfield’ assessments tend to be the preserve of researchers, academics and 
industry players with often a vested interest – some of whom at times may also have 
been awarded the ‘Nethead’ banner. 
 
Sweden was the first country in Europe, and perhaps the world, to develop a 
broadband policy and to discuss the public funding of broadband infrastructure.  In 
1999, the Swedish ICT Commission reported to the government on broadband 
infrastructure and recommended that the State take responsibility for the 
development of a sophisticated new optical fibre network to serve all households and 
organisations and to provide high capacity communications for all purposes. (Corning 
Incorporated 2002) The IT Commission’s vision of future-proof broadband 
infrastructure in Sweden was for everyone to have a fixed Internet connection of at 
least 5 Mb/s real throughput capacity by 2005, with that capacity doubling each year 
thereafter. (Berner 2001) Further, mention was made that this increase in capacity 
would arise from changing the (presumably customers’) end equipment, rather than 
changes to the network itself – implying that the new optical fibre network would 
inherently have a far greater capacity and not pose a limitation. 
 
Between 1999 and 2001, a period of significant broadband deployment and both 
boom and bust in the telecommunications and Internet markets, the US Computer 
Science and Telecommunications Board reported on the technologies, policies and 
strategies associated with broadband local access connectivity within the United 
States of America.  In examining what constitutes a broadband service, it concluded 
that a single number – be it 200 kb/s or 2 Mb/s – is not a useful definition of 
broadband on account of the ‘chicken-and-egg’ conundrum: an application will not be 
made available unless a sufficient number of subscribers have broadband 
connections with performance high enough to support the application, yet service 
providers will not invest in higher-performance broadband until they know that there 
will be sufficient demand for the service. (CSTB 2002) 
 
However, barely one year later and possibly in a move to re-invigorate the flagging 
US high-tech sector, two groups of US technology chief executive officers called 
upon the US government to declare: 19,20 
 
                                            
18 This term arises from the ’Netheads’ versus ‘Bellheads’ debate, see Frieden, R. (2002). 
"Revenge of the Bellheads: how the Netheads lost control of the Internet." 
Telecommunications Policy 26: 425-444. 
  
19 “IT CEOs push for broadband policy”, ITworld.com, 24 January 2002, 
http://www.itworld.com/Man/3830/IDG020124broadbandpolicy/pfindex.html, accessed 31 
May 2004 
20 “TechNet CEOs Call for National Broadband Policy”, TechNet.org, 14/15 January 2002, 
http://www.technet.org/news/release/?index=131, accessed 13 May 2007 
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• an interim goal by 2004 of providing at least 6 Mb/s from two or more providers 
to at least 50 per cent of users to enable high-bandwidth applications including 
DVD-quality video, file-sharing and peer-to-peer computing; 
• an aggressive goal of reaching broadband deployment of 100 Mb/s connectivity 
to 100 million homes and small businesses by 2010.21 
 
Fearful that the slow pace of broadband deployment in the US would adversely affect 
national productivity, homeland security and international competitiveness, a IEEE-
USA workshop held in June 2002 recommended adoption of ‘Advanced Fiber 
Networks (AFN)’ that would provide Ethernet capability of gigabit speeds 
complemented by broadband wireless technologies. (McAdams 2002a) The 
significance here is the willingness to leapfrog over the bandwidth-limited 
technologies of incumbent operators which then enables ‘broadband’ to take on a 
hugely expanded functionality, not dissimilar to the Swedish thinking. 
 
Perhaps the ultimate response to the ‘broadband’ dilemma was that posed by one of 
the discussion papers supporting that IEEE-USA workshop.  Frustrated with the 
widely accepted FCC definition of broadband as being “anything over 200 kb/s”, the 
author of that particular paper saw fit to adopt the following creative terminology: 
(IEEE-USA 2002) 
 
• ‘K-band’ for describing broadband capacity less than 1 Mb/s; 
• ‘M-band’ for capacity measured in Megabits per second; and 
• ‘G-band’ for capacity of at least one gigabit per second. 
 
For now, such definitions have not been adopted by the marketers of broadband 
services. 
 
2.3.2 ‘Next Generation’ 
 
It is natural that marketers and technologists would wish to categorise new designs 
or products compared with earlier ones, and particularly to highlight the advantages 
of the new over the old.  Certain stages in the early development of computers were 
informally categorised so that new designs could be simply differentiated.  For 
example, some consistently defined generations were the ‘first generation’ 
(employing valves), the ‘second generation’ (employing transistors) and so on, with 
the ‘fifth generation’ purportedly embodying artificial intelligence. (Simpson and 
Weiner 1989, p.436) With the maturing of computing and the absence of any 
incentive to do otherwise, it is not surprising that common usage of this 
categorisation has since lapsed. 
 
Telecommunication networks have long evolved from one network type to another, 
with overlay networks implemented from time to time as commercially required.  
Table 3 depicts the various carrier network ‘generations’ (as commonly accepted by 
                                            
21 The achievability of the latter goal is now being investigated under a US$7.5 million grant 
from the National Science Foundation; see Carnegie Mellon Press Release, 25 September 
2003 “Carnegie Mellon Leads Team Receiving $7.5 Million from NSF to Develop High Speed 
Telecommunications Network Reaching Every Home in America”, 
http://www.cmu.edu/PR/releases03/030925_highspeedtel.html, accessed 13 May 2007 
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the industry) that have been built or are being built.  At times, generations can be 
wholly superseded, for example within Australia, the analogue PSTN and analogue 
mobile networks have already been replaced. 
 
Table 3: Progressive Generations of Carrier Networks 
 
Fixed Network 
 
Mobile Data 
 
Analogue PSTN Analogue Mobile 
(AMPS) 
X.25 Packet 
Digital PSTN Digital Mobile 
(GSM, CDMAOne) 
Frame Relay 
Internet 
D
ev
el
op
m
en
ta
l 
Pr
og
re
ss
io
n 
‘Carrier Grade IP’ 3G 
(CDMA2000, UMTS) 
‘Carrier Grade IP’ 
(Adapted from Peter Darling’s presentations for the project http://www.acif.org.au/Activities/ngn ) 
 
Taken at face value, application of the label ‘next generation’ would seem to benefit 
from its lack of specificity as to which generation has which characteristics and hence 
becomes a sort of movable feast.  However, there are examples where the label has 
been granted institutional recognition in specific technical domains where it does 
refer to a forecast or prescribed measure of improved functionality.22 
 
Next Generation Internet (NGI) 
 
This US government initiative circa 1996/97 had the goals of:23 
 
• Connecting universities and national labs with high-speed networks that are 100 
to 1,000 times faster than today’s Internet; 
• Promoting experimentation with the next generation of networking technologies, 
such as handling real-time services such as high-quality videoconferencing and 
increasing the number of Internet users by a factor of 100; 
• Demonstrating new applications that meet important national goals and 
missions, such as supporting scientific research, national security, distance 
education, environmental monitoring and health care. 
 
Next Generation Internet Protocol 
 
More specifically known as IP version 6 (IPv6), this has been designed by the 
Internet Engineering Task Force to replace the current version Internet protocol, IP 
version 4 (IPv4) with the main advantage of increasing the number of available IP 
addresses and improving performance in areas such as routing and network auto 
configuration.24 
 
                                            
22 Popular usage of the term also grew significantly from 1987 with release of the film “Star 
Trek: The Next Generation”. 
23 Refer to the report “Research Challenges for the Next Generation Internet” at 
http://www.cra.org/Policy/NGI/research_chall.pdf accessed 13 May 2007 
24 Refer to http://www.isoc-au.org.au/ipv6summit/ accessed 13 May 2007 
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ITU and ACIF Next Generation Network Studies 
 
Commencing in 2002/03, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) resolved 
to establish implementation guidelines and standards for realisation of Next 
Generation Networks (NGN) based on Global Information Infrastructure concepts it 
had previously discussed.  Factors leading to this study include: (ITU-T 2003) 
 
• Open competition between operators due to the total deregulation of markets; 
• Increased use of the Internet; 
• Increased demand from users for new multimedia services; 
• Increased demand from users for a general mobility. 
 
Growing organically from and integrating the existing PSTN, mobile telephony 
networks, data networks and the Internet, the NGN is expected to embody: 
 
• Existing voice and data services, including multimedia; 
• Packet-based or IP information transfer; 
• Broadband capabilities with end-to-end transparency; 
• Interworking with legacy networks; 
• Open interfaces between services and the new network; 
• Unfettered access of users to competing service providers and/or services of 
their choice. 
 
A related NGN study was undertaken by the Australian Communications Industry 
Forum (ACIF).25  In reporting to the ITU in July 2003, the manager of the ACIF NGN 
project Mr Peter Darling spoke of next generation networks as being an essential part 
of the ‘broadband future’26 – although, as we shall see, whose future it is can colour 
one’s appreciation of what may constitute a next generation broadband network. 
 
Darling contrasted the ‘Internet View’ with the ‘Telco View’ of future interworking, 
inter-operability and any-to-any connectivity required to bring about a next generation 
network.  Recognising the strong carrier influence on ITU and ACIF, plus an 
assessment that voice (telephony) is likely to continue as a major (if not the major) 
service, he surmised that the ‘Telco View’ could ultimately dominate.27  It is 
noteworthy that Table 3 is a carrier-centric representation that doesn’t recognise the 
existence of overlay networks such as hybrid-fibre coaxial ones particularly when 
used for telecommunications, end-user wireless networks such as Wi-Fi or the 
infrastructure sub-set of optical fibre in the customer access network.  Such a 
contrast of views has also been depicted as a clash of cultures between the 
‘Netheads’ and the ‘Bellheads’. (Frieden 2002) 
 
An alternative approach may be to focus on how access platforms for broadband are 
now developing in response to market demands and commercial offerings – in other 
words, we examine the evolving network fringes that directly serve users.  Assessing 
                                            
25 Refer to http://www.acif.org.au/Activities/ngn , accessed 13 May 2007 
26 Refer to report S8-06 at http://www.itu.int/itudoc/itu-t/workshop/ngn/, accessed 13 May 
2007 
27 Refer to report S8-06 at http://www.itu.int/itudoc/itu-t/workshop/ngn/, accessed 13 May 
2007 
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the response of the ‘narrowcast’ legacy networks (encompassing the PSTN, ISDN 
and subsequently DSL technologies) and the ‘broadcast’ legacy networks 
(encompassing digital television and cable modems) to the increasing demands for 
interactive broadband services, a European Commission study produced the 
following estimations for broadband access platform development over the 
subsequent three, five and 10 years:28 (EC DG INFOSOC 2001, pp.13-14) 
 
3 Year View (2 Mb/s to the home/SME) 
• ADSL & Cable (HFC) will compete for market share, also with speeds 
upgraded to 2 Mb/s and beyond 
• Broadband fixed wireless access (FWA), power line carrier and two-way 
satellite solutions will serve niche but small markets 
• Fibre optic and HFC networks will increasingly reach closer to the home, with 
a growing minority switching from ‘interim’ broadband solutions to fibre 
• ISDN growth will slow and then decline 
• Third generation mobile will grow but not reach the ‘broadband’ speeds of 
fixed platforms 
5 Year View (2-10 Mb/s to the home/SME) 
• Both ADSL & Cable (HFC) will be available in most built-up areas, otherwise 
FWA will be an alternative; all three technologies will also be applied to 
broadcasting 
• Fibre to the basement of apartments and to SMES will begin to replace 
copper access platforms 
• Two-way satellite will serve remote regions 
10 Year View (10+ Mb/s to the home/SME) 
• Fibre optic is expected to be the most likely and most appropriate technology 
for symmetric, unlimited bandwidth 
• The market for ADSL will begin to decline and HFC will be replaced by fibre, 
including fibre-to-the curb alternatives 
• Symmetric, high bandwidth via wireless technology may emerge. 
 
This 10 Year View suggests a developmental path that could be an appropriate proxy 
for being regarded as next generation broadband service delivery in terms of this 
research. 
                                            
28 Rather than being regarded as absolute time frames, they could be taken as encapsulating 
Short Term, Medium Term & Long Term developments. 
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CHAPTER THREE – RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This section discusses case study research as the applicable methodology and 
discusses multiple case designs.  Selection of the cases is then justified. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Research is defined as: 
 
“An investigation directed to the discovery of some fact by careful study of a 
subject; a course of critical or scientific inquiry.” (Little, Fowler et al. 1984: 
Ch.9) 
 
A framework for research activity, illustrated in Figure 1, explains the relationship 
between research domains and research methodologies. (Nunamaker, Chen et al. 
1991: 92) The research domain of this research project is Open Access to Next 
Generation Broadband, whilst the appropriate research methodology is that of the 
case study. 
Source: Adapted from Nunamaker, Chen et al., 1991, p.92. 
 
Figure 1 – Framework for Research Activity 
 
Nunamaker et al. explain that the body of knowledge includes both the research 
domain and research methodology, and the research process involves understanding 
this domain, asking meaningful research questions and applying a valid research 
methodology to address these questions.  Not surprisingly, the results from a well 
conducted research project contribute to the body of knowledge by expanding the 
knowledge in the particular domain. 
 
Results 
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+
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The typology of research can be described from three perspectives, which are not 
mutually exclusive: the nature of the application, the intended objectives and the type 
of information sought. (Kumar 1999: 8) Figure 2 refers. 
 
Source: Adapted from Kumar, 1999, p.8. 
Figure 2 – Types of Research 
 
The research designed for this dissertation adopts a historical and contemporary 
case-based qualitative analysis of relevant strategies, policies, technologies and 
practices arising in Australia and other comparable countries.  As such, the proposed 
research may be categorised in Kumar’s terms as being: 
 
• Applied (the information collected can be used for policy formulation and 
enhancement of understanding); 
• Explanatory primarily (the information attempts to clarify why and how there is a 
relationship between certain aspects) but also descriptive (in that it attempts to 
systematically describe a problem) and; 
• Qualitative (in that the purpose of the study is primarily to describe a situation or 
problem, without quantifying variations in parameters or employing quantitative 
variables). (Stake 1995: Ch.3) 
 
3.2 Case Study Research 
 
Despite describing the case study as ‘rather a portmanteau term’ (Burns 2000: 459), 
differences in appreciation are small and merely reflect understandings that are 
developing over time as the research strategy is applied to new areas under study. 
 
Yin (1991: p.13) and Burns (2000: 459) consider the case study as the preferred 
strategy for undertaking research when ‘how’, ‘why’ or ‘what’ questions are being 
asked, when the investigator has little control over events or when the focus is on a 
contemporary phenomenon within a real life context.  The setting for such research is 
not restricted to the domains of sociology or psychology but can equally be applied to 
research in areas of policy, organisational and management studies, city and 
regional planning, and even public administration. 
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Robson adopts a slightly different perspective by defining a case study as “a strategy 
for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a particular 
contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of 
evidence”. (Robson 1995: 52 & 146) The ‘contemporary phenomenon’ or ‘case’ can 
be virtually anything and not necessarily a study of individuals, but also a group, an 
institution, an innovation, a decision, a service or a programme. 
 
Regardless, the subject of a case study must be a bounded system, that is, an entity 
in itself. (Burns 2000: 459) (Merriam 1988: 9) In the view of Robson (1995: 168), the 
choice of research strategy is virtually self-evident: “if your main concern is in 
understanding what is happening in a specific context, and if you can get access to, 
and co-operation from, the people involved – then do a case study.” 
 
While a case study can be either quantitative or qualitative, or even a combination of 
both, most case studies lie within the realm of qualitative methodology. (Merriam 
1988: 16-21) The end product of a qualitative study is narrative or descriptive, 
expressed in words and pictures rather than numbers. (Winegardner n.d.: 3) 
According to Yin (1991: 15+), a case study can be seen to satisfy the three tenets of 
the qualitative method: describing, exploring and explaining. 
 
From the research problem comes the selection of the case or cases to study – but 
how many cases should there be and on what criteria should they be selected?  In 
addressing a general criticism about how case study results can be generalised, Yin 
(1991: 21) asserts that case studies are generalisable to theoretical propositions but 
not to populations.  The results of a multi-case study can never be statistically 
significant. 
 
Miles & Huberman (1994: 29) explain that multiple-case sampling adds confidence to 
findings: “By looking at a range of similar and contrasting cases, we can … 
strengthen the precision, validity, and stability of the findings.”  Multiple cases 
strengthen the results by replicating the ‘pattern-matching’ of results. (Yin 1991: 109-
111) This can be achieved through literal replication, where cases designed to 
replicate each other produce corroborating evidence, or through theoretical 
replication, where cases designed to cover different theoretical conditions produce 
contrasting results for predictable, theoretical reasons. (Yin 1991: 109-111) (Robson 
1995: 161) 
 
Cases are selected by a sampling process for a specific reason.  The most 
appropriate case sampling strategy for qualitative research is non-probability 
sampling. (Merriam 1988: 47) The usual form of non-probability sampling is termed 
purposive, purposeful or criterion-based sampling; that is, a case is selected because 
it serves the real purpose and objectives of the researcher of discovering, gaining 
insight and understanding into a particularly chosen phenomenon. (Burns 2000: 465) 
Table 4 lists the characteristics of cases often sought in purposive or criterion-based 
sampling. 
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Table 4: Characteristics in choosing the Purposive Case 
 
Typical Profile of average case made and instance sought. 
 
Extreme/deviant After norm is established, extreme case sought to enable 
comparison or contrast to be made. 
 
Convenient The case is readily available. 
 
Comprehensive Review of all available instances before choice made. 
 
Quota Arbitrary number of contexts to form case. 
 
Network Case collected by referral (one case leads to another). 
 
Unique A rare case. 
 
Reputational Chosen on recommendation of expert. 
 
Ideal Profile developed of most effective, desirable, best instance 
then search for real world case. 
 
Source: Adapted from Burns, p.465 & Merriam p.49. 
 
Above all, case selection must be done so as to maximise what can be learned, in 
the period of time available for the study. (Tellis 1997: 6)  Merriam (1988: 48) is more 
explicit: “Purposive sampling is based on the assumption that one wants to discover, 
understand, gain insight; therefore one needs to select a sample from which one can 
learn the most”. 
 
‘Triangulation’, involving the use of multiple investigators, multiple sources of data or 
multiple methods to confirm emerging findings, serves to strengthen reliability as well 
as internal validity of research findings. (Merriam 1988: 169-172) (Robson 1995: 290)  
Although case studies do not need to have a minimum number of cases, or to 
randomly ‘select’ cases, the researcher is called upon to work with the situation that 
presents itself in each case. (Tellis 1997: 4) According to Eisenhardt (1989: 545), 
practical considerations such as time and money will dictate when to place an upper 
limit on the number of cases being studied. 
 
Some interpret triangulation as implying a minimum of three cases or sources of 
data. (Winegardner n.d.: 12) In reviewing a number of research studies, Eisenhardt 
(1989: 545) concludes that “while there is no ideal number of cases, a number 
between 4 and 10 cases usually works well.  With fewer than 4 cases, it is often 
difficult to generate theory with much complexity, and its empirical grounding is likely 
to be unconvincing ....” 
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3.3 Case Criteria, Number and Selection 
3.3.1 Criteria 
 
Of necessity, the time available posed a limit on the number of case studies and the 
extent to which they were analysed.  Their selection was influenced by a particular 
network design or business operation of relevance and coloured by experience within 
various countries of origin.  The prime countries initially considered were Australia, 
the United States of America and those of the European Union. 
 
The case studies, all communication networks of one type or another, were selected 
according to the predominantly technical criteria in Table 5 which are arranged in 
approximate order of importance, highest to lowest. 
 
Table 5: Selection by Criteria 
Broadband Given the variable definition of what may constitute ‘broadband’, 
a selected case study network should aim at the higher end of 
data speeds likely to be available over the coming 10 years. 
 
Next 
Generation 
Given the variable definition of what may constitute ‘next 
generation’, a selected case study should be considered a 
pacesetter within its country of implementation; an existing 
network considered to remain innovative over the coming 10 
years would also suffice. 
 
Competitive 
Access 
The network design or operation should have already raised or 
have potential for raising issues of access by competitive access 
seekers or of competitive access to end users; the network 
should preferably not embed any inherent bottleneck to 
competitive access. 
 
Access not 
Backbone 
The network should be capable of directly connecting end users, 
in other words be an access network (perhaps among other 
things), rather than being just infrastructure between carrier 
nodes, i.e. a backbone facility. 
 
Public not 
Private 
End users should be those regarded as constituting the ‘mass 
market’ such as residential and/or SME users, rather than those 
within a ‘closed user group’ perhaps serviced by a just local area 
network or LAN.  Nevertheless, it may be possible for some 
implementations of the network to serve users in public areas 
though not provide connectivity to other public networks. 
 
Wireline or 
Wireless 
Separate examples of wireline and wireless networks should be 
considered, though recognising the expectation that wireline 
solutions could be the most appropriate technology for 
substantially unlimited symmetric bandwidth into the foreseeable 
future. 
 
Accessible 
Information 
An adequate amount of information about the network and its 
services should be available in the public domain or accessible 
by interviewing relevant stakeholders. 
Australian At least one Australian network, in operation or planned to be 
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Relevance operation, should be included.  Failing that, overseas network 
examples should raise issues that are translatable to Australian 
application. 
Country of 
Deployment 
An existing network may be specific to just one country or even 
one location in a country; however others may be deployed or 
deployable across a number of countries. 
 
3.3.2 Selection 
 
Four case studies were then selected to satisfy as many as possible of the technical 
selection criteria as well as the characteristics of purposive cases as noted in Table 
4.  At least one case study was arranged to be Australian and at least one was to 
involve wireless delivery. 
 
The case studies were as follows: 
 
• The Telstra/Foxtel pay television-based hybrid fibre/coaxial cable network in 
Australia, drawing upon the experience of access seekers and the regulatory 
decisions arising (‘Telstra/Foxtel’); 
• The Australian Capital Territory TransACT fibre-to-the-curb network, drawing 
upon its open access philosophy; (‘TransACT’) 
• Evolving fibre-to-the-home developments, as technically described mainly in the 
USA (‘FTTH’) and 
• Evolving fixed wireless broadband networks, particularly including variants 
which exploit unregulated spectrum and/or adopt a user-centred philosophy. 
(‘FWA – Wi-Fi’) 
 
The suitability of each was then assessed against the selection criteria.  As 
discussed in the section thereafter, the fourth case study was eventually eliminated. 
 
3.3.2.1 Suitability of the Telstra/Foxtel Pay TV network as a Case Study 
 
Broadband: This is a traditional HFC network platform installed primarily for 
broadcasting pay television, namely downstream video signals, however the Internet 
data cable modem service capability is bi-directional. 
 
Next Generation: Although this Australian installation is modern by world standards, 
the tree-branch design of HFC networks is decades old and primarily created for 
broadcasting.  Even when digitalised, the coaxial cable band plan embodies inherent 
bandwidth limitations.  
 
Competitive Access: Access seekers have made sustained attempts to gain access 
for delivering pay television services; it is understood that no attempt has been made 
for competitive access to the cable modem capability. 
 
Access not Backbone: The HFC network directly connects to pay television 
subscribers via set top boxes (STBs) and to Internet users via cable modems. 
 
Public not Private: This is a public though overlay network connecting to mass 
market users. 
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Wireline or Wireless: Although the Foxtel pay television service is also delivered via 
satellite (and therefore involving wireless transmission), the focus here is on the HFC 
wireline network. 
 
Accessible Information: Information is nominally accessible via court cases dealing 
with access seeking and jurisdictional matters, in addition to more publicly accessible 
information about determinations and policy considerations by the ACCC. 
 
Australian Interest: The Telstra/Foxtel network was installed around 1996/97 in some 
areas of Perth, Adelaide and the Gold Coast, and most of Melbourne, Sydney and 
Brisbane. 
 
Country Deployment: Similar HFC installations exist in many other countries. 
 
3.3.2.2 Suitability of the TransACT network as a Case Study 
 
Broadband: The network architecture is of fibre-to-the-curb design, involving VDSL 
technology for the last few hundred metres which is capable of bi-directional data 
transfer up to 50 – 100 Mb/s. 
 
Next Generation: TransACT is clearly an innovative broadband delivery platform due 
to its network architecture and open access business model. 
 
Competitive Access: The TransACT broadband network was technically and 
commercially designed to be ‘open access’ such that any third party ISP can utilise 
the network for providing broadband Internet access to subscribers. 
 
Access not Backbone: The network directly connects to subscribers for telephony as 
well as Internet access (via third party providers). 
 
Public not Private: TransACT is a public network connecting to mass market users. 
 
Wireline or Wireless: This is a wholly wireline network. 
 
Accessible Information: Company information is nominally accessible and some 
technical/product information is in the public domain.  More detailed information, 
particularly of a strategic nature, may only be accessible by interviewing company or 
ex-company personnel. 
 
Australian Interest: The network is currently installed only in Canberra but with 
prospects of deployment in neighbouring regions. 
 
Country Deployment: TransACT is unique within Australia and it is understood that 
just a few equivalent installations may exist elsewhere in the world. 
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3.3.2.3 Suitability of FTTH as a Case Study 
 
Broadband: Fibre-to-the-user networks, depending on the particular architecture 
deployed, inherently provide broadband speeds of 100 Mb/s to 1 Gb/s per user 
(though commercially available speeds may be less). 
 
Next Generation: Such networks are the most likely and most appropriate technology 
for providing symmetric, unlimited bandwidth into the foreseeable future. 
 
Competitive Access: Depending on the chosen architecture, the business philosophy 
and particularly the nature of any conditional access systems, access may be open, 
closed or somewhere in between. 
 
Access not Backbone: The networks directly connect to end users. 
 
Public not Private: Fibre-to-the home/user networks may be deployed in both public 
and private (for instance, a university campus) configurations. 
 
Wireline or Wireless: These are wholly wireline networks. 
 
Accessible Information: Architectural information should be available from standards 
setting fora (such as the IEEE) and from designers or suppliers.  Other information, 
particularly of an operational or of a commercial nature, may be difficult to obtain. 
 
Australian Interest: Telstra announced that it was planning to deploy initial networks 
commencing 2004. 
 
Country Deployment: Canada, USA, Sweden – in each country, perhaps some 
dozens of networks exist and the number is growing. 
 
3.3.2.4 Suitability of FWA/Wi-Fi as a Case Study 
 
Broadband: Depending on the available spectrum, the wireless technology deployed 
and the number of users, data speeds in the order of hundreds of kb/s to low tens of 
Mb/s can be achieved. 
 
Next Generation: Modern day wireless technologies are considered desirable as they 
can offer affordable bandwidth to users on the move, and avoid reliance on the fixed 
cable networks of dominant carriers. 
 
Competitive Access: Depending on the chosen architecture, the business philosophy 
and particularly the nature of any conditional access systems, access may be open, 
closed or somewhere in between. 
 
Access not Backbone: The networks directly connect to end-users, who may be 
mobile or at least movable. 
 
Public not Private: Such networks may be deployed in both public (eg. airports, public 
streets) and private (eg. a university campus) configurations. 
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Wireline or Wireless: These are wholly wireless networks, though they are likely to be 
connected to wireline networks for backbone connectivity. 
 
Accessible Information: Architectural information should be available from standards 
setting fora (eg. IEEE) and from designers or suppliers.  Other information, 
particularly of an operational or of a commercial nature, may be difficult to obtain. 
 
Australian Interest: Some networks are already deployed in Australia. 
 
Country Deployment: Many such networks are already deployed in various countries, 
particularly in North America and Europe. 
 
3.3.3 Discussion of Selection 
 
The Telstra/Foxtel HFC network would not ordinarily qualify as a broadband medium, 
since the main focus of this case study is on third-party access to the pay television 
capability which lacks bi-directional transmission.  Further, the underlying network 
architecture is dated and in the terms of this study is not classifiable as next 
generation infrastructure.  On the other hand, this is an Australian wireline network 
about which there has been significant public disclosure of information arising from 
third-party access disputes.  The disputes have created a new Australian precedent 
for access to telecommunications facilities.  Also, limited pay television interactivity 
has been added with network digitisation commencing 2004.  A secondary focus of 
this case study is on third-party access to the cable modem capability which does 
embody bi-directional transmission.29 
 
In terms of Table 4, the Telstra/Foxtel case exhibits characteristics of convenience 
and comprehensiveness.  In that the researcher previously had some consultancy 
involvement relating to questions of third-party access, the case could also be said to 
have been collected by referral. 
 
Being a highly innovative broadband delivery platform due to its network architecture 
and open access business model, the TransACT network is an ideal fit with the 
selection criteria.  Access to detailed information, particularly of a strategic nature, 
raised a potential difficulty which was addressed by interviewing company or ex-
company personnel. 
 
In terms of Table 4, the TransACT case is currently unique to Australia and rare 
worldwide, offering an ideal profile in terms of open access but whose business plan 
could even be considered as extreme when compared to most other broadband 
telecommunication networks.  Its Australian location makes it convenient for 
assessment. 
 
The other two case studies partly relate to implementations now being deployed in a 
number of locations in various countries whilst other design aspects remain under 
development or commercial applications are still evolving.  These case studies focus 
more on generic characteristics of the underlying technologies and opportunities for 
access, rather than a history of experience. 
                                            
29 Third-party ISP access was a key issue identified by the literature review of US examples. 
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Fibre-to-the-home (FTTH) networks embody highly innovative broadband delivery 
platforms that may provide either open or closed access, depending on particular 
architecture variants, business philosophies and conditional access systems 
employed.  In broad terms, they are nominally an ideal fit with the technical selection 
criteria.  Access to detailed information, particularly of an operational or commercial 
nature, raised a potential difficulty. 
 
In terms of Table 4, the FTTH case offers an ideal profile in terms of delivering next 
generation broadband though in terms of embodying open access it may or may not 
present an extreme example. 
 
Although not commonly capable of providing broadband speeds to the same extent 
as the FTTH examples, modern day wireless technologies are considered desirable 
as they can offer affordable bandwidth to users on the move, and avoid reliance on 
the potential (and often very real) bandwidth and access bottlenecks of carrier 
dominated fixed cable networks.  Again, particular implementations can provide 
either open or closed access, and detailed information of an operational or 
commercial nature could be difficult to obtain. 
 
In terms of Table 4, the sole wireless case presented a unique contrast to wireline 
network solutions and would have enhanced the comprehensiveness of findings.  It 
was ultimately excluded due to insufficient time available to gather data of the 
required quality. 
 
3.4 Data Sources 
 
In the opinion of Stake (1995: 49), there is no particular moment when data gathering 
begins and it may even occur before there is commitment to do the study.  Data are 
categorised as either primary or secondary. (Kumar 1999) Interviewing, observation 
and the use of questionnaires are the three main methods classified under primary 
sources.  All other sources, where the information is already available, such as 
publications, reports and previous research, are called secondary sources. (Kumar 
1999: Ch.9) 
 
3.4.1 Primary Sources 
 
A small number of individuals were interviewed.  They were public figures (eg. 
TransACT employees, private consultants) or senior public servants (eg. employed 
by the ACCC) who have spoken in public fora, written papers and/or been involved in 
major policy determinations bearing a relationship to the research question. 
 
Interviews were conducted, depending on circumstances prevailing at the time, by 
telephone, email or face-to-face communication.  The particular questions put to the 
interviewees were open ended in nature and framed to fill in gaps that became 
evident from the extended literature research.  The broad area of questions related to 
the design, application and commercial operation of telecommunication networks 
(with particular emphasis on those considered to be ‘next generation’ networks), 
legislation and regulatory material (telecommunications, broadcasting, competition 
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law), and forecasted network and industry developments.  Data was collected in the 
form of email responses or written notes. 
 
3.4.2 Secondary Sources 
 
Being a Telco operating in a competitive environment, relevant information on 
TransACT was difficult to access.  Sources were from the company itself (technical, 
commercial), suppliers (technical), and the Australian Stock Exchange and financial 
houses (business related).  Information made public on the current company Web 
site was considered likely to be ‘sanitised’ and therefore treated with caution.  Papers 
of an academic nature were almost non-existent. 
 
Telstra and Foxtel were highly protective of any information in the public domain 
other than of a retail nature.  However a fertile source of information was accessed 
via the ACCC Web site by way of determinations, reports and access agreements 
plus the courts as a result of various legal challenges by access seekers.  Whilst 
these information sources were prolific, much if not most was peripheral to the 
research question.  A limited amount of technical information was found that drew on 
analogous overseas examples. 
 
Technical information concerning fibre-to-the-home (FTTH) networks and their 
derivative services was available via the Internet from international standards setting 
fora (eg. IEEE) as well as from network and systems designers and equipment 
suppliers.  Direct contact was also made with Ericsson (Australia). 
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CHAPTER FOUR –TELSTRA/FOXTEL PAY TV NETWORK CASE STUDY 
 
The introduction of pay television to Australia has a tortured history, colourful at times 
and even cloaked in intrigue, most of which is beyond the focus of this study.  Mark 
Westfield (2000), a keen observer of events until presumably 1999, could not have 
foreseen the ongoing pertinence of the title of his book “The Gatekeepers – The 
Global Media Battle to Control Australia’s Pay TV”. 
 
Following an effectively 15-year long moratorium on subscription (or ‘pay’) 
television30, the federal government finally gave approval for services to commence 
from late 1992.  By 1995 this was achieved with delivery via MMDS, satellite and 
cable technologies.  A decade later, the dominant service provider is Foxtel and the 
dominant cable provider is Telstra with their hybrid fibre coaxial (or HFC) network. 
 
In 2003, the Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (ACCC 2003a) 
released a report calling for a formal demarcation between the infrastructure provider 
Telstra and the content provider Foxtel regarding the delivery of pay television 
services.  That bold recommendation arose from concerns over the determined 
action by Telstra and Foxtel to limit access by other service providers to its analogue 
and digital networks. 
 
This case study revisits the birth of cable television and examines the attempts of 
third parties to seek access to this infrastructure so they may deliver their content 
and establish their customer relationships.  Matters such as access to content, 
mergers within the industry or third line forcing are not explicitly addressed. 
 
4.1 The Birth & Closure of Cable 
4.1.1 Ending the moratorium 
 
Pay television services did not commence in Australia until 1995, after thirteen years 
of various public inquiries whose findings were rejected by governments due to 
political pressure from commercial television broadcasters.  It was not until the 
Broadcasting Services Act of 1992 that regulatory barriers to ‘subscription 
broadcasting’ services were finally removed – the moratorium came to an end.  
(Turner and Cunningham 2000)  Thereafter, new entrants could introduce 
subscription television services via delivery technologies such as satellite, microwave 
(MMDS) and cable. 
 
However, the introduction of pay television was intertwined with government plans to 
introduce competition to Australia’s telecommunications.  The financially troubled 
national satellite system, AUSSAT, had been sold to Optus Communications in 1991 
to enhance its ability to compete against the government-owned Telecom Australia. 
(Albon and Papandrea 1998) (Turner and Cunningham 2000) The Broadcasting 
Services Act mandated satellite delivery as the initial delivery platform for pay 
                                            
30 Defined in legislation as subscription television, the industry in Australia prefers to market 
the services as ‘pay’ television.  Harking back to the origins of the industry in the United 
States, such services there are almost universally referred to as ‘cable’ television – even 
when the delivery technology is that of satellite. 
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television, which made sense in terms of serving an Australia-wide audience from the 
outset as well as providing a revenue stream for the new Optus satellite. 
 
Despite the licensing of a satellite service, alternative means of delivery such as 
MMDS or cable were not ruled out.  In fact, the Act enabled non-satellite licences to 
be issued for a minimal cost simply upon application in writing.  An attempt by an 
entrepreneur to ‘jump the gun’ by accumulating MMDS spectrum licences for the 
delivery of pay television services prior to that of satellite was stymied in 1993 by 
legislative amendment.  It prescribed that no MMDS licences could be issued before 
satellite services commenced, with a sunset date of 31 December 1994. (Albon and 
Papandrea 1998) In any case, satellite delivery was delayed until 1995 awaiting 
settlement of technical standards for digital transmission.  Table 6 provides a 
chronology of the key events in the delivery of Australian pay television from 1992 to 
2004. 
 
Table 6: Key Events in Australian Pay Television Delivery 
 
1992 Nov. Broadcasting Services Act legalises Pay TV; end of 
moratorium 
1993 Sept. Telecom Australia trials Pay TV via HFC cable in 
Centennial Park, Sydney 
1995 Jan. Australis/Galaxy Pay TV service commences via MMDS 
ײ Sept. Australis/Galaxy Pay TV service commences via satellite 
ײ Sept. Optus Vision Pay TV service commences via HFC cable 
ײ Oct. Foxtel Pay TV service commences via HFC cable 
1996 June Optus Vision telephony service commences via HFC cable 
1997 April Telstra cable modem service commences 
ײ Oct. Telstra and Optus cable roll-outs end 
ײ Oct. Neighbourhood Cable Pay TV services, eventually 
including telephony & data, commence via HFC cable in 
Mildura, later Ballarat (2002) and Geelong (2003) 
1998 May Australis/Galaxy collapses; MMDS & satellite Pay TV 
services effectively taken over by Austar 
ײ  Austar/Windytide Pay TV service commences via HFC 
cable in Darwin 
2000 May TransACT Pay TV, telephony & data services commence 
via cable (FTTC/VDSL) in Canberra 
ײ July West Coast Radio Pay TV & data services commence via 
HFC cable in Ellenbrook, WA. 
2004 Mar. Foxtel commences conversion of subscribers to digital Pay 
TV 
   
Sources: (Albon and Papandrea 1998, p.94), (Andrews 2002), (BIS Shrapnel 2001, pp.98-
103), (TISP 2001) ,(Turner and Cunningham 2000, p.69), (Westfield 2000), (Whittle 1997), 
company Websites. 
 
The government of the day had simply not anticipated delivery via cable.  A former 
Minister was reported as saying "There was no evidence at all about a cable roll-out. 
We just hadn't anticipated where it was going.  When Optus announced its cable roll-
out there should have been a complete review (of policy)”.  (Maiden and Simpson 
1997)  Nevertheless, cable delivery of pay television did eventuate and before the 
two main systems became monopoly networks, it is instructive to appreciate why the 
incumbent Telecom Australia, later to become Telstra, originally envisaged itself as 
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the nation’s common carrier and how this was upset by plans of the newcomer 
Optus. 
 
4.1.2 The cable guys 
 
In 1975, Telecom Australia31 released a report, Telecom 2000, which examined the 
capabilities and role of telecommunications in the society of the future – a future then 
envisaged to be up to 25 years away.  The study drew upon a breadth of views and 
information from within the Commission, from specialists elsewhere in Australia and 
from overseas.  Among many topics, cable television (CTV) was considered and 
particularly how Telecom Australia could have a central role in its delivery.  Optical 
fibre was by then still a research novelty and overseas cable television networks 
constructed only of coaxial cable.  Modern systems could provide up to about 36 
channels, though 20 channels was said to be a more reasonable figure.  With the 
cable television industry still in its infancy elsewhere and the Australian scene 
dominated by free-to-air broadcasters, the authors of the 1975 report then 
considered programme material to be a relatively scarce commodity.  Accordingly, 
they observed that “The initial capacity of CTV systems in Australia would be 
expected to be well in excess of the availability of potential programmers”. (Telecom 
1975, s5.5.2)  Clearly, one cable would be more than enough! 
 
Note that in 1975, telecommunications was yet to embrace ‘competition’.  Coupled 
with the Commission being wholly government owned, this would explain the report 
recommending that: (Telecom 1975, p.89) 
 
4. The Commission should own the physical transmission plant.  This stems 
from substantial economies of common provision which will increase in the 
long-term if a common-cable medium (optical fibre) becomes available to 
reticulate both public telecommunications and CTV services. 
 
5. The principle of separation of ownership and operation be supported in any 
draft legislation for cable television; this should not exclude provision by the 
Commission of visual information services. 
 
6. The Commission lease CTV capacity to CTV operators who might be 
commercial entrepreneurs, institutions, or community groups; guidelines for 
franchising and channel assignment should be developed by the government 
committee proposed in recommendation 9. 
 
                                            
31 The Postmaster-General’s Department was corporatised in 1975 and became the 
Australian Telecommunications Commission, trading as Telecom Australia (also referred to 
herein as Telecom).  It then became the Australian and Overseas Telecommunications 
Corporation Limited in 1992 and finally Telstra Corporation Limited in 1993, trading thereafter 
as Telstra.  During 1994, many references freely swapped the titles Telecom, Telecom 
Australia and Telstra but from 1995 the trading name Telstra became widely accepted. 
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Most respondents32 to this part of the report, apart from those connected with 
government, questioned or rejected these recommendations for reasons not 
published. (Telecom 1978, p.56) 
 
The 1980s saw rapid acceptance of optical fibre as the new standard transmission 
technology, initially for long distance applications and then increasingly for customer 
access from the early 1990s onwards.  By November 1987, the first long-distance 
optical fibre link had been opened to traffic between Melbourne, Canberra and 
Sydney. (Sabine 1988) Telecom’s Strategic Management Committee decided in July 
1988 that a nationwide optical fibre network would provide the capability for carriage 
of future broadband services, including, if permitted within the regulatory framework, 
pay television. (Telecom 1992b, 2.2) The same year witnessed the commencement 
of two trials of deploying optical fibre to the home, called the OFREP project, to 
dozens of homes in Toorak, Melbourne and Centennial Park, Sydney. (Rozental, 
Griffin et al. 1992) These barely publicised trials carried content of minimal 
commercial significance and were wound up by late 1992. 
 
With at least four reports prepared during the 1980s, the Australian Government 
surely had a surfeit of advice as to how to move on the matter of introducing pay 
television.  The last report, from a House of Representatives Committee in 1989, was 
instrumental in continuing the moratorium until 1992.  It recommended that: (1989: 
4.54) 
 
(a) Telecom Australia be made the common carrier for cable pay television, as 
prescribed in legislation; and 
(b) The legislation prohibit Telecom Australia from being a pay television 
operator and from influencing or determining the program content of such 
television. 
 
In reaching this conclusion, the committee was strongly influenced by Telecom 
Australia’s progress in laying optical fibre cable and particularly their potential ability 
to connect 60 per cent of Australian homes for broadband services commencing in 
199433.  The considerable channel capacity of optical fibre was the other issue of 
attraction.  The committee justified it this way: (1989: 4.52) 
 
It is therefore almost academic to talk of other providers of optical fibre outside 
Telecom, including such providers for the final stages of cable.  It is a move that 
would be impractical because of the broadband nature of the services provided. 
 
                                            
32 The sample of respondents was self-selective, including academics, students, technical 
and lay people, and not a representative of the population at large. 
33 By February 1992, this initiative was being marketed as that of Laserlink™.  The target 
was redefined as attaining a goal of 60 per cent ‘connectivity’ of optical fibre in the customer 
access network by 1994/95.  By ‘connectivity’ it was meant that only an average of 700 
metres of cable would remain to be installed between the optical fibre cabling end point and 
customers’ premises. Telecom (1992b). Supplementary Submission to the Senate Select 
Committee on Subscription Television Broadcasting Services concerning Part 7 of the 
Broadcasting Services Bill 1992. Melbourne, Australian Overseas Telecommunications 
Corporation (Telecom Australia): 5. 
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This recommended arrangement would also keep separate the carriage and content 
businesses of pay television. 
 
The final government inquiry concerning pay television was that of a Senate Select 
Committee established to assess the proposed Part 7 of the Broadcasting Services 
Bill 1992.  Concerned not to upset the government’s plans to initially promote satellite 
delivery but determined to impress the Senate Committee (and warn off potential 
competitors) with its ongoing optical fibre roll-out, Telecom Australia made the 
following points: (Telecom 1992a) (Telecom 1992b) 
 
• In the initial years, cable delivery should not be viewed as a threat to satellite 
delivery but rather as a complementary service; 
• For the benefit of all of Australia and its economy, no pay television licensee 
should be awarded the exclusive right to determine total industry delivery 
technology at any time; 
• There should be no detrimental regulations that could cause delay in the 
development of cable delivery of broadband services, including pay television 
and interactive services. 
 
This stance was further emphasized by highlighting the creation that year of the 
Lasercast™ service involving optical fibre for delivering narrowcasted television 
programmes to businesses, government and like entities in Sydney, Canberra and 
Melbourne.  Though a common carriage video network, Lasercast was not designed 
for delivering to a residential audience. 
 
Also in 1992, Telecom Australia commissioned both fibre-to-the-home (FTTH) and 
fibre-to-the-curb (FTTC) trials in Wollongong, New South Wales.  Though delivering 
this time to a residential audience, they were limited technical trials and carried 
content not threatening to aspirant commercial providers of pay television. (Hsieh, 
Butterfield et al. 1993)  By end 1992, Telecom Australia had publicly declared its 
intention to be in the business of delivering pay television as a common carrier, that 
is, according to a business model based on open access or non-discrimination 
principles.  Among other things, these plans stated: (Kelso 1992a, pp. 52-54) 
 
The delivery technology 
• AOTC/Telecom plans to adopt the hybrid fibre coaxial (HFC) cable means to 
distribute video services to the mass residential market. 
 
The open access business model 
• AOTC could charge the Service Provider according to the following nominal 
tariff structure: 
o Per video link from ‘head end’ to local Fibre serving Areas; 
o Per household passed: 
o Per service lead-in to each household; 
o A monthly charge per household connected. 
• Blocks of TV channels would be sold, with volume discounts applicable for 
additional capacity. 
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The cable service provider 
• The Cable Service Provider would operate under a Class Licence, purchase a 
delivery network from AOTC on a long term basis, create the Cable Pay 
Television business and then charge customers for the service so delivered. 
• AOTC is willing to forge strategic alliances with Service Providers. 
 
To further reinforce its support for an open access business model, Telecom 
Australia cited the instance in the United States where the Federal Communications 
Commission had newly determined that telephone companies could offer ‘Video Dial 
Tone’, being ‘a common carrier access and transport network service for video 
information’. (Kelso 1992b) In Australian parlance, this was seen as a ‘video 
gateway’ network capability that would facilitate entry of a carrier into other value-
added video services 
 
Pursuant to the Telecommunications Act 1991, the Commonwealth Government 
awarded Optus the second carrier licence with the objective that it would compete 
against Telecom Australia in a range of consumer and business markets with fixed 
line, mobile and satellite services.  Commencing operations in 1992, Optus was well 
aware that it had five years of duopoly competition for at least fixed line services 
before open competition was anticipated after July 1997.  Whatever network 
coverage it could create by then would significantly determine how it could defend 
and grow its market share thereafter. 
 
Westfield (2000:156-157) recounts how the first year of Optus’s marketing and 
service delivery exceeded expectations, grabbing nearly 30 per cent of the mobile 
phone market and making inroads into Telecom Australia’s dominance of the long-
distance call market.  The next challenge was to compete with Telecom Australia in 
the $5 billion per year local telephony call market.  Clearly, the easiest strategy would 
be to strike a deal with Telecom Australia for access to its local call network but that 
would force Optus to be subservient to Telecom Australia by having to accept 
whatever rates were offered.  Optus was said to be already paying $250 million 
annually in interconnection fees and was concerned that future unilateral changes by 
the incumbent to its network architecture could have adverse consequences for 
Optus. (Lewis 1994c) (BTCE 1994)  Creation of a separate Optus local access 
network looked like an attractive proposition. 
 
However, commercial relations between Optus and Telecom Australia were 
deteriorating, with Telecom playing ‘hard ball’ to defend its market position.  In March 
1993, Optus commenced proceedings in the Federal Court challenging the validity of 
both Strategic Partnership Agreements and certain Corporate Flexi-Plans being 
marketed by Telecom, on the grounds that they involved discriminatory supply of 
services contrary to the Telecommunications Act 1991 in markets which Telecom 
was in a position to dominate.34  This and other disputes about access and 
interconnection continued for the remainder of the decade.  Optus developed a deep 
distrust of Telecom, believing the dominant carrier would do everything in its power to 
                                            
34 Telstra Corporation Ltd v Optus Communications Pty Ltd and Optus Networks Pty Ltd and 
Optus Communications Pty Ltd and Optus Networks Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd [1997] 
FCA 501, Federal Court of Australia, 11 June 1997 (cited on page 12). 
D.R.Kelso PhD Thesis, QUT, February 2008: Open Access to Next Generation Broadband {single line spaced version} 
 55
hinder Optus in its attempts to offer competitive services, especially where use of 
Telecom Australia infrastructure was involved. (Andrews 2002) 
 
In the meantime, Telecom Australia was continuing to show it had every intention of 
being a key player in any future pay television industry: 
 
• Telecom joined with News Corporation and the Nine Network from April 1993 in 
a syndicate to explore a mutually beneficial pay television strategy35 (Westfield 
2000: 155, 267); 
• Commencing September 1993, Telecom opened a limited trial of HFC 
technology to deliver a batch of readily available ‘pay’ and free-to-air broadcast 
television channels to some 300 homes in the Sydney suburb of Centennial 
Park. (Westfield 2000: 232, 234) The locality was selected because its 
demographics suggested residents were likely to be early adopters of pay 
television.  (Griffin 1993) 
• Telecom sought industry responses in December to a tender requesting cable 
and equipment to build a pay television network. (Meredith 1994a) 
 
The period 1993/94 would also prove to be a highly significant time for pay television 
developments in the USA that had worldwide repercussions in the arenas of strategic 
appreciation, business deals, content aggregation and technology deployment.  In an 
October 1993 deal that rocked the US communications and entertainment industries, 
Time Cable International and Bell Atlantic proclaimed the world’s largest merger.  
Westfield (2000: 229-231) proffered that no combination of companies globally would 
be better placed to exploit the opportunities on offer down the ‘information super-
highway’ and through the gateway to the home posed by the Set Top Box (STB)36.  
Although that deal had fallen over by February 1994, it had already triggered a frenzy 
of mergers and investments. 
 
According to Maney (1995: 2, 6): 
 
Companies across the communications, information and entertainment 
industries had been caught off guard.  They were aware of the industry 
transformation that had begun early in 1993.  They were buzzing about 
‘technological convergence’ – the supposed melding of televisions, telephones, 
computers and content into one technology, one industry.  Cable companies 
were testing ways to carry phone calls.  Computer companies were looking at 
ways to put video on PC screens.  Hollywood was thinking about selling movies 
over phone lines. 
 
At the start of 1993, telephone companies were boring voice-communications 
utilities that couldn’t come up with anything more exciting than ‘call-waiting’.  
Within a year, they started efforts to become futuristic video and information 
companies. 
 
Key developments were the technologies to digitally compress television signals for 
carriage over telephone lines and to carry telephony calls over HFC systems of cable 
                                            
35 Thereafter dubbed the Packer-Murdoch-Telecom or PMT consortium. 
36 Some references also refer to the STB as a Set Top Unit or STU. 
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television companies.  Opportunities for the mass market to access the Internet were 
only just beginning to be appreciated. 
 
During 1993, Optus was in regular discussion with Continental Cablevision, the 
number three cable television operator in the USA.  They were on the threshold of a 
technological breakthrough to pass both telephone and pay television signals down 
the same optical fibre and coaxial cables.  Well aware of Telecom’s intentions, Optus 
was fast becoming convinced that if it created its own HFC network, pay television 
could act as a carrot to attract subscribers for telephony and online services. 
(Westfield 2000: 157) 
 
For Optus the unpalatable alternative of not building its own network was the risk of 
being marginalized by the expected rush of new competitors entering the market 
after deregulation in July 1997.  That fateful date was then just over three years 
away.  The question confronting both Optus and Telecom was how they should react, 
not whether they should, recounted Westfield. (2000: 231) The rewards would go to 
the company which moved first and secured the best content package. 
 
4.1.3 The coming of closure 
 
Events moved during 1994 with a speed perhaps unparalleled in Australian 
telecommunications and broadcasting history.  During January and February, 
Telecom furthered its selection of a tenderer of the necessary cable and equipment 
elements of a pay television network and formed a wholly-owned company 
‘Visionstream’ to undertake the roll-out. (Meredith 1994a) (Meredith 1994c) Telecom 
welcomed the Packer and Murdoch organisations into a newly formed ‘PMT’ 
consortium to lease a block of analogue channels, within the limit of the possible 67 
available37, but insisted that the remainder of cable capacity would be open to all 
comers who wanted to use it. (Westfield 2000: 236) In turn, representatives of the 
Packer and Murdoch organisations pressed Telecom for a share of the telephony 
revenue that could be derived from services offered with the proposed network, on 
the basis that this would improve the economics of any investment by them.  
Telecom was unimpressed with such a proposal.38 
 
Since 1992, Telecom had been distributing a few channels from Turner 
Broadcasting, including CNN, to certain organisations in Sydney, Canberra and 
Melbourne via its Lasercast network.  The rather small Australian company behind 
that deal, Cable Television Services (CTS), nurtured a growing interest in expanding 
such a service to the greater residential market along with Telecom’s developing 
intentions in the field of pay television delivery.  CTS also arranged for these Turner 
channels to be supplied over the trial networks at Wollongong and Centennial Park.  
In this manner CTS, in addition to the Australian Broadcasting Corporation and the 
Special Broadcasting Service, established an ongoing dialogue with Telecom 
regarding possible content for carriage over a future Telstra pay television network.  
                                            
37 The analogue HFC network channel capacity was later said to be 64. 
38 Unlike Optus, Telecom/Telstra had no intention of offering a telephony service via its HFC 
cable as that would have cannibalized its paired copper-based local access network. 
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These discussions had run for at least a year before the PMT consortium came on 
the scene.39 
 
CTS obtained licences from the Australian Broadcasting Authority (ABA) in February 
1994 to operate 10 pay television services over a delivery means other than satellite, 
for example cable40, and by early March had reached an agreement with Telecom to 
be allocated the first 10 channels on its proposed cable-delivered pay television 
network. (Meredith 1994b) No price for carriage had been initially agreed.  CTS 
gained another 10 licences from the ABA in June the same year. (Meredith 1994d) 
(Syvret 1994) By April, the board of Telecom Australia gave formal approval to 
proceed with the first stage of roll-out of an HFC network. (Westfield 2000: 237)  The 
tension between pay television aspirants was palpable, heightened all the more when 
Australis Media managed to win most of the MMDS licences for microwave delivery. 
 
The above events in early 1994 brought to a head discussions Optus had been 
having with Continental Cablevision for at least a year.  The board of Optus approved 
plans for a joint-venture partnership from July to build “an advanced broadband 
network … to deliver local phone calls, pay and cable TV, interactive entertainment 
and information systems on a hybrid fibre-coaxial cable system”. (Meredith 1994f) 
The potential for a new revenue stream directly from telephony calls and the prospect 
of reduced interconnection payments to Telecom were the main attractions.  No 
mention was made then as to whether the Optus-Continental Cablevision network 
would be a closed network, or operated as a common carriage facility like the plans 
of Telecom Australia. 
 
In the meantime, Telecom was being inundated with approaches for channel capacity 
on its soon-to-be created HFC network.  By end May, CTS had been allocated 20 
channels and requests for capacity from other service providers were in various 
stages of discussion. (Syvret 1994) With a maximum analogue capacity now 
admitted to be 64 channels, Telecom revealed to the regulator AUSTEL41 that it 
recognised a potential problem of channel scarcity arising, and would have to 
determine who the serious players were in the developing industry before further 
channel allocation.42  Other possible contenders for channels included Australis, who 
wished to also distribute on cable their forthcoming satellite and MMDS channels, the 
Nine Network and News Corporation, and Channel Ten. (Meredith 1994e) (Westfield 
2000: 253) 
 
At least one complaint, possibly from Australis, had been lodged with AUSTEL and 
the Trade Practices Commission43 claiming that Telecom Australia was denying 
                                            
39 Information in the above paragraph is based on my personal recollection. 
40 Refer to the Australian Communications and Media Authority Website for licences 
allocated under Section 96 of the Broadcasting Services Act 1992; 
http://www.acma.gov.au/WEB/STANDARD//pc=PC_90046 accessed 13 may 2007 
41 From July 1997, AUSTEL became the Australian Communications Authority, which in turn 
became the Australian Communications and Media Authority from July 2005. 
42 Telecom Presentation to AUSTEL on Pay Television, 31 May 1994 
43 From 1995, the Trade Practices Commission became the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission, or ACCC. 
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access to its HFC network44. (Lewis 1994a) Telecom was under increased pressure 
to devise a fair and reasonable process for channel allocation, in addition to an 
acceptable pricing plan.  The hoarding of channels by parties who gained more than 
their immediate needs was of particular concern; claims were also made that CTS 
was trying to on-sell part of its allocation. (Lewis 1994a)  Communications Minister 
Michael Lee was reported as having made it clear he did not want Telecom to hand 
out channels unless users could guarantee they had the programs.  In addition, 
AUSTEL would need to ensure the public interest was protected when it came time 
to approving Telecom’s charges for the new service. (Burton 1994) 
 
Being a dominant carrier under the Telecommunications Act 1991, Telecom Australia 
was required to file a tariff with AUSTEL if it desired to supply a pay television service 
via cable to programme providers as well as the viewing public.45  On 16 August 
1994, Telecom announced the wholesale tariffs and conditions for programme 
providers to utilise its new ‘Videostream’ product as including: (Lewis 1994b) 
(Korporaal 1994) 
 
• A one-off fee of $500,000 for access to the network from a central play-out 
point; plus 
• $50,000 per channel delivered; plus 
• 50 cents per channel for every subscriber the programme provider signed up; 
plus 
• No service provider could have more than 15 channels out of the maximum 60 
or 64 available. 
 
The PMT consortium, established the previous year primarily to spoil the moves by 
other satellite and MMDS aspirants but also as a defensive play to watch one 
another’s backs, was going nowhere and was dissolved on 9 September (Westfield 
2000: 267-269) (Furness and Lewis 1994)  The Nine Network and News Corporation 
were then legally free to pursue other opportunities about which they had been 
privately negotiating for some months.  Whilst Telecom Australia had been focussing 
on the roll-out of their cable network and tariffs to entice programme providers, 
Optus, the Nine Network and News Corporation recognised the critical importance of 
programming agreements. 
 
The Optus and Continental Cablevision joint venture, formalised on 20 September 
1994 as Optus Vision, was further bolstered by agreements with the Seven and Nine 
Networks. (Korporaal 1994) Strenuous efforts were underway to also bring in News 
Corporation and thereby totally isolate Telecom.  Suddenly, Telecom was faced with 
the potential of deploying an extensive network but with no major programming 
                                            
44 Telstra was later reported to have taken a booking from Galaxy, the Australis pay-tv 
service, for 15 cable channels. Meredith, H. (1994h). Telstra Races Forward in Pursuit of 
Viewers. Australian Financial Review: 1. 
  
45 Of necessity, such a basic carriage service had to offered on an ‘open access’ basis that 
was non-discriminatory to all providers and customers.  This particular tariff was directed only 
to television programme providers. 
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customers46 and, due its reliance on an open access business model, no business 
partners.  The Optus cable roll-out plans would pass half of Australia’s six million 
homes and cost $3 billion. (Westfield 2000: 267) The one cable would deliver both 
pay television and telephony services. 
 
Optus then dropped a bombshell that would forever change the Australian landscape 
for pay television.  Optus Vision declared that whilst it would be bound by the 
‘common carrier’ requirements of the Telecommunications Act 1991 regarding 
telephony services, the part of the cable being used to supply pay television was 
covered by the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 which does not require open access 
to all comers. (Ries 1994) Optus and its partners, Continental Cablevision and the 
Seven and Nine Networks would be the sole suppliers of pay television programmes. 
 
Already concerned at the prospect of duplicated cable networks, Communications 
Minister Michael Lee was confronted with an Optus proposal that ran counter to the 
Government’s philosophy of open access for end-line consumers and content 
providers. (Furness 1994) Optus sought approval of its plans from the Trade 
Practices Commission and AUSTEL, and the Minister subsequently requested 
AUSTEL to report on the legalities of operating a closed network. (Korporaal 1994) 
(Furness 1994) 
 
Insight into the Optus decision to close access to its pay television cable was given 
by their legal advisor Bill Spain who reportedly told a conference audience: (Furness 
1994) 
 
• Telecom’s decision to treat its cable television network on a common carriage 
basis was not necessarily correct or desirable from a commercial or policy 
perspective; 
• There was virtually nowhere in the world where the common-carrier approach 
had been adopted in relation to pay television; 
• It was misleading to describe the Optus Vision concept as ‘closed’ because it 
would acquire most of its programming from third-party sources; 
• By securing arbitrary control over content, the commercial rewards would be 
much greater for those involved, enabling them to choose product that promises 
to attract the widest market of consumers; 
• The alternative would be an open access system enabling education and other 
community services to make a claim for scarce space that would probably 
deliver less substantial revenues than, for example, movies and sport. 
 
According to the then Optus Director of Corporate and Regulatory Affairs, Mr Andrew 
Bailey “We are going to invest $3 billion and we have got to make the pay TV venture 
work and if you let go of the decision making on content, you let go of a part of your 
capacity to raise revenue”. (Frith 1994a) Commenting on Telecom’s tariff application 
limiting any one service provider to a maximum of 15 channels out of a total of 60 
available, Optus chief executive Bob Mansfield pointed out that this could result in 
                                            
46 CTS, being the only programme provider then signed up to Videostream channels , was a 
rather small company without a unique claim to pay television material; the company ran into 
financial difficulty around October 1994 and its agreement subsequently bought out by 
Telecom once an exclusive arrangement was being negotiated with News Corporation. 
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only four service providers on Telecom’s pay television network – hardly open slather 
in terms of general access.  “It’s a limited competitive model, anyway.  It’s not 
competition.  It’s just a little bit more open”, he said. (Korporaal 1994)  Mansfield also 
argued that outside content providers would confuse subscribers and weaken the 
Optus marketing effort. (Westfield 2000: 286) By packaging its pay television and 
telephony services, pay television would act as an incentive to ‘pull through’ 
customers to the Optus telephone service. 
 
Nevertheless, by end-August as the PMT consortium neared its end, Telecom 
Australia chief executive Frank Blount did acknowledge Telstra’s vulnerability: 
(Meredith 1994g) 
 
We do not intend to be marginalised in this business – and that is what we 
would be if we were only in carriage. 
 
We have to provide carriage services, but the margins are not in basic carriage. 
 
The issue was content, not infrastructure, he said.  Blount believed that the way 
forward for Telecom was to find additional joint-venture partners who could provide 
the pay television content, including the possibility of Telecom taking equity in these 
companies.  Blount later recalled “We were going to have an open system, they 
(Optus) would have a closed one.  I couldn’t see how the two could co-exist”. 
(Westfield 2000: 290) 
 
The Optus Vision plan spurred Telecom to crystallise an alliance with News 
Corporation to solve the content problem.  On 11 November 1994, a joint venture 
was announced whereby Telecom would accelerate its cable roll-out, bearing the full 
cost, and a Telecom-News programming company would provide a multi-channel pay 
television service on the cable.47 (Furness and Burton 1994) Three days later, 
Telecom withdrew its Videostream tariff and abandoned its former intention to have 
an open access network. (Kelso 1996)  In so doing, Telecom Australia abandoned a 
philosophy it had cherished at least since 1975. 
 
4.1.4 The government decides 
 
By the direction of the Federal Minister for Communications and the Arts, Michael 
Lee, AUSTEL conducted an inquiry into the legality of firstly the Optus proposal for a 
closed access pay television network and then, given Telecom’s late change of heart, 
an almost matching proposal from Telecom Australia. 
 
Optus Communications had declared it would install a broadband cable network for 
the delivery of pay television, data and telephony, but with the proviso that access to 
the network would be closed to other parties.  This claim for exclusivity relied on two 
grounds: 
                                            
47 On 9 March 1995, this joint venture was formalised as Foxtel which since October 1998 
has had the following ownership: Telstra 50 per cent; News Corporation 25 per cent; 
Publishing & Broadcasting 25 per cent. 
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• Analogue transmission over cable gave insufficient channel capacity for others; 
• The new broadband cable system would be owned and operated by a non-
carrier service provider, Optus Vision, which was not obligated to provide open 
access under the Telecommunications Act 1991. 
 
The first ground was built upon an inescapable outcome of the only technology 
available at that time, although it was debatable as to what constituted ‘insufficient 
channel capacity’.  However, the second ground was purely the result of a clever 
legal subterfuge. 
 
Optus Vision was established as a joint venture specifically to own and operate the 
broadband cable system, with installation and maintenance by Optus Networks 
utilizing its rights and immunities as a licensed general carrier.  Telephony access 
would be provided by the non-carrier Optus Vision back to the carrier Optus 
Networks, in addition to carriage services for pay television being provided to another 
entity Multicom which held the necessary licences under the Broadcasting Services 
Act 1992.  According to Ferguson (1996), the Optus exclusive access arrangement 
was a key factor in securing investment in the network roll-out. 
 
AUSTEL observed that, whilst Optus Vision could operate as a Service Provider 
under the Telecommunications Act 1991 to effect 'closed access' to parties other 
than those in the joint venture, such an arrangement may not have been 
contemplated under the Act and the impact upon competition should be considered.  
Nevertheless, other important considerations were that the Optus Vision network 
would result in a competitive local telephone service for the first time to a broad base 
of residential customers, and that the pay television carriage services provided for 
Multicom would further extend competition and consumer choice. (AUSTEL 1994) 
 
In addition to any special status derived from their proposed organisational 
arrangement, Optus claimed that the analogue technology to be deployed produced 
only a relatively small number of television channels (64 in fact) which, according to 
the joint venture's business plan, were a scarce resource that was necessary to fully 
allocate to Multicom.  AUSTEL concluded that with the advent of digitalisation, 
channel capacity relief would ultimately remove any justification for discriminatory 
provision of service.  On the other hand, Optus Vision could nevertheless continue to 
operate in the same vein since it was a Service Provider and not a carrier, and hence 
not be subject to the usual requirements of access. 
 
AUSTEL likewise concluded that Telstra's broadband joint venture proposal with 
News Ltd was similar to that of Optus in that the cable network was to be installed by 
a licensed carrier but owned and operated by a Service Provider who in turn would 
provide pay television carriage on to a licensed broadcaster and telephony carriage 
back to the licensed carrier.  The evidence submitted by Telstra led AUSTEL to 
believe that the initial (pre-digital) phase of pay television services could extend for at 
least three years.  With the AUSTEL report to the Minister being dated 23 November 
1994, limited capacity may then have been said to be a constraint to open access at 
least until end 1997.  In other words, limited channel capacity was seen to be an 
artefact only of the initial phase of pay television services; the advent of digitalisation 
should remove any justification for discriminatory provision of service.  AUSTEL 
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considered that where the Service Provider network is characterised by strictly 
limited capacity, the then current form of the Trade Practices Act should not require 
either Optus Vision or Telstra to provide pay television carriage to third parties. 
(AUSTEL 1994) 
 
The Optus and Telstra organisational arrangements are depicted in Figure 3.  
Despite the differences in detail, in both cases the Service Provider (later to be 
known as a 'Carrier Associate') would own and operate new broadband cable 
infrastructure that would be installed and maintained by the relevant carrier. 
 
AUSTEL concluded that Government policy objectives would be met most 
appropriately by a combination of a direction from the Minister and an amendment to 
the Service Providers Class Licence. 
 
Figure 3 – Comparison of Optus Vision and MOCO (Telstra Multimedia/Foxtel) 
Proposals (extracted from AUSTEL 1994) 
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In announcing his acceptance of the AUSTEL report on 24 November 1994, Minister 
Michael Lee cited the two critical issues as being duplication of cable infrastructure 
and access to the broadband cable network. (Lee 1994) 
 
He justified the former on the grounds of encouraging greater competition in 
telecommunications without the need to resort to splitting up Australia into regional 
monopolies.48  Regarding the desire of Optus Vision and Telstra Multimedia for 
closed access to their broadband cabling, the Minister supported the argument that 
greater benefit would accrue from the roll-out of cable not being delayed if the 
builders of each cable could share revenue from both content provision as well as 
carriage.  In addition, closed access should be tolerated during the period when the 
service provider had limited network capacity due to analogue technology.  
Recognising that closed access could be seen as discriminatory and hence 
inconsistent with both the Telecommunications Act and the Government's general 
competition policy, Minister Lee agreed to closed access operating at least until 1 
July 1997. 
 
The resultant Direction to AUSTEL from the Minister took the form of the 
Telecommunications (Service Providers Class Licence) Direction No. 1 of 1995, 
hereafter called 'the Carrier Associates Direction'.  It created the new entity of a 
'Carrier Associate', which has a direct or indirect interest in a carrier and a significant 
influence on the carrier's business activities.  The Direction required AUSTEL to 
issue a class licence governing the conditions under which a carrier associate is 
permitted to supply certain services. (Butler 1995) 
 
In brief, where Carrier Associates such as Optus Vision and Telstra Multimedia were 
already providing a pay television service they would be exempted from being 
required to provide access for another person's (the 'recipient') pay television service 
up until 1 July 1997, but in any case not if one of the following applies: 
 
• AUSTEL deems connection of the requested service to be not technically 
feasible; 
• The Carrier Associate deems the recipient to be not creditworthy, et al; 
• The Carrier Associate deems there to be inadequate capacity to meet it's own 
reasonably anticipated network requirements, or the needs of the recipient; 
• The requested service has not been previously separately supplied to another 
person. 
 
In like manner to the above, the grounds on which a Carrier Associate may 
discriminate against another person include the supply of a pay television service 
prior to 1 July 1997.  However, applicable at all times are a wide range of additional 
grounds such as: 
 
• In relation to the supply of telecommunications services for community, 
charitable or educational purposes, or for the promotion of health, 
• The recipient is a person who is disadvantaged on financial or health grounds; 
• The difference in costs that would be borne by the carrier associate; 
                                            
48 A suggestion that had been promoted by Kerry Packer and abhorred by the Government. 
D.R.Kelso PhD Thesis, QUT, February 2008: Open Access to Next Generation Broadband {single line spaced version} 
 64
• The different characteristics involved with the intended service; 
• The commercial value of the service to the recipient; 
• The desirability of trial programs and demonstrations being conducted (by the 
carrier associate) that promote the objects of the Act. 
 
Such discrimination, which may relate to the charges for or the performance 
characteristics of the service concerned, may in particular be justified in terms of 
costs borne by the carrier associate in respect of service quantities, transmission or 
bandwidth capacity, the places from or to which the service is supplied and the 
relevant periods of supply, the required performance characteristics, (unspecified) 
network matters and costs of an administrative or operational nature.  Where the 
discrimination is argued on grounds of insufficient capacity, the carrier associate may 
take into account its ‘reasonably anticipated requirements’ which may extend to the 
introduction of new kinds of eligible services not currently provided. 
 
On hearing the Minister’s announcement, Optus immediately threatened to walk 
away from its proposed investment: “If the changes announced by the Minister are 
passed into law, then Optus Vision will withdraw from the race, the monopoly powers 
of Telstra will be greatly enhanced and the prospect of local phone calls becoming 
cheaper will effectively disappear”. (Optus Vision 1994)  This was pure bluff, as 
Optus had already won the main argument about closing its network. 
 
Commercial cable television in Australia was born in 1995, with the launch of the first 
Optus Vision pay television service on 20 September and that of Foxtel on 23 
October.  With government blessing, both commenced as closed networks. 
 
4.2 Potential Bottlenecks with HFC Networks 
 
A hybrid fibre coaxial or HFC network, as the name implies, employs a combination 
of optical fibre and coaxial cable.  Due to its favourable economics, HFC has been 
very popular for delivering analogue pay television channels to subscribers but is 
upgradable to digital working once changes are made to the Head End and every Set 
Top Box (STB).  An advanced HFC network is capable of also delivering telephony 
and Internet access (data) services.  As shown in Figure 4, all signals (telephony, 
video and data) are funnelled to a common point called a Head End, typically 
arranged to have one per major city, and thereafter distributed by optical fibre in a 
star topology out into suburban areas.  Once a given fibre reaches a group of some 
500 to 2000 potential subscribers, the optical signals are converted at a Hub into 
radio frequency signals for transmission over coaxial cables which run down streets, 
branching where necessary, and finally terminating on STBs in subscriber premises. 
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Figure 4 – Basic Topology of a Hybrid Fibre Coaxial Network 
 
An HFC network is a shared delivery medium, such that signals for all the 
subscribers fed from a given optical hub are available at every household served by 
that hub.  This calls for a system to be in place that identifies each and every 
subscriber with a unique address and then provides or denies access by subscribers 
to a desired service on an as-required basis, that is, conditionally.  Such a 
'conditional access' regime embodies the following basic functions: (Kelso 1996) 
 
• The form of the picture signal is continually changed (that is, scrambled) so that 
it is unintelligible without a suitable de-scrambler and electronic key at the 
customer's Set Top Box; 
• The electronic key needed to de-scramble the signal is continually changed (via 
data encryption under control of the operator) so that the keys are secure from 
piracy; 
• A process of subscription management is required in order to receive and 
process requests for new or discontinued services, and to pass on relevant data 
to the systems that authorize access as well as initiate billing; and 
• These arrangements are economically and securely implemented on a mass 
market basis via a programmable 'smart card' inserted into each STB. 
 
 
Figure 5 – Functional Diagram of a Conditional Access System 
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Figure 5 depicts the typical functions of a conditional access system or CAS 
appended to an HFC network.  Additional elements critical to a modern pay television 
business can be: 
 
• The Applications Programme Interface or API: This software, usually proprietary 
and often categorized as middleware, runs on the STB between the operating 
system and the different applications. (Galperin 2002) 
• Electronic Navigation Software; EPG: Evident to the subscriber as an electronic 
programme guide or EPG, this software enables subscribers to access 
information about available services and perform scheduling functions. 
 
Any of the above elements may present themselves to an access seeker as a 
technical or commercial bottleneck.  The most fundamental is whether there is 
sufficient transmission capacity to deliver the requested services.  The Telstra/Foxtel 
and Optus pay television services commenced with analogue signal transmission on 
HFC networks which are inherently limited to about 64 television channels.  Their 
respective carrier associates immediately announced plans to use most if not all of 
these channels into the near future. 
 
Digital technology greatly increases the number of channels and facilitates early 
forms of interactivity, but still embodies CAS, API and EPG facilities.  Cowie and 
Marsden (1999) describe how digitisation raises the potential for a new series of 
bottlenecks and consequently higher barriers to entry by competitive service 
providers.  Vertically integrated operators who control the content, bundling into 
channels, channel packaging, the means of delivery, conditional access, consumer 
reception equipment and subscriber management greatly increase the potential for 
market abuse of such bottlenecks. (Cowie and Marsden 1998)  According to these 
authors, there are a number of commercial bottlenecks which can also restrict access 
by third parties: 
 
• Services viewed as potentially competitive with a (vertically integrated) access 
provider’s own offerings may be flatly denied access; 
• Access providers may exert undue influence to ‘encourage’ independent third 
parties to join a proprietary service package; 
• Access to the facility may only be granted on discriminatory terms; 
• Where access is granted on non-discriminatory terms, a monopoly access fee 
may be charged (which may not be economically efficient); 
• Proprietary services may only be sold when bundled with non-proprietary 
services, thereby leveraging market power to related markets (foreclosure); and 
• Access terms may contain ‘unreasonable’ restrictions, such as platform 
exclusivity clauses, which reduce scope for competition. 
 
In the United States where pay (‘cable’) television companies have also provided 
access to non-affiliated ISPs, examples of bottlenecks for data services were 
reported as including: (Saltzer 1999) 
 
• Video limits.  Some access providers limit the number of minutes that a 
customer may use a ‘streaming video’ connection. 
D.R.Kelso PhD Thesis, QUT, February 2008: Open Access to Next Generation Broadband {single line spaced version} 
 67
• Server restrictions.  While advertising the benefits of being ‘always on’ the 
Internet, some providers impose an ‘acceptable use’ contract that forbids 
customers from operating an Internet service, such as a Web site. 
• Fixed backbone choice.  The traffic route may cause distance-related delays or 
response-slowing congestion which can significantly interfere with some kinds 
of service, such as video conferencing or interactive file editing. 
• Data packet filtering. 
• A prohibition on home networks. 
 
4.3 Opening the Door to Access: Deeming & Declaration 
 
With the introduction of open competition into the Australian telecommunications 
market commencing 1 July 1997, the ACCC gained the power to mandate access to 
a carriage service by ‘declaring’ that service49 under a new Part XIC of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (TPA).  The prime object of Part XIC is to promote the long-term 
interests of end-users or LTIE of what are called ‘listed services’, that is, carriage 
services or of services provided by means of carriage services.  In determining what 
constitutes the LTIE, the ACCC must give regard to the objectives of promoting 
competition in markets for the listed services, achieving any-to-any connectivity in 
relation to carriage services that involve communication between end-users, and 
encouraging the economically efficient use of, and the economically efficient 
investment in, the infrastructure by which the listed services are supplied.50 
 
The key effect of declaration is to require the supply of declared services by an 
access provider to an access seeker on demand.  Such supply is described in 
section 152AR of the TPA in terms of standard access obligations or SAOs. 
According to Grant (2004: 89), ‘access’ refers to the ability of carriers and service 
providers to pass and receive telecommunications traffic over each other’s networks, 
in order to fulfil the imperative that all end-users of similar services be able to connect 
with one another, irrespective of the particular networks to which they are connected. 
 
The following partial extract of section 152AR highlights the main elements of a 
standard access obligation: 
 
(2) For the purposes of this section, if a carrier or a carriage service provider 
supplies declared services, whether to itself or to other persons:  
(a) the carrier or provider is an access provider; and 
(b) the declared services are active declared services. 
(3) An access provider must, if requested to do so by a service provider:  
(a) supply an active declared service to the service provider in order that 
the service provider can provide carriage services and/or content services; 
and 
(4) Paragraph (3)(a) does not impose an obligation to the extent (if any) to 
which the imposition of the obligation would have any of the following effects:  
(a) preventing a service provider who already has access to the declared 
service from obtaining a sufficient amount of the service to be able to meet 
                                            
49 Under Part XIC of the TPA, there is no general right of access.  Rather, the ACCC must 
first ‘declare’ (that is, decide to regulate) a particular service. 
50 As per Section 152AB of the TPA. 
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the service provider's reasonably anticipated requirements, measured at 
the time when the request was made; 
(b) preventing the access provider from obtaining a sufficient amount of 
the service to be able to meet the access provider's reasonably anticipated 
requirements, measured at the time when the request was made; 
(c) preventing a person from obtaining, by the exercise of a pre-request 
right, a sufficient level of access to the declared service to be able to meet 
the person's actual requirements; 
(d) depriving any person of a protected contractual right. 
 
As a vehicle for linking the 1991 telecommunications regime to that of 1997, the 
ACCC was empowered under section 39 of the Telecommunications (Transitional 
Provisions and Consequential Amendments) Act 1997 to ‘deem’ certain services as 
declared services with effect from 1 July 1997.  In the case of the Telstra/Foxtel and 
Optus pay television networks, deeming was necessary as the 1995 ‘carrier 
associates’ exemption to permit closed access would expire from 1 July 1997.  One 
of the eleven services so deemed by the ACCC was that of a ‘broadcasting access 
service’ defined as: 
 
An analogue service necessary for the purpose of enabling the supply of a 
broadcasting service by means of line links that deliver signals to end-users, 
and of a kind that was used for those purposes on 13 September 1996.  This is 
an access service which provides a basic carriage and distribution access 
function together with other functions as requested. 
 
The specification of ‘line links’ clearly encompassed analogue cable television 
services of the type already provided by Foxtel (via Telstra) and Optus Vision (via 
Optus Networks) since late 1995.  Furthermore, in accordance with section 152AR of 
the TPA and as recommended by the Telecommunications Access Forum, the 
resultant SAO would from then on include ancillary services such as the functions of 
network management access, conditional access and subscriber premises servicing.  
This could include any in situ set top box or STB.  An access seeker could opt to ‘mix 
and match’ whichever service elements they required. (ACCC 1997a) Broadly 
speaking, the intent was to address the full range of technical bottlenecks as 
previously discussed. 
 
The flexibility of this service definition ( … “together with other functions as 
requested”) raised concerns within the industry as to the validity of the declaration, 
thereby purportedly discouraging access seekers.  To resolve the uncertainty, the 
ACCC commenced a public inquiry in December 1998.  (Grant 2004: 107) This led to 
a new declaration in August 1999 of an analogue pay television service as being 
subject to a range of standard access obligations, pursuant to sections 152AL(3) and 
152AR of the TPA, though removing the element of access seeker choice.  In brief, 
these standard access obligations required an access provider to: 
 
• Supply the declared service; 
• Ensure that the declared service supplied is of equivalent technical and 
operational quality as that which the provider supplies to itself; 
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• Ensure that the fault detection, handling and rectification in relation to the 
declared service is of equivalent technical and operational quality as that which 
it provides to itself; 
• Permit interconnection of its facilities with those of the access seeker; and 
• Provide particular billing information to the access seeker. 
 
As before, the scope of the declared service encompassed pay television services 
delivered via cable, but it did not extend to digital signal transmission.  The revised 
service description of an analogue subscription television broadcast carriage service 
then became: (ACCC 1999) 
 
A service for the carriage, by means of lines, of analogue signals used for the 
purposes of transmitting a subscription television service from a facility owned, 
controlled or operated by a carrier or carriage service provider to any point on, 
or in, a line link, customer cabling, or customer equipment connected to that 
facility. 
 
Examples of this service are the delivery of analogue signals used for the 
purposes of transmitting a subscription television service to: 
(a) an end-user’s television set; 
(b) conditional-access customer equipment of an end-user51, or potential end 
user, of a subscription television service; 
(c) a wall socket at the premises of an end-user, or potential end-user, of a 
subscription television service; 
(d) a point on a line link from which a lead-in connection may be run to the 
premises of an end-user, or potential end-user, of a subscription 
television service. 
 
Section 152AR(8) was of particular relevance to analogue pay television services in 
that it provided a legislated avenue for an access seeker to gain access to the 
conditional access equipment of another provider: 
 
Conditional-access customer equipment 
 
(8) If an access provider supplies an active declared service by means of 
conditional-access customer equipment, the access provider must, if requested 
to do so by a service provider who has made a request referred to in subsection 
(3), supply to the service provider any service that is necessary to enable the 
service provider to supply carriage services and/or content services by means 
of the active declared service and using the equipment. 
 
In justifying its decision, the ACCC said, in part: (ACCC 1999) 
 
Each of the carriage providers has an incentive to restrict access to the 
infrastructure it controls, because of the vertical links between the carriage and 
retail pay television services. 
 
                                            
51 That is, a Set Top Box. 
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In the event that the access seeking and access providing parties are unable to 
agree on the terms and conditions related to implementing the above obligations, 
either the ACCC can arbitrate and make a determination or the access provider can 
file an access undertaking which, if accepted by the Commission, becomes a legally 
binding obligation. (ACCC 2004a) However, the ACCC did not formally revoke the 
original deemed declaration and as we shall see later on, the existence of two current 
declarations in respect to the same service led to legal challenge. (Grant 2004: 107) 
 
During August and September 1999, Seven Cable Television (C7) formally requested 
access to the broadcast carriage services of the Telstra cable television network.  
Likewise, in August 1999 Television & Radio Broadcasting Services Australia 
(TARBS) sought access to the declared services in a request to Telstra, News 
Corporation and Foxtel.52  All requests for access were refused by the access 
providers, justified on a variety of grounds.  Two streams of substantially parallel 
activity then ensued: legal challenges and ACCC-sponsored arbitration, both 
extending over a number of years. 
 
So far, we have considered only the matter of access by competitive service or 
programme providers to television channels and associated services delivered via an 
HFC network.  The second prospect for ‘open’ access is that of access by 
competitive Internet service providers to the data capacity via cable modems – an 
access issue that has been the defining one in the United States.  Strangely, the 
opposite has been the case in Australia.  Barring voluntary action by cable providers 
Telstra and Optus, the ACCC would need to declare a cable modem service 
delivered via an HFC pay television network.  According to a 2001 interview with an 
ACCC senior official, “nobody has approached us in any concerted way to ask us to 
look at declaration” and so to date cable modem access remains closed. (Chirgwin 
2001: 60)  In other words, a subscriber requesting an Internet data capability from the 
Telstra HFC network can now only receive access to Telstra’s BigPond ISP, and a 
subscriber requesting an Internet data capability from the Optus HFC network can 
now only receive access to the Optus ISP. 
 
4.4 Challenge & Counter-Challenge 
 
Section 152AR of the Trade Practices Act 1974 has been the prime focus of the 
resultant flurry of legal actions to both seek and deny access to the analogue pay 
television service delivered by Foxtel through Telstra’s HFC network.53  Contention 
initially centred on whether the 1997 Deeming and/or 1999 Declaration by the ACCC 
were valid and whether section 152AR(4) negated the standard access obligations 
on the grounds that there was insufficient ‘amount of the service’ (that is, analogue 
channel capacity) to be able to meet the ‘reasonably anticipated requirements’ of 
Foxtel and that the provision of service by Telstra to Foxtel was subject to a 
‘protected contractual right’. 
 
                                            
52 Seven Cable Television Pty Ltd v Telstra Corp Ltd [2000] FCA 350, Federal Court of 
Australia, 27 March 2000. 
53 In contrast, the Optus HFC network has been spared equivalent legal action but 
nevertheless remains closed to third party access. 
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4.4.1 Validity of deeming and declaration 
 
The subscription or pay television service marketed as Foxtel is based on a number 
of agreements between, among other parties, Telstra and its subsidiary Telstra 
Multimedia, and Foxtel and its subsidiaries.  Figure 3 schematically outlines these 
arrangements.  In brief, Foxtel delivers pay television content to subscribers by 
utilising the carriage services of Telstra. 
 
During 1999 and 2000, the relevant Foxtel and Telstra entities challenged on 
administrative grounds the validity of both the 1997 deeming and 1999 declaration 
made by the ACCC relating to access to analogue subscription television 
broadcasting services.  If the actions of the ACCC were found to be invalid, pay 
television carriage would not be subject to the competition regime set out in Part XIC 
of the Trade Practices Act.  Furthermore, it was claimed that both instruments had no 
application since Foxtel was neither a carrier nor a carriage service provider. 
 
The Federal Court held that the deemed service declaration was invalid in part but 
that the revised declaration was valid.54, 55  Furthermore, it held that in delivering 
content to the public, Foxtel delivered the listed carriage service known as Foxtel 
subscription television via network units owned by a licensed carrier, Telstra.  
Accordingly, Foxtel was a carriage service provider within the meaning of section 
152AC of the TPA and therefore an access provider of the services so declared by 
the ACCC.56  Appeals to the Full Court and the High Court against this decision were 
refused. 57, 58 (Grant 2004: 107) 
 
4.4.2 Sufficient amount of service/channel capacity 
 
The Telstra hybrid fibre coaxial (HFC) network commences at a capital city Head End 
installation in the form of optical fibres radiating out to regional Nodes and local 
exchanges, and terminating at optical/radio frequency devices in the street called 
Hubs.  From there, coaxial cabling continues towards the customer premises 
whereupon lead-in cables connect to the Set Top Boxes.  The forward signal band 
operates from 85 MHz to 750 MHz (Whittle 1995/96) and is currently designed to 
carry: (BTCE 1994: 7) 
 
• 64 PAL-B analogue video channels between 85 and nominally 550 MHz, plus 
• 200 MHz of digital channels (video and cable modem) between nominally 550 
and 750 MHz 
 
                                            
54 Foxtel Management Pty Ltd v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission [2000] 
FCA 589, Federal Court of Australia, 8 May 2000. 
55 Telstra Corporation Ltd v Seven Cable Television Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1160, Federal Court 
of Australia, 18 August 2000. 
56 Foxtel Management Pty Ltd v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission [2000] 
FCA 589, Federal Court of Australia, 8 May 2000. 
57 Foxtel Management Pty Ltd v Seven Cable Television Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1161, Federal 
Court of Australia, 18 August 2000. 
58 Foxtel Management Pty Limited & Anor v Seven Cable Television Pty Limited & Ors [2001] 
S228/2000, High Court of Australia Transcript, 10 August 2001. 
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Figure 6 depicts the nominal band plan of the Telstra HFC network: 
Figure 6 – Nominal Band Plan of Telstra’s HFC Network 
 
Prior to March 2004, only analogue video signals were carried.  Even without 
knowing the magnitude of Foxtel’s ‘reasonably anticipated requirements’, those being 
a confidential figure, it can be seen from the ACCC report into emerging market 
structures (ACCC 2003a: Attachment A.1, plus allowance for the free-to-air stations) 
that the figure must be at least 40 channels.  It is therefore apparent that, if spare 
capacity were to be shared with access seekers, the nominal analogue channel 
capacity of 64 is a relatively scarce resource. 
 
However, once full conversion to digital has been effected, requiring all Set Top 
Boxes to be replaced by digital units, the full bandwidth from 85 to 750 MHz becomes 
potentially available.  Assuming no other digital signals, such as Internet data, each 8 
MHz of bandwidth can potentially support up to nine digital program streams which 
amounts to a total capacity in excess of 700 digital streams.  With Internet data, this 
figure would be a little lower.  Nevertheless, the fully digitalised capacity becomes 
less of a scarce resource and is more amenable to being shared with access 
seekers. 
 
4.4.3 Protected contractual right 
 
Telstra and News Corporation challenged the right of Seven Cable/C7 and TARBS to 
access on the grounds that Foxtel already had the exclusive right to provide and 
manage these services.  As such, this amounted to a ‘protected contractual right’ 
under section 152AR(4) of the TPA being in force as at 13 September 1996 and 
therefore negating any standard access obligation to provide access.  The 
significance of this date was that it was when mention of a ‘protected contractual 
Return 
path 
Forward path 
(initial digital 
band) 
Bandwidth in MHz 
65 85 550 750 5 
Guard band 
(not used) 
Forward path 
(original analogue band; 
ultimately digital) 
D.R.Kelso PhD Thesis, QUT, February 2008: Open Access to Next Generation Broadband {single line spaced version} 
 73
right’ first appeared within the second exposure draft of the Bill that led to the new 
Part XIC of the TPA which eventually came into force on 30 April 1997.59 
 
The trial judge, Justice Tamberlin, dissected the complex web of relationships 
between various entities associated with Telstra and News Corporation that 
eventually led to the creation of Foxtel: 
 
• An ‘umbrella agreement’ between News Corporation and Telstra dated 9 March 
1995; 
• A version of a Broadband Cooperation Agreement dated 12 July 1995; 
• A letter dated 23 October 1995, signed by Telstra Multimedia and Foxtel 
Management, said to be the source of the ‘protected contractual right’; and 
• A second version of the Broadband Cooperation Agreement executed by 
Telstra Multimedia and Foxtel Management dated 14 April 1997. 
 
The exclusivity right claimed by Foxtel was said to be framed in the following terms:60 
 
The right to prevent Telstra Multimedia from using, or permitting the use of its 
broadband telecommunications network to deliver a subscription television 
service which is not provided by Foxtel or the provision of which is not managed 
by Foxtel (by virtue of its having entered into an agreement with a third party to 
do so) except where Telstra Multimedia is required by law to so use or permit 
the use of that network. 
 
Justice Tamberlin, held that as at 23 October 1995 there was no legally binding 
agreement reached between Telstra Multimedia and Foxtel and therefore there was 
no contract capable of giving rise to a protected contractual right.61  This was 
because the conditions of the exclusivity and bundling rights were not negotiated to 
the stage of a legally binding arrangement by 23 October 1995 and other important 
clauses were left also outstanding.  Negotiations continued even after 13 September 
1996 and no final Broadband Cooperation Agreement was reached until 14 April 
1997. 
 
Accordingly, Justice Tamberlin held that Foxtel was not entitled to prevent Telstra 
granting access to TARBS for the purpose of broadcasting the services sought by it 
on the ground that Foxtel would be deprived of a protected contractual right.  On 
similar grounds it was held that Foxtel was not entitled to prevent Telstra granting 
access to Seven Cable/C7 for the purpose of broadcasting the Olympic Games or for 
other purposes for which access was sought by Seven.  In an appeal to the Full 
                                            
59 Pay television service via cable began in September/October 1995 and the first exposure 
draft of changes to the TPA was tabled before Parliament on 20 December 1995, towards 
the end of the Keating labour government.  The first Howard coalition government took office 
on 11 March 1996 and among other things revisited this proposed legislation.  By the time of 
the second exposure draft tabled on 13 September 1996, section 152 was modified to 
include an access exemption in the event of a ‘protected contractual right’ and hence 
became the date from which such an exemption could commence. 
60 Paragraph 140 of Seven Cable Television Pty Ltd v Telstra Corp Ltd [2000] FCA 350, 
Federal Court of Australia, 27 March 2000. 
61 Seven Cable Television Pty Ltd v Telstra Corp Ltd [2000] FCA 350, Federal Court of 
Australia, 27 March 2000. 
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Court against this judgement, Justices Beaumont, Moore and Gyles each delivered 
separate reasons for upholding the decision of the trial judge and so dismissed the 
appeal.62 
 
4.5 Arbitration of Access Disputes 
 
Part XIC of the Trade Practices Act also vests the ACCC with arbitration powers 
enabling it to make directions and do all things necessary for the speedy hearing and 
determination of an access dispute. 
 
Where a dispute cannot be resolved after private negotiations, mediation and/or 
conciliation, either of the access parties may refer the matter to the ACCC as a last 
resort.  The ACCC must then determine the matter, unless it decides to terminate the 
arbitration or the notification is otherwise withdrawn. 
 
On 27 September 1999, just a few weeks following declaration of cable-delivered 
analogue subscription television services, TARBS notified the ACCC of an access 
dispute with Telstra Multimedia under Part XIC of the TPA.63  C7 likewise gave notice 
of an access dispute with Telstra Multimedia, Foxtel and related entities on 7 
September 2000.64 
 
The Commission resolved to settle these access disputes through arbitration, a 
process not on the public record due to confidentiality.  Information considered dealt 
with issues such as service costs, prices, technical feasibility and channel capacity.  
Arbitration extended from 1999/2000 to 2004, whereupon it was effectively 
terminated following acceptance of the Telstra Multimedia and Foxtel access 
undertakings for analogue pay television services.  However, the process suffered 
repeated delay over this period due to legal arguments over the validity of 
deeming/declaration and existence of a protected contractual right, coupled with the 
ACCC’s assessment of the eventual undertakings.  Despite legislated changes to 
reform the arbitration regime in 1999 and 2001, Grant (2004: 116) concludes that “an 
unfortunate side effect is that the regime has now become labyrinthine”. 
 
On 10 August 2001, following news of failure by Foxtel for special leave to appeal the 
decision validating the Commission’s pay TV service declaration, Chairman 
Professor Allan Fels said:65 
 
                                            
62 Foxtel Management Pty Ltd v Seven Cable Television Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1159, Federal 
Court of Australia, 18 August 2000. 
63 Refer to ACCC Press Release “Telecommunications access dispute” MR 182/99, issued 
27 September 1999, at http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/322771, accessed 
13 May2007 
64 Refer to ACCC Press Release “Telecommunications access dispute” MR 240/00, issued 7 
September 2000, at http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/87484, accessed 13 
May 2007 
65 Refer to ACCC Press Release MR “High Court rejects challenge to ACCC pay TV 
declaration” MR 183/01, issued 10 August 2001, at 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/87802/fromItemId/378012, accessed 13 
May 2007 
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The ACCC trusts this decision will bring Telstra and Foxtel’s resistance to this 
declaration to an end.  It is now time for both parties to facilitate the use by 
others of the Telstra cable to offer pay-TV services that are in competition with 
Foxtel. 
 
The issues concerning the validity of the ACCC's declaration decision have 
been before the courts for almost two years as Telstra and Foxtel have 
challenged the ACCC's decision using every legal avenue available.  This has 
created much uncertainty in the industry and frustrated the development of 
competition. 
 
This decision means that, subject to capacity being available, Telstra must 
provide access to its HFC network to access seekers for the supply of analogue 
pay-TV services.  This will assist alternative content providers, such as 
Television and Radio Broadcasting Services Australia Pty Ltd (TARBS) and 
Seven Cable (C7), who have requested access to Telstra’s cable network to 
obtain access either on negotiated terms, or failing agreement, on the terms 
and conditions determined by the ACCC in an arbitration. 
 
Indeed both these alternative content providers have notified the ACCC of a 
dispute. 
 
Although these arbitrations have been delayed as a consequence of 
proceedings before the courts the ACCC has issued interim determinations 
requiring that both C7 and TARBS be given access and, in the absence of 
agreement by the parties, the ACCC will be looking to finalise its decision on 
access by TARBS and C7 to Telstra’s cable. 
 
Although the substance of this interim determination remains confidential, it would be 
expected to have been broadly similar to what later transpired with the analogue 
service undertaking. 
 
4.6 Access Undertakings & Exemptions 
 
By August 2001, all of the court action initiated by the access providers, Telstra and 
Foxtel, had come to nothing – except for the passage of further years of avoiding the 
need to provide access.  The ACCC arbitration process, at times also delayed by the 
litigation, had at least produced an interim determination and was heading towards 
finalisation.  Nevertheless, the main industry players were continuing to determine 
their future. 
 
On 5 March 2002, in a major move towards industry rationalisation, Foxtel and Optus 
announced a proposal to share pay TV programming whereby Optus would become 
largely a reseller of Foxtel content.66  In concluding that such a deal would likely 
breach the Trade Practices Act through a substantial lessening of competition, the 
ACCC identified its four principal areas of concern as relating to: 
 
                                            
66 Refer to Foxtel Press Release “Breakthrough Agreement in Subscription Television”, 
issued 5 March 2002, at http://www.foxtel.com.au/236_328.htm, accessed 13 May 2007 
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• The acquisition of content; 
• The likely dominance of the Foxtel distribution network; 
• The supply of pay TV services to households; and 
• The provision of channels to third parties who wish to supply pay TV to 
customers. 
 
It then drew from the parties a number of court-enforceable undertakings under 
section 87B of the TPA.  These included, inter alia, agreements to lodge access 
undertakings under Part XIC of the Act relating to third-party access to pay TV 
services – initially analogue delivered (already declared) and eventually digital (not 
then declared).  They would apply in the absence of commercial agreement between 
the parties. 
 
Draft undertakings were opened for public comment from 5 September 200267 and 
revised on a number of occasions.  The resultant submissions to inquiries, ACCC 
reports and final undertakings involve a considerable amount of material which is 
accessible via the ACCC pay TV portal.68  Only the key aspects are highlighted here, 
in keeping with a broad approach of appreciating the nature of the regulatory 
outcomes rather than the detail of processes involved in getting there. 
 
4.6.1 Undertakings of analogue access 
 
By 25 March 2004, the ACCC had accepted revised undertakings from Telstra 
Multimedia and Foxtel enabling non-discriminatory access by competitors to Telstra’s 
analogue HFC network and Foxtel’s STBs.69  Under these arrangements, Telstra was 
thereafter required to make available ten analogue video channels to third parties 
according to prescribed technical, service and pricing terms deemed reasonable by 
the Commission.  The quantity of ten channels would now appear to be above and 
beyond Foxtel’s ‘reasonably anticipated requirements’ for an analogue subscription 
service.  The costs refer, inter alia, to enhancements and extensions to the various 
programme Headends to facilitate signal carriage, transmission of individual 
channels from the Headends throughout the HFC network to subscriber premises 
and provision of the conditional access service. 
 
Arrangements are also detailed to allocate analogue channels to aspirant access 
seekers, for an accepted access seeker to supply its own smartcards and STBs for 
servicing subscribers not already those of Foxtel and to facilitate the transition from 
                                            
67 Refer to ACCC Press Release “ACCC seeks comment on section 87B undertakings for 
Foxtel/Optus proposal” MR 211/02, issued 5 September 2002, at 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/88164/fromItemId/378014, accessed 13 
May 2007 
68 Refer to ACCC document index titled “Pay TV” at 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/269329/fromItemId/356715, accessed 13 
May 2007 
69 Refer to ACCC document indexes titled “Analogue pay TV access undertakings - Telstra 
multimedia and Foxtel - 2002/03” and “Revised analogue pay TV access undertakings - 
Telstra multimedia and Foxtel - 2003/04)” both at 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/786759/fromItemId/786597 accessed 13 
May 2007 
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an analogue to digital pay TV service.  Once an access seeker has arranged carriage 
by Telstra, Foxtel is required to ensure non-discriminatory access to its STBs and fly 
cables70 at a price deemed reasonable by the ACCC.  Matters such as procedures to 
deal with faults are also prescribed.  Third party pay TV providers utilising the 
Telstra/Foxtel service are to be responsible for their own subscriber management 
functions, including billing, and call centre services. 
 
From here on, if requested, third party access to Telstra’s analogue cable network 
and Foxtel’s analogue set top boxes could be achieved under prescribed terms and 
conditions – a regulatory outcome sought since July 1997.71  According to ACCC 
Commissioner Ed Willett “The new access undertakings will have implications for the 
resolution of the long standing pay TV disputes between TMM and Foxtel and 
TARBS and C7, which the ACCC had been arbitrating”.72  This was because any 
determination for these arbitrations would need to be consistent with the terms and 
conditions laid down in the new access undertakings. 
 
Also as part of their section 87B undertakings, Telstra and Foxtel committed to: 
(Grant, 2004: 108) 
 
• Digitise their pay TV network infrastructure, conditional upon legislation being 
passed enabling exemption from the standard access obligations;73 
• Provide competitive access to at least 35 per cent of the total number of digital 
channels on the new digital platform. 
 
4.6.2 Telecommunications Competition Bill amendments 
 
Only the year before, the Productivity Commission’s Inquiry Report on 
Telecommunications Competition Regulation (PC 2001a) recommended the Trade 
Practices Act be amended to enable the ACCC to exempt services provided by 
prospective investments – exactly what Telstra and Foxtel were seeking.  In 
response, the government produced the Telecommunications Competition Bill (2002) 
which, following a Senate inquiry, gained assent on 19 December 2002. 
 
Among other amendments, a new section 152ATA of the TPA was created to enable 
an access provider, or a potential access provider, to apply for and receive an 
exemption from the standard access obligations referred to in section 152AR before 
an investment in a telecommunications service is made or before the service 
becomes an active declared service – hence facilitating ‘anticipatory exemption’.  
                                            
70 A ‘fly cable’ connects the pay television network wall-mounted socket to the Set Top Box. 
71 But with the undertaking for analogue access finally ratified in March 2004 and Foxtel 
digital services commenced in the same month, this was indeed a pyrrhic victory for any 
access seeker!  Analogue access thereafter had no commercial or strategic value compared 
to that of digital. 
72 Refer to ACCC Press Release “ACCC accepts the new analogue pay TV access 
undertakings of Foxtel/Telstra multimedia” MR 045/04, issued 25 March 2004, at 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/510383 accessed 13 May 2007 
73 Seemingly contradicting their declaration of ‘no digitisation without legislation’, they also 
undertook to supply access to digital services once retail service delivery commenced, even 
if exemption had not been granted! 
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Prior to these amendments, exemption orders could only be sought and gained for 
active declared services, which was simply not the case for digital pay TV services 
which didn’t then exist. 
 
The intention of the amendments was “to provide certainty for potential investors in 
telecommunications infrastructure and services in relation to access to that 
infrastructure or service in the future” by increasing “the level of competition and 
investment in the telecommunications market to the benefit of consumers and 
business”. (2002) 
 
In making such an exemption order, the ACCC would need to be satisfied that such 
an order would promote the long-term interests of end-users of the said carriage 
services or services provided thereby. 
 
For an access or potential access provider, gaining exemption from the standard 
access obligations of section 152AR of the Trade Practices Act had the advantage of 
avoiding (or conversely, disadvantage for the access seeker in not having the benefit 
of): 
 
• The application of any future ministerial pricing determination made pursuant to 
section 152CH; 
• Any access seeker rights including arbitration, enforcement and remedial rights, 
in accordance with Sections 152AY, 152AYA, 152AZ, 152BB, 152BBA, 
152BBB, 152BBC, 152CM, 152CO – 152EB, 152EF and 152EG of the TPA. 
 
4.6.3 Exemptions leading to digital access 
 
Two days after the Telecommunications Competition Act gained assent, Telstra and 
Foxtel lodged anticipatory individual exemption order applications with the ACCC 
relevant to the proposed provision of digital pay TV services.  Following an inquiry, 
the Commission concluded that granting an exemption should provide for greater 
certainty for access than leaving the issue open to potential declaration, as well as 
resulting in a more timely investment decision.  Greater access would also potentially 
improve the efficiency in use of the Telstra/Foxtel network and enhance the build/buy 
decision by access seekers for subscription television services.74 
 
The ACCC announced its final decision to accept the revised undertakings of Telstra 
and Foxtel on 12 December 2003.75 These were the first anticipatory exemption 
orders made as a consequence of the TPA amendments introduced 12 months 
earlier.  Under the Telstra and Foxtel Digital Access Agreement, the services to be 
supplied include distribution over the Telstra HFC network and access to Foxtel's Set 
Top Boxes, conditional access and Smart Card authorisation services.  Most 
importantly, any digital STB had to be “actually in use by a subscriber for reception of 
                                            
74 Refer to document index “Anticipatory exemptions: Foxtel and Telstra - digital pay TV 
services” at http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/754926/fromItemId/786596 
accessed 13 May 2007 
75 Refer to ACCC Press Release “ACCC grants exemption to Foxtel/Telstra for digital Pay TV 
services” MR 267/03, issued 12 December 2003, at 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/424020 accessed 13 May 2007 
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Foxtel’s digital subscription television services” and “as a total package and not as 
one or more component parts”.76  Other key features of Digital Access Agreement 
included:77 
 
• An annually published rate card, calculated in accordance with a publicly 
available methodology and independently audited; 
• Access to an active customer smart card database designed to support at least 
25 access seekers; 
• Access to the digital network once 100,000 digital cable STBs are rolled out as 
part of a commercial digital cable service or 6 months after Foxtel's digital 
launch whichever date is sooner; 
• A fixed percentage of capacity allocated on the Telstra HFC network and 
Foxtel's STB network available to access seekers, namely: 
o 15% during the dual transmission of both analogue and digital services 
(likely to be 24 channels); and 
o 35% once Foxtel is only supplying digital services (likely to be up to 192 
channels). 
• Foxtel to use all reasonable endeavours to obtain the consent of the lessor of 
the digital STBs, understood to be ABN AMRO and the Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia, to use those STBs for the supply of services to each access seeker. 
 
No undertaking was given by Telstra for third-party access to its cable modem-
delivered Internet service and nor was this sought by the ACCC.  The ACCC also 
acquiesced with Foxtel and Telstra’s insistence that their undertakings should 
exclude ‘return path or interactivity functionality’ from the digital set top box services 
provided by Foxtel, in addition to exclusion of, among other items:78 
 
• Call centre services; 
• Subscriber management and related services, including billing; 
• Electronic Program Guide services; 
• Any digital STB functionality, other than decryption of the access seeker’s digital 
subscription television services; 
• Dedicated access to any second or subsequent tuner and/or hard drive in the 
Digital Set Top Unit79; and 
• Magazine and program guide listings. 
 
The Foxtel digital pay television services commenced in March 2004 and over the 
subsequent three years, analogue STBs were to be progressively replaced by digital 
STBs. (Lehmann 2005)  On 21 February 2005, Foxtel launched its Personal Digital 
Recorder, iQ, with Chief Executive Kim Williams declaring “The three-way 
combination of the FOXTEL iQ set-top-box, the vast pallet(sic) of FOXTEL Digital 
                                            
76 In other words, any access seeker’s channel(s) can only serve as a complement to the 
basic Foxtel package of channels and never as a substitute for it, with the effect that the 
access seekers offering would have to be purchased as a premium tier once a subscriber 
had already purchased Foxtel’s basic package. 
77 Refer to Foxtel Press Release “ACCC Decisions on Third Party Access to the Foxtel 
Platform – Explanatory Notes”, issued 16 December 2003, at 
http://www.foxtel.com/209_1265.htm, accessed 13 May 2007 
78 Clause 4.2(a) of the Digital Access Agreement refers. 
79 This effectively excludes access to the Foxtel iQ personal digital recorder. 
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channels, and the FOXTEL Digital Guide that binds it all together, delivers the 
ultimate television experience”.80 
 
4.6.4 Tribunal invalidation of exemption 
 
Seven Network Limited and its cable television arm, C7 (collectively ‘Seven Network’) 
first requested access to the Telstra network and Foxtel pay television service in 
August 1999 and since then had not shied away from the ongoing process of legal 
challenge and regulatory inquiry.  The only other access seeker, TARBS, went 
bankrupt late 2003. 
 
On 30 December 2003, the Seven Network filed an application with the Australian 
Competition Tribunal for a review of the decision by the ACCC made on 12 
December whereby Telstra and Foxtel were granted anticipatory exemption from the 
standard access obligations set out in section 152AR of the Trade Practices Act with 
respect to their digital subscription cable television service.  In a stunning reversal of 
fortunes, the Tribunal set aside the ACCC decision and invalidated the anticipatory 
exemption.  Dated 30 September 2004, the judges’ reasons for decision were 
published on 23 December 2004.  The highlights are:81 
 
• The exemption order sought by Telstra and Foxtel would not promote the long-
term interests of end-users and the exemption would not be likely to achieve the 
objectives of: 
a. promoting competition in markets for listed service having regard to the 
extent to which the making of the exemption orders will remove obstacles 
to end-users of listed services gaining access to listed services; and 
b. encouraging the economically efficient investment and use of the digital 
infrastructure. 
• Digitisation by Foxtel and Telstra was going to occur by the end of March 2004 
at the earliest and by October 2005 at the latest, regardless of whether an 
exemption (in the form of a Final Order as defined in the section 87B 
undertakings) was granted to each of Foxtel and Telstra; 
• Refusal to make the exemption order on the grounds that digitisation is going to 
occur in any case will not deter future investors; 
• The exclusion of interactivity from the exemption orders granted by the 
Commission, thereby requiring potential entrants to obtain access under 
multiple parallel regimes would place them at an unjustified competitive 
disadvantage, and may discourage entry; 
• The tie of the Basic Package to access to Foxtel's services as contained in the 
digital access agreement is a significant deterrent to entry, as it makes a 
prospective access seeker vulnerable to potential manipulation by Foxtel of the 
Basic Package to prevent or to preclude competitive conduct; 
• The period of the undertakings and the length of the exemption period which 
may, at Foxtel's or Telstra's option, extend until the end of 2015 provides no 
certainty to potential access seekers - in contrast, these undertakings appear to 
                                            
80 Refer to Foxtel Press Release “Foxtel iQ - Foxtel’s Personal Digital Recorder Unveiled“, 
issued 21 February 2005, at http://www.foxtel.com/209_3229.htm, accessed 13 May 2007 
81 Seven Network Limited (No 4) [2004] ACompT 11 (23 December 2004) 
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have been structured to give Telstra and Foxtel ‘an each way bet’ such that they 
can exit their self-constructed access regime if it does not meet their interests 
or, conversely, they can elect to extend it for a further eight years; 
• While accepting the pricing methodologies underlying the Telstra and Foxtel 
access price, more rigorous verification of the inputs would have been 
appropriate.  One key element not adequately addressed in the decision by the 
ACCC was that of quantifying the value of Telstra’s ‘telephony defence’ strategy 
in deploying a HFC network. 
 
4.6.5 The sequel 
 
The decision by the Australian Competition Tribunal (ACT) meant that Telstra and 
Foxtel no longer had the benefit of an exemption from Part XIC of the Trade 
Practices Act if the ACCC ever decided to declare a digital cable pay television 
service in the future.  If that eventuated, presumably following notification of a new 
access dispute, the ACCC would have the power to set its own terms and conditions 
for digital access.  At least in theory, access seekers would then be more likely to 
become beneficiaries. 
 
According to Foxtel chief executive Kim Williams “The ACT’s decision renders Foxtel 
vulnerable to a declaration by the ACCC which could result in terms and conditions 
we see as commercially unacceptable”. (Sainsbury and Schulze 2005) 
 
Notwithstanding this regulatory setback, Foxtel announced that from 24 February 
2005 it was broadcasting the services of the first third party to utilise Foxtel’s digital 
open access regime.  TVN or ThoroughVisioN, a thoroughbred racing channel 
operating independently of Foxtel, would be responsible for marketing its channel 
and the management and billing of its own subscriber base.82,83 (Lehmann 2006) 
 
In the meantime, the Seven Network began to pursue PBL, News Limited and Telstra 
(the three partners in Foxtel), as well as a raft of other media companies and sporting 
bodies in the courts, accusing them of illegally conspiring to force the closure of its 
pay television sports channel C7 in 2002. (Schulze 2004b) 
 
Foxtel subsequently lodged a special access undertaking in relation to the digital set 
top box service in October 2005, which was later replaced by another in December 
2006.  After agreeing to amendments sought by the ACCC, the Commission 
accepted the special access undertaking in March 2007. (ACCC 2007)  The Seven 
Network immediately appealed to the Federal Court claiming, in part, that Foxtel is 
not obligated to supply set top box service in locations where Foxtel does not have 
subscribers. (Moran and Schulze 2007) 
 
                                            
82 Refer to Foxtel Press Release “Foxtel provides open access to its digital platform”, issued 
24 February 2005, at http://www.foxtel.com.au/209_3248.htm, accessed 13 May 2007 
83 This independence could be short-lived, with Foxtel partner PBL mooted to be interested in 
taking up a 25 per cent stake in TVN just over a year later. Lehmann, J. (2006). TVN on track 
to race ahead with Telstra and PBL. The Australian. Sydney. 
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4.7 Discussion 
 
In this section we discuss possible limitations arising from analysis of the 
Telstra/Foxtel pay television HFC-delivered network as a case study, followed by a 
summary of findings that should inform the Research Question. 
 
4.7.1 Limitations of Case Study 
 
In contrast with the other two, this case study has been quite detailed; not only is 
there a wealth of primary and secondary source material available from which to 
analyse how and why Telstra’s interest in open access to pay television has waxed 
and waned over the years, the events and reasoning of key players, determinations 
and judgements are complex by nature. 
 
In my own small way I was one of those players, initially as a manager within 
Telstra’s pay television project team during the era when open access was 
considered the natural way of things and later providing expert advice assisting the 
ACCC with their arbitration of access disputes and concurrent legal challenges.  
While initially generating the interest to commence this dissertation, this background 
experience provided me in particular with the ability to ‘connect the dots’ from the 
large amount of information and so achieve a clearer understanding of the often quite 
vigorous and often arcane contests between the access seekers and access 
providers. 
 
Matters such as access to content, mergers within the pay television industry and 
third line forcing have not been explicitly addressed.  The first two in particular 
certainly had an adverse impact on the business plans for aspirant access seekers 
but not on the actual denial of access.  However, the monopolisation of content by 
Foxtel and Optus more than likely added to the overall delays in the whole process of 
attempts to gain access.  The case study identified the importance of delay by 
access providers in thwarting the advances of access seekers. 
 
On entering the realm of the protracted legal and regulatory challenges and counter-
challenges, the case study could easily have greatly increased in size by analysing 
the most complex and detailed judgements and determinations.  Instead, the 
treatment of events and their meanings was restricted to appreciating the nature of 
outcomes rather than the detail of the processes involved in getting there. 
 
The Telstra-Foxtel HFC network was primarily constructed to deliver pay television, 
with data carriage for Internet service a secondary consideration.  Historically this 
has also been the case in the United States of America, the home of ‘cable’ 
television.  However from the viewpoint of third party access, Australia and the USA 
have differed greatly.  If this case study had covered USA experience, it would have 
dealt with a large amount of material concerning attempts by competitive Internet 
service providers to gain access to the data capacity of the cable networks.  The 
Australian experience has been the opposite, with no attempts to seek declaration of 
access to the cable modem service and so this case study instead focussed on the 
matter of access to the television broadcast capacity. 
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4.7.2 Findings 
 
The key findings of the Telstra/Foxtel pay television case study are summarised in a 
stand-alone manner.  Interpretations made possible by drawing correlations with the 
other case studies are withheld until Chapter Eight. 
 
General 
 
The process of gaining access to Australia’s dominant cable television network has 
been tortuous and time consuming – and yet to be fulfilled in any meaningful way.  
For the first two years from 1995 to 1997, a government mandate denied third party 
access on the promise of competition which was never effective and is now basically 
stymied.  Between 1997 and 1999, deeming and declaration by the regulator made 
third party access legally possible but impractical due to regulatory uncertainty.  That 
period was followed by yet another two years of public legal challenges involving the 
access providers, access seekers and the regulator, running in parallel with private 
arbitration of the access disputes by the regulator.  The end result of these political, 
regulatory and commercial processes has been nine years of delay in the provision 
of access to competitive parties. 
 
Threatening not to upgrade to digital working (and thereby perpetuating an inherent 
shortage of analogue channel capacity) but with the backing of new provisions of the 
Trade Practices Act aimed at promoting investment in telecommunications 
infrastructure, Foxtel and Telstra gained regulatory approval via agreed undertakings 
to permit third party access to their digital service infrastructure from December 2003 
and analogue service infrastructure from March 2004.  With digital Foxtel services 
also having commenced in March 2004, no third party would then have sought 
analogue access.  And as the Australian Competition Tribunal revealed in its 
September 2004 decision, it was quite likely that Foxtel and Telstra would have 
digitalised regardless. 
 
Since 2002, the supply of pay TV content within Australia has consolidated to the 
extent that other incumbent operators now effectively draw upon the same pool as 
that of the dominant provider. (ACCC 2003a) Any third party aspiring to gain access 
to digital capacity faces the challenge of having to offer content sufficiently enticing to 
carve out a new share of a market that has been the sole province of monopoly 
providers since 1995.  The prospects of the now dominant access providers, Foxtel 
and Telstra are now even further enhanced whilst the prospects of any third parties 
to gain worthwhile access to the Foxtel/Telstra network are greatly diminished.  The 
Seven Network foresaw such an outcome in its submission to the Senate inquiry into 
the Telecommunications Competition Bill 2002: (Seven Network Supp 2002: 17) 
 
….. in the telecommunications and pay TV industries time is of the essence. 
Access delayed is access denied.  Delays in obtaining access entrench the 
position of incumbents, thereby defeating the purpose of the regime by stripping 
access-seekers of the intended benefits of access and making it difficult, if not 
impossible, to generate competition from access-seekers at a later date. 
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Closure wins over openness 
 
By the end of the moratorium on subscription television, the government was well 
informed by various public inquiries and commissioned reports as to which delivery 
technologies could be deployed.  Satellites, favoured for their ability to serve an 
Australia-wide audience from the outset, involved significant capital outlay to launch 
and at the time offered strictly limited channel capacity.  Viable business models 
called for vertical integration which inevitably led to closed access operation – an 
arrangement in keeping with the norm established by commercial television 
broadcasters.  Business models for microwave (MMDS) delivery followed a similar 
pattern. 
 
In comparison, cable then offered some 20 to 36 channels – a capacity ‘expected to 
be well in excess of the availability of potential programmers’ according to a 1975 
report from the government-owned telecommunications carrier, Telecom Australia.  
Scarcity of delivery capacity was clearly not seen to be an issue.  Imbued with the 
principle of ‘common carriage’, the report recommended an open access business 
model whereby channels would be leased to a variety of operators.  The principles of 
common carriage and open access for cable television services were further 
emphasized in the House of Representatives committee report of 1989, the last 
before the moratorium was lifted.  Any cable television network was still seen to be 
the natural province of Telecom Australia to deploy.  By end 1992 and the first year 
of operation by Telecom’s only general carrier competitor Optus, Telecom Australia 
continued to make public its intention of being in the business of delivering pay 
television as a common carrier. 
 
With no wireline access network, Optus became concerned about the increasing 
access and interconnection payments being paid to Telecom.  Optus further claimed 
that Telecom was discriminating in the supply of services to corporate customers and 
took legal action.  As their deep distrust of Telecom Australia grew, so did their desire 
to be independent of Telecom by creating a separate local access network.  This was 
the tipping point that led Optus to become interested in the delivery of cable 
television. 
 
The 1993/94 period witnessed many US telephone and cable television companies 
becoming interested in entering each other’s markets, aided by new technologies 
that enabled television signals to be carried over telephone lines and telephone calls 
over cable television networks.  Part owned by US carrier Bell South, Optus began 
regular discussions with Continental Cablevision, the number three cable television 
operator in the USA.  Optus was fast becoming convinced that if it created its own 
HFC network, pay television could act as a carrot to attract subscribers for telephony 
and online services.  Failure to build its own network promptly would encourage 
others to build once full competition arrived after July 1997.  In the meantime, 
Telecom Australia was marketing its common carrier plans but encountered 
problems in dealing with the allocation of television channel capacity once operating 
under an open access business model.  With around 67 analogue channels 
available, HFC network capacity was now fast becoming a scarce resource. 
 
In announcing a joint venture to deploy an HFC network throughout Australian capital 
cities, Optus and Continental Cablevision devised a business model that would 
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exercise control over the channels delivered so as to attract the widest market of 
subscription television viewers who could then be ‘pulled though’ to become 
customers of an Optus telephony service.  All revenue streams would be captured by 
the one business that would adopt a homogeneous marketing strategy.  Optus 
concluded that such a business model could only be successful if it avoided the 
common carrier requirements of the Telecommunications Act 1991 by permitting the 
business to discriminate against unwanted service providers.  Clever lawyers and 
skilful political lobbying would be necessary to bring this about. 
 
The Minister for Communications was confronted with a dilemma – agree with the 
Optus proposal which ran counter to the government’s philosophy as well as the 
Telecommunications Act, or reject the proposal and lose a golden opportunity to 
create a wireline local telephone service independent of Telecom Australia’s.  The 
Minister relented and legalized the proposed discrimination through the instrument of 
a Carrier Associates Direction that would operate until 1 July 1997. 
 
As these events unfolded towards the end of 1994, Telecom Australia was 
experiencing far less success than Optus in garnering service providers for its 
proposed open access cable television network.  Would it roll out an HFC network, 
primarily now as a ‘telephony defence’ against Optus, but without secure agreements 
for the supply of content?  Faced with a bold Optus/Continental cablevision joint 
venture about to win the Minister over to a closed access business model, Telecom’s 
chief executive envisaged great difficulty for a Telecom open access business to co-
exist with an Optus closed access business when serious content service providers 
were enticed by the opportunity to take a share in the revenue of the whole business.  
Conversely, Telecom Australia did not want to be marginalized by continuing to only 
earn revenue from basic carriage.  Telecom promptly discarded its long held plans 
for an open access network to deliver subscription video, data and information 
services.  Thereafter the two major Australian cable television networks commenced 
operation as vertically integrated businesses with closed networks justified on 
strategic and commercial grounds. 
 
HFC technology restricts access 
 
The Telstra HFC network commenced operation employing analogue transmission.  
With each length of coaxial cabling required to deliver the same channels to 
hundreds of subscribers along a given route and being of low cost design with a 
limited bandwidth, the coaxial cable elements limit the overall carrying capacity of the 
network emanating from a given Head End to some 64 analogue video channels.  
Such a limited quantity is potentially an access bottleneck depending on the demand 
for channels.  However in the case of the Telstra/Foxtel pay television business via 
cable, the bottleneck became immediate as Telstra contracted all channel capacity to 
Foxtel. 
 
Software within or interfaces between set top boxes, subscriber management, 
conditional access and electronic navigation systems are invariably designed in 
anticipation of access being closed.  Certain parameters, particularly within set top 
boxes, may be embedded in firmware or hardware and not possible to change 
without replacing the units.  Regulated attempts to open up access ex-post will 
generally encounter the need for modifications to be made to software, middleware 
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and even certain hardware items, all of which result in cost to be recouped from the 
access seeker and delay in making access effective. 
 
Common carriage sacrificed for investment certainty 
 
Despite many years of government inquiries and reports all concluding that any pay 
television cable should be operated under a common carrier arrangement, and 
despite Part XIC of the Trade Practices Act creating the mechanisms to facilitate an 
(open) access regime, three critically timed government-sponsored interventions 
provided investment certainty at the expense of the common carriage/open access 
principle. 
 
• Carrier associates direction of 1995 
 
By August 1994, Telecom Australia had filed a tariff with the regulator for common 
carriage of pay television services.  Optus declared to the government its intention to 
create a new broadband cable network for the delivery of pay television, data and 
telephony – on the proviso that both infrastructure and service access would be 
closed to parties not part of its business model. 
 
Despite alarm over the prospect of duplicated cable infrastructure and closed access 
for consumers and excluded service providers, the government faced collapse of its 
policy aim of encouraging facilities-based (that is, infrastructure) competition during 
the 1992 - 1997 telecommunications duopoly phase.  The government was attracted 
to the creation of an alternative telephony network and supported the argument for 
closed access through garnering greater investment from sharing both content and 
carriage revenues.  The Telecommunications (Service Providers Class Licence) 
Direction No. 1 of 1995 was thereby issued to grant the new entities of Carrier 
Associates exemption from being required to provide access for another entity’s pay 
television service until 1 July 1997. 
 
Optus commenced roll-out of its cable television network which began commercial 
service in September 1995.  Telstra’s roll-out substantially mirrored that of Optus by 
adopting a blatant defensive strategy, although in reality Telstra’s plans had been 
incubating for years beforehand.  As a consequence, Australia witnessed the almost 
parallel deployment of substantially identical HFC networks.  The investments in both 
networks were later substantially written off by up to $4 billion – a clear sign that this 
duplicated infrastructure, where just one network could service all market needs, was 
plainly uneconomic. (Budde 1999) Each network was monopolized by its owner and 
eschewed third party access for alternative programming and services. 
 
• Protected contractual right defence of 1997 
 
Pay television service via cable began in September/October 1995 and the first 
exposure draft of changes to the Trade Practices Act was tabled before Parliament 
on 20 December 1995, towards the end of the Keating labour government.  In 
keeping with the statement of Telecommunications Policy Principles post-1997 
released on 1 August 1995, Principle 20 stated that “a carrier would be able to deny 
a request for interconnection or carriage on reasonable grounds, including 
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connection not being technically feasible or insufficient capacity being available”.84  
There was no mention then of any ‘protected contractual right’.  Dismayed at the 
prospect of having to provide access, Telstra and Foxtel lobbied the new Howard 
coalition government for protection from third-party access - insisting that Telstra had 
already contracted all cable capacity to Foxtel.  Accordingly, by the time the second 
exposure draft was tabled on 13 September 1996, section 152 had been modified to 
include an access exemption in the event of a ‘protected contractual right’.  This new 
defence against access was operable from that date and used by Telstra Multimedia 
and Foxtel Management to deny requests by Seven Cable and TARBS for analogue 
access. 
 
Due to circumstances peculiar to the agreement between Telstra Multimedia and 
Foxtel Management, application of the defence was legally defeated but only after 
the two access seekers lost valuable time to establish new businesses via cable.  
Once the ACCC declared cable-delivered analogue subscription television services 
in early September 1999 and assuming early resolution of the dispute over channel 
capacity, Seven Cable could have had up to twelve months lead time to provide pay 
television coverage of the Olympic Games held in Sydney between 15 September 
and 1 October 2000.  The most favourable outcome could have been the ongoing 
commercial survival of Seven Cable, as well as TARBS, resulting in a more 
competitive pay television industry.85  With the sunset date now passed and the 
claims of Telstra and Foxtel rejected by the courts, the defence of ‘protected 
contractual right’ is now no longer applicable.  However at the time it served its 
purpose by providing greater investment certainty for Telstra and Foxtel. 
 
• Anticipatory exemption vehicle of 2002 
 
The origins of anticipatory exemption hark back at least to the 2001 inquiry by the 
Productivity Commission under the direction of the government to ‘review the state of 
competition in the telecommunications market, and the impact of new technologies 
and delivery platforms’.  Telstra and Foxtel exploited this additional opportunity to 
bolster their case for restricting third party access to their pay television network and 
convinced the Productivity Commission that the telecommunications access regime 
was deficient as long as it allowed the ACCC to declare services only if they were 
‘active’ or in existence.   Keen to facilitate investment in new telecommunications 
infrastructure by reducing regulatory uncertainty for services not yet declared or 
services not even in existence, the government proposed a new ‘anticipatory 
exemption’ vehicle that could be used to bypass standard access obligations.   
 
                                            
84 Refer to “Parliamentary Bills Digest No 72 1995-96; Telstra (Dilution of Public Ownership) 
Bill 1996” at http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bd/1995-96/96bd072.htm accessed 13 may 
2007.  Also refer to paragraph 64 of Seven Cable Television Pty Ltd v Telstra Corp Ltd 
[2000] FCA 350, Federal Court of Australia, 27 March 2000. 
85 In reality, Seven Cable was unable to create a brand name in the nascent pay television 
industry which, amplified by its subsequent inability to wrestle broadcasting rights to certain 
other sports events from News Corporation, led to its eventual demise.  TARBS ultimately 
met a similar fate, though for more complex reasons.  Given that Seven Cable and TARBS 
were the only original access seekers, their departure from the market significantly enhanced 
the opportunity for Foxtel to dominate Australian pay television content and delivery. 
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Commencing 19 December 2002, actual or potential access providers gained the 
right to apply to the ACCC for exemption from the standard access obligations 
detailed in section 152AR of the Trade Practices Act, prior to a telecommunications 
service becoming an active declared service or even prior to an investment being 
made in a telecommunications service, that is, they could seek ‘anticipatory 
exemption’. 
 
Telstra and Foxtel immediately applied to the ACCC for anticipatory exemption from 
the standard access obligation that would otherwise apply to their proposed digital 
pay television services.  Twelve months later, the Commission made the first 
anticipatory exemption orders and commercial digital service delivery commenced 
three months thereafter, in March 2004.  The Seven Network immediately challenged 
the Commission’s orders by appealing to the Australian Competition Tribunal.  In 
setting aside the orders, the Tribunal revealed flaws in the ACCC decision-making 
process granting exemption and saw through a series of disingenuous claims by 
Foxtel and Telstra.  Even though this judgement meant that the anticipatory 
exemption application by Telstra and Foxtel had been wasted, they nevertheless 
gained a huge strategic advantage by having commenced digital service operation 
on their own terms – and without third party access.  However, the generic right to 
seek ‘anticipatory exemption’ remains unaffected as a vehicle available for access 
providers to call upon in the future. 
 
Business success with closed access 
 
A series of deliberate strategic moves by Telstra and Foxtel since the mid 1990s 
secured the continued operation of the Foxtel network and conversely the demise of 
aspirant players in the Australian pay television business desiring to use cable 
delivery.  Advantage was particularly taken of opportunities presented by the evolving 
regulatory and commercial environments in telecommunications and the media. 
 
• Delayed access 
 
Telstra and Foxtel were resolute in their conviction that continued legal and 
regulatory delays would enable them to further entrench their market position, 
particularly by growing subscriber numbers in the final years of analogue provision, 
before the digital network arrived and removed capacity as the prime argument 
against additional service providers. 
 
Access delayed was access denied, according to the Seven Network, in that delay 
caused by regulatory fiat or legal challenges over some nine years stripped access 
seekers of the intended benefits of access by making it difficult, if not impossible, to 
generate competition at a later date. 
 
• Terms of access dictated 
 
Telstra and Foxtel exploited the regulatory labyrinth to sufficiently prolong arbitration 
until they were ready to provide access undertakings to the ACCC.  Crafted by their 
own lawyers, these undertakings were subjected to public inquiry which entailed 
critical examination by the Commission and the few other parties interested in the 
matter of access.  Although the ACCC extracted a few concessions from the access 
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providers, in reality Telstra and Foxtel were privy to the greater amount of information 
and had already dictated the prime grounds for undertakings of analogue and digital 
access that they considered to be commercially acceptable. 
 
Given digitisation from March 2004, the analogue undertaking settled that same 
month was immediately of little value to any serious access seeker.  On considering 
Telstra and Foxtel’s terms of the digital access agreement, the ACCC concurred with 
the mandatory inclusion of Foxtel’s basic package and the exclusion of interactivity.  
The Australian Competition Tribunal subsequently found these and other terms of the 
agreement to be placing an access seeker at an unjustified competitive 
disadvantage.  Prior to this legal setback the incumbent had succeeded in setting the 
agenda. 
 
• Unrestricted business entry 
 
Australian telecommunications and broadcasting has long followed developments in 
the United States and Britain, except in the matter of carriers being initially excluded 
from providing cable television services. 
 
Fearing the infant United States cable industry would be swallowed by telephone 
companies, Thorne (1995: 487, 489) records why the 1970 FCC Rules and the 1984 
Cable Act explicitly forbade telephone companies from offering cable television 
services to the public.  By the time the 1996 Telecommunications Act permitted 
telephone companies to provide video services and cable operators to provide 
telephony, the US had gained massive competing sets of broadband infrastructure in 
consequence of this initial prohibition. (Huber 1997) 
 
Once British Telecom was split from the Post Office and duopoly competition allowed 
from 1983, the Telecommunications Act segregated the telecommunications and 
cable television markets.  Although cable television companies were permitted to 
provide telecommunication services after 1991, the prohibition against carriers 
providing cable television services was extended for another decade. (DTI 1991) The 
ban on broadcasting by UK carriers was finally lifted in January 2001. 
 
The closest Australia came to a similar regulatory situation was a recommendation 
from the 1989 House of Representatives Committee that Telecom Australia be made 
the common carrier for cable pay television but be prohibited from being a pay 
television operator and from influencing or determining the program content of such 
television.  By the time the ex-AUSSAT satellite had been purchased by Optus in 
1992, the government had already selected satellite to deliver the first national pay 
television service.  Although Telecom Australia’s intentions to at least provide 
carriage services for pay television and other information services had been well 
publicised since at least 1975, by 1992 this was being marketed as not being ‘a 
threat to satellite delivery but rather as a complementary service’.  The government 
of the day had simply not anticipated that cable delivery could occur so quickly, let 
alone soon become the foundation for the dominant business in Australian pay 
television.  As a result, Telstra Corporation was totally unfettered to enter into a joint 
venture that ultimately became Foxtel, with 50 per cent ownership as at 2006. 
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• Minimal competitive threat 
 
Telstra entered the pay television business in late 1995 as a ‘telephony defence’ 
strategy to counter Optus.  With cable roll-outs duplicated in some 80 per cent of 
streets, Telstra and Optus effectively neutralised one another’s strategic advantage.  
Once the regulations against aerial cabling killed off any further roll-out by either 
party and each company wrote off billions of dollars of HFC network investment, the 
prospect of any other cable competitor operating in the same territory vanished.  In 
March 2002, an agreement was reached to share pay television programming 
whereby Optus would become largely a reseller of Foxtel content.  Foxtel thereby 
neutralised any competitive threat from Optus Vision and Telstra’s ‘telephony 
defence’ had finally become effective although at a huge cost. 
 
Telstra and Optus also exploited their HFC networks to provide data capacity via high 
speed cable modems for their respective ISPs.  In the United States, third party 
access to such data capacity had become a defining issue for ‘open access’, 
occupying the attention of judges, regulators and academics for a number of years.  
In contrast, no Australian ISP approached the ACCC ‘in any concerted way’ to 
request declaration of a cable modem service so that it would become subject to the 
standard access obligations of the Trade Practices Act.  Telstra’s cable modem 
service commenced in April 1997 followed by Optus.  Ozemail was the only other ISP 
at the time with sufficient financial resources but they were intent on selling their 
business.  With broadband Internet competition by then still immature and other ISPs 
seemingly more interested in gaining unbundled access to Telstra’s paired copper 
local loop network, third party access to the cable modem capacity of Telstra and 
Optus continues to remain closed to competitors.  Considering the current 
attractiveness of ADSL access utilising Telstra’s CAN, this situation is unlikely to now 
change. 
 
The final realm for competitive threat was posed by the Seven Network and TARBS 
who sought access to Telstra’s HFC distribution network and Foxtel’s pay television 
service.  Their story of repeatedly rebuffed attempts to gain access has already been 
told.  TARBS is now bankrupt and by 2005/07 the Seven Network was relentlessly 
pursuing PBL, News Limited and Telstra (the three partners in Foxtel) in the courts, 
accusing them of illegally conspiring to force the closure of its pay television sports 
channel C7 in 2002. 
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CHAPTER FIVE – TRANSACT NETWORK CASE STUDY 
 
This case study assessment examines the TransACT broadband network currently 
servicing suburbs within Canberra, Australian Capital Territory.  Conceived in 1996 
and operational by 2000, it was designed from the outset as an open access network 
capable of connecting a variety of service providers to customers, each with its own 
data stream of up to 52 Mb/s.  TransACT remains unique within Australia and a 
relatively rare occurrence worldwide. 
 
Perhaps TransACT is more a creature of its times and unlikely to be repeated, but 
the overwhelming lesson is that open access was achieved voluntarily, not by 
regulatory fiat, and that it works. 
 
5.1 Background 
 
Two national developments in the period 1993-1995 had a significant impact on the 
creation of TransACT.  These were the agreements on national competition reforms, 
particularly as they affected government business enterprises such as electricity 
distributors, and the end of a 15-year long federal government moratorium against 
pay television, as exemplified by the roll-out of competitive services and the creation 
of communications infrastructure by entities other than Telstra.  At the same time, 
new ‘interactive broadband services’ were beginning to excite policy makers, 
providers and users. 
 
Corporatisation of government business enterprises 
 
In October 1992, Australian governments initiated a national approach to competition 
policy reform when they established an Independent Committee of Inquiry into a 
National Competition Policy for Australia.  The committee's recommendations were 
presented the following year and became known as the Hilmer Report, named after 
its Chair, Fred Hilmer. (Hilmer 1993)  Leading on from the recommendations of the 
committee, all Australian governments reached agreement in April 1995 on a 
National Competition Policy (NCP).  Three intergovernmental agreements 
underpinning the NCP are contained within the Compendium of Competition Policy 
Agreements which included, inter alia, agreements that the governments would, 
where appropriate, adopt a corporatisation model for its government business 
enterprises and remove any competitive advantage such enterprises may have over 
privately owned businesses. (NCC 1998, Clause 3(4)) 
 
Within the Australian Capital Territory, the supply of electricity, water and sewerage 
services had been the responsibility of the ACT Electricity and Water Authority, an 
integrated utility considered unique within the major cities of Australia.  In accordance 
with NCP principles and at the behest of the incoming Liberal government led by 
Chief Minister Kate Carnell, the authority was transformed into ACTEW Corporation 
Ltd on 1 July 1995.86  This privatised entity had two voting government shareholders, 
                                            
86 Donovan, P. (1999). Lights! Water! ... ACTEW! A History of ACTEW and its Predecessors. 
Canberra, ACTEW Corporation. 
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the Chief Minister and the Minister for Urban Services.  The Chairman’s Report of 
September 1996 highlighted that “the change from the Authority structure to that of a 
company removed some important barriers to progress” and included in the key 
elements of company strategic view were statements such as: (Service 1996) 
 
Our added role is to use elsewhere the skills built in our core business, to earn 
profits for the community that we serve and who are our ultimate owners. 
 
We do not expect or seek favoured treatment from Government.  However, 
parallel to that a substantial degree of commercial independence is necessary 
if we are to produce satisfactory financial results and high quality service. 
 
Such a strategic view enhanced the prospects of a favourable response from 
ACTEW management on considering a later proposal for a new enterprise in the 
communications business. 
 
Roll-out of cable television 
 
By late 1994, Telstra commenced roll-out of its broadband hybrid- fibre coaxial (HFC) 
network followed by Optus in February 1995. (BIS Shrapnel 2001)  What resulted 
was a frenzied race to cable suburban residential areas initially in Melbourne, Sydney 
and Brisbane such that some 85 per cent of targeted homes would be eventually 
passed by two sets of substantially identical infrastructure.  By October 1995, pay 
television begun to be delivered to subscribers via satellite (Galaxy) and cable 
(Telstra and Optus Vision).  From the outset, Optus strung all of its cabling along 
power poles to achieve a cheaper and faster roll-out that was independent of 
Telstra’s underground conduit.  Alarmed that it was being overtaken, Telstra 
commenced to follow suit by end 1995 and eventually constructed a HFC network 
that was part underground and part aerial. 
 
By end 1995, Telstra and Optus had yet to announce plans to extend their HFC 
cabling to the national capital.  Clearly, any roll-out in Canberra would occur only 
after the main capital cities had been exploited.  A 1993 scheme by Telstra to provide 
the suburb of Gungahlin with a state-of the art multimedia network was quietly 
shelved.  However, a few regional operators were developing plans to cable regional 
areas.  The old paradigm of sole reliance on Telstra to create communications 
infrastructure had come to an end. 
 
Interactive broadband networks and services 
 
In December 1993, the Commonwealth Government commissioned the Broadband 
Services Expert Group and charged it with the task of examining the technical, 
economic and commercial preconditions for the widespread delivery of broadband 
services to homes, businesses and schools in Australia.  With mass market adoption 
of the Internet yet to be realised, the Group considered the future for ‘interactive 
broadband networks’ throughout Australia to carry ‘interactive information and 
                                                                                                                                        
 From here on, ACTEW is taken to refer to either the ACT Electricity and Water 
Authority or ACTEW Corporation Ltd (both being publicly owned) whereas ActewAGL refers 
to the part-privatised entity formed in October 2000. 
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communications services’.  In its final report tabled December 1994, the Group spoke 
of the need for a “managed evolutionary approach, building on opportunities offered 
by existing services and infrastructure”.  (BSEG 1994, Ch.2 et al) 
 
Current developments were then seen to be the recently commenced HFC networks 
by Telstra and Optus for the delivery of broadcast pay television services, followed by 
‘near video-on-demand’ services some years later once transmission on those cables 
had been digitalised.87  The Group forecast the next significant step to be “the 
transition to digital interactive or video-on demand services”, noting that “the network 
architecture of such a system is complex”. (BSEG 1994, Ch.2)  Only optical fibre 
technology was then seen to be capable of supporting the required high-bandwidth 
two-way services.  Referring to recent costing studies undertaken by the Bureau of 
Transport and Communications Economics, the Group concluded that such a 
transition impacting on all Australian households would cost many tens of billions of 
dollars and would take decades to occur. 
 
Clearly, the phrase ‘managed evolutionary approach’ assumed continued nationwide 
dominance of Telstra’s infrastructure and the ongoing challenge of upgrading its 
legacy technology.  The Broadband Services Expert Group could not have 
anticipated a series of serendipitous events unfolding over the next few years in the 
Australian Capital Territory that would belie this assumption. 
 
5.2 The TransAct Communications Project (1995 – 1999) 
 
Dr Michael Sargent was appointed Chief Executive Officer of ACTEW in November 
1991 and continued until August 1997, a critical period covering corporatisation of the 
Authority as well as the birth of the TransAct communications project.  Mike Sargent 
insisted on staff development and encouraged people to develop themselves 
professionally, to ensure change became acceptable and permeated the organisation 
from below rather than being imposed from above. (Donovan 1999, p.222) In April 
1994 he inaugurated a leadership program that featured three main components; a 
residential retreat during which participants learned appropriate skills, an outdoors 
component where participants honed some of these skills, and an ‘action learning’ 
project.  This latter component involved five or six people who were given a project 
identified by a member of the executive.  Each project ran for about five months, 
typically involving about half a day each week, after which they were required to 
present their findings to their colleagues. (Donovan 1999, p.225) Participation in the 
program was a sure sign of advancement and was greatly sought after. 
 
Some time during 1993, Robin Eckermann – an IT consultant who had developed an 
interest in communications – sketched out some plans for pulling optical fibres 
through Canberra sewers and put the idea to Wayne Harris, General Manager 
Northern Region of ACTEW, who had a background in water and sewerage 
engineering.  The idea provoked interest, but was then set aside until around October 
1995 when Harris remembered the earlier proposal and literally knocked on the door 
at Eckermann’s home one Saturday with the query “what do you know about 
broadband”.88  According to Eckermann, Harris got “a full dose of broadband 
                                            
87 This eventually occurred in March 2004. 
88 Record of telephone transcript, Kelso/Eckermann, 17 September 2004. 
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enthusiasm” and mentioned that ACTEW had established a small project team to 
explore the possible use of aerial bundled conductors – several electricity lines 
bundled into one cable – which might prove more compatible with the larger, more 
established trees then being encountered in the older suburbs of Canberra.  
Donovan (1999, p.276) records this team as being members of the fourth leadership 
program established by the CEO, Mike Sargent.  The team report made a passing 
note about the prospects of including optical fibre within bundled electricity cables but 
could do no more than recommend a subsequent team explore the matter in further 
detail.  Telstra and Optus were already well advanced in rolling out pay television 
cabling by late 1995, including much of it attached to electricity poles, but in cities 
other than Canberra. 
 
Harris invited Eckermann to talk further about communication issues to ACTEW 
senior management on 30 November 1995.  Eckermann outlined to them the trend 
starting to emerge overseas where some utilities were becoming interested in 
communications89 and discussed the major different technology choices.  
Importantly, he touched on the many assets of utilities that were potentially a great 
launching pad to enter the communications business, for example, utilities already 
had networks, customers and billing systems.90 
 
The idea continued to gestate.  By early 1996, a team under the fifth leadership 
program was charged with the task of more closely examining ACTEW’s possible 
role in communications. (Donovan 1999, p.276-277) The team was aware that by 
then both Telstra and Optus had made some tentative enquiries about attaching their 
pay television cables to ACTEW poles.  To be more clear of trees, each company 
vied for the higher pole position.  ACTEW engineers were concerned as to whether 
the poles would support two lots of wiring.  As time passed, the matter remained 
unresolved and suspicion grew that Canberra was low on the priority list for the 
Telstra and Optus HFC roll-outs – perhaps because the poles were primarily located 
in the backyards of residences.91,92 
 
Eckermann was invited in March 1996 to chat with this latest leadership team who, 
representing a broad cross-section of the organisation, had no background in 
communications at all.  Subsequent discussions led to a small consultancy awarded 
                                            
89 Reference was made to the pioneering effort of the Glasgow Electric Plant Board in 
Kentucky, USA (http://www.glasgow-ky.com/epb/, accessed 13 May 2007) which established 
a cable television network in mid-1989. 
90 Record of telephone transcript, Kelso/Eckermann, 17 September 2004. 
91 Almost exclusive to the ACT, electricity poles installed at the rear of properties (called 
‘back-spining’ or ‘rear-spining’) ensured picturesque streetscapes but, as trees matured and 
house extensions occurred, pole replacement became increasingly difficult.  Donovan, P. 
(1999). Lights! Water! ... ACTEW! A History of ACTEW and its Predecessors. Canberra, 
ACTEW Corporation. 
  Experience in Sydney and Melbourne showed that two sets of pay television aerial 
cabling led to a proportion of poles having to be structurally modified. 
92 Other reasons for avoiding Canberra: By 1996, Optus Vision was bleeding financially and 
attracting tremendous public opposition for its aerial cabling elsewhere; Telstra (before also 
deciding to go aerial) was concerned over the high establishment costs for a new Head End 
to serve a relatively small market; furthermore Telstra’s underground customer access 
network in Canberra was reportedly in poor condition, hence requiring too much replacement 
of conduit and/or telephone cable. 
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to Eckermann that enabled the leadership team to produce the very ‘first cut’ of a 
business case, culminating in the CabTech (cable technology) Report by September 
1996. 93  This initial feasibility study produced a rough commercial model exploring 
the opportunities in communications and suggested a better rate of return than 
utilities generally get from other infrastructure investment.  The analysis contrasted a 
hybrid fibre coaxial (HFC) with a fibre-to-the curb (FTTC) architecture, whilst a crucial 
issue identified was whether both Telstra and Optus cables should be allowed on 
ACTEW poles, or only one cable and the other company excluded, and regardless, 
should ACTEW workforce install it?94  In fact, should ACTEW even own such cabling 
– in the same way as it already owned the poles and electricity wires? 
 
The typical fate of a leadership team report may be to gather dust in a departmental 
filing cabinet, however the CabTech Report appealed to the CEO who had faith in his 
staff and was willing to entertain lateral ideas.  Perhaps there really were 
opportunities for an electricity utility in the communications game?  Mike Sargent 
escalated the report to the ACTEW Board who approved a budget to expand the 
project team, develop the technical options and commission some market research.  
The TransAct communications project formally began with a staff of four, including 
Robin Eckermann recruited as project manager.  On 18 October 1996, potential 
service providers and investment partners were invited to register interest in the 
project, followed by a request for proposal (RFP) seeking comprehensive network 
infrastructure and service solutions issued on 1 November. 
 
This dual-pronged approach reflected the belief that although ACTEW could 
demonstrate competence in many areas of relevance to broadband networking 
through it’s distribution network, established customer service facilities and the ability 
to undertake complex engineering projects, it would need new skills and particularly 
those of a partner to help run telephony and data-related services.95  ACTEW's focus 
would be on the deployment, maintenance and operation of a broadband customer 
access network – but not the services.  It had no desire to become either a telephone 
company or a pay television operator. (ACTEW RFP 1996, 3.14) 
 
The RFP reflected the promise of a ‘green field’ communications business only 
possible without the constraints of incumbency.  The proposed ACTEW broadband 
communication network had to be able to support “a comprehensive range of video, 
telephony and data communication services as well as providing a communications 
framework for introducing utility-specific applications such as remote meter reading, 
customer energy management, outage monitoring etc.” (ACTEW RFP 1996, 3.9)  
Video services could include basic broadcast television channels, premium 
subscription television channels, pay-per-view (PPV) services, near-video-on-
demand (NVOD) and video-on-demand (VOD).  The network had to deliver both 
telephony and data services, with the latter including access to the Internet that 
“could support a wide range of existing and emerging educational, entertainment, 
communication and commercial applications.  Other data services could include high-
                                            
93 Record of telephone transcript, Kelso/Eckermann, 17 September 2004. 
94 To carry out work on power poles installed in residents’ backyards, ACTEW staff had to 
rely on ladders brought in by foot; it would have been unwise for ACTEW to subject residents 
to the intrusion of another company’s workforce. 
95 Record of telephone transcript, Kelso/Eckermann, 17 September 2004. 
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speed connection to corporate LANs and video-conferencing to facilitate 
telecommuting.” (ACTEW RFP 1996, 3.11-12) 
 
However the RFP also reflected a crystallisation of project team thinking about the 
impact of additional communication cables to ACTEW power poles: it made no 
practical or business sense to allow more than one cable and since ACTEW was 
already in the ‘wires business’, it should own and operate that cable.  But with neither 
Telstra nor Optus seemingly willing to provide pay television services to Canberra 
residents by then, would not such an ACTEW cable be in a monopoly position?  The 
RFP gave the answer: (ACTEW RFP 1996, 3.13) 
 
3.13 ACTEW intends that the network be as open as possible, with capacity 
being made available to a range of providers offering telephony, video and 
data communication services.  The architecture of the network should be 
independent of particular services and service providers so that new services 
can be introduced as and when appropriate.  It is envisaged that there will be 
only one type of network equipment at the headend and regional 
hubs/exchanges and only one type of Network Terminating Unit (NTU) or Set 
Top Box (STB) in each residence that is connected to the network. 
 
The idea was straightforward – customers would experience one new communication 
cable leading into their homes96, providing a single network interface, and through 
this ‘pipe’ would flow as many services as possible, all provided by a range of service 
providers independent of ACTEW.  It is not surprising for a utility to think this way.  
Canberra residents already paid ACTEW a monthly fee for the electricity 
infrastructure plus a service charge for electricity consumed.  In like manner, the cost 
to customers of the proposed communications network would be structured as a line 
rental for access to the network plus charges made by the providers of services such 
as telephony, the Internet and pay television. (Donovan 1999, p.277)  A single 
broadband network would offer competition between service providers. (TransAct 
Communications Project 1997a)  The secret would be to deploy a broadband 
communications network with an architecture to reflect this demarcation and also of 
sufficiently advanced design to economically deliver a panoply of services, including 
ones not currently envisaged – a ‘full service network’.97 
 
Right at the outset, the project team evaluated both the fibre-to-the-curb (FTTC) and 
hybrid-fibre-coax (HFC) architectures, but announced in the RFC that fibre-to-the-
curb was preferred for the following reasons: (ACTEW RFP 1996, 3.16) 
 
a. The socio-economic profile of Canberra was an ideal environment for 
pioneering future communications-based applications such as telecommuting, 
distance learning and electronic commerce; 
b. By taking fibre ‘deeper’ into the network, the FTTC architecture was capable of 
cost-effectively supporting a high level of interactive demand not possible with 
the architecture of an HFC network; 
                                            
96 That is, in addition to Telstra’s existing paired copper cable for telephony. 
97 In the view of the project team, neither Telstra nor Optus could ever compete with such a 
vision as they were in the midst of deploying HFC networks for only pay television services 
and would also be loathe to cannibalise their current telephony and data services.  
Historically, incumbent operators tended to create new networks that are service-specific. 
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c. Practical deployment of cables in Canberra’s backyards necessitated a long-
term strategy that avoided the need for subsequent upgrade; 
d. The interactive capacity of an appropriate FTTC architecture would enhance 
options for high-grade telephony and data communication services. 
 
The conceptual model for an FTTC architecture envisaged a fully switched digital 
broadband system capable of delivering voice, data and video services via a star-
topology network from the service area optical node to a digital terminating unit in 
each residence.  A minimum of 25 Mb/s downstream and 1 Mb/s reverse channel 
bandwidth per residence was requested.  A range of service providers would 
interface with the network via a central ‘headend’ installation.  The optical fibre would 
typically terminate in curb-side pillars or pits, mounted on poles or installed in the 
basement of multi-dwelling buildings.  Although the conceptual architecture of Figure 
7 implied an FTTC solution, the RFC was open to alternative offerings claimed to 
deliver comparable service functionality. 
 
 
 
Key: HE = Headend (one only); RX = regional hub (multiple); ON = optical nodes 
(many); NTU = network termination unit (one per customer). 
 
Figure 7 – Conceptual Architecture of a Fibre-to-the Curb Network 
(Source: Adapted from ACTEW RFP 1996, 3.22) 
 
The project team classified the 11 responses offering total network solutions into two 
streams: those utilising HFC versus those utilising FTTC technologies. (TransAct 
Communications Project 1997b)  An economic comparison between the best within 
each stream selected an FTTC offering that deployed shared-use optical fibre to the 
Optical Nodes followed by individual copper pairs to each customer exploiting very 
high rate digital subscriber line or VDSL transmission – all configured in a ‘switched 
digital’ manner that would present each customer with a dedicated two-way 
broadband service.  This latter requirement was critical for accommodating multiple 
service providers. 
 
According to Eckermann, “the final straw that tipped it in favour of (V)DSL was that 
the HFC architecture broke down catastrophically with demand-based video 
services…. the methodology was to start with the vision (which involved a rich 
payload of services), then find the platform that most cost effectively supports that 
vision”.98  By June 1997, the project team had a clear preference for an offering that 
deployed an FTTC/VDSL architecture.  This solution would ultimately be realised as 
the network for delivering commercial service.  The remaining problem would be to 
attract a ‘rich payload of services’. 
 
                                            
98 Record of telephone transcript, Kelso/Eckermann, 17 September 2004. 
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Eckermann recounts that under the model of ACTEW owning the ‘wires’ they would 
need a partner to provide all of the service-related expertise, and particularly in 
regard to telephony as “that was just a very complicated thing”.  An approach to 
Telstra was rebuffed, so the project team focussed business discussions on Optus 
and AAPT.  The open network approach was reflected in the planned commercial 
structure: the project team used terms such as ‘Netco’ for the network company that 
built and owned the infrastructure (that is, ACTEW) and ‘Opsco’ for the entity that 
operated the network and provided the key service of telephony.  An arm’s length 
separation between Netco and Opsco was essential. 
 
By about March 1997, a relationship with Optus appeared more promising but 
became deadlocked on some key issues: “We were going to spend what looked like 
some $150M on building the network – they wanted to come in with a switch (say a 
$2-3M investment), but be in a strongly dominant position and give a fairly small 
pittance to us by way of revenue.  We would take the big risks building the network, 
but they would totally control the marketing and hence every aspect of our fate.  We 
wanted them to also put pay television on it and other stuff but telephony was at the 
centre of their thinking at that stage”.99,100  These service negotiations, though 
delicate, were independent of whichever broadband technology was chosen. 
 
ACTEW highlighted in July 1997 that the new network could not be monopolised by 
any one service provider: “Although ACTEW is entering into a business arrangement 
with one company, the network will still be essentially open to all service providers 
wanting to run services in Canberra. (TransAct Communications Project 1997c)  By 
then, the prospect of a relationship with AAPT appeared more attractive than one 
with Optus.  AAPT had been awarded a carrier licence on 1 July 1997 when the 
Australian telecommunications industry was finally opened to competition.  However, 
due to the pending listing of AAPT on the Australian Stock Exchange, the board of 
AAPT put settlement of such a business relationship with the TransAct project on 
hold.  With these discussions mutually discontinued, TransAct began to absorb the 
implications of the post-July 1997 deregulation of telecommunications – was having a 
‘telephony partner’ now such a critical success factor?101  By January 1998, a 
spokeswoman for ACTEW revealed a significant change in strategic thinking by 
TransAct: (Connors 1998) 
 
The more we talked to AAPT, the more we realised that linking up with one 
carrier would limit us, so we decided to preserve our independence.  Any 
agreement could have left other service providers a bit dubious about how 
open the network really is. 
 
Thereafter, the TransAct project team resolved to deploy its own telephony switch 
that would alleviate dependence on a single telecommunications carrier for 
narrowband services, yet still retain an ‘open’ network for broadband services. 
 
                                            
99 Record of telephone transcript, Kelso/Eckermann, 17 September 2004. 
100 Optus ceased their roll-out later that year (1997), had accumulated a massive debt and 
were already dismissing staff, so they couldn’t have been seriously thinking about pay 
television!  Establishing a telephony-over-HFC capability was a prime part of their original 
competitive strategy. 
101 Record of telephone transcript, Kelso/Eckermann, 4 February 2005. 
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University-conducted market research of Canberra and Wollongong residents and 
businesses showed wide support for ACTEW’s involvement in the project, 
highlighting the services of greatest interest and revealing the estimated take-up 
figures for the business model to be quite conservative. (TransAct Communications 
Project 1997c) 
 
The benefits to ACT residents and businesses of the proposed ‘open’ broadband 
communications network were claimed to include: (TransAct Communications Project 
1997a) 
 
• Profits from an ACT-owned and operated network would remain in the ACT; 
• A single broadband network would offer competition between service providers; 
• A large variety of services would be available from each PC or TV (probably 
including a local community channel); 
• Competition in telephone calls - local, STD, ISD; 
• Excellent free-to-air television reception without a TV aerial; 
• Faster Internet access; 
• The network would attract new services through state-of-the-art technology; 
• ACT businesses would gain better services than currently available in other 
capital cities; and 
• Job creation would result from the construction and ongoing management of the 
network. 
 
Evaluation of the RFP and service provider responses lead to a refined business 
case approved by the ACTEW Board on 28 July 1997. (TransAct Communications 
Project 1997c)  Given successful testing of the chosen technology in a laboratory, a 
pilot roll-out to an area encompassing some 900 homes was then scheduled for the 
following year.  Four possible sites were evaluated against criteria including: results 
of previous market research, demographics, number of schools in the area and 
community acceptance and willingness to participate in a pilot. (TransAct 
Communications Project 1998) 
 
Two new events then arose that could threaten the future of the TransAct 
Communications Project – one unexpected, the other part of an ongoing process.  
The project’s patron, CEO Mike Sargent, resigned mid-1997 and was eventually 
replaced in early 1998 by a career bureaucrat John McKay who was most sceptical 
about it.  Eckermann recalls the new CEO’s first reaction as being “what the hell are 
we doing in communications, let’s shut this down”.102  However, the project was now 
part of a bigger event.  Progressively since 1995, the ACT government had been 
implementing structural reforms consistent with National Competition Policy.  ACTEW 
was already a government-owned corporation, but the Liberal government of the 
Australian Capital Territory was keen to explore privatisation.  In considering 
structure and ownership options, a scoping study by ABN AMRO/DGJ Projects also 
examined ‘non-core’ investment activities such as that posed by TransAct.  
Fortuitously, it concluded: (ACT Government 1998) 
                                            
102 Record of telephone transcript, Kelso/Eckermann, 17 September 2004. 
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We recommend this project proceed to the conclusion of the pilot stage at 
which point potential purchasers of ACTEW can assess the viability of the 
project.  If ACTEW is retained in public ownership the risk exposure of 
ACTEW needs to be substantially mitigated.  ACTEW management has 
commenced discussions with private sector parties interested in TransAct. 
 
The northern suburb of Aranda was chosen for the pilot technical trial which Chief 
Minister Carnell launched on 27 November 1998.  It ran until end-July 1999 and 
connected some 250 homes.  Services tested during the pilot included: (Eckermann 
1999) 
 
• High-speed Internet access (with Ozemail and Spirit participating as ISPs and 
the ACT Government hosting a range of advanced applications); 
• Fourteen channels of broadcast digital video (commercial content provided by 
Foxtel plus several European language channels); 
• Two channels of near-video-on-demand (content provided by the Advanced 
Computational Systems CRC in collaboration with the National Film and Sound 
Archive); and 
• A comprehensive telephony service. 
 
Connections and equipment were provided free of charge, although customers paid 
for services on a commercial basis, such as telephony and pay television.  “Those 
taking part in the trial were enthusiastic about it and, having a taste of the future, 
hoped it would succeed.” (Donovan 1999, p.278) 
 
Sealing the fate of the original proposal to seek a ‘telephony partner’, a 
telecommunications carrier licence was applied for and awarded to TransAct Carrier 
Pty Limited in February 1999.103 
 
5.3 Commercial Operation (2000 onwards) 
 
The decisions and efforts of previous years made by the ACT government, ACTEW 
management and the TransAct project team laid the groundwork for consolidation in 
2000 leading to commercial operation the following year. 
 
Firstly, the ACT government delivered on its promise to explore privatisation of 
ACTEW.  From October 2000, ACTEW Corporation Limited began operating a 50/50 
public-private partnership with the Australian Gas Light Company (AGL) in the form 
                                            
103 According to the Australian Communications and Media Authority, this was carrier licence 
no. 26.  Though surrendered in June 2001, it was effectively replaced by licence no. 49 
awarded to Transact Capital Communications in September 2000. Refer to 
http://www.acma.gov.au/WEB/STANDARD//pc=PC_1625 accessed 30 May 2007. 
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of ActewAGL.104  Secondly, funding was secured to support a territory-wide network 
roll-out culminating in the official launch of TransACT Communications Pty Limited on 
31 May 2000 involving the following partners:105 (Carnell 2000) 
 
• ACTEW Corporation Limited; 
• TVG Transact Holdings; 
• AGL TransACT Pty Limited; 
• Marconi Corporation plc; and 
• Australian Capital Ventures Limited. 
 
ACT Chief Minister Kate Carnell announced that “not only will subscribers be able to 
get multiple telephone lines, free-to-air and pay television and high-speed permanent 
internet connection, all on the one-line and all on the same account; new services 
like video on demand, video conferencing and community networks will be offered for 
the first time”.  The environment for the new TransACT could not have been more 
favourable: 
 
• The FTTC/VDSL broadband technology chosen by TransACT was unequalled 
in Australia (refer to Section 5.4 for further discussion); 
• Neither Telstra nor Optus HFC-delivered pay television cabling had eventuated 
in Canberra; (BIS Shrapnel 2001, p.98) 
• The Australia-wide roll-out of ADSL services, offering the only possible 
competition, was in its infancy by late 2000; (BIS Shrapnel 2001, p.53) 
• Relying until then only on dial-up access to the Internet, Canberra was the 
leading Australian city in terms of households online, with a 35 per cent take up 
in 1999; (DCITA 2000) 
• The security of the ACT government underwrote the financial risk for the private 
partners. (Cameron 2007, p.216) 
 
No longer a fully government-owned entity, commercial practice limits the availability 
of details about the subsequent network roll-out.  However an ITU report in 2001 on 
broadband in Australia observed that the developing TransACT service is “tightly 
focussed on serving the 100,000 residents and 14,000 businesses in the ACT and 
the neighbouring regional centre of Queanbeyan (population of 25,000)”. (Houghton 
and Morris 2001, p.15)  By December 2001 TransACT had publicly reported the 
                                            
104 ACTEW's electricity-infrastructure assets and AGL's Canberra and Queanbeyan gas 
infrastructure became part of the joint-venture, although ACTEW retained ownership of the 
existing water and wastewater network, catchment and treatment infrastructure and 
associated water and wastewater assets.  ActewAGL now handles all distribution and retail 
operations of the parent companies relating to electricity and natural gas services, as well as 
ACTEW's water and wastewater operations under a service-contract arrangement. 
105 Subsequent investors included the Commonwealth Bank of Australia and MTAA 
Superannuation Fund (TransACT) Utilities Pty Ltd in April 2002, followed by Westscheme Pty 
Ltd.  The end result has been dilution of ACT government/ACTEW Corporation Limited 
ownership of TransACT from 100 per cent to 24.86 per cent as at May 2004. Refer to page 
4, Attachment A of ActewAGL and TransACT lodgement at 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/505972 , accessed 8 February 2005 
D.R.Kelso PhD Thesis, QUT, February 2008: Open Access to Next Generation Broadband {single line spaced version} 
 102
connection of their 10,000th customer and in January 2005 the first customer had 
been connected in Queanbeyan.106 
 
In reality, TransACT’s fortunes have not been without upset, partly due to the novelty 
and scale of the business venture, and partly due to the financial uncertainty posed 
by the ‘dot com’ crash during the period 2000 – 2002.  Major technology partner 
Nortel withdrew, CEO Richard Vincent resigned and then press reports followed that 
the company was on the verge of collapse. (Mitchell 2001, p.35) In announcing 
additional debt and equity funding obtained from investors in April 2002, new CEO 
Michael Del Gigante predicted the TransACT network would pass 50 per cent of 
Canberra’s suburbs by the end of that year. (Osman 2002, p.72) 
 
Residential and non-residential (business, government, education) customers may 
avail themselves of various service package offerings derived from the following 
basic TransACT network services:107 
 
• TransTALK Premium 
 
This telephony service offers the usual PSTN capabilities plus the bonus of free 
local calls to other TransTALK customers.  Unless only the TransWEB 2 Mb/s 
service is ordered, TransTALK Premium is common to all package offerings.  
The service is directly provided by TransACT as a telecommunications carrier.  
TransTALK also supplies an ISDN service for businesses. 
 
• TransTV 
 
As at May 2006, 32 digital quality video channels are provided on a subscription 
basis in additional to four video-on-demand or VOD services: Adultshop on-
demand, ANYTIME, TransTv on-demand and Video On Demand.  The former 
are distributed by TransACT108 whereas the VOD services derive from service 
providers to whom separate subscription is required.  The channel programming 
on offer was that of Table 7.  The six local free-to-air television channels are 
also re-broadcasted. 
                                            
106 Refer to TransACT media releases at http://www.transact.com.au/about/media.asp, 
accessed 7 February 2005 
107 For a more complete description of service availability, packages and tariffs, refer to 
http://www.transact.com.au, accessed 7 February 2005. 
108 According to the Australian Communications and Media Authority, Transact Broadcasting 
Pty Limited was allocated pay or subscription television broadcasting licences in October 
2001 and November 2002.  Refer to 
http://www.acma.gov.au/WEB/STANDARD//pc=PC_90046  under Section 96 licences, 
accessed 30 May 2007. 
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Table 7: Channel Programming Line-up 
 
News and information 
Australian Christian 
Channel 
BBC World Bloomberg television 
Channel NewsAsia Channelvision Channel One 
CNBC Australia CNN Deutsche Welle TV 
EWTN House of Representatives Liaoning TV 
Parliamentary 
Committees 
Senate SBS world news 
TV5   
   
Kids and family 
Boomerang Cartoon Network Disney Channel 
   
Movies 
Anytime Turner Classic Movies Video On Demand 
   
 
Documentary and special interest 
Adventure One Animal Planet Discovery Health & 
Health 
Discovery Real Time Discovery Science Channel Discovery Travel & 
Living 
 
Fashion TV National Geographic 
Channel 
 
   
Music and entertainment 
E! MCM TOP Soundtrack Channel 
   
Sports 
ESPN FOX Footy Channel TransTV on-demand 
   
Source: Compiled from http://www.transact.com.au/television/channels.aspx  
 
• TransVPN 
 
This Virtual Private Network connects network groups of users across multiple 
sites (offices and homes) with individual private high-speed data networks, 
allowing the easy interchange of information and ideas in a secure environment.  
There are no extra charges for data usage. 
 
• TransWEB 
 
A permanent data connection is provided to an interface with an ISP, offering 
bandwidth options of (downstream/upstream) 256/64 kb/s, 512/128 kb/s, 1 Mb/s 
/256 kb/s or 2 Mb/s /512 kb/s for residential users, and from 1 Mb/s / 256 kb/s to 
10 Mb/s / 1 Mb/s for non-residential users.  Users subscribe to TransACT for 
TransWEB data carriage and additionally to an ISP chosen by the customer for 
Internet access.  As at May 2006, eleven separate ISPs competed for 
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broadband customers via TransACT.  They are: APEX internet; cbit Internet, 
CyberOne, GoldWeb Internet, Grapevine, Interact Broadband, NetSpeed, 
OfficeLink+, PC Users Group (ACT), Velocity Internet and WebOne Internet. 
 
ActewAGL Net Connect became the sixth ISP in May 2003 to establish service on 
the TransACT network despite ActewAGL being a 25 per cent owner of that network. 
(Brennan 2003) Then in February 2004 it was announced that ActewAGL would take 
over the management of day-to-day operations of TransACT so as to rationalise 
company overheads. (TransACT Communications 2004)  Service providers and 
users have since claimed that TransACT is now refusing to allow new ISPs onto their 
network – purportedly to protect the viability of the then ActewAGL Net Connect, now 
Grapevine.109 110  The above events now raise questions about the true ‘openness’ of 
the TransWEB service in that TransACT may no longer be treating competing ISPs in 
an impartial manner. 
 
5.4 Designing for Open Access 
 
The TransAct project team took a conscious decision to first develop their service 
delivery vision, namely to “support a comprehensive range of video, telephony and 
data communication services” and “be as open as possible, with capacity being 
made available to a range of providers” and then choose a technological solution to 
best deliver that vision.  The result was an architecture employing fibre-to-the curb 
(FTTC) and very high rate digital subscriber line (VDSL) broadband transmission 
configured to offer switched digital services. 
 
On considering the delivery of video, data and telephony services, it was found more 
suitable for video and data to be delivered by a ‘broadband network’ whilst telephony 
is delivered by a ‘narrowband network’.  Technically, these two networks run in 
parallel and are substantially distinct though share common physical infrastructure 
and systems. (Evans 2001) Subscribers are not made aware of this distinction.  In a 
functional and basic topological sense, the TransACT network is described by Figure 
8. 
 
The backbone network consists of Synchronous Digital Hierarchy (SDH) optical fibre 
rings underpinning a city-wide Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) system designed 
to carry voice, data and particularly video services.  A series of fibre rings connect 
the central Gateway to at least five Hub sites in such a manner as to provide for 
alternative routing in case of failure.  The Hub sites are strategically located to serve 
all Canberra homes and businesses.  For the sake of economy and effectiveness, 
customers are serviced by individual ‘Category 5’ paired copper lines over which 
broadband services are delivered via VDSL transmission up to a maximum length of 
300 metres.  Optical signals are converted to electrical signals for carriage on the 
copper lines at points called Nodes; most of these (about 85 per cent) are 
‘broadband’ Nodes for delivering data and video services, whereas the remainder are 
                                            
109 Refer to discussion forum at http://www.whirlpool.net.au under ‘Regional, Satellite’, 
‘TransACT’ and then, among other topics, ‘Internode on TransACT’, as at 8/2/2005. 
110 ActewAGL Net Connect was re-badged as Grapevine on 20 April 2005. Refer to 
http://www.actewagl.com.au/news/Article.aspx?id=514 accessed 30 May 2007. 
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Super Nodes designed to deliver telephony service with enhanced reliability. 
(Bernstone 2001) 
 
 
Figure 8 – Schematic of TransACT Network 
adapted from (TransACT Communications 2001) 
 
Those fibres terminating on Nodes support a small serving area, typically comprising 
around 50 homes or businesses.  Each residential customer may avail themselves of 
VDSL capacities of up to 52 Mb/s downstream and 1.6 Mb/s upstream.111  
Broadband signals terminate on Set Top Boxes for video and/or Modems for Internet 
access, whilst narrowband signals terminate on standard telephones, facsimile 
machines or voice-grade modems.  No encryption of broadband signals is required to 
implement conditional access because users are only sent those channels they are 
authorised to receive. (Eckermann 1999) 
 
The TransACT FTTC/VDSL network architecture contrasts with the Telstra and 
Optus HFC pay television networks deployed elsewhere.  Those networks are 
instead designed with optical fibre serving between 500 and 2,000 homes, and 
moreover the optical signals are converted to electrical signals on a common coaxial 
cable.  Individual customers on an HFC network share all signals broadcast over 
their particular length of coaxial cable, resulting in limited service capability and 
capacity for end-users and requiring stringent control mechanisms at each Set Top 
Box to prevent unauthorised access to signals. (TransACT Communications 2005)  
HFC networks are particularly unsuited for delivering a highly interactive service such 
as video-on-demand. 
 
This is the crucial distinction that enables the TransACT network to operate under an 
‘open access’ regime.  With each customer having a dedicated physical connection 
                                            
111 By comparison, ADSL technology typically delivers up to 1.5 Mb/s over distances up to 
some 6 km; DSL speed can only increase by shortening the distance signals need to travel. 
Another example of this network design approach was the Telstra fibre-to-the-node proposal 
of 2005/06 to deploy fibre 1.5 km deeper into the traditional CAN and thereafter exploit 
ADSL2+ technology to deliver downstream speeds of at least 12 Mb/s and in some cases 24 
Mb/s. 
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capable of delivering up to 52 Mb/s, a quantity well in excess of presently 
conceivable applications, plus a common optical fibre backbone network designed to 
switch individual service demands to and from the central gateway without contention 
for capacity, individual service demands can be satisfied without impacting on service 
quality for others.  By itself such ‘switched digital access’ doesn’t dictate open 
access, however once multiple service providers are interfaced to the central 
gateway then any service provider is equally able to connect with any customer who 
requests their particular service.  The underlying transport network is designed to be 
independent of both services and service providers. (Eckermann 1999) 
 
5.5 Success with Open Access 
 
The TransACT network in the Australian Capital Territory came about because the 
management and staff of ACTEW entertained a vision and then took the steps to 
implement it.  The key enablers of success were: (Eckermann 1999) 
 
• The absence of ‘broadband’ competition, in that Canberra was bypassed by the 
HFC roll-out of Telstra and Optus; 
• Access to the physical assets of ACTEW such as power poles, substations, 
ducts and rights of way, as well as the existing relationship with customers; 
• The Canberra market which is statistically more information-centric than 
elsewhere in Australia. 
 
By themselves, these factors could have alternatively resulted in a ‘closed’ network, 
one relying on a vertically integrated business strategy.  However, ACTEW was a 
utility with no background in communications and could see no sense in unnecessary 
duplication of infrastructure.  It was attuned to the concept of a network owner 
throwing open its infrastructure and abstaining from the higher layers of business that 
might compete with third parties wanting to use the network.  (Eckermann 1999)  
Given that ACTEW was not encumbered with any existing communications 
infrastructure and possessed no existing communications portfolio vulnerable to 
being undermined, it was possible to design a ‘greenfields’ solution able to support 
multiple service providers, multiple services and even services not currently 
envisaged - a solution based on the business principles of open access.  The 
switched digital architecture offered by FTTC/VDSL technology was a logical 
outcome at that time of decision-making. 
 
TransACT would intentionally become dependent upon third party service providers 
to provide the services, applications and content on its network.  This calls for trust 
between the network owner and service providers, such that third parties “can utilise 
the TransAct network without fear of the network owner undermining their businesses 
by competing from a privileged position”. (Eckermann 1999)  There would however 
be one crucial qualification – “if there is any service on which the success of the 
network depends and no service providers step up to the opportunity, TransAct will 
fill the vacuum”.  That policy option was exercised in the case of telephony services 
when the TransAct project team exhausted alternative avenues of supply via existing 
telephone companies towards late 1997, and opted to provide narrowband services 
(that is, telephony) by itself. 
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TransACT’s open approach to broadband service provision is argued to have the 
benefit of allowing new market entrants to focus their resources on a narrower set of 
activities, and to take advantage of the strengths and resources of others in 
complementary service and content areas. (TransACT Communications 1999)  
Successful models of TransACT’s approach can be found in other industries such as 
ports, railways and airports, where companies “derive their success from being very 
good in a specialised area rather than attempting to be a one-stop shop”. (TransACT 
Communications 1999)  Table 8 draws comparisons between the TransACT 
business model and that of a vertically integrated operator. 
 
Table 8: Comparison of Business Models 
 
 
Vertical Integration Model 
 
 
TransACT Model 
Resist efforts to force network open to 
third party content and service providers. 
Welcome all third party service and content 
providers to give real choice to the consumer. 
Establish own ISP service and fight to win 
customers from other ISPs, providing all 
of the support functions that go with a 
diverse range of Internet users. 
Partner with many major ISPs and cooperate 
in enhancing service to their tens of 
thousands of established customers through 
provision of broadband access. 
 
Try to limit customer's choice to ‘own’ 
products and services in order to 
maximize revenue per customer. 
Promote broadest possible array of services 
and products in order to optimise the value of 
broadband connection to the maximum 
number of customers. 
Strive to uphold pricing of bandwidth as a 
multiple of telephony capacity. 
‘Lead the charge’ in introducing broadband 
communications capacity at prices designed 
to foster higher usage. 
Where wholesaling capacity to third 
parties, erect ‘Chinese walls’ but compete 
vigorously at the retail layer. 
In collaboration with service providers, 
promote all products and services that are 
available through the network. 
Lose a customer whenever they churn to 
another provider's service. 
Retain the customer irrespective of churn 
between service providers.112 
Amortise the cost of the network over only 
‘own’ products and services. 
Amortise the cost of the network over multiple 
service streams, service providers and 
services. 
Sources: (TransACT Communications 1999), (Eckermann 1999) 
 
Not surprisingly, TransACT argues that their open access principles are good for the 
customer, the service provider and the network owner.  As at May 2006, a variety of 
service providers have contracted to provide 32 digital quality video channels, plus 
four video-on-demand services.  The six local free-to-air television channels are also 
re-broadcasted.  Eleven ISPs compete for broadband customers, including one 
owned by the major partner and entity now operating TransACT, that is, ActewAGL.  
As at 2002, the proportion of TransACT customers who had subscribed to the 
following bundles of services were: (Brooks 2002) (Eckermann 2003) 
                                            
112 Provided that the customer remains with TransACT, which now may not be the case given 
increased competition from ADSL technology carried via Telstra’s paired copper network. 
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• All three services (telephony, video & data)  63 - 70 per cent 
• Two services (mostly telephony & video)  10 - 12 per cent 
• One service only (mostly telephony)   20 - 24 per cent 
 
Another measure of customer satisfaction is that of the ‘churn’ rate, which had been 
recorded as less than 2 per cent of customers who disconnected from TransACT 
during a 12 month period. (Eckermann 2003)  Although perhaps not a fair 
comparison between national figures for broadband adoption and those of a single 
network such as TransACT, the same author notes that around 2001 – 2002 
TransACT broadband customers were signing up (in terms of lines per 100 
inhabitants) at a level far in excess of the Australian average and only bettered by 
that of Korea. 
 
On the other hand, some industry analysts have warned that a strategy of ‘making 
money off the pipe, not the content’ is not without pitfalls: (Taggart 1999) (Taggart 
2002) 
 
… if TransACT doesn’t quickly lock in customers, other players with less 
sophisticated offerings could use ‘fear, uncertainty and doubt’ about the new 
system to drive customers toward purportedly ‘safer’ - but less capable –
broadband systems. 
 
The downside (in not developing broadband content and services) is that there 
may not be much money in utility services, which are homogeneous goods. 
 
A typical monthly outlay by a residential customer subscribing to a three-service 
bundle, involving the TransACT Home Pack 1000113 and the NetSpeed Plus 5 
Plan114, would be as follows (applicable as at May 2006): 
 
$59.95 paid to TransACT which 
offers 
• TransTALK AllTime, including free local 
calls to other TransTALK customers (with 
other call usage charged accordingly) 
• TransWEB data connection to an ISP of 1 
Mb/s downstream and 128 kb/s upstream 
• TransTV, including a basic ‘Classic’ line-
up of 15 programme channels, together 
with the six re-broadcast free-to-air 
channels 
plus   
$27.50 paid to the ISP which 
offers 
• Internet access with a 5 Giga Byte 
download data limit (plus a charge for 
excess data) 
 
                                            
113 Refer to http://www.transact.com.au/packages/HomePack.aspx, accessed 31 May 2007 
114 Refer to http://www.netspeed.com.au/netspeed.cfm?action=p_1, accessed 31 May 2007 
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For an even higher outlay, residential customers can obtain: 
 
From any of the four video-on-demand 
service providers 
 On-demand movie entertainment on 
a pay by use basis 
 
From TransACT  The remaining 17 television 
channels 
 Faster data connection to their ISP 
of choice 
 
From their ISP  Higher download data limits whilst 
accessing the Internet. 
 
5.6 Discussion 
 
In this section we discuss possible limitations arising from analysis of the TransACT 
network as a case study, followed by a summary of findings that should inform the 
Research Question. 
 
5.6.1 Limitations of Case Study 
 
Accessing information about the TransACT network proved a problematic exercise.  
No descriptive writings of a substantive and independent nature were identified at the 
outset, which meant that this case study would need to cover novel ground – 
although limited with a particular focus on access and openness.  Despite its local 
government origins, the TransACT Communications Project had not been openly and 
independently documented apart from many smallish articles of a technical or semi-
technical nature in the trade press at the time. 
 
Comprising a very small team of persons planning a network for deployment in only 
one city, the ‘knowledge footprint’ on industry in terms of involved consultants, 
designers, manufacturers and installation contractors was likewise quite small.  
Contrast this with plans for and implementation of a nationwide roll-out by a national 
carrier where the much larger ‘footprint’ leaves behind a plethora of knowledgeable 
persons who could be interviewed as well as more verifiable information sources.  If 
that carrier were Telstra, information could also be gleaned from parliamentary 
inquiries and analyses commissioned by competing financial analysts.  In all these 
regards, the TransACT Communications Project was literally ‘below the radar’.  Due 
to its open business plan it avoided regulatory attention and being rolled out only in 
Canberra after the other capital cities had already been cabled by Telstra/Foxtel and 
Optus for pay television, the TransACT network was more or less regarded as a 
special case and substantially disregarded by analysts. 
 
The problem of information gathering was potentially magnified by reliance on one 
main source, Mr Robin Eckermann, who led the TransACT Communications Project 
and subsequently became the network Chief Architect.  He also authored most of the 
technical and semi-technical information appearing in the trade press and gave most 
of the PowerPoint presentations at conferences around that time.  Interviews of 
Robin Eckermann provided a first-hand account of what led to the open access 
philosophy and in that regard were unique.  Archived images of the early TransACT 
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project website were recoverable via the Wayback Machine115 and filled in various 
gaps in information but this material was probably also substantially based on 
Eckermann’s work. 
 
With a focus on just the TransACT network and the origin of its open access 
philosophy, the information gathering exercise could only go so far before being 
exhausted.  Possibly triggered by my interviews, Robin Eckermann also began to 
write a memoir of his time with TransACT.  Eventually I was able to reach a high level 
of confidence that I was gaining a consistent and relatively accurate appreciation of 
how TransACT came to become an open access network by comparing the primary 
source information gained by interview with the many secondary sources available.  
A corporate history of ACTEW by Peter Donovan, compiled independently of Robin 
Eckermann, provided the keystone source to validate the quality of other information 
gathered. 
 
Paradoxically the TransACT network is such an ideal candidate for a case study, 
raising many positive issues and only few negative ones that it can give the 
appearance of almost being an anticlimax compared to the other two studies. 
 
5.6.2 Findings 
 
The key findings of the TransACT case study are summarised in a stand-alone 
manner.  Interpretations made possible by drawing correlations with the other case 
studies are withheld until Chapter Eight. 
 
General 
 
Conceived in 1996, the TransACT network would ordinarily be considered now a 
legacy network yet it was designed to deliver broadband data and video services in a 
manner that can still be regarded as ‘next generation’ compared to all other so-called 
broadband networks in Australia.  Designed from the outset as an open access 
network capable of connecting a variety of service providers to customers via 
individual data streams of up to 52 Mb/s, TransACT remains unique within Australia 
and a relatively rare occurrence worldwide. 
 
The TransACT network in the Australian Capital Territory came about because the 
management and staff of ACTEW entertained a vision and then took the steps to 
implement it.116  The overwhelming lesson of the case study is that open access was 
                                            
115 Refer to http://www.archive.org/web/web.php?sa=X, accessed 13 May 2007 
116 TransACT remains the only retail telecommunications business in Australia with a 
electricity utility heritage and a government one at that. Cameron, A. (2007). Enabled to 
Engage in the Information Age: A Comparative Study of Broadband Take-up in Two Regions 
of Australia. School of Social Science. Brisbane, University of Queensland: 315. 
  This stands in stark contrast to the US where about a quarter of the 2,000 or so 
communities with publicly owned electric utilities provided some type of communications 
service as of 2003. Gillett, S. E., W. H. Lehr, et al. (2004). Municipal Electric Utilities' Role in 
Telecommunications Services. Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, 
Washington. 
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achieved voluntarily, not by policy fiat or regulatory forbearance, and that it works 
technically and commercially. 
 
Genesis of an ‘open access’ philosophy 
 
Inaugural ACTEW CEO Mike Sargeant encouraged staff creativity and supported 
examples of lateral thinking.  Being part of an electricity utility, the TransAct project 
team and the management of ACTEW were naturally attuned to running a ‘wires 
business’.  ACTEW had been recently subjected to ‘de-regulation’ of its electricity 
business and so could appreciate the concept of more than one service provider 
(electricity retailer) operating off a common distribution network.  To them, there was 
no logic for competing service providers to construct parallel sets of wires to effect 
delivery to the same group of customers. 
 
Given that ACTEW was not encumbered with any existing communications 
infrastructure and possessed no existing communications portfolio that could be 
undermined, it was attractive to consider a ‘greenfields’ solution able to support 
multiple providers of communication services, multiple services and even services 
not currently envisaged - a solution based on the business principles of open access.  
Most importantly of all, the necessary technology was by then available.  Modelling 
suggested a better rate of return than utilities generally get from other infrastructure 
investment. 
 
The project team therefore considered it made good business sense to incorporate 
open access into any new communications network to serve residents and 
businesses in the Australian Capital Territory.  This intent was publicly declared in 
late 1996 by a call for expressions of interest from service providers and investment 
partners, followed shortly afterwards by a request for proposal seeking network and 
service solutions.  The open access philosophy thereafter guided all commercial, 
technical and service decisions leading to implementation. 
 
Services deliverable via open access 
 
Each customer must deal with the network provider, TransACT Communications, and 
one or more service providers.  TransACT is also a service provider in regard to 
telephony and one of the ISPs.  It is not possible to obtain a bare network connection 
without any service, since the network has to be instructed to digitally switch each 
connection on a service-specific basis.  The services available are telephony, video 
and data.  All may be obtained concurrently. 
 
For residential customers, the minimum network connection also requires a 
telephony service for which TransACT Communications is also the service provider 
and long distance carrier.  All intra-TransACT network telephony calls are free of 
charge. 
 
Video services include: 
 
• pay television channels sourced from independent service providers, although 
for regulatory reasons TransACT is licensed as the carrier; 
• free-to-air television channels, re-broadcasted; and 
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• video on demand services from independent service providers. 
 
Data services include: 
 
• a point-to-point data connection for businesses configurable as a virtual private 
network; 
• a data connection to an interface with an Internet service provider or ISP, all but 
one of which are independent of TransACT Communications. 
 
Separate charges are payable for the services of these service providers and as an 
incentive to increase network uptake various bundled offers are made through 
TransACT as the billing entity.  Customers make separate arrangements with the ISP 
of their choice. 
 
Are there degrees of openness? 
 
The above service delivery arrangements raise the question as to what ‘open access’ 
really means – can there be various degrees of ‘openness’?  Why this becomes an 
issue is discussed in terms of each of the main service types delivered, followed by a 
concluding assessment. 
 
• Narrowband service - telephony 
 
TransACT initially had no desire to become a telephone company and accordingly 
sought to partner with an existing telecommunications carrier.  Telephony was 
considered to be “just a very complicated thing”.  Discussions ensued with Telstra, 
Optus and AAPT but in the end ceased to be fruitful.  TransACT instead became a 
carrier in its own right and now offers telephony services over a network which it 
owns and operates.  The justification was said to be “we realised that linking up with 
one carrier would limit us, so we decided to preserve our independence.  Any 
agreement (with one carrier) could have left other service providers a bit dubious 
about how open the network really is”. 
 
Under Australian telecommunications and competition law, TransACT was under no 
obligation to become a ‘carrier’s carrier’117 and if it had gone down that path, it would 
have become a unique example in Australia – another way of saying that it may not 
have established a viable business.118  Residents and businesses within the ACT 
now have a choice of subscribing to telephony carriage via the distinctly different 
Telstra paired copper CAN or TransACT FTTC/VDSL networks,119 in addition to 
                                            
117 In this situation, it would not compete at the retail level but supply only wholesale services 
to one or more carriage service providers.  Refer to page 24 of Grant, A., ed. (2004). 
Australian Telecommunications Regulation. Sydney, UNSW Press. 
  
118 Anecdotally, revenue earned from telephony usage has been a significant source of 
overall TransACT revenue and hence a critical success factor for the business case. 
119 An equivalent choice also exists for those in mainly Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane 
whose streets are cabled with the Optus HFC network which offers a telephony service 
independent of that utilizing Telstra’s copper CAN. 
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preselecting any other telephony service provider they prefer via either of those 
networks.120 
 
• Broadband service – video/television 
 
Neither TransACT nor any of its partners has a pecuniary interest in any of the 
programme channels on offer; from the point of view of television or video-on-
demand services, TransACT as a network provider has not vertically integrated into 
the provision of video or television content.  Various channels are packaged, and 
priced in certain groups to appeal to the tastes of different viewer groups.  Although 
the full package of digital Foxtel channels were not then being carried, this has been 
attributed to either a supposed system incompatibility with Foxtel or Foxtel’s concern 
that its brand image could be compromised if delivered along with channels that were 
differently packaged.121  Regardless, there is no evidence that TransACT 
discriminates against Foxtel and to the contrary, TransACT is welcoming of all 
available broadcast television or interactive video-on-demand channels.  The 
switched nature of the delivery technology employed places no capacity limitation on 
the number of deliverable channels or service providers. 
 
• Broadband service – data, Internet access 
 
Of the eleven separate broadband ISPs now accessible via the TransACT network, 
Grapevine is wholly owned by ActewAGL which is a 25 per cent owner of TransACT.  
Provided TransACT does not discriminate in favour of Grapevine, that ownership 
situation by itself may not raise concern.  However, since February 2004 ActewAGL 
took over the management of day-to-day operations of TransACT so as to rationalise 
company overheads.  Users and at least one service provider have subsequently 
claimed that TransACT is now refusing to allow new ISPs onto their network – 
purportedly to protect the viability of Grapevine (then ActewAGL Net Connect), but 
also reflecting a wider concern that TransACTs telephone revenue could be 
increasingly cannibalized by Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services.122 
 
A more serious claim is that Grapevine may be subsidised through preferential 
network charges from TransACT.  If this is true, TransACT would no longer be 
treating competing ISPs in an impartial manner and hence it could be questioned 
whether the TransWEB service is now truly ‘open’. 
 
The counter argument is that the other ten broadband ISPs continue to provide retail 
competition off the same wholesale network – an overall situation infinitely superior to 
                                            
120 E-mail communication, Kelso/Bouffler, 2 March 2005. Wayne Bouffler is the National 
Telephony Manager for TransACT. 
121 Record of telephone transcript, Kelso/Eckermann, 17 September 2004. 
122 Record of interview, Kelso/Hackett, 6 April 2005; also issues raised by users on the 
discussion list www.whirlpool.net.au .  Simon Hackett is the MD of the ISP Internode 
Systems Pty Ltd. 
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that of either the Telstra or Optus HFC networks over which cable modem Internet 
access is monopolized by only their single in-house ISP in each instance.123 
 
• Scorecard 
 
According to Cameron (2007, p.88), the owner of a truly ‘open’ network would offer 
wholesale bandwidth only, with “all the retail services, including telephony, media 
services, digital content, Internet access and business networks offered to clients 
connected to the network” being owned and operated by other parties.  This may 
include ISPs, media and gaming companies, business service providers, owners of 
Web material and other telecommunications companies.  On that basis, TransACT 
was not a completely ‘open’ network, in that it has limited the number of ISPs offering 
services on the network and also regulates the retail media, gaming and video 
services available to TransACT customers. (Cameron 2007, p.275) 
 
Cameron’s initial definition is arguably correct, along with the conclusion that 
TransACT is not completely ‘open’, but the picture is not that black and white 
according to the foregoing assessment of the degrees of openness for each main 
service type – as summarised in Table 9. 
 
Table 9: Degrees of Openness? 
 
 
Service type 
 
 
Open Network 
 
Closed Network 
Telephony See caveat 1 Yes 
Video/television Yes --- 
Data, Internet access Yes See caveat 2 
Caveat 1: Technically speaking, telephony services are delivered in a closed 
network manner, yet open networks for telephony are probably non-existent 
worldwide.  The key issue is that TransACT permits competitive access to 
multiple telephony carriers – in addition to that provided by Telstra’s PSTN. 
Caveat 2: In addition to the ten competitive retail broadband ISPs 
independent of TransACT, one other (Grapevine) is not independent. 
 
Cameron’s claim that openness is in doubt due to a limit on the number of ISPs 
misses the point that at least ten ISPs are offering retail competition off the same 
network – a situation unique in Australia and quite rare worldwide.  Furthermore, it is 
not correct that TransACT regulates the retail media, gaming and video services – 
TransACT is understood to be independent of any such content providing business 
and benefits as a network provider from encouraging diversity of retail content. 
 
The matter of possible preferential connection for the Grapevine ISP could be 
determined if the tariffs and terms under which service providers may connect to the 
                                            
123 By enabling users to directly access eight broadband ISPs, TransACT offers a degree of 
customer choice comparable with accessing a range of narrowband ISPs via dial-up 
modems or broadband ISPs via ADSL, in either instance employing Telstra’s paired copper 
CAN as the carriage infrastructure. 
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TransACT network were on the public record.124  The ACT government, through 
ACTEW Corporation Limited, now owns only one-quarter of TransACT and can no 
longer require it to be accountable to parliament.  With control of the company in 
private hands, operations are now able to be shielded from competitive view to the 
extent possible under company law.  One aspect not made public is the commercial 
arrangements between TransACT and its service providers, in particular, the tariffs 
and terms under which service providers may connect to the TransACT network.  As 
such, these arrangements are no more restrictive than required by any other network 
provider in Australia. 
 
Technical realisation of open access 
 
The TransAct project team took a conscious decision to first develop their philosophy 
of open access service delivery and then to choose an appropriate technological 
solution.  The result was a network architecture employing fibre-to-the curb or FTTC 
plus very high rate digital subscriber line or VDSL broadband transmission delivered 
over twisted pairs, with the system configured to offer ‘switched digital’ services. 
 
With each customer having a dedicated physical connection capable of delivering up 
to 52 Mb/s, a quantity well in excess of presently conceivable applications, plus a 
common optical fibre backbone network designed to switch individual service 
demands to and from the central gateway without contention for capacity, individual 
service demands could be satisfied without impacting on service quality for others. 
 
By itself such a switched digital configuration doesn’t dictate open access, however 
once multiple service providers are interfaced to the central gateway, any service 
provider is equally able to connect with any customer who requests their particular 
service and multiple services can be delivered concurrently.  The underlying 
transport network is designed to be independent of both services and service 
providers.  These network characteristics are particularly advantageous to open 
access delivery. 
 
Business success with common carriage 
 
During the formative planning stages, before the introduction of private equity, the 
parent organisation ACTEW was highly supportive and given a free rein by the ACT 
government as the sole ACTEW shareholder.  ACTEW provided access to electricity 
ducts and poles, constituting a critically important and unchallenged ‘right of way’.  
Without any background in telecommunications, there were no existing ACTEW 
products or services to be cannibalised by a new broadband network. 
 
There were no regulatory barriers to establishing a new carrier entity.  By the time of 
launching the commercial services of TransACT Communications Pty Limited in 
                                            
124 In the United States, the Grant County Public Utility District operates the ‘Zipp’ fibre-to-the 
curb network on an open access basis.  Being wholly owned by a local government authority, 
there is a legislated requirement by the Senate of Washington State for the applicable tariffs 
and conditions of service for wholesale service providers deliverable over Zipp to be publicly 
accessible via the Internet and subject to appeal if considered unduly or unreasonably 
discriminatory or preferential.  Refer to the Grant County PUD Fiber Optic Network policies at 
http://www.gcpud.org/zipp/policies.htm, accessed 28 April 2005. 
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2000, ACTEW had become a 50/50 public-private partnership in the form of 
ActewAGL and TransACT had taken on private partners which reduced ACT 
government equity to just below one-quarter. 
 
TransACT quickly gained a significant market share in the Australian Capital Territory 
since: 
 
• it offered a unique ‘triple play’ of telephony, television and data services, in 
addition to video-on-demand; 
• competing pay television services could only be delivered via satellite as 
Canberra was bypassed by the HFC roll-outs of both Telstra and Optus; 
• Canberra was the leading Australian city in terms of households online; and 
• alternative means of delivering broadband access to the Internet (eg. via ADSL 
or wireless) were initially uncompetitive or not fully deployed by late 2000. 
 
Continued success has relied upon this ‘first-mover’ advantage and third party 
service providers trusting that they “can utilise the TransAct network without fear of 
the network owner undermining their businesses by competing from a privileged 
position”. 
 
In summary, the TransACT network was rolled out in what was tantamount to a 
‘greenfield’ broadband environment and delivered a unique set of services without 
having to face competition during the initial years of establishment. 
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CHAPTER SIX – FIBRE TO THE HOME NETWORKS CASE STUDY 
 
This third and final case study bears characteristics that position it between the other 
two.  The Telstra/Foxtel pay television network, although subject to extensive 
regulatory attempts to be prised open, remains effectively closed to third party 
access despite recent digitisation that, in terms of video channel capacity, 
substantially lessens the original problem of bandwidth scarcity.  By a large measure, 
the TransACT network remains substantially open to third party service providers, a 
situation resulting from original choice by those who designed the network and 
justified its business case.  There has been no reason for TransACT to attract 
regulatory attention.  Roll-out of both networks ceased some years ago and both 
continue to operate under circumstances that appear to be commercially sustainable 
in the longer term. 
 
In contrast, fibre to the home networks in Australia commenced to be rolled out by 
Telstra from 2005 first on a trial basis and then commercially limited to new housing 
estates.  With wider deployment inevitably developing characteristics of a natural 
monopoly, fibre to the home networks are certain to eventually attract regulatory 
attention.  These initial networks involve closed access operation under a vertically 
integrated business model despite the underlying technology that provides a relative 
abundance of communications bandwidth capable of supporting a multiplicity of 
service providers. 
 
6.1 The Next Generation of Bandwidth Abundance 
 
Modern low-loss glass optical fibre and input/output technology offers almost 
unlimited bandwidth125 and unique advantages over all previously developed 
transmission media.  Electrical input signals are converted into an optical beam 
which is conveyed along a filament of glass, usually circular in cross section and clad 
with a suitable material that enables transmission over long distances with minimal 
degradation.  A receiver converts information in the beam back into a replica of the 
original electrical signal.  Compared to traditional paired copper and coaxial cables, a 
cable of optical fibres is typically thinner and lighter, supports much higher data rates 
over greater distances and is relatively immune to interference. 
 
The most commonly used optical wavelengths or light colours are at or close to 850, 
1300 or 1550 nanometres.  Using wavelength division multiplexing or WDM 
technology, two or more wavelengths are combined and carried via a single fibre 
such that the signals modulating one wavelength are completely independent of 
those at another wavelength.  When a hundred or more wavelengths are closely 
spaced, the technology is called dense wavelength division multiplexing or DWDM.  
Multiple wavelengths significantly increase the data carrying capacity of individual 
optical fibres, though at some expense for increased input/output complexity. 
                                            
125 Optical fibre is claimed to have a usable bandwidth today of up to 75,000 Ghz.  Green, P. 
E. (2004). "Fiber to the Home: The Next Big Broadband Thing." IEEE Communications 
Magazine 42(9): 100-106. 
   Although commercially available fibre-based systems utilize bandwidths far less 
than this, in comparison with current wireless, DSL and cable modem technologies, optical 
fibre bandwidth is hugely greater now and will be so in the future. 
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By reason of the economics and capabilities of available technologies, most 
communication networks are designed to serve the functions of either a ‘customer 
access network’ or a ‘core network’. (Darling 2005: 72-75) A customer access 
network or CAN126 provides the connection from each user, customer or subscriber 
to and from the core network.  Whether implemented via shared or individual 
infrastructure, each user must be able to obtain service whenever desired with the 
result that economies of scale in the provision of the infrastructure can be poor.  
Whilst individual users may produce quite low levels of traffic, a typical customer 
access network is configured to concentrate all traffic at a convenient geographic 
point whereafter the core network exploits greater economies of scale and scope 
through the sharing of transmission and switching infrastructure.  Figure 9 refers. 
 
 
 
Figure 9 – Schematic of Traditional Telephony Network 
 
In a traditional CAN providing telephony services, a pair of twisted copper conductors 
is dedicated to each user such that each service is independent of all others.  The 
paired copper cables for a given geographic area terminate at a ‘telephone 
exchange’ and thereafter telephony traffic enters the core network.  To aid more 
general explanation, this interface between the CAN and the core network shall be 
called an ‘access unit’.  For the last few decades, core networks have been based on 
optical fibres and digital switching.  Apart from paired copper cabling, the CAN may 
deploy transmission infrastructure based on radio technology, coaxial cabling (such 
as in a pay television network) or optical fibre.  In practice, the nature and location of 
the access unit changes according to the type of communication network, such as 
telephony or pay television, as well as design variants of the same network type. 
 
The extent of optical fibre deployment in the CAN provides a basis for appreciating a 
commonly accepted range of network models.  FTT’x’ is a generic term for those 
                                            
126 In US parlance, the CAN is also called the ‘local loop’, ‘subscriber loop’ or merely the 
‘access network’. 
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network technologies which extend optical fibre into the CAN and hence closer to the 
end user, where ‘x’ can variously mean: 
 
B -  building C -  curb, cabinet 
CP -  customer premises H -  home 
N -  node, neighbourhood P -  premises 
SA -  serving area U -  user, (multi-dwelling) unit 
X -  exchange   
 
Technologists and marketers in the telecommunications industry are prone to adopt 
their own meanings from time to time.  Figure 10 portrays the basic differences 
between the major FTT’x’ variants primarily in terms of the depth to which optical 
fibre penetrates into the customer access network.127 (DCITA 2003) (Green 2004) 
 
 
Figure 10 – Deployment of Optical Fibre in the CAN 
Source: Compilation from multiple sources, including (DCITA 2003), (Green 
2004) and (Darling 2005). 
 
FTTX (fibre to the exchange) 
 
Representing the traditional public switched telephone network or PSTN, optical fibre 
terminates at ‘telephone’ exchange buildings representing the boundary between the 
core network and the CAN.  Cables of twisted copper pairs connect to telephony 
subscribers.  DSL-type transmission services, such as ADSL, can also provide data 
access to the Internet over such copper pairs. 
 
                                            
127 The first variant, and perhaps also the second, does not strictly describe infrastructure 
designed to provide broadband to end users but are included to illustrate a logical 
progression of increasing depth of optical fibre into the CAN, from Figure 9 top to bottom. 
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FTTSA (fibre to the serving area) 
 
A variant typically between FTTX and FTTN, in which the telephone carrier extends 
the core network optical fibre into the customer access network such that the 
‘exchange’ access unit is now a cabinet, sometimes called a remote multiplexer,128 
whereupon individual copper pairs then connect to telephony subscribers. 129  The 
group of subscribers are said to fall within a ‘serving area’ of the access unit.  This 
approach is usually adopted by the telephone carrier either to serve more distant 
subscribers from the exchange or where the copper cables or conduits closer to the 
original exchange have become congested.  DSL-type services can also be carried 
and where the length of copper pairs happens to be shorter than typical, higher 
speed data access may be possible such as that provided by ADSL2 or ADSL2+ 
technologies. 
 
FTTN (fibre to the node) 
 
A ‘node’ can mean different things to different technologists, however in this instance 
it is taken to be where the optical fibre terminates at an access unit or ‘hub’ located in 
a street at a distance of 500 to 1500 metres from the end users to be served.  Where 
the medium providing the final connection from the hub is coaxial cabling, the 
network is described as comprising ‘hybrid fibre coaxial’ or HFC technology.  Such 
networks are used to distribute pay television programming, as well as providing 
connectivity for Internet access, as exemplified by the Telstra/Foxtel network case 
study.  Depending on the chosen design, between 500 and 2000 users may share a 
given hub and hence a fibre.  In terms of Figure 9, no traditional ‘exchange’ location 
is relevant as the optical fibre extends all the way back to a city central Head End 
installation.  The hub could also be a Remote Multiplexer, as with FTTSA. 
 
Where the medium providing the final connection to the customer is paired copper 
cabling, the remaining length is sufficiently reduced to enable the working of higher 
bandwidth transmission technologies such as ADSL2+.  Such networks are 
particularly employed to provide connectivity for Internet access, in addition to voice 
telephony, to more distant end users or customers. 
 
FTTC (fibre to the curb/kerb) 
 
Where the optical fibre extends further to within a distance of 100 to 300 metres from 
end users, it is said to terminate at a ‘curbside’ node.130  In the TransACT network 
case study, the medium providing the final connection comprises paired copper 
cabling over which VDSL transmission provides up to 52 Mb/s downstream data 
capacity for video and Internet access.  In the case of the TransACT design, 50 
customers are served by each optical fibre.  In terms of Figure 9, no ‘exchange’ 
location is relevant as the optical fibre extends all the way back to a city central Head 
End installation. 
                                            
128 Remote multiplexers utilised have been known as Remote Integrated Multiplexers or 
RIMs and Customer Multiplexers or CMUXs. 
129 FTTSA has also been known as fibre in the loop or FITL. 
130 Where serving a multi-dwelling unit, the fibre could terminate outside or in the basement 
of the unit and hence the final connecting medium would be cabling within the building.  Such 
a network arrangement could also be referred to as ‘fibre to the building’ or FTTB. 
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FTTH (fibre to the home) 
 
The prime subject of this case study, a ‘fibre to the home’ network architecture 
implies optical fibre extending all the way to the user premises, a residential home or 
office building131, whereafter the final connection medium may be either relatively 
short lengths of paired copper cabling within the premises or otherwise fibre all the 
way to an end user interface such as a set top box.  In practice, there may be 
minimal technical or product difference between a FTTC network extending fibre 
further towards end users and a FTTH network architecture.  In the instance of a 
‘home run’ configuration (as explained in section 6.3.1), each user could be served 
by a dedicated optical fibre. 
 
The significance of contrasting the 
FTTN, FTTC and FTTH network 
architectures lies in the impact that 
extending optical fibre deeper into the 
traditional CAN has on the bandwidth 
potentially available to users, a 
measure also typified by the number of 
users able to share the bandwidth of a 
given fibre.  Figure 11 depicts this 
trend.132 
 
Apart from the traditional PSTN, the 
next most common wireline 
communications networks are the HFC 
(fibre to the node) networks delivering 
pay television and cable modem 
services.  With a tree-branch topology and multiple users connected to 
lengths of common coaxial cables, there is an inherent scarcity of 
bandwidth for sharing amongst other users within the neighbourhood and 
possibly also with other service providers.  Such shortcomings are not a 
feature of ‘fibre rich’ architectures such as TransACT’s FTTC employing 
switched digital technology, or of certain FTTH architectures which can 
potentially deliver Gb/s of transmission capacity to individual users. 
 
The closer optical fibre extends towards users, the greater is the potential 
bandwidth that can be made available to users. (DCITA 2003: 2.3) When 
optical fibre extends all the way to users as with FTTH architectures, users 
can experience the next generation of bandwidth abundance – where 
scarcity of bandwidth is no longer an issue.  However, the practical world is 
not so ideal as we shall later appreciate, in that certain FTTH variants may 
                                            
131 To address this broader user market, some carriers have even coined the term ‘fibre to 
the customer premises’ or FTTCP. 
132 Between the optical fibre end point and the end user will be either paired copper or 
coaxial cabling and it is the particular transmission technology used thereon which can limit 
the actual bandwidth available to end users. For economic or commercial reasons the actual 
bandwidth often falls well short of the potential bandwidth capacity of such cabling. 
Extent of optical fibre in the CAN 
Figure 11 – CAN Fibre Bandwidth 
Source: Author’s appreciation 
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employ sharing of fibre capacity which can diminish the potential for an 
environment facilitating open access. 
 
FTTU (fibre to the user) 
 
In an attempt to lessen confusion in the marketplace arising from the above FTT’x’ 
variants, some equipment suppliers have adopted the all embracing description of 
FTTU as implying a delivery system sufficiently flexible to address the markets for 
FTTB, FTTH, FTTP and FTTC.  This is understandable since individual residences, 
multi-dwelling units and commercial premises in a given locality may share the same 
fibre-based network. 
 
In this study, the description FTTH is mainly used as it has been commonly adopted 
in literature although the discussion would be little different if it was replaced with 
FTTU. 
 
6.2 The Natural Monopoly of Fibre in the Access Network 
 
In economic terms, a monopoly exists where production in a given market is by a 
single firm, though not all monopolies are regarded as being ‘natural’.  For example, 
where a firm controls the essential inputs into production through trademarks or 
patents, or from the exclusive right to sell in a market, then other firms are unable to 
compete on an equal basis if they are denied access to those inputs.  Where control 
of such inputs may be impermanent, this is not said to be a ‘natural’ monopoly.  
(Sharkey 1982, p.54) 
 
Given that natural monopolies usually attract regulation and also involve strong 
vested interests, the topic of rigorously defining exactly when a natural monopoly 
exists has concerned economists over recent decades.  Their approaches have 
subtly differed.  With the focus in this study on the business of telecommunications in 
Australia, the prime definitional reference adopted is that concluded by the 
Productivity Commission (PC 2001a) arising from their 2001 inquiry into 
telecommunications competition regulation.  It represents a measured synthesis from 
a range of sources.  (PC 2001a, Box 2.3) 
 
A natural monopoly exists where one firm is able to produce the relevant range 
of outputs at a lower cost than two or more firms.  In particular, a natural 
monopoly requires a strictly and globally subadditive cost function over the 
relevant range of output – every way of dividing output between two or more 
firms would result in higher total costs than if the output was produced by one 
firm. 
 
For this to be the case, the cost of production has to be subject to economies of 
scale and/or scope over at least part of the output range. 
 
Economies of scale exist where a one percent increase in production raises the 
total cost of production by less than one percent.  A common cause is fixed 
costs, or costs that are incurred regardless of output.  Fixed costs are significant 
in network industries such as telecommunications, postal services and 
electricity transmission. 
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Economies of scope exist where one firm can supply two products at a lower 
cost than two firms individually producing each product.  For example, the costs 
of the joint provision of cable TV and telephony services are much lower than 
their separate provision. 
 
Since economies of scale and scope are influenced by transaction costs which in 
turn can be strongly influenced by technological change, it is possible for a natural 
monopoly in a particular market to be a temporary phenomenon.  
Telecommunications involves a multiplicity of products or outputs that are produced 
or delivered via a multiplicity of technologies.  Some aspects of telecommunications 
service delivery in Australia are considered to demonstrate natural monopoly 
characteristics, to a lesser or greater extent according to specific circumstances. 
 
Economies of scale are evidenced by the cost savings for a single firm to serve 
additional customers in a given market.  Telecommunications infrastructure involving 
cable technology, but to a lesser extent that involving radio technology, require 
substantial costs for the digging of trenches and provision of cabling on a distance 
related basis, for the connection to termination equipment and for the installation of 
exchanges for the interconnection of networks and creation of services.  These costs 
are said to be ‘sunk’, in that they cannot be transferred readily to other uses. (PC 
2001a, p.23) Once the infrastructure is in place, the cost of carrying traffic or services 
is relatively low as the marginal costs for such activity are almost zero.  High sunk 
costs and low marginal operating costs are typically associated with the business of a 
natural monopoly.  If a competitor were to duplicate such infrastructure to serve the 
same customers with the same services, a similarly substantial investment would be 
required but this would produce no additional customer benefit.  According to 
Sharkey (1982, p.56), ‘the entry of firms in a natural monopoly market could only 
reduce welfare by raising total costs of production’.  Describing the public switched 
telephone network or PSTN as a ‘strong’ natural monopoly, the Chairman of the 
ACCC referred to cost modeling whereby the PSTN had been assessed as 
producing 10 per cent increased output for an increased total cost of less than one 
per cent. (Fels 2002) 
 
Economies of scope refer to cost savings associated with the joint production of 
different types of services, and exist ‘if it is possible to produce any vector of outputs 
more efficiently in a single firm than in two or more specialty firms, holding constant 
the level of production of each output’. (Sharkey 1982, p.56) For example, it would be 
more economic for the one PSTN to provide local, national and international 
telephone services rather than have separate networks to customers for each service 
type. (PC 2001a, p.25) The Optus Vision pay television network garnered economies 
of scope by delivering both pay television and telephony services on the same 
infrastructure, compared to the alternative of Optus operating a pay television only 
network whilst re-selling Telstra’s existing telephony service.  In contrast, at least 
from the perspective of Telstra, no economy of scope could be appreciated by 
carrying telephony on the Foxtel pay television network as Telstra already had sunk 
investment in its own PSTN. 
 
Digital transmission combined with optical fibre magnifies the potential for economies 
of scope, in that a data bit carried for telephony is indistinguishable from a data bit 
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carried for video or any other service.  The Productivity Commission (PC 2001a, 
p.26) also noted how ACTEW benefited from economies of scope by using its 
electricity poles to carry the new broadband services of TransACT. 
 
Definitions aside, econometric evidence regarding the existence of natural monopoly 
may be difficult to prove conclusively in specific instances.  A commonly accepted 
‘rule of thumb’ is that natural monopoly can be identified where there are high fixed 
costs but low marginal operating costs, which happens to be true for certain parts of 
telecommunications networks.  (PC 2001a: 24 alluding to King) (Huber 1997: 104) 
The particular market or sub-market in question may also be of key relevance, for 
example long-distance calls versus local calls, low bandwidth dial-up access versus 
broadband ‘always on’ access, especially if a competitor relies on technology that 
involves different service and cost characteristics.  A duplicated access network may 
weaken a previous natural monopoly network if consumers gain benefits from 
differentiated products arising from new technology. (PC 2001a: 27-28)  King and 
Maddock (1996: 72-75) conclude that ‘judgement of natural monopoly status requires 
a close examination of the relevant technology’ which they specifically refer to as 
‘cost-minimising technology’.  Such technologies are the cornerstone of the 
telecommunications industry. 
 
Telstra’s ubiquitous customer access network is constructed of cables of twisted 
copper pairs connecting each subscriber to nearby telephone exchanges.  In most 
instances, the cables are laid underground in conduits and pipes which are 
interspersed with manholes and pits.  Individual connections to subscriber premises 
from the street cables are either laid underground or strung aerially from poles 
positioned outside the premises. The cost of civil work involved in constructing the 
CAN has been estimated to comprise some 90 per cent of total capital costs. (DCITA 
2003) Many of the conduits and most of the pipes are either occupied by Telstra’s 
cables or are reserved for Telstra’s future anticipated requirements.  The paired 
copper CAN of Telstra is commonly regarded as a natural monopoly and this broad 
assessment also applies to other telecommunication carriers throughout the world 
involving similar CAN construction. (ECITA 2005b: 4.2) (Sharkey 1982) (Reed 
1992a) Sharkey (1982: 9.4) concludes that ‘competition for local access must be 
between one active monopolist and one or more potential, but never active, 
competitors’.  Further, he contends there is no direct evidence that this form of 
competition is viable and even where given markets are judged to be contestable, 
there is no guarantee that they will be stable.  In these terms, unviable competition 
refers to delivery of the same set of services as the incumbent, rather than 
differentiated services arising from, for example, the introduction of mobile 
technology in the local loop. (Reed 1992a: 5.5.2) 
 
An example of unviable competition and/or an unstable market was that of the 
duplicated roll-out of HFC pay television networks by Telstra/Foxtel and Optus 
Vision, which were reported by 1998 to have accumulated losses and write-offs of 
$3.5 billion. (Budde 1999) According to Sharkey (1982: 2.3), competition resulting in 
a substantial amount of overbuilding and excess capacity is a classic formula for 
‘destructive competition’. 
 
However, the deployment of optical fibre in the CAN places an entirely different 
dimension on considering ‘excess capacity’.  Huber (1997, p.104) explains that the 
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costs are largely the same whether the cable contains one pair of fibres or a dozen, 
and whether the fibre carries a million telephone calls or none at all. 
 
Once the glass cable is in place, though, the costs of running traffic through it is 
almost vanishingly small.  And the carrying capacity of fiber-optic glass can be 
increased almost indefinitely, and at very little cost.  Every few years engineers 
double the carrying capacity of that cable. 
 
A fibre to the home (FTTH) network in Australia would appear to exhibit many of the 
characteristics of a strong natural monopoly.  This conclusion is reinforced by the 
following assessment of the prospects for FTTH in the United States, a country 
already with far greater wireline competition than Australia: (PWC 2004, p.24) 
 
• A single fibre has the capacity to accommodate all foreseeable services; 
• No one will have an incentive to deploy the second fibre; 
• The total available market will not justify two fibre deployments. 
 
Such a natural monopoly would normally be a strong candidate for attracting access 
regulation. 
 
6.3 Network Architecture and Design 
 
In the context of this discussion, the term ‘network architecture’ refers to the physical 
and functional configuration, representing the embodiment of topographical layout, 
electronic design and often also the underlying communication protocols.133  When 
deciding which fibre architecture to deploy, a service provider primarily considers the 
density of potential customers and the network location.  Perhaps the most important 
locational factors are affected by whether the provider is an incumbent or new-start 
operator, and whether there is a pre-existing access network involving optical fibre. 
 
An incumbent service provider can exploit rights of way through sunk investment in 
poles or underground conduit, and economies of scale and scope via existing core 
and access network fibre cabling and systems.  On the other hand, existing products 
and services may need to be cannibalized and existing infrastructure may not be 
upgradeable. 
 
A new-start provider may experience no such conflicts but is then required to create 
new rights of way with lower economies of scale and scope.  In the case of the 
TransACT fibre to the curb network, ACTEW benefited from existing rights of way for 
aerial cabling but not from any previous telecommunications infrastructure.  They 
chose an architecture that served their strategic intent of providing an open access 
wholesale service. 
 
The cost of network deployment and the expected return on investment are 
paramount considerations for any service provider.  Above all, a critical prerequisite 
is the ‘first mover advantage’ - a second parallel or overlaid fibre access network is 
                                            
133 There may also be design variants within a given architecture according to, for example, 
the standards for transmission technology employed such as ATM or Ethernet. 
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generally impossible to justify economically.  Network costs tend to be contained 
through the competitive supply of equipment designed to agreed standards.134 
 
The various architectures may be categorised according to whether multiple 
customers or end users share a common fibre in the access network, and whether 
any equipment in the access network involves active equipment: 
 
Home Run > Each customer has a dedicated fibre, similar in concept to the paired 
copper CAN; also known as a ‘Point-to-Point’ (P2P) or ‘Single Star’ 
architecture. 
 
‘Double Star’ > Multiple customers share one fibre, similar in concept to the coaxial 
portion of a HFC network; also known as a ‘Point-to-Multipoint’ (P2MP) 
architecture. 
 
 Active 
Star > 
A remote node in the access network involves active or 
powered equipment. 
 
 Passive 
Star   > 
PON > Passive Optical Network, involving a single 
nominal wavelength and passive optical splitters. 
 
  WDM 
PON > 
Wavelength Division Multiplexed network, 
involving a different optical wavelength per 
customer. 
 
 
According to Tseng (2001: 4.3), the chosen architecture directly impacts on the ability 
of a given network to facilitate access by third party service providers.  As we shall 
see, a key factor is the extent of sharing of network resources among customers 
which in turn is determined by network planners who consider CAN transmission 
costs and the characteristics of the services to be carried. (Reed 1992a) 
 
6.3.1 Home Run Architecture 
 
With the traditional customer access network designed to deliver telephony services, 
each customer is served by a dedicated pair of copper wires radiating out from the 
telephone exchange.  An item of line terminating equipment within the exchange 
bears a unique relationship with the service of every customer.  In like manner, the 
optical fibre equivalent is called the ‘Home Run’ architecture where a dedicated fibre 
is deployed from the exchange or access unit to each customer as shown in Figure 
12.  Alternative labels describe a ‘Single Star’ or ‘Point to Point’ (P2P) architecture. 
(Reed 1992a: 2.2) 
 
The interface at the exchange or access unit connecting to the core network 
comprises an optical line termination or OLT for each fibre where the electrical 
signals are converted to an optical beam, and vice versa.  The reverse function is 
                                            
134 The two main standard-setting fora for fibre access networks have been the FSAN (Full 
Service Access Networks) group of telecommunication companies, and the IEEE Ethernet in 
the First Mile Task Force of mainly equipment suppliers. 
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performed by an optical network unit or ONU at the distant end of each fibre and 
provides the interface with the customer premises equipment or CPE. 
 
 
Figure 12 – Schematic of Home Run Architecture 
 
Within an optical CAN constructed to a ‘home run’ architecture, there is no possibility 
for contention of network resources between the service of any one customer and 
another as there is no sharing of optical fibres. (Tseng 2001: 4.3.1) The bandwidth 
available to each customer is only limited by the design of particular OLTs and 
ONUs, or the commercial offering by the service provider and in theory can approach 
the maximum bandwidth capable of each optical fibre.  In similar vein, there is 
nothing inherent in the architecture that prevents the offered bandwidth from being 
symmetrical.  The absence of shared network resources also implies the highest 
possible security of individual services.  The direct one-to-one relationship between a 
service appearance at the OLT and its corresponding ONU makes the home run 
architecture ideal for delivering switched services directly from the Access Unit or 
Exchange. (Reed 1992a) 
 
6.3.2 Active Star Architecture 
 
Compared to the Home Run architecture, the three ‘Double Star’ architectures all 
arose as approaches to reduce the total amount of optical fibre deployed in the CAN 
through the mechanism of traffic aggregation.  The Active Star or Active Optical 
Network variant introduces into the access network a Remote Node containing active 
devices such as optical transceivers and a router or Ethernet switch to effect 
Core Network / Customer Access Network 
Access Unit 
(or Exchange) 
ONU 
OLT 
Key: 
OLT - Optical Line Termination 
ONU - Optical Network Unit 
CPE – Customer Premises Equipment Customers
Individual fibres to each customer 
(no shared infrastructure in CAN) 
CPE 
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multiplexing and de-multiplexing of signals.135 (Tseng 2001: 4.3.2)  Figure 13 
provides a schematic. 
 
Figure 13 – Schematic of Active Star Architecture 
 
Between the Access Unit and the Remote Node, up to 32 customers share an OLT 
and the same optical fibre – sometimes called a ‘feeder’ fibre. (Reed 1992a) On the 
other side of the Remote Node, the network adopts a star architecture though with 
shorter lengths of cable connecting to customers.  Multiple Remote Nodes would be 
required to service a whole CAN.136 
 
Compared to the Home Run architecture, the economic justification for an Active Star 
architecture is based upon the capital and operational expense of multiple Remote 
Nodes being out-weighed by the savings arising from the need to install and maintain 
less optical fibre overall. (Banerjee and Sirbu 2003: 3.2) 
 
With bandwidth being shared over the ‘feeder’ fibres between the Access Unit and 
the Remote Nodes, the maximum bandwidth potentially available to each customer is 
typically less than with a Home Run configuration but greater than that available from 
the Passive Star or PON network architecture. 
 
                                            
135 Although not a definitive description of the network architecture at the physical layer level, 
some vendors offer solutions described as ‘Active Ethernet’ that are in reality configured with 
an Active Star architecture. 
136 The TransACT network also adopted an Active Star architecture, although transmission 
between the Remote Nodes and customers utilized VDSL transmission technology over 
relatively short lengths of paired copper wires.  Fibre from the Remote Nodes extended back 
to a city central Head End installation. 
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6.3.3 Passive Star Architecture (PON) 
 
The desire of network operators for the Remote Node to be a passive device with 
greater reliability and reduced operational costs led to a passive ‘double star’ 
architecture commonly known as the Passive Optical Network or PON as depicted in 
Figure 14.137 
 
The degree of shared network resources is similar to that of the Active Star 
architecture, however the distinguishing feature is that now all customers receive the 
same downstream signal and all must contend for access to the same upstream data 
channel.  In logical terms, this is similar to a HFC network in that signals for multiple 
customers are shared across a common ‘bus’ within the final distribution network. 
(Tseng 2001: 4.3.3) Both PONs and HFC networks are optimised for point to multi-
point broadcasting of common signals such as television programmes. 
 
 
Figure 14 – Schematic of Passive Star Architecture (PON) 
 
The Remote Node comprises an optical splitter/coupler that replicates the same 
wavelength across a number of distribution fibres serving individual customers, 
typically in a ratio of one feeder fibre serving from four to 64 customers but more 
often 16 or 32.138  Where time division multiplexing is employed across a PON, each 
ONU extracts the data time slots specific to that customer and undertakes the 
necessary decryption to maintain privacy in terms of the signals pertinent to the other 
customers. (Corning Incorporated 2005) Each ONU also multiplexes upstream traffic 
                                            
137 All ONU within customer premises are active devices and require powering, regardless of 
whether the architecture within the CAN is active or passive. 
138 Typically a two-stage splitter arrangement is used, such as an OLT connecting to a 1:4 
splitter, followed by four 1:8 splitters to accommodate 32 users. Riverstone (2004). FTTP 
Shootout - Active Ethernet vs PON. Santa Clara, Riverstone Networks: 6. 
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on a time slot basis using either the same wavelength or perhaps a separate 
wavelength.139 
 
Specific commercially available design variants exploiting the PON architecture 
include:140 
 
• APON or ATM PON, as defined by the FSAN group of telecommunication 
carriers to use ATM transmission as the layer 2 signalling protocol; 
• BPON or Broadband PON, encompassing a mix of APON, Ethernet access and 
video distribution systems, ITU-T standard G.983 refers; 
• GPON or Gigabit PON, as defined by the FSAN group to operate at bit rates 
above 1 Gb/s as per standard ITU-T G.984; 
• EPON or Ethernet PON, as defined by the IEEE Ethernet in the First Mile or 
EFM group, IEEE standard 802.3ah refers. 
 
6.3.4 Wavelength Division Multiplexed Passive Star Architecture (WDM PON) 
 
In this third Double Star variant, each customer is assigned a wavelength unique to 
the particular Remote Node so that traffic streams in the access network are 
effectively kept separate from one another.141  Figure 15 refers.  The Remote Node, 
still passive, now comprises an optical filter which blocks out all but the one 
wavelength intended for a particular customer. (Reed 1992a) That action is designed 
to be bi-directional. 
 
Called a Wavelength Division Multiplexed Passive Optical Network or WDM PON, it 
may also be described as a ‘Coarse’ or CWDM PON if only a few wavelengths are 
multiplexed onto the same feeder fibre, or a ‘Dense’ or DWDM PON if many 
wavelengths are multiplexed. (Banerjee and Sirbu 2003) The limiting factors are the 
signal power available for splitting at the Remote Node and the quality of ONUs to 
identify individual wavelengths. 
 
                                            
139 Most PON designs use the wavelengths of 1490 and/or 1510 nanometres for downstream 
signals and 1310 nanometres for upstream signals. Banerjee, A. and M. Sirbu (2003). 
Towards Technologically and Competitively Neutral Fiber to the Home (FTTH) Infrastructure. 
Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA, Carnegie Mellon University. 
  Also see Alcatel (2004a). Fiber-to-the-User: The Ultimate Endgame. Technology 
White Paper. Paris, Alcatel: 12. 
  
140 For more detail, refer to http://www.fsanweb.org , http://www.ieee802.org/3/efm/ (both as 
at 13/5/2007) and Nakamura, M., H. Ueda, et al. (2004). "Proposal of Networking by PON 
Technologies for Full and Ethernet Services in FTTx." Journal of Lightwave Technology 
22(11): 10. 
   A further discussion of these variants can be found in section 6.5.3.2. 
141 An alternative WDM PON design whereby unique wavelengths are allocated to individual 
service providers is not considered in this study due to implementation difficulties. 
D.R.Kelso PhD Thesis, QUT, February 2008: Open Access to Next Generation Broadband {single line spaced version} 
 131
 
Figure 15 – Schematic of Wavelength Division Multiplexed Passive 
Star Architecture (WDM PON) 
 
6.3.5 Advantages and Disadvantages 
 
According to Reed (1992a: 2.2) “different services favour different architectures, and 
with so little known about future service markets, it is not surprising that a wide array 
of architectures have been proposed to connect fiber to the home”.  Network 
planners must anticipate the likely environment to be faced by their company as 
regards competitors, services, technologies and costs.  When the transmission costs 
are expected to be high relative to switching costs142, architectures with the most 
common plant in the access network are favoured, and vice versa. 
 
All equipment costs have tended to fall over time on a per-circuit or per-customer 
basis, with the optical fibre cost profile showing the greatest downward trend.  In the 
meantime, bandwidth requirements per-customer are rising over time.  These trends 
could perhaps be regarded as favouring the Home Run and WDM PON 
architectures, but in practice architectural selection is strongly influenced by whether 
a prospective FTTH network operator is an incumbent telecommunications carrier or 
a new-start player, and whether there is a pre-existing access network whose right-
of-way may be exploited.  The decision-making is complex and no two network 
operators will necessarily experience the same costs for the same architectures, or 
adopt the same strategic evaluation. 
 
                                            
142 Roughly speaking, transmission costs include the laying of optical fibre plus any passive 
splitters/combiners/filters in Remote Nodes, whereas switching costs include customer-
interfacing switching equipment in the Access Unit and any active switches or routers in 
Remote Nodes.  Most other items could be considered common to different architectures. 
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Table 10: Advantages and Disadvantages of Various Architectures 
 
ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES 
Home Run Architecture 
• Can potentially deliver the greatest 
bandwidth per customer compared 
to Active Star or PON architectures. 
• Highest possible security of services 
between customers. 
• Involves no contention for network 
resources. 
• Ideal for delivering purely switched 
services. 
• Requires considerably more fibre in 
the access network. 
• Requires more OLTs (one per 
customer). 
Active Star Architecture 
• Requires less fibre in the access 
network due to shared ‘feeder’ 
cable. 
• Can make optimal application of 
lower cost Ethernet technology and 
IP protocol. 
• Active Remote Node enhances 
network troubleshooting, greater 
service flexibility. 
• Can potentially deliver symmetric 
bandwidth of greater magnitude 
than for PON architecture. 
• Active Remote Node can potentially 
deliver switched services. 
• Active Remote Node requires 
powering and environmentally 
hardened enclosure. 
• Requires most OLTs (one per 
customer plus two per feeder cable). 
Passive Star (PON) Architecture 
• Requires less fibre in the access 
network due to shared ‘feeder’ cable 
plus fewer OLTs than Home Run. 
• Passive Remote Node requires no 
powering and less environmental 
protection. 
• Popular with incumbent carriers in 
terms of maintenance and 
operation. 
• Potentially upgradeable to WDM 
operation. 
• Security of services between 
customers needs to be guaranteed 
by encryption within ONUs. 
• Shared ‘feeder’ cable and passivity 
restricts bandwidth potentially 
deliverable per customer to the 
lowest of all four architectures. 
• Customer bandwidth typically 
asymmetric. 
• Passive and fixed nature of Remote 
Node can lead to operational 
inflexibility. 
Wavelength Division Multiplexed Passive Star (WDM PON) Architecture 
• Requires less fibre in the access 
network due to shared ‘feeder’ cable 
plus fewer OLTs than Home Run. 
• Passive Remote Node requires no 
powering and less environmental 
protection. 
• Can potentially deliver the highest 
bandwidth per customer, similar to 
the Home Run architecture. 
• Involves no contention for network 
resources. 
• Optical filtering within OLT, Remote 
Node and ONUs in addition to 
tunable lasers incurs higher cost 
than other architectures. 
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Sources: (Banerjee and Sirbu 2003), (DCITA 2003), (OCCAM 2005), (Allied Telesyn 2004), (Tseng 
2001), (Riverstone 2004), (Park, Lee et al. 2004), (Kramer and Pesavento 2002). 
 
The intent of the comparison in Table 10 is to better appreciate the commonly 
perceived advantages and disadvantages of the various main FTTH network 
architectures so as to broaden the understanding of how each is situated when 
considering the prospects for facilitating third party access. 
 
6.4 Designing for Competitive Access 
 
The aim of the following analysis is to appreciate which basic characteristics of the 
various FTTH architectures and designs tend to support competitive access and 
which impede it.  It does not purport to deal with the economic and commercial 
viability of ‘open access’ in practice. 
 
6.4.1 Traditional Regulatory Approaches 
 
Reflecting the policy direction of the Australian government through the 
Telecommunications Acts of 1991 and 1997, in addition to the corresponding parts of 
the Trade Practices Act concerning telecommunications, the Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission or ACCC has adopted a regulatory approach 
encouraging industry competition through a mix of facilities-based and access or 
service-based competition.  According to the ACCC: (ACCC 2005b: 6) 
 
Facilities-based competition involves service providers using own network 
infrastructure, often complemented by the use of lower level access services; 
 
Access or service-based competition is when service providers rely heavily on 
the access and wholesale services of an incumbent to compete in retail 
markets, rather than employing their own network infrastructure. 
 
Where economically viable, the Commission considers facilities-based competition to 
be more effective in the long term in driving efficiency, and in delivering a wider 
choice of services and more competitive prices to retail users.  The market for mobile 
services is quoted as an example where strong facilities-based competition has been 
successful. (ACCC 2004b: 17) Access-based competition is often seen as a 
precursor to greater facilities-based competition.143  However, the ACCC recognises 
that where infrastructure creation involves significant economies of scale, facilities-
based competition may either be unviable or only partially so. (ACCC 2005b: 11) 
 
                                            
143 The decision to invest in new infrastructure means that facilities-based providers have to 
compete in how and when to develop new services; on the other hand, access-based 
providers must await the development of services and facilities by the incumbent and hence 
their opportunity to innovate is much less.  Access or service-based competition offers, at 
best and over the long run, only a 'stepping stone' to competitors on their way to building 
their own access network or ‘facilities’, according to Woroch, G. A. (2002b). Local Network 
Competition. Handbook of Telecommunications Economics. M. Cave, S. Majumdar and I. 
Vogelsang, Elsevier. 
 . 
D.R.Kelso PhD Thesis, QUT, February 2008: Open Access to Next Generation Broadband {single line spaced version} 
 134
In terms of fibre to the home networks, facilities-based competition requires the 
construction of parallel optical fibre cabling along substantially the same streets or 
otherwise arranged to serve substantially the same subscribers with a similar set of 
services.  Whilst this is technically viable, the huge economies of scale available to 
the first network and large fixed costs of any subsequent network are likely to create 
significant commercial barriers for a second entrant. (Banerjee and Sirbu 2003: 23) 
(PWC 2004, p.24) Tseng (2001: 46) moots a possible scenario whereby incumbent 
telephone and cable television operators in the USA could separately migrate their 
networks to all fibre as demand outgrows the capabilities of the current infrastructure 
and each provider desires to capitalize on the ability to provide all services over the 
one network.  Currently, no examples of overlaid or duplicated FTTH networks are 
known to exist. 
 
The more likely alternative, given a regulatory requirement facilitating ‘open access’, 
is creation of a workable access or service-based competition regime applying to 
FTTH networks.  As with the dial-up telephone network, individual service providers 
and customers could establish direct relationships as depicted by Figure 16, without 
encountering bottlenecks or gateways dictated by a network provider.  At first sight, 
this should be a rather obvious conclusion – particularly if such a regime already 
exists for other telecommunication networks and services and merely needs to be 
applied to fibre to the home networks.  Unfortunately the reality can be different, with 
incumbent providers liable to frustrate attempts to unbundle FTTH networks or 
services through either intentional design or adoption of industry designs that just 
happen to assume the network provider to be the sole service provider. (Tseng 2001: 
49-52) 
 
 
Figure 16 – FTTH Competitive Access Relationships 
 
The accessibility of FTTH architectures can be appreciated against two different yet 
complementary technological frameworks.  One is based on the type and manner of 
multiplexing employed, the other on a more abstract consideration of design 
expressed in terms of functional layers and data protocols.  
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6.4.2 Multiplexing Framework 
 
By definition, multiplexing comprises the combination of two or more information 
channels onto a common transmission medium, followed by the reverse process 
known as de-multiplexing with recovers the original channels.  The two main 
techniques are time division multiplexing and frequency division multiplexing, 
however in optical communications the equivalent of frequency division multiplexing 
is called wavelength division multiplexing.144 (Rowe 1999) 
 
With time division multiplexing or TDM, the signals for multiple channels are carried 
in sequential time slots of data, whereas with frequency division multiplexing or FDM, 
the signals for multiple channels are simultaneously carried at different frequencies 
or sub-carriers on the transmission medium.  With wavelength division multiplexing or 
WDM, the signals are carried simultaneously as separate wavelengths of light along 
an optical fibre. 
 
By its nature, multiplexing involves the sharing of network resources in order to 
improve the economics of network deployment and/or to provide a required level of 
functionality.  According to Tseng (2001: 63-64), the more a network is shared, the 
more responsibility and control the network provider has over the management and 
allocation of network resources.  Conversely, the more a network is dedicated, the 
more responsibility and control the service providers and ultimately the subscribers 
have over the network traffic providing their services.  But how does this relate to 
open access? 
 
For a FTTH network to be opened to access by a service provider other than that of 
the network provider, the point of network interconnection must be at the Access Unit 
or wherever the optical line termination devices or OLT are located.145  Means must 
then be had to associate the traffic to and from a particular customer with their 
designated service provider or providers.  Since an open access network requires 
mechanisms that ensure fair allocation of network resources among different service 
providers and their customers, the network provider will need to facilitate this, in 
addition to managing quality of service and otherwise ensuring the maintenance of 
overall network integrity.146 (Tseng 2001) 
 
Each of the four main FTTH architectures is now assessed in terms of the extent and 
nature of multiplexing employed. 
 
                                            
144 Also refer to http://searchnetworking.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid7_gci212614,00.html 
, accessed 20 November 2005 
145 It is generally not feasible for interconnection to be effected at any other point closer to the 
optical network units or end users, such as at a Remote Node, as this could compromise 
network integrity. 
146 In particular, the activities of one provider must not adversely affect any other provider, 
nor any one customer affect the services of another. 
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Home Run Architecture 
 
With each customer being serviced by an individual fibre all the way to the Access 
Unit, every customer ONU is represented in the Access Unit by a specific OLT 
appearance.  There is no multiplexing of signals involving different customers at any 
point in the CAN, implying no shared network resources. (Tseng 2001: 65) 
 
Each service provider physically connects to a particular OLT and hence the 
corresponding ONU.  As a result, there should be no untoward impediments to the 
network provider implementing open access in a Home Run network.  Further, at 
least in theory, there should be no network-specific limitations on a service provider 
delivering a unique set of services to each customer. 
 
Active Star Architecture 
 
Although each customer is serviced by an individual fibre to a particular Remote 
Node, there can be no interconnection to service providers at such points without 
costly network re-design that would made interconnection an uneconomic 
proposition.  All interconnection must occur at the Access Unit. 
 
Between a given Remote Node and the Access Unit, signals involving different 
customers are shared over the same ‘feeder’ fibre using TDM multiplexing.  For 
typical active star network designs, this imposes an upper limit on the bandwidth 
resource able to be allocated to each customer.  The network provider needs to 
allocate a logical point-to-point connection between each service provider and a 
particular customer. (Tseng 2001: 67) Accordingly, open access may be 
implemented with an Active Star network but requires a greater degree of resource 
management compared to the Home Run network. 
 
Passive Optical Network Architecture 
 
With the Remote Node now performing a passive splitting/coupling function, each 
customer ONU receives the same downstream transmission of signals and each 
must contend for access to the same upstream transmission.  Even though each 
customer is serviced by an individual fibre to a particular Remote Node, it is the 
broadcast nature of the whole architecture that results in all resources being shared 
throughout the entire network. (Tseng 2001: 67) 
 
Although open access may conceivably be implemented with a PON network 
architecture, multiple service providers experience restrictions similar to that when 
accessing a HFC cable television network.  In particular, each customer must be 
offered the identical set of services and the allocation of network resources is 
controlled to a greater extent than with any other FTTH architecture.  According to 
Tseng (2001: 69), such allocation is effected though Quality of Service or QoS 
mechanisms implemented by the network provider. 
 
WDM PON Architecture 
 
Although the signals to and from all customers are shared over the same ‘feeder’ 
fibre between the Access Unit and the Remote Node, each customer or service 
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provider is allocated a specific optical wavelength such that there is effectively no 
sharing of network resources at any point within the CAN.  An optical switch or filter 
within the Remote Node effects the required ‘optical switching’.  Arbitration of 
bandwidth among customers then ceases to be an issue, in a manner similar to that 
with the Home Run architecture. (Tseng 2001: 70, 71) 
 
Two designs are possible – either a specific wavelength is allocated to each 
customer served by a Remote Node, or a specific wavelength is allocated to each 
service provider. 
 
In the former case, each service provider interfacing at a given OLT may connect 
through to the corresponding ONU for an individual customer according to its 
allocated network wavelength.  In this configuration, a Wavelength Division 
Multiplexed PON network should present no network-specific limitations on a service 
provider delivering a unique set of services to each customer and hence no untoward 
impediments to the network provider implementing an open access regime. 
 
In the latter case, each customer ONU must be capable of tuning into the desired 
service provider wavelength.  Whilst technically feasible, such a design is more 
expensive when it is realised that ONUs are individual to each customer and 
simplified implementations are necessary to minimise costs.  Open access becomes 
even more complicated if a customer subscribes to services from multiple providers. 
(Tseng 2001: 71) 
 
Accordingly, consideration of the WDM PON architecture in this study assumes only 
the more practical design where a specific wavelength is allocated to each customer. 
 
In summarising the above architectural and design comparisons, assessment against 
a multiplexing framework illustrates that the greater the extent of shared network 
resources the greater is the need for the network provider to arbitrate access, which 
in turn raises obstacles to accommodating multiple service providers and hence open 
access.  The PON architecture fares the worst on this assessment. 
 
6.4.3 Layers Framework 
 
The capabilities, services, design and/or implementation of communication networks 
can be described in terms of conceptual models involving ‘layers’.  Each layer is 
described by a set of rules or protocols defining its function and interface to another 
layer.  A series of layers are said to be ‘stacked’ such that one provides a service to 
another, the result being a description of the provision of a service to an end-user or 
perhaps another network.  The genesis of such layered descriptions was the need for 
computer network or data equipments from different vendors to communicate with 
each other.  Provided the interfaces between layers remained constant, different 
designs or implementations realising one layer could be made without affecting the 
operation of other layers. (Whitt 2004) 
 
OSI Reference Model 
 
Of the many layer-based reference models devised since the early 1970s, the OSI 
and Internet models are the most widely appreciated. 
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Figure 17 – The Seven-Layer OSI Reference Model 
Source: Adapted from (Leon-Garcia and Widjaja 2004, p.44) 
 
During the 1970’s, the desire for interoperability led to an effort in the International 
Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) first to develop a reference model for open 
systems interconnection (OSI) and later to develop associated standard protocols. 
(Leon-Garcia and Widjaja 2004) The resultant OSI reference model partitioned the 
communications process into seven layers and provided a framework for talking 
about the overall communications process.  This is depicted by Figure 17 which 
portrays the basic communications functions required for two computers to 
communicate via a communication network. 
 
The functions of each layer are briefly described, in addition to cross-references to 
key Internet model layers: (Linfield 1994), (Leon-Garcia and Widjaja 2004) 
 
Application layer Layer # 7 Performs the services required for the 
application processes, such as file transfer, e-
mail and the World Wide Web as accessed 
through the Internet. 
Presentation layer Layer # 6 Provides the Application layer with 
independence from differences in machine-
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application processes. 
Transport layer Layer # 4 Provides transparent transfer of data between 
end-users; with the Internet, this function is 
approximated by the Transmission Control 
Protocol or TCP. 
Network layer Layer # 3 Provides for the transfer of data in the form of 
packets across a communication network; with 
the Internet, this function is approximated by 
the Internet Protocol or IP. 
Data link layer Layer # 2 Determines how two machines on a network 
‘talk’ to one another; a common such protocol 
in use is Ethernet (IEEE 802.3). 
Physical layer Layer # 1 Deals with the transfer of bits of data over a 
communication channel provided by a specific 
transmission media. 
Media layer Layer # 0 Sometimes assumed as part of Layer # 1; 
refers to the actual transmission media such 
as optical fibre, coaxial cable, twisted paired 
conductors or radio waves. 
 
The concept of layered protocols, as exemplified by the OSI reference model, 
provides a lens or framework through which to appreciate how openness can be 
facilitated or impeded in various FTTH designs or implementations. 
 
Unbundling 
 
According to Pindyck (2005), the regulation of telecommunications, railroads and 
other network industries has been based on mandatory unbundling and facilities 
sharing – entrants have the option to lease part or all of incumbents’ facilities if and 
when they desire, at rates determined by regulators.  Alert to the inevitable 
convergence between telephone networks and computers, the FCC Computer 
Inquiry III of 1986 declared that US telephone companies could enter markets for so-
called ‘enhanced’ services provided new entrants could enter the phone companies’ 
markets. (Huber 1997, p.82) 
 
The principle of ‘equal access’ was thereby promoted and would be effected by US 
telephone companies being mandated under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to 
‘unbundle’ their networks in both a technical and commercial sense by offering the 
basic elements of service to aspiring providers on a non-discriminatory basis.147  The 
term ‘network element’ meant both a “facility or equipment used in the provision of a 
telecommunications service” and “features, functions, and capabilities that are 
provided by means of such a facility or equipment”.  This latter definition included 
items such as subscriber numbers, databases, signalling systems, and information 
sufficient for billing and collection, or used in the transmission routing, or other 
provision of a telecommunications service.  The Act mandated an access provider to 
provide an access seeker with “non-discriminatory access to network elements on an 
unbundled basis at any technically feasible point on rates, terms, and conditions that 
are just, reasonable, and non-discriminatory …”.  The intention was that an access 
seeker would then be able to combine such ‘unbundled network elements’ or UNEs 
                                            
147 Refer to http://www.fcc.gov/Reports/tcom1996.txt, accessed 13 May 2007, noting 
Sections 3(a)(2)(45) and 251(c)(3). 
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in order to provide a telecommunications service as an alternative to that of the 
incumbent’s services. (Northfield 1999, s.3.3.1) (Shah, Sicker et al. 2003, s.2.1.2) 
 
In essence, unbundling of a telecommunications network enables the sharing of 
facilities of an incumbent network provider with one or more ‘third party’ service 
providers.  The concept and practice of unbundling is now well established as applied 
to the PSTN which has traditionally comprised twisted pair copper cabling for the 
‘local loop’ that connects customers to telephone exchanges.  Publicly available 
network and equipment standards have meant there have been few technical 
obstacles to realising the necessary interconnection.  But how readily can these 
PSTN-based concepts translate to fibre to the home networks and services? 
 
Service-based Competition 
 
Given that the first FTTH network in Australia is tantamount to a natural monopoly, 
facilities-based competition involving replicated customer access networks is most 
unlikely.  Non-facilities or service-based competition can then only arise through 
multiple service providers sharing the resources of a common optical fibre access 
network. 
 
Banerjee and Sirbu (2003) consider the design of a generic FTTH network as 
comprising three layers: 
 
Network & Higher Layers 
 
{≈ OSI Layer 3 & above} 
Derived voice, video, data 
services. 
 
Data Link layer 
 
 
{≈ OSI Layer 2} 
Asynchronous transfer mode 
or ATM, Ethernet, amplitude 
modulation for analogue 
video. 
 
Optical layer (multiple 
wavelengths). 
Physical Infrastructure 
 
 
{≈ OSI Layer 1 & ‘0’} 
Physical medium (optical 
fibres). 
 
They then proceed to treat each layer in turn, postulating the impact of it being 
unbundled so that service-based competition may occur at the layer above.  This 
analysis commences at the bottom of the layer stack and works upwards. 
 
• Unbundled optical fibre; data link layer/‘UNE-based’ competition 
 
Where the optical fibre cabling is amenable to unbundling, that is, in US parlance it is 
listed as an unbundled network element or UNE, a service provider or access seeker 
would pay the requisite amount to the network provider and then deliver services 
over the FTTH network employing the data link layer technology of their choice.  The 
one network would simultaneously support multiple link layer technologies, enabling 
each service provider to uniquely deliver service to their customers as depicted in 
Figure 18.  However this is not practicable where the access network involves 
multiple customers sharing a common data stream on the same fibre as they must all 
share a common data link layer.  Hence, data link layer-based competition in this 
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manner would not be possible with the Active Star and PON architectures, but would 
be feasible to implement with the Home Run architecture. (Banerjee and Sirbu 2003: 
5.1.2) 
 
Figure 18 – Data Link Layer Competition through Unbundling of 
Optical Fibre cabling 
 
• Unbundled optical wavelength; data link layer/‘UNE-based’ competition 
 
Where multiple optical wavelengths on the same access fibre are technically 
accessible, they could be allocated to either multiple service providers or to individual 
subscribers sharing a common Remote Node.  The result is a Wavelength Division 
Multiplexed PON, employing respectively a ‘coarse’ or ‘dense’ WDM design.  In 
either way, a unique relationship could then be established between a service 
provider and a customer, similar to that of the Home Run architecture, and the 
service provider could employ the data link technology of their choice.  Figure 19 
refers.  This would not be possible with the Active Star and PON architectures, but 
would be feasible to implement with a WDM PON architecture. (Banerjee and Sirbu 
2003: 5.1.3) 
 
 
Figure 19 – Data Link Layer Competition through Unbundling of 
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• Unbundled data link layer; network (& higher) layer/‘open access-based’ 
competition 
 
In this model, unbundling occurs at the data link layer in a manner not dissimilar in 
concept to a dial-up, ADSL or HFC cable modem access arrangement.  The 
customer and/or service provider is delivered a prescribed data link layer protocol 
which may even be tied to a specific ISP in certain cases.  Importantly, no service 
provider can offer a service beyond that arranged by the network provider, who is 
more than likely also a service provider.  Given that all customers receive the same 
nominal service stream, such as ATM or Ethernet, and are constrained by the same 
nominal bandwidth offering, the extent of competitive offering is necessarily reduced 
to that possible between the derived voice, video or data services as shown in Figure 
20.  Competition effectively becomes that of retail arbitrage; nevertheless data link 
layer unbundling can be readily supported by all FTTH architectures. (Banerjee and 
Sirbu 2003: 5.1.4, 5.2) 
 
 
Figure 20 – Service-based Competition through Unbundling of 
Data Link layer 
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providers to each send their own package of programming to their subscribers. (Lehr, 
Sirbu et al. 2004: 12)   
 
• Switched delivery 
 
When video signals are carried as part of an IP data stream, only the requested 
programmes are delivered to each customer.  Multiple video service providers can be 
accommodated just as easily as multiple ISPs.148 (Lehr, Sirbu et al. 2004: 13) 
However, the data carrying capacity per customer becomes the deciding issue as far 
as FTTH architecture and design are concerned.  According to Riverstone (2004), 
currently the highest capacity commercially available PON design is GPON where 
customers can each receive up to 39 Mb/s.  With high definition television or HDTV 
requiring bandwidths up to 19 Mb/s and customers expecting more than one 
simultaneous HDTV stream to multiple viewers in a home, GPON systems would 
provide insufficient capacity.  Because Active Star networks typically deliver 100 
Mb/s Ethernet to each customer, the Active Star architecture is more amenable to the 
competitive delivery of video programming than PON architectures. 
 
6.4.4 Commentary 
 
Assessment against either a ‘multiplexing’ or ‘layers’ framework reaches a similar 
conclusion: the architecture and design of a given FTTH network does matter as 
regards its ability to accommodate access to competitive service providers in a non-
discriminatory manner.  The differentiating factor is the extent to which a given 
network architecture and design has been engineered to maintain a ‘one-to-one’ and 
symmetrical relationship between service providers and customers.149  The stronger 
this relationship, the more readily choice of service providers can be supported as 
well as services delivered that are unique to particular service providers.  On the 
other hand, the greater the sharing of resources in the access network, the lower the 
ability to support choice of service providers and the more likely their service 
packages will be replicas of one another – with there being only monopoly service 
provision in the limiting case.150 
 
It is not feasible that this assessment explores every single FTTH design variant and 
commercial product on offer.  However, the broad trend is clear: 
                                            
148 This open access friendly characteristic is also shared by the fibre to the curb network 
architecture and system design of the TransACT network. 
149 In this situation, each customer is uniquely addressable as regards both incoming and 
outgoing traffic.  Connections are effectively ‘switchable’. 
150 The precedents for such contrasting outcomes are clearly evident with the traditional 
telephony and pay television networks.  The former was designed to support direct point-to-
point connections in order to handle voice traffic between pairs of interacting customers, 
whereas the latter was primarily designed as a shared network to broadcast television 
signals from a Head End facility to passive viewers, i.e. in a point-to-multipoint manner. 
Tseng, E. (2001). Competition in Fiber to the Home: A Technology and Policy Assessment. 
Engineering Systems Division, Massachusetts Institute of Technology: 101. 
  Both generic networks were optimised for their prime application and also assumed 
a single provider.  In the case of pay television, that provider was typically both a network 
and service provider whereas with telephony it was originally perceived only as a network 
provider since the customers provided the content. 
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• The architectures most amenable to competitive access are those of the Home 
Run and Wavelength Division Multiplexed Passive Star or WDM PON designs; 
• The Active Star architecture is a compromise solution for competitive access, 
situated between the limit cases of the Home Run and PON designs; 
• The architecture least amenable to competitive access is that of the Passive 
Optical Network or PON design. 
 
The basic characteristics of pertinence are as follows: 
 
Home Run Individual optical fibres to each customer result in no contention for 
network resources in the CAN and potentially deliver the greatest 
bandwidth per customer compared to other architectures; as a 
result, this architecture is the most amenable to service-based 
competition regardless of which layer is unbundled. 
 
Active Star Representing a compromise as regards the sharing of network 
resources in the CAN, this architecture can deliver a symmetric 
bandwidth per customer of greater magnitude than PON; it is more 
amenable to the delivery of multiple video streams and switched 
delivery in particular. 
 
PON The broadcast nature of service delivery within the CAN causes the 
highest contention for network resources and the lowest ability for a 
‘one-to-one’ relationship between service providers and customers; 
depending on the given design, this architecture is typically the most 
constrained as regards expanding the bandwidth to each customer 
and only supports service-based competition at the network and 
higher layers, that is, no service provider can offer a service beyond 
that arranged by the network provider, who is more than likely also a 
service provider. 
 
WDM PON The ability to optically segregate service streams across the CAN 
produces an outcome very similar to that of the Home Run 
architecture. 
 
6.5 FTTH in Australia – Threat or Opportunity? 
“What would happen if bandwidth scarcity was to end all of a 
sudden?”151 
 
The roll-out by Telstra and Optus of hybrid fibre coaxial networks from 1995 to 1997 
for the delivery of pay television was a watershed in the development of Australia’s 
public wireline access network.  Widespread deployment by Telstra of fibre to the 
home networks, or their close variants, arising from policy decisions taken in 2005 
and 2006 will mark another watershed – unlikely to be overtaken for decades to 
come. 
 
                                            
151 Question posed by Diana McCarty in her message ‘Markets and Anti-Markets’ to the 
mailing list www.nettime.org , 7 Feb 1997. 
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Such watersheds are marked by significant changes in the strategic, technical, 
commercial and regulatory environments.  However, fibre to the home (FTTH) offers 
a quantum change – the potential to end the scarcity of communications bandwidth 
available to residential and SME customers.  Yet with many aspects of the existing 
CAN infrastructure comprising a natural monopoly, such an opportunity is being 
overshadowed by Telstra’s threat not to further invest in fibre in the CAN without 
regulatory relief. 
 
6.5.1 From Technology Trials to Commercial Pilots 
 
FTTH technology has been available to carriers for least a decade, being an 
incremental development from that employed in long distance and inter-exchange 
applications, as well as computer-based office LANs.  According to Tseng (2001), 
‘the viability of FTTH has always been primarily a question of economics rather than 
technology”.  Telstra has possessed the technological answers for over a decade. 
 
The Optical Fibre Residential Engineering Pilot or OFREP provided a dedicated fibre 
to dozens of homes commencing 1988/89 in the suburbs of Toorak, Melbourne and 
Centennial Park, Sydney. (Rozental, Griffin et al. 1992) (Griffin 1993) These barely 
publicised technical trials carried content of minimal commercial significance and 
were wound up by late 1992.  That same year, Telecom Australia commissioned new 
trials of both fibre to the home and fibre to the curb technology in Wollongong, New 
South Wales.  Although again primarily technical trials, they differed from OFREP in 
that some aspects of interactivity were also explored. (Hsieh, Butterfield et al. 1993) 
 
This was the era of the Commonwealth Government’s Broadband Services Expert 
Group and a public policy focus on deploying ‘interactive broadband networks’ to 
carry ‘interactive information and communications services’, including video on 
demand services. (BSEG 1994) Only optical fibre technology was envisaged to be 
capable of delivering the necessary high bandwidth both downstream and upstream.  
In 1993, Telstra devised plans to provide the Canberra suburb of Gungahlin with a 
state-of-the-art multimedia network but with competition looming in the delivery of 
broadcast pay television such plans were quietly shelved in the interest of 
expediency. 
 
Nevertheless, despite its new found focus on rolling out a HFC network between 
1995 and 1997, and freezing that infrastructure thereafter, Telstra did not stand still.  
Telstra’s competitive advantage lay not just in its ability to sustain a massive annual 
capital expenditure and all which that brings, nor in its rights of way embodied in the 
CAN and backbone infrastructure, but in a less overt way – through the accumulation 
of written down infrastructure and optical fibre cabling in particular, both backbone 
and in the CAN, held in reserve to address future demand. 
 
Due to the competitive marketplace, statistics on the extent of fibre in the CAN are no 
longer made public but reasoned projections can be made from data made available 
in 1992.  Under the Laserlink™ initiative, Telecom Australia publicised a target of 
attaining a goal of 60 per cent ‘connectivity’ of optical fibre in the customer access 
network by 1994/95. (Telecom 1992a) (Telecom 1992b) By ‘connectivity’ it was 
meant that only an average of 700 metres of cable would remain to be installed 
between the optical fibre cabling end point and customers’ premises in residential 
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areas.152  Figure 21 illustrates the anticipated connectivity profile extending from the 
1992 achievement to the 1995 target. 
 
 
 
Figure 21 – CAN Optical Fibre Connectivity 
Source: Author’s publication (Kelso 1992b, Fig. 4) 
 
There is every reason for this target to have been met, if not exceeded, and the trend 
to have subsequently continued to reach 100 per cent ‘connectivity’ by the year 2000, 
if not before.  The reasons for this confidence are as follows: 
 
• From 1995 to 1997, Telstra rolled out a hybrid fibre coaxial network passing 2.5 
million homes throughout Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide, Perth and the Gold 
Coast, advancing the extent of optical fibre in the CAN to within groups of 
approximately 500 to 750 homes; 
• Commencing 1992/93, Telecom began to deploy the next generation of Remote 
Multiplexers known as RIMs sited centrally within given fibre serving areas or 
FSAs to provide customers with ISDN Basic Rate Access in addition to the 
usual voice frequency telephony services; (Rozental, Griffin et al. 1992) 
                                            
152 Exchange areas throughout Australia were sectionalized into cellular-like groupings 
known as Fibre Serving Areas or FSAs, each accommodating approximately 450 customers.  
Fibres extending from local exchanges throughout the CAN would interlink the FSAs, thereby 
realizing this connectivity target. Rozental, S., J. Griffin, et al. (1992). "Optical Fibre in the 
Customer Access Network." Telecommunications Journal of Australia 42(2). 
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• Remote multiplexer application has since been extensive throughout Australia, 
in residential, regional and rural areas, avoiding the need to install new copper 
cabling in the CAN and over recent years particularly supplanting the creation of 
new telephone exchanges; (Darling 2005) 
• Optical fibre has also been deployed extensively to interconnect mobile 
telephony base stations throughout residential, regional and rural areas. 
 
With the cost of laying optical fibre cabling substantially independent of the number of 
fibres within the sheath, it stands to reason that Telstra would always tend to install 
capacity surplus to its immediate needs. (AIEAC 1999, p. 237) Fibre that is unlit or 
‘dark’, or lit but underutilised, called ‘brown’, represents a substantial competitive 
advantage for an incumbent carrier. 
 
Back in 1992, Telecom/Telstra was buoyant about the prospects for utilising its 
expanding deployment of optical fibre in the CAN: (Rozental, Griffin et al. 1992, p. 
14) 
 
It is likely that FTTC will become cost-competitive with conventional copper in 
the near future (1995 to year 2000 time frame) for the provision of narrow band 
services.  FTTCP is a relatively more futuristic application and is currently more 
expensive than the FTTC alternative.  Economic application of FTTCP 
technology is expected to be around the latter part of this decade or early 2000s 
time frame when opto-electronic integration, miniaturization and associated 
photonic development occurs.153 
 
The latter prediction was not far off the mark.154  Unveiling its Future Network 
Evolution and Product Strategy in July 2004, Telstra announced a $34 million 
program to deploy fibre to the premises or FTTP infrastructure in two new housing 
estates south of Brisbane as ‘greenfield’ developments155, in addition to the very 
limited retrofit or ‘brownfield’ deployment of FTTP in situations where replacement of 
existing copper CAN infrastructure would be efficient. (Telstra 2004b, p.9)  These 
would be commercial pilots and deliver to each customer up to four telephone 
services, Foxtel pay television plus a broadband Ethernet connection for access to 
BigPond Internet. (Todd 2004)  The Alcatel technology had been tested at Telstra’s 
Research laboratories for at least the previous year. 
 
Telstra’s Group Managing Director, Telstra Technology, Innovation and Products Mr 
Ted Pretty spoke of aggressive industry forecasts suggesting that by 2020 there 
could be about 6 million lines served by FTTP in Australia compared to around 2 
million remaining copper access lines. (Telstra 2004b, p.10)  Already, he considered 
                                            
153 That author used the terms FTTC for ‘fibre to the curb’ in the same manner as this paper, 
and FTTCP for ‘fibre to the customer premises’ in the same manner as this paper uses FTTH 
for ‘fibre to the home’. 
154 This was despite the element of competitive bypass subsequently introduced by the 
extensive HFC network roll-out that was in 1992 still only a prospect. 
155 A total of 280 multi-dwellings were reported as being served in the new estate of 
Brookwater at Springfield, south west of Brisbane and 65 at Emerald Lakes at Carrara, City 
of Gold Coast. Telstra (2004a). Telstra announces next generation access technology 
commerical pilot. Media Release. Sydney, Telstra Corporation Limited: 1. 
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FTTP technology a commercially viable alternative to the copper network in new 
estates, also known as ‘greenfield’ developments, but from mid 2006 it could even be 
economical in ‘brownfield’ situations: 
 
Within the next 18-24 months, the total FTTP capex for network equipment 
(including cable) per home passed is expected to equal the cost of provision via 
the traditional copper based network.  Today it is around 1.5 times the cost of 
copper.  The cost to support FTTP will be less than the cost to support 
traditional copper based network.  In addition to savings on the initial activation, 
we estimate there will be annual savings from a more resilient and flexible FTTP 
network.  Currently, customers use a variety of access infrastructures to receive 
Telephony (copper), broadband data (Copper/ADSL, HFC, Satellite) and payTV 
(HFC/Satellite) services.  FTTP will offer an equivalent to these existing 
products and services via one dual-fibre access technology with on-going cost 
savings in operations and maintenance.  Also longer term, FTTP technology will 
provide a growth path to higher bandwidth internet and entertainment services. 
 
From here onwards, fibre to the home technology could be destined to eventually 
transform the service capability of Australia’s wireline CAN and in so doing reinforce 
the scale and scope of a putative natural monopoly in that market.156  And it would 
exploit a massive sunk investment of optical fibre in the CAN progressively built since 
1989.  In the meantime there would be at least one major hurdle to jump, and FTTP 
would end up being sidelined from ‘brownfield’ deployment – at least initially. 
 
6.5.2 A Mexican Standoff157 
 
Two events rapidly changed Telstra’s confidence of July 2004: 
 
• In a shock reversal of fortunes, the Australian Competition Tribunal on 23 
December 2004 negated the anticipatory exemption from standard access 
obligations for the pay television business of Foxtel and Telstra; 
• In early January 2005, CEO Dr Ziggy Switkowski visited the US and learned 
that the US regional Bell operating companies or RBOCs had only recently won 
regulatory relief from mandated access requirements for new fibre networks in 
the CAN.158 (Sainsbury 2005) 
 
By February 2005, Switkowski had declared that the planned FTTP deployment 
would no longer take place without ‘iron-clad guarantees’ from the ACCC and even 
mooted the possibility for Telstra to partner with others to build a national fibre 
network.  Appearing before a Senate committee, Telstra’s Group Managing Director 
– Regulatory, Corporate and Human Relations revealed: (ECITA 2005a) 
                                            
156 That is, the market of providing the scale and scope of next generation bandwidth 
services only possible with optical fibre. 
157 Being a term describing an impasse or stalemate, it was first applied by the Australian 
media to this subject matter over a year before the arrival of new Telstra CEO Sol Trujillo and 
his American ‘amigos’. 
158 Refer to FCC Memorandum Opinion and Order No. FCC 04-254 released 27 October 
2004, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-04-254A1.doc, accessed 13 
May 2007 
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If the regulatory environment says that the moment infrastructure is put down 
then any wholesale customer is able to have access to that at what is effectively 
marginal cost, that affects the economics quite considerably.  It does not 
necessarily mean Telstra would not do it, but we need to know about that.  We 
need to know what that environment is, because without having that deep 
understanding it is not possible for us to even build a business case to put to 
the board as to what might be the appropriate returns and over what time frame 
those returns might be realised. 
 
The Australian government was pushing hard to sell its remaining shareholding in 
Telstra and desperately seeking the support of the National Party and regional and 
rural voters.  In March 2005, the Nationals released a proposal to ‘future proof’ 
telecommunications in non-metropolitan Australia that included a key option for the 
roll-out of a non-Telstra funded optical fibre network. (Page Research Centre 2005)  
Telstra could not lose its strategic advantage and not long after the arrival of new 
CEO Sol Trujillo, it submitted to the government a ‘Digital Compact and National 
Broadband Plan’ with the following key proposals: (Telstra 2005a) 
 
• Telstra and the government would commit to build a world class, high capacity 
broadband infrastructure within 3-5 years; 
• 98 per cent of Australian homes and businesses159 would have access to the 
‘next generation’ of Internet services at a minimum speed of 6 Mb/s; 
• The government and Telstra would assume obligations to each other and to the 
public to build the network, with Telstra committing $3.1B to provide 6 Mb/s 
broadband to 87 per cent of homes and businesses, and the government 
providing the remaining $2.6B to cover the remaining 13 per cent. 
 
Regulatory ‘reform’ would be an essential element of the proposed Digital Compact, 
with Telstra calling for, among other things, the new infrastructure and services to be 
exempted from standard access regulation based on the principle of Telstra holding 
the property rights.  The government was reported to be unimpressed and in turn Mr 
Trujillo said he would withhold capital investment if telecommunications regulations 
were not wound back. (Boyd, Crowe et al. 2005) 
 
As part of initiatives arising from a strategic review of its business operations, Telstra 
re-launched its proposals to invest in new fibre access technology but this time spoke 
of proposed fibre to the node or FTTN as well as FTTP investments, being part of 
creating a ‘next generation multi-service access network’ with an initial emphasis on 
metropolitan services and the five mainland capital cities in particular160. (Telstra 
2005b)  The demand for regulatory relief was reiterated. (Telstra 2005e) 
 
                                            
159 Throughout metropolitan, regional and rural Australia. 
160 Although not explicit at the time, the Digital Compact proposal had almost certainly also 
been based on the widespread roll-out of FTTN technology though with a greater focus on 
regional and rural deployment.  The Digital Compact proposal was Option A of Telstra’s 
‘Project Titan’ with Option A2 being the FTTN roll-out focused more on metropolitan areas.  
Option B was to upgrade the HFC network and also focus more on the 3G mobile network, 
according to Sainsbury, M. (2006). $500m bill for Telstra's plan B. The Australian. Sydney. 
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The Minister dismissed Telstra’s call for its proposed fibre investment to gain a 
permanent ‘regulatory holiday’,161 saying that the current framework was adequate, in 
that Telstra could always submit an undertaking or seek an exemption from the 
access regime prior to making an investment. (Coonan 2005) One week later, on 21 
December 2005, Telstra formally advised the Australian Stock Exchange or ASX that 
it would not proceed with some parts of its Next Generation Network or NGN 
program: (Telstra 2005f) 
 
Telstra confirms that the ‘fibre to the node’ component of the NGN remains on 
hold and vendors have been notified accordingly.  As a result, Telstra will retain 
various legacy elements of the copper access network and therefore does not 
expect to accelerate the depreciation or write down of these elements in fiscal 
2006. 
 
The Minister had already claimed it was inevitable that Telstra would invest in the 
new networks regardless (Coonan 2005, p.5) and this view was subsequently 
supported by an investment analyst who declared “any decision by Telstra to 
abandon FTTN would have a significant negative impact on the value of the 
company”.162 (Guerra 2006) 
 
Nevertheless, Telstra was sensitive about its sincerity on this issue and in a public 
submission to the ACCC re-affirmed: (Telstra 2006, p.22) 
 
Telstra has made clear in a statement to the ASX that it will not roll out a broad 
scale FTTN network unless and until the necessary regulatory safeguards are in 
place.  The company is aware of its legal obligations in making such a 
statement. 
 
6.5.3 The Next Generation CAN Technology 
 
The technology briefing of 16 November 2005 revealed Telstra’s plans to transform 
their customer access network from delivering telephony and data over a 
substantially copper-based CAN augmented by optical fibre connected multiplexers 
and increasingly involving ‘piggy back’ ADSL technology, to one with a lower 
dependence on paired copper cables all the way from exchange to customer, a 
greater penetration of optical fibre into the CAN to feed more multiplexers but instead 
involving a higher bandwidth ADSL technology known as ‘ADSL2+’. (Telstra 2005b)  
The CAN optical fibre would be configured as FTTN for existing or ‘brownfield’ 
                                            
161 Alternatively known as an ‘access holiday’; the concept is discussed further in Chapter 8. 
162 The inevitability of Telstra’s replacement of its copper CAN had been previously 
highlighted in a Senate committee hearing on 12 November 2003; in response to the 
question “Is Telstra investing in new networks and new infrastructure that bypasses the 
existing copper network and will help improve penetration of broadband”, Telstra’s group 
manager of regulatory strategy replied “I think it is right to suggest that ADSL is an interim 
technology. It is probably the last sweating, if you like, of the old copper network assets.  In 
copper years, if you like, we are at a sort of transition – we are at five minutes to midnight.” 
ECITA (2003). Competition in Broadband Services. Environment, Communications, 
Information Technology and the Arts References Committee (ECITA). Canberra: 74-75. 
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locations and as FTTP for new or ‘greenfield’ locations, with the former initially 
comprising the greater investment. (Alcatel 2005) 
 
The exchange and inter-exchange network would be substantially replaced with one 
involving only five pairs of ‘soft switches’ based on IP/MPLS163 technology and 
capable of delivering to customers an ‘integrated triple-play’ of voice, data and video 
services.  Interfacing with each customer premises would be a ‘home gateway’ 
device arranged to provide and manage services including entertainment, gaming, 
home automation and security. (Telstra 2005b) (Alcatel 2006a) Such a gateway was 
claimed to ‘remove complexity for customers’ by instead having Telstra as the single 
provider. 
 
6.5.3.1 Fibre to the Node 
 
Telstra proposed to modernise the wireline CAN such that it would deliver Internet 
access bandwidth up to at least 12 Mb/s164 to the large majority of customers by 
segmenting the service area of each traditional exchange on an annular basis, as 
follows: (Telstra 2005b) (Telstra 2006) 
 
• Those 40 per cent165 of customers living within a radius of 1.5 kms of an 
exchange building would continue to be served with voice telephony plus 
Internet access delivered via exchange-based equipment, with the latter utilising 
ADSL2+ technology capable of a minimum of 12 Mb/s bandwidth per copper 
pair; 
• The remaining 60 per cent beyond the 1.5 km radius would be served from 
newly constructed nodes connected back to the exchange network via optical 
fibre.  Copper pairs between each node and the approximately 250 lines166 
within its service area would deliver voice telephony plus Internet access, with 
the latter utilising node-based ADSL2+ technology similarly capable of a 
minimum of 12 Mb/s bandwidth per copper pair. 
 
Harking back to section 6.1, the 40 per cent group of existing customers to be served 
via entirely exchange-based equipment imply a conventional fibre to the exchange or 
FTTX network architecture.  By contrast, the 60 per cent group of existing customers 
would be served by remotely located multiplexer equipment in an arrangement 
described as fibre to the node or FTTN.  Figure 22 depicts this arrangement. 
 
                                            
163 Internet protocol (IP) and multi-protocol label switching (MPLS). 
164 Telstra’s proposal is for a minimum standard access speed of 12 Mb/s for most 
households, although some could receive up to 24 Mb/s depending on distance and network 
configuration. 
165 The 16 November 2005 technology briefing spoke of a one-third/two-thirds split whereas 
the submission to the ACCC of February 2006 spoke of 40 per cent/60 per cent. 
166 Derived from 20,000 FTTN nodes said to be serve 5 million PSTN lines or services in 
operation (SIOs). Telstra (2005c). Transcript from Analysts Q&A session - Telstra Investor 
Day. Melbourne, Telstra Corporation Limited: 53. 
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Figure 22 – Proposed Fibre to the Node Configuration 
Source: Graphical representation of text of (Telstra 2006) 
 
By reducing average paired copper lengths, such CAN segmentation enables 
increased DSL bandwidth.  Alcatel highlight that its series 7330 FTTN equipment is 
ideal when time-to-market pressures and short term economic concerns are 
paramount and describe FTTN deployment as an interim step before the deployment 
of FTTU for triple play services. (Alcatel 2006b) (Alcatel 2006c) 
 
6.5.3.2 Fibre to the Premises (or Home) 
 
Earmarked for deployment in ‘greenfield’ or new estates167, Telstra has revealed little 
about the technology involved apart from a reference to it “evolving from Broadband 
Passive Optical Network or BPON to Gigabit Passive Optical Network or GPON” as 
time goes by. (Telstra 2005b) Video carriage was said to be either “video on RF 
overlay or over IP”.  However, it had been previously revealed that Alcatel are to 
provide their series 7340 Fibre to the User or FTTU product to fulfil Telstra’s 
FTTP/FTTH plans and it is from these technical specifications that further information 
can be gleaned.168 (Riley 2004) 
 
The product is based on ITU-T standards derived from deliberations of the Full 
Service Access Network or FSAN group of telecommunication carriers.  Involving a 
Passive Optical Network or PON network architecture as discussed in section 6.3.3, 
signals for up to 32 customers are shared over a common optical fibre deployed from 
an exchange site or access unit to a passive optical splitter situated in the CAN.  
Thereafter, individual fibres connect to customers over the last few hundred metres.  
The CAN infrastructure of optical fibres and splitters remain unchanged as the 
                                            
167 Interestingly, since the mid-November 2005 launch of Telstra’s strategy to achieve a next 
generation network, the demands for the regulatory relief have been specifically linked to 
FTTN investment and not FTTP, presumably since the latter was by now considered to be 
economically justified in new estates compared to paired-copper deployment. 
168 Personal discussion with Geof Heydon, Director Innovation & Market Development, 
Alcatel Asia Pacific on 22 November 2005. 
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network performance is eventually upgraded from BPON to GPON. (Alcatel 2004a) 
(Alcatel 2004b) 
 
The data bandwidth available to each customer approximates the PON line 
transmission rate divided by the number of customers served by the optical splitter, 
i.e. typically 16 or 32 for BPON and 16, 32 or 64 for GPON.  Line transmission rates 
are set to the carrier requirements and can be selected from the following 
possibilities: 
 
 Downstream 
(to customer) 
Upstream 
(from customer) 
 
BPON 622 Mb/s; 1.25 Gb/s 155 Mb/s; 622 Mb/s 
 
GPON 1.25 Gb/s; 2.5 Gb/s 155 Mb/s; 622 Mb/s; 
1.25 Gb/s; 2.5 Gb/s 
 
Assuming a 32-way optical split, the maximum possible bandwidth available to 
individual customers is then of the order of 15 or 31 Mb/s for BPON and 37 or 74 
Mb/s for GPON.169  For residential service installation, the Alcatel 7340 optical 
network terminal provides a port enabling a 10/100Base-T Ethernet LAN connection 
for Internet access. (Alcatel 2004b) In the BPON configuration, video service for pay 
television delivery is effected via a separate downstream wavelength of 1550 
nanometres that is coarse wavelength division multiplexed with the downstream 
wavelength of 1490 nanometres for data delivery.  With GPON in the future, video 
signals could alternatively be carried within the total Internet Protocol or IP data 
payload. 
 
6.5.4 Regulatory Certainty 
“Legacy regulation for legacy network, new arrangements for new 
networks.” (Telstra 2005e, transcript p.5) 
“The regulatory regime has long been a whipping boy for those who 
claim we are in (a) period of regulatory uncertainty and change.” 
(Coonan 2006) 
 
Despite all the talk about new networks, the focus of Telstra’s public lobbying and 
representations to the government and the ACCC has been more on the bread and 
butter issue of lessening the impact of ‘legacy’ regulation for their legacy or existing 
network since they claimed this critically affected their immediate financial fortunes.  
The regulatory reforms Telstra insisted as being essential to ‘promote competition, 
investment and equal services to all Australians’ were: (Telstra 2005e, Media 
Release) 
 
                                            
169 Calculated on the basis of 80 per cent protocol efficiency for BPON and 94 per cent for 
GPON. Nortel (2004). Ultra broadband access: Unleashing the power of PON. White Paper, 
Nortel Networks: 16. 
  George, J. (2005). "FTTH Design with the Future in Mind." Broadband Properties: 6. 
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• An average ULL price of $30;170 
• Limiting operational separation requirements to existing wholesale core 
services; and 
• Exempting new services from mandated third party access. 
 
By highlighting this third issue, Telstra was alerting the ACCC and the government to 
the prospect of future battles arising from unsatisfactory resolution of the ULL matter 
and that the legacy services of today should be quarantined from being regarded as 
evolving to the new services of tomorrow. 
 
Only a few months earlier, Telstra had raised two other issues in the context of their 
Digital Compact and National Broadband Plan that illuminated their regulatory 
thinking: (Telstra 2005a, Tab 4) 
 
• The regulatory certainty sought should also apply to new facilities, i.e. 
infrastructure, whereas ACCC declaration traditionally applied only to 
telecommunication services; 
• A possible outcome could be no third party access at all. 
 
Addressing a broader forum raised by the government task force on reducing the 
regulatory burden on business,171 Telstra contended that it suffered from excessive 
regulation compared to other industries and that continued over-regulation would 
reduce investment, reduce consumer choice, stifle innovation and create competitive 
imbalances. (Telstra 2005d, s.3.5) (Telstra 2005e, slide 7)  Furthermore, in its 
submissions to this task force and the ACCC strategic review of the regulation of 
fixed network services,172 Telstra contended that it was no longer a monopolist in 
much of the retail access market and since “only true bottlenecks are subject to 
regulated competitor access”, future implementation of Part XIC of the Trade 
Practices Act should be more carefully targeted to regulate only those remaining 
bottleneck hotspots. (Telstra 2006, p.10, 17) 
 
Underpinning its strategy announced mid-November 2005 to create a ‘next 
generation multi-service access network’ was reliance on a 3-year rolling investment 
in a new network embodying fibre to the node or FTTN technology.  But in the same 
breath Telstra declared that such FTTN deployment would not progress unless there 
was ‘regulatory reform’. (Telstra 2005b) (Telstra 2005e) The so-called regulatory 
certainty required to unleash this FTTN investment could only be had by amending 
the Trade Practices Act to achieve the following outcomes: (Telstra 2005e, slide 19) 
(Telstra 2006, p.22) 
                                            
170 Unconditioned local loop or ULL, comprising the traditional copper paired CAN; Telstra 
had long been at loggerheads with the ACCC in determining a suitable price for third party 
access to its CAN and as at August 2005 the Commission had issued a draft pricing decision 
which Telstra strongly rejected. 
171 Refer to http://www.regulationtaskforce.gov.au/index.html, accessed 13 May 2007 
172 Refer to http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/719844, accessed 13 May 
2007 
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• A freeze on the declaration of new services under Part XIC173; 
• Limit the operation of Part XIB174 to those services already declared under Part 
XIC; and 
• Clear exclusion of new services from the scrutiny of the recently imposed 
operational separation requirements. 
 
In effect, implementing these changes to the Trade Practices Act would remove the 
access pricing powers of the ACCC and grant Telstra a ‘safe harbour’ for its new 
network investments. (Telstra 2005d, p.24) 
 
Being required to open access to new infrastructure to competitors at low prices 
that are not set in a way that allows recovery of costs discourages the 
construction of new infrastructure.  These new markets and technologies are 
intensely competitive markets and there is no bottleneck market failure 
justification for regulation. 
 
If granted, Telstra would then have the power to dictate the price and non-price terms 
of access in a manner that they considered should reward their risk and enterprise, 
i.e. access should be on ‘commercial terms’. (Telstra 2005e, transcript p.18)  Another 
inference was that Telstra considered fibre to the node deployment not to create a 
new access bottleneck. 
 
By early 2006, the ACCC and the Minister for Communications, IT and the Arts 
Senator Helen Coonan had continued to reject Telstra’s demands.  At a Senate 
hearing in February 2005, ACCC Chairman Graeme Samuel accepted that “what 
business needs and is entitled to is regulatory certainty” but that should not be 
confused with ‘regulatory holidays’. (ELC 2005) He then proceeded to outline the 
mechanism already within the Trade Practices Act that provided for regulatory 
certainty, being the process of anticipatory undertakings and/or exemptions.  Public 
interest considerations would take account of the need for investment certainty, 
reasonable investment returns and, ultimately, the long-term interests of end users. 
 
Nevertheless, the markets were continuing to change and regulation needed to be 
adaptable to stay relevant.  By December 2005, the ACCC launched a broad-ranging 
review of the future regulation of fixed network services, partly in response to the 
challenges posed by Telstra’s FTTN proposal. (ACCC 2005c) According to the 
ACCC Chairman, a key objective of the review was to ensure that the overall 
regulatory environment does not hinder investment in innovative technologies whilst 
still providing competitive safeguards where necessary. (ACCC 2006a) 
 
Minister Coonan contended that regulatory certainty was achievable within the 
current framework of the Trade Practices Act which allowed a company such as 
Telstra to submit an undertaking or to seek an exemption from the access regime, 
including prior to making an investment. (Coonan 2005)  Furthermore, these 
                                            
173 Part XIC of the Trade Practices Act deals with a pro-competitive access regime; refer to 
section 4.3 onwards of the Telstra-Foxtel case study for further detail. 
174 Part XIB of the Trade Practices Act deals with anti-competitive conduct; both parts of the 
Act are telecommunications specific. 
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provisions have never been properly tested, despite the December 2004 adverse 
ruling by the Australian Competition Tribunal regarding an anticipatory exemption 
granted by the ACCC to Foxtel and Telstra. 
 
The Minister also contended that Telstra’s proposed fibre to the node network would 
likely exhibit natural monopoly characteristics and hence be economically unsuitable 
for duplication. (Coonan 2006) In those circumstances, third party access would be 
critical.  Also noting the unlikelihood of duplicated fibre networks in the CAN, the 
ACCC Chairman made the bold suggestion that “perhaps there is scope for the 
industry to invest jointly – although as the competition regulator the ACCC is 
conscious of the risk of trying to engineer structural outcomes”.175 (ACCC 2006a, p.7) 
 
Increasingly concerned about the prospect of Telstra further entrenching its CAN 
monopoly, various parties floated proposals for more cooperative investment.  By 
early April 2006, Optus had suggested three possible access regime models arising 
from a new fibre network built through co-investment with Telstra: (Boyd 2006) 
 
• Telstra would maintain the network on behalf of all parties who would gain 
access perhaps related to their investment; 
• Each operator would lay fibre in a specific geographic territory but provide 
access and inter-operability to the other networks; 
• A joint-venture company would run the network through which all carriers would 
work, in like manner the 3G network built between Optus and Vodafone. 
 
A more ambitious proposal, launched 21 April 2006 by a group of seven companies 
comprising Internode, Macquarie, Optus, PowerTel, Primus, Soul and TransACT 
extended these by adding a fourth model: (Corner 2006) 
 
• Integrate existing high speed access networks such as those of the Optus and 
Telstra HFC networks, the TransACT network, Soul’s, etc. 
 
Optus CEO Paul O’Sullivan claimed the advantages of a cooperative approach would 
include a more extensive roll-out due to the increased investment available and a 
higher take-up due to greater choice for consumers and lower prices.  With a more 
open design of the network, participating companies could offer differentiated 
services to customers. (ABC RN 2006, pp.2-3) In contrast, under Telstra’s proposal, 
O’Sullivan contended that “we’d pretty much have to live with whatever Telstra 
decided the rest of us would resell”. 
 
Commencing about 23 March 2006, Telstra and the ACCC commenced discussions 
which, according to the ACCC Chairman “should put Telstra in a position to develop 
a comprehensive undertaking, which can be submitted to full public consultation”. 
(ACCC 2006b) 
 
The investment/regulatory impasse continued at least until mid-2007.  Who would 
blink first, Telstra or the government?  The former demanded regulatory certainty 
                                            
175 Such a suggestion is tantamount to admitting the failure of facilities-based competition 
within the CAN.  Joint investment was also mooted by Telstra CEO Dr Ziggy Switkowski as 
noted in section 6.5.2. 
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whilst the latter said they already had it.  Unless the government relented, maybe 
Telstra could commence a lesser FTTN roll-out that isn’t really ‘broad scale’?  If the 
Telstra-Foxtel case study is any guide, years of litigation could also be a likely 
outcome. 
 
6.6 Discussion 
 
In this section we discuss possible limitations arising from analysis of fibre to the 
home networks as a case study, followed by a summary of findings that should 
inform the Research Question. 
 
6.6.1 Limitations of Case Study 
 
Whilst the Telstra/Foxtel network remains effectively closed to third party access and 
the TransACT network remains substantially open, the fate of access to next-
generation fibre to the home networks has yet to unfold.  At the time of writing, FTTH 
developments in Australia had not generated regulatory precedents and hence the 
case study could not enter this realm. 
 
This case study further differs from the other two in that it necessarily becomes more 
technical to explain, though expressed in a manner that is hopefully understandable 
to a generalist reader.  Despite telecommunications legislation purportedly framed to 
be ‘technologically neutral’, the reality is that regulatory activity nowadays can easily 
be drawn into at least this level of technical detail in order that the detail of and 
challenges to regulation are adequately appreciated. 
 
Section 6.4, the kernel of the case study, was substantially based on the work of only 
Tseng, and Banerjee and Sirbu.  This limited breadth of literature seems to arise from 
an inherent asymmetry in information relating to access to FTTH networks; being at 
the very least disinterested in third party access, network providers and equipment 
designers are unlikely to publicise options that benefit such access and it transpires 
that only these few researchers have ventured to ask the relevant questions.  Much 
effort was taken to validate the conclusions made here, backed up by alternative 
sources where possible, to the extent that I am now confident in relying upon these 
few literature sources. 
 
Explanation of the major FTT‘x’ variants was necessary in order to position fibre to 
the home networks as part of a continuum of architectures and designs that extend 
the reach of optical fibre closer and closer towards customers as the end users.  
When the case study was first conceived, it was not envisaged that Telstra’s 
business plans during 2005 and 2006 would quickly develop to the extent that its 
initial FTTH offerings would be overshadowed by controversial plans to also deploy 
FTTN infrastructure.  Regulatory determinations relating to these FTTN plans are 
likely to be made from mid-2007 onwards and any legal challenges could extend well 
beyond then.  It remains to be seen whether such regulatory determinations also 
encompass FTTH, a matter which may possibly be more affected by the extent of 
competitive interest in third party access to FTTH compared to FTTN. 
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Nevertheless, this case study terminated during the early phase of such 
developments and so could not be informed by marketplace and/or regulatory 
happenings that signal the ultimate fate of attempts to access FTTH or FTTN 
networks individually, or in contrast to one another.  The aim of the case study was 
instead to be a vehicle for understanding the principles involved in enabling third 
party access to those next generation networks where, at least in theory, scarcity of 
capacity should not pose a restraint on access. 
 
6.6.2 Findings 
 
The key findings of the fibre to the home case study are summarised in a stand-alone 
manner.  Interpretations made possible by drawing correlations with the other case 
studies are withheld until Chapter Eight. 
 
Whilst the case study is titled ‘fibre to the home’, the initial section discussed a range 
of FTT’x’ variants with FTTN and FTTC being those architectures most closely 
related to FTTH as the reach of optical fibre extends further into the CAN.  Many of 
the case study findings also apply substantially to these variants and particularly to 
the FTTN architecture and design as described by Telstra commencing mid-2005. 
 
General 
 
Modern low-loss glass optical fibre and input/output technology offers almost 
unlimited bandwidth and unique advantages over all previously developed 
transmission media.  When fully deployed in the customer access network or CAN, 
the underlying technology of fibre-based systems should at least in theory provide an 
abundance of communications bandwidth capable of supporting a plethora of 
information and information services in addition to a multiplicity of service providers.  
Fibre-based access networks truly offer the potential to end the scarcity of 
telecommunications bandwidth currently experienced by residential and SME 
customers. 
 
The capital cost of deploying optical fibre is largely the same whether the cable 
contains one pair of fibres or a dozen, and whether the fibre carries a million 
telephone calls or none at all.  Exhibiting economies of both scale and scope, a 
customer access network involving optical fibre would appear to exhibit many of the 
characteristics of a strong natural monopoly and therefore attract access regulation. 
 
As the reach of optical fibre extends further into the CAN and hence closer to 
customers, individual customers should be more able to access the increased 
bandwidth capacity offered by the fibre but that depends on the particular network 
architecture and system design adopted.  The case study appreciated the broad 
impact of progressing from fibre to the exchange (FTTX) and fibre to the serving area 
(FTTSA) network architectures, through intermediate stages of fibre to the node 
(FTTN) or (FTTC) curb and concluding with the ‘end game’ of fibre to the home 
(FTTH).  However, the potential to end or at least significantly lessen the scarcity of 
bandwidth can be negated by architectures and designs that employ sharing of the 
optical fibre capacity amongst a group of users together with any bandwidth-limiting 
transmission medium that users must access in order to join with the optical fibre. 
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The various fibre to the home architectures may also be categorised according to the 
extent of capacity sharing and the presence or absence of active equipment in the 
CAN.  The four main FTTH architectures are: 
 
• ‘Home Run’ where each customer is served by a dedicated fibre, similar in 
concept to the paired copper CAN; 
• ‘Active Star’ where a remote node in the access network involves active or 
powered equipment; 
• ‘Passive Optical Network’ or PON, a variant of Active Star involving a single 
nominal wavelength and passive optical splitters; and 
• ‘Wavelength Division Multiplexed Passive Optical Network’ or WDM PON where 
each customer is served by a different optical wavelength. 
 
In practice, architectural selection is strongly influenced by whether a prospective 
FTTC, FTTN or FTTH network operator is an incumbent telecommunications carrier 
or a new-start player, and whether there is a pre-existing access network whose 
right-of-way may be exploited.  The selection is ultimately dictated by the network 
provider’s business plan, which in turn is a matter of economic analysis and strategic 
intent. 
 
Importance of FTTH network architecture and design 
 
Given that the first FTTH network in Australia is tantamount to creating (or 
perpetuating) a natural monopoly in the CAN, facilities-based competition involving 
replicated customer access networks is most unlikely.  Non-facilities or service-based 
competition can then only arise through multiple service providers sharing the 
resources of a common optical fibre access network.  Since that network provider will 
generally also be an incumbent operator and additionally a service provider, the 
access seekers must usually await the development of services and facilities by the 
incumbent and hence experience much less opportunity to innovate themselves. 
 
Although the concept and practice of competitive access through unbundling is well 
established with the PSTN, such application to fibre to the home networks and 
services continues to be novel.  Incumbent network providers can frustrate attempts 
to unbundle FTTH networks or services through either intentional design or merely 
the adoption of industry designs that just happen to assume the network provider to 
be the sole service provider. 
 
A prime finding of this case study is that the architecture and design of a given FTTH 
network is the crucial determinant of its ability to accommodate multiple service 
providers in a non-discriminatory manner.  The differentiating factor is the extent to 
which a network architecture and design has been engineered to maintain a ‘one-to-
one’ and symmetrical relationship between service providers and customers.  The 
stronger this relationship, the more readily choice of service providers can be 
supported as well as services delivered that are unique to particular service 
providers.  Conversely, the greater the sharing of resources in the access network, 
the lower the ability to support choice of service providers and the more likely their 
service packages will be replicas of one another – with there being only monopoly 
service provision in the limiting case. 
 
D.R.Kelso PhD Thesis, QUT, February 2008: Open Access to Next Generation Broadband {single line spaced version} 
 160
The architectures most amenable to competitive access are those of the Home Run 
and WDM PON designs.  The Active Star architecture is a compromise solution for 
competitive access, situated between the limit cases of the Home Run and PON 
designs.  The architecture least amenable to competitive access is that of the PON 
design.  In greater detail, the distinctions are as follows: 
 
Home Run Individual optical fibres to each customer result in no contention for 
network resources in the CAN and potentially deliver the greatest 
bandwidth per customer compared to other architectures; as a 
result, this architecture is the most amenable to service-based 
competition regardless of which layer is unbundled. 
 
 
Active Star Representing a compromise as regards the sharing of network 
resources in the CAN, this architecture can deliver a symmetric 
bandwidth per customer of greater magnitude than PON; it is more 
amenable to the delivery of multiple video streams and switched 
delivery in particular. 
 
PON The broadcast nature of service delivery within the CAN causes the 
highest contention for network resources and the lowest ability for a 
‘one-to-one’ relationship between service providers and customers; 
depending on the given design, this architecture is typically the most 
constrained as regards expanding the bandwidth to each customer 
and only supports service-based competition at the network and 
higher layers, i.e. no service provider can offer a service beyond 
that arranged by the network provider, who is more than likely also a 
service provider. 
 
WDM PON The ability to optically segregate service streams across the CAN 
produces an outcome very similar to that of the Home Run 
architecture. 
 
Appreciating Telstra’s fibre in the CAN proposals 
 
Whenever scoping new investment in the CAN, Telstra immensely benefits from the 
rights of way inherent in its installed underground conduit and optical fibre 
infrastructure.  Not only do the existing core and access network fibre cabling and 
systems embody technologies with significant economies of scale and scope, much 
of these investments have been substantially written down. 
 
Coupled with the ability to sustain an annual capital expenditure considerably greater 
than any competitor, Telstra thereby gains a ‘first mover advantage’ with much of its 
new CAN investment that makes competitive entry impossible to economically justify 
throughout much of Australia.  When this investment entails optical fibre extending 
deeper into the CAN and hence closer to residential and small business customers, 
the additional scale and scope advantages further reinforce Telstra’s natural 
monopoly in terms of delivering the next generation bandwidth services only possible 
with optical fibre. 
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In July 2004, Telstra announced trials to deploy fibre to the premises/home or 
FTTP/H infrastructure in selected new housing estates as ‘greenfield’ developments, 
plus very limited retrofit or ‘brownfield’ deployment of FTTP/H in situations where 
replacement of existing copper CAN infrastructure would be efficient.  Bullish 
forecasts spoke of about 6 million lines being served by FTTP in Australia by 2020 
compared to around 2 million remaining copper access lines.  However by February 
2005 Telstra began to adopt a revised strategy in dealing with the regulator and the 
government. 
 
Chastened by a regulatory rebuff in late December 2004 affecting third party access 
to its Foxtel venture but buoyed by recent US telco regulatory wins relieving them of 
access requirements for new fibre networks in the CAN, Telstra declared that the 
planned FTTP deployment would no longer take place without ‘iron-clad guarantees’ 
from the ACCC regarding a future access regime.  Telstra’s regulatory stance 
hardened further with the arrival July 2005 of a CEO from the US who called for the 
exemption of any new CAN infrastructure and services from standard access 
regulation based on, among other things, the principle that Telstra held the property 
rights. 
 
In August 2005 Telstra re-launched its proposals to invest in new fibre access 
technology but this time spoke of proposed fibre to the node or FTTN as well as 
FTTP investments, with the former delivering at least 12 Mb/s to existing metropolitan 
customers whilst the latter would still be deployed in areas of new growth.  By 
segmenting each CAN service area on an annular basis to reduce average paired 
copper lengths, increased DSL bandwidth would then be possible.  Customers within 
the inner ‘ring’ would be served via entirely exchange-based equipment implying a 
conventional fibre to the exchange or FTTX network architecture and minimal 
additional capital expenditure.  In contrast, customers within the outer ‘ring’ would be 
served by remotely located multiplexer equipment engineered in a fibre to the node 
or FTTN configuration and this would comprise the major capital expenditure. 
 
Concurrently, Telstra declared that it would not roll out any such FTTN network 
without the necessary regulatory safeguards and by late March 2006 had 
commenced discussions with the ACCC with the expectation of concluding a 
comprehensive access undertaking.  Telstra’s ambit claim was that only true 
bottlenecks should be subject to regulated competitor access and the proposed 
FTTN deployment would not create a new access bottleneck.  Telstra was seeking a 
‘safe harbour’ for its new network investments. 
 
The ACCC confirmed that whilst public interest considerations would take account of 
the need for investment certainty and the making of reasonable investment returns, 
ultimately the long-term interests of end users had to be protected.  It was expected 
that Telstra would exploit the mechanism of gaining an ‘anticipatory exemption’ 
despite failure with this approach for its Foxtel venture. 
 
Alcatel, supplier of the FTTN equipment and systems, revealed that FTTN 
deployment was ideal when time-to-market pressures and short term economic 
concerns were paramount, describing it as an interim step before the deployment of 
fibre to the home.  To complete development of its ‘next generation multi-service 
access network’, Telstra’s strategy was to provide a gateway device within each 
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customer premise to provide and manage services including telephony, 
entertainment, gaming, home automation and security. 
 
Increasingly concerned about the prospect of Telstra further entrenching its CAN 
monopoly, other carriers floated proposals for more cooperative investment.  Claimed 
advantages included a more extensive roll-out due to the increased investment 
available and a higher take-up due to greater choice for consumers and lower prices.  
The alternative would be a next generation broadband network delivering only 
Telstra’s services. 
 
Due to the obvious regulatory parallels, lessons could also be learned here from the 
findings of the Telstra-Foxtel case study. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN – MOVING GOALPOSTS: FROM OPEN ACCESS TO NETWORK 
NEUTRALITY? 
 
Research involves a journey in discovery of information and understanding over time, 
and research encompassing contemporary events risks being overtaken by the 
passage of time.  At the very least, common appreciation of terminology can change.  
The Literature Review focussed on open access to broadband networks and 
services.  One of the issues arising from this review was to explore the contention 
that, rather than ‘open access’, the objective should be ‘network neutrality’, that is to 
say, not favouring one application over another.  Could the open access question 
have been ‘just the tip of the iceberg’,176 a proxy for deeper questions of Internet 
communications policy?177 (Wu 2003, p.2) 
 
This chapter explores how in the United States of America, network neutrality 
trumped open access from 2002/03 to at least 2006, how the opposing sides in the 
debate have taken network neutrality to mean whatever supports their case and 
whether certain elements of the debate could be of relevance to the Australian 
scene.  It avoids the minutiae of the blow for blow aspects of the sometimes heated 
debate that commenced in 2005 and swelled to a crescendo in 2006. 
 
7.1 Origins of the US Debate 
 
In this section, we examine how in the US the regulatory histories of 
telecommunications, cable television and the Internet gave birth to a debate over 
whether network operators should be allowed to differentiate their services by 
charging for prioritisation of Internet-based data. 
 
7.1.1 Uncommon Carriage Rules the Telecosm178 
 
This summary of events belies the intensity of stakeholders over the years in their the 
positive and negative impacts of industry mergers and regulatory changes within the 
US.  Concern by consumers, service providers and academics about the adverse 
                                            
176 Jerome H. Saltzer, “Open Access is Just the Tip of the Iceberg”, 22 October 1999, 
available at http://mit.edu/Saltzer/www/publications/openaccess.html, accessed 13 May 2007 
177 Not only that, could the very phrase ‘open access’ have been appropriated by another 
agenda?  A quick search of http://www.wikipedia.org , whose content is admittedly subject to 
topical change, provided the following amount of information as at 4 July 2006: 
  Search Term   No. of Pages 
  ‘open access’   15 
  ‘broadband open access’ ½ 
  ‘network neutrality’  15 
Ironically, ‘open access’ was by this time taken to mean “the free online availability of digital 
content, best known and most feasible for peer-reviewed scientific and scholarly journal 
articles, which scholars publish without expectation of payment”.  What I had previously 
understood by ‘open access’ was now demoted to a mere ½ page under the heading of 
‘broadband open access’ and seemingly hijacked by the new issue of ‘network neutrality’! 
178 With apologies to Huber, P. W. (1997). Law and Disorder in Cyberspace: Abolish the FCC 
and Let Common Law Rule the Telecosm. Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press. 
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consequences of restrictions on access hark back to the days of ‘closed’ online 
services from the 1980s such as CompuServe, Prodigy and America Online which 
prospered by selling subscribers dial-up access to ‘walled gardens’ involving 
proprietary content and the ability to exchange e-mails with other subscribers to the 
same service. (Nuechterlein and Weiser 2005, pp.155, 555.) (Lessig 2001, p.162-
163.) By the mid to late 1990s, these companies relented by also granting their 
subscribers access to the public Internet as competition grew from higher speed 
Internet access offered directly by other service providers. 
 
Cable television systems had gained the ability to offer cable modem access to the 
Internet and later on also offered telephony service – the beginning of a ‘triple play’ 
capability the envy of telecommunication carriers.  By the late 1990s, carriers began 
to deploy DSL technology likewise enabling Internet access of much higher speed 
than dial-up means.  Table 11 illustrates that cable modem delivery in the US has 
long surpassed DSL, satellite and wireless as the preferred conduit for accessing the 
Internet, although as at June 2005 ADSL take-up was beginning to accelerate. 
 
Table 11: US Growth in High-Speed Lines for Internet Access179 
 
Technology 
 
June 
2000 
June 2001 June 2002 June 2003 June 2004 June 2005 
ADSL 951,583 2,693,834 5,101,493 7,675,114 11,398,199 16,182,076
SDSL, etc. 758,594 1,088,066 1,186,680 1,215,713 1,407,121 905,648
Cable 
Modem 
2,284,491 5,184,141 9,172,895 13,684,225 18,592,636 23,938,908
Fibre 307,151 455,593 520,884 575,613 638,812 864,831
Satellite & 
Wireless 
65,615 194,707 220,588 309,006 421,690 970,133
Power Line, 
etc. 
  4,872
Total Lines 4,367,434 9,616,341 16,202,540 23,459,671 32,458,458 42,866,468
Note: The FCC defines ‘high-speed lines’ as those enabling over 200 Kbps in at least one 
direction 
 
By 2004, voice over Internet protocol or VoIP technology began to deliver telephony 
over higher speed Internet-capable lines, posing a commercial threat more to 
telecommunication than cable television companies.  This trend only exacerbated a 
long-standing disparity between the two classes of companies in a regulatory sense. 
 
Since the late 1990s, there had been a boom in mergers and acquisitions between 
telecommunication companies, and between telecommunication and cable television 
companies. (Kim 2005) According to evidence from the US Department of Justice 
(Klein 1998), “the telecommunications industry was in the midst of not only profound 
technological change, but unprecedented regulatory change as well”.  As service 
differentiation lessened, competition on price necessarily grew and all providers were 
keenly exploring avenues to attract additional revenue. (Litan and Noll 2004) Perhaps 
a new variant of the ‘walled garden’ concept could be the answer? 
 
                                            
179 Refer to FCC report on High-Speed Services for Internet Access, Status as of June 30, 
2005, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-264744A1.pdf, accessed 13 
May 2007 
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The US Telecommunications Act (1996) had codified the distinction between a basic 
service and an enhanced service, alternatively known as a telecommunications 
service and an information service.  Telecommunications services, delivered by 
wireline carriers and including telephony and DSL, have been subject to traditional 
common carriage obligations whereas information services had been exempted. 
(Nuechterlein and Weiser 2005, Ch.5) As a consequence, telecommunication 
carriers have been traditionally required to interconnect and unbundle for competitive 
access, whereas cable television companies have been relatively free of regulatory 
control. 
 
Once cable modem services became available, cable television companies offered 
their customers Internet access through ISPs with which they were typically affiliated.  
Pressure soon grew for such cable systems to provide ‘open access’ to unaffiliated 
ISPs, in like manner to what was the norm for carriers regarding dial-up and DSL 
Internet access.  The merger of AOL and Time Warner brought such matters to a 
head in 2000 with the FTC imposing an ‘open access’ requirement on cable modem 
services offered by the merged entity.  Local government regulators began to impose 
similar requirements on cable television companies in general, who responded with 
legal challenges.  A crucial point was whether cable modem services could also be 
classed as information services under the 1996 Telecommunications Act and thereby 
be exempted from common carriage obligations. (Nuechterlein and Weiser 2005, 
Ch.5) 
 
In March 2002, the FCC issued its Cable Modem Order180 declining to impose any 
open access regime, which it described as ‘multiple ISP access’, and reaffirming that 
cable modem providers would be exempt from any obligation to unbundle the 
transmission component of their service for wholesaling to unaffiliated ISPs.  Legal 
challenges eventually failed to dislodge this ruling and telecommunication carriers 
demanded that DSL services be similarly released from any requirement to connect 
to all ISPs or carry all services.  In August 2005, the FCC granted its Wireline DSL 
Order181 which met this demand. 
 
The FCC, through its Triennial Review proceedings, had been frequently reminded 
by telecommunication carriers that cable television companies were dominating the 
market for broadband service delivery.  The carriers, smarting from their inability to 
match the ‘triple play’ capability of the cable networks, sought incentives from the 
FCC so they might be encouraged to deploy optical fibre to customers.  In October 
2004, the FCC extended forebearance from enforcing the Telecommunication Act 
requirements with regard to unbundling broadband services delivered over fibre to 
the home, fibre to the curb and related networks.182 
 
                                            
180 Refer to FCC Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/News_Releases/2002/nrcb0201.html accessed 8 July 
2006. 
181 Refer to FCC Report and Order and Proposed Rulemaking, released 23 September 2005 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-05-150A1.pdf accessed 8 July 2006. 
182 Refer to FCC Memorandum Opinion and Order No. FCC 04-254 released 27 October 
2004, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-04-254A1.doc accessed 8 
July 2006 
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From here on, all Internet broadband service delivery whether via cable modem, DSL 
or optical fibre would be free to discriminate if so desired by not providing access to 
competing ISPs.183 (Crawford 2007) 
 
7.1.2 Alleged Discriminatory Practices 
 
Debate over the adverse consequences of industry mergers on network and service 
innovation, and hence the broader consumer interest was precipitated by the 1998 
acquisition of TCI, then one of the largest cable television operators in the US, by 
major telecommunications carrier AT&T.  TCI had already partnered with the popular 
Internet content portal and ISP Excite@Home, and so now AT&T took over this 
relationship.  According to Bar, Cohen et al. (2000), AT&T argued that it should retain 
control over which ISPs could have access to the Excite@Home broadband network, 
just as cable operators have always controlled which video programmes are sent 
over their network.  Other cable companies were said to share this view. 
 
Early experience with Excite@Home around 1999, being the only ISP of choice on 
the network, raised concern over end use restrictions and biased access to content. 
(Bar, Cohen et al. 2000: 4.2) For example, the @Home ‘acceptable use policy’ 
imposed the following restrictions on customer usage: 184,185 
 
• Limits on up-stream traffic, curtailing the ability of a customer to experiment with 
new services such as Internet telephony and video conferencing; 
• Prohibitions on setting up any kind of server for operating a customer’s own 
Web site; 
• Prohibitions on certain work-related activities, such as connection to a corporate 
LAN from home; 
• In order to enforce these rules, @Home would constantly monitor customers’ 
data traffic thereby raising privacy concerns. 
 
AT&T/@Home offered speedier service to Internet content providers who agreed to 
become ‘content partners’ and share their revenue stream.  Such arrangements were 
not revealed to customers leading to the charge that AT&T/@Home was biasing 
access to content.  Sandvig (2006) describes such secrecy as ‘chilling’, in that a 
cable modem subscriber trying Internet gaming using both a Sega Dreamcast and a 
competing platform would find the former more responsive unaware of a private 
agreement between SegaSoft and AT&T/@Home.  According to Bar, Cohen et al. 
(2000: 4.2) if the single ISP affiliated with the cable modem network provider has sole 
access to such strategies, then it alone can ‘systematically shape what content and 
services gets to the end-users’, shaping ‘the very terms of innovation on the internet, 
deciding who gets to experiment and who can capture the resulting benefits’. 
                                            
183 This situation was indeed ironic, since the foundation for mass market Internet adoption 
was laid in the truly open access regime of dial-up yet narrowband telecommunications 
where multiple ISPs blossomed. 
184 Even if a customer paid an additional amount for Internet service from another ISP, the 
terms of this acceptable use policy would continue to apply. 
185 Similar examples of ‘gate keeping’ exposing actual or potential conflicts of interest were 
noted by Saltzer, J. H. (1999). "Open Access" is Just the Tip of the Iceberg, MIT: 6. 
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Whilst a comprehensive survey of the ten largest cable operators and six major DSL 
operators in the US discerned no broad effort to ban everything that might be said to 
threaten their interests, many instances were identified of restrictions on certain uses. 
(Wu 2003: Part 3)  For example, every cable operator and one-third of DSL operators 
placed restrictions on operating a server and/or providing content to the public.  
Although justified as an architectural feature, asymmetric bandwidth directly 
discriminated against user-originated content.186  The use of a basic residential 
connection for ‘commercial’ or ‘enterprise’ purposes was also widely banned, 
preventing home users from connecting to their work network via a Virtual Private 
Network or VPN.  One outstanding restriction followed from the definition by AT&T 
Broadband of home networking as ‘theft of service’. (Wu 2003: Part 3)  
Notwithstanding the above, it was noted that cable companies no longer barred 
streaming video despite the potential for competing with their own cable television 
services. 
 
Two celebrated cases of discrimination, one being more a threat thereof arose from 
third party Internet service providers and their applications whose success has 
become the envy of network operators.  In March 2005, the FCC announced a 
Consent Decree in which the Madison River Telephone Company was fined 
US$15,000 and forbidden from blocking Internet protocol ports used for VoIP 
applications or otherwise preventing customers from using VoIP applications.187  The 
Voice over IP services in question were being provided by Vonage.  When SBC 
Telecommunications CEO Edward Whitacre was asked in October 2005 whether he 
was concerned about the plans of ‘Internet upstarts’ Google, MSN, Vonage and other 
companies to further expand their services that critically depended on broadband 
networks for accessing customers, he responded with a surprisingly frank 
admission:188 
 
How do you think they’re going to get to customers?  Through a broadband 
pipe.  Cable companies have them.  We have them.  Now what they would like 
to do is use my pipes free, but I ain’t going to let them do that because we have 
spent this capital and we have to have a return on it.  So there’s going to have 
to be some mechanism for these people who use these pipes to pay for the 
portion they’re using.  Why should they be allowed to use my pipes? 
 
The internet can’t be free in that sense, because we and the cable companies 
have made an investment and for a Google or Yahoo! or Vonage or anybody to 
expect to use these pipes [for] free is nuts! 
 
Although few in number, the above allegations of discriminatory practices fuelled a 
debate that Internet-based network operators should be required to be neutral as 
regards the treatment of third party service providers and their applications. 
                                            
186 To this day, almost all broadband service providers operate on a broadcasting-type 
business model whereby users are assumed to receive downloaded content and generate 
little. 
187 Refer to FCC Consent Decree, In the Matter of Madison River Communications, LLC and 
affiliated companies, File No. EB-05-IH-0110, DA 05-543, March 3, 2005. 
188 Refer to Business Week, 31 October 2005, “At SBC, it’s all about ‘scale and scope’”, 
http://www.freepress.net/news/12110 accessed 8 July 2006 
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7.2 Neutrality Principles 
 
The public debate has almost always been framed as being about ‘network neutrality’ 
or ‘net neutrality’ and rarely about ‘Internet neutrality’, whereas in reality the terms 
‘network’ and ‘net’ were shorthand for the Internet rather than networks delivering 
cable television.  Although the latter are private networks and operated as such, the 
Internet remains a global network accessible by the public at large despite being 
accessed via predominantly private networks that connect with end users.  Lessig 
(2005) feared that Internet access could become like cable television and fervently 
spoke for the need to change public policy to prevent this happening.189 
 
For a decade, Stanford Law School professor Lawrence Lessig had studied the 
relationship between the architectural design of the Internet and innovation. (Lessig 
2001: Ch.3) He argued that the explosive growth of the Internet is a direct result of its 
innovation-promoting design based on the ‘end-to-end’ principle. (Saltzer, Reed et al. 
1981) In his testimony to a US Senate hearing, Lessig declared that “if this 
Committee wants to preserve that growth and innovation, it should take steps to 
protect this fundamental design” by incorporating certain principles of Internet 
neutrality into the telecommunications law guiding FCC policy. (Lessig 2006, p.1) 
 
After surveying a plethora of suggestions made over a number of years as to what 
neutrality should embody, Lessig threw his support behind ex-FCC Chairman 
Michael Powell’s statement of the Internet’s four ‘Internet Freedoms’ provided it was 
augmented by one additional requirement arising from the work of University of 
Virginia law professor Timothy Wu.  If implemented, this total package would protect 
consumers from the adverse effects of certain kinds of discriminatory practices. 
 
According to Powell, “usage and deployment of high-speed Internet depends on 
access to content” and “network owners, ISPs, equipment makers, and content and 
application developers all benefit when consumers are empowered to get and do 
what they wish”. (Powell 2004)  In his view, “it is time to give the private sector a 
clearer roadmap by which it can avoid future regulation on this issue190 by embracing 
unparalleled openness and consumer choice”.  Powell issued a challenge to the 
broadband network industry to preserve the following ‘Internet freedoms’:191 
                                            
189 “Simple ideas fix public policy, but simple ideas also break it.  A simple idea about how 
markets in networks should function has fixed U.S. policy regulating those networks.  That 
idea is also slowly breaking those networks.  The Internet is not cable television.  The 
opportunity costs in allowing it to become cable television are huge.  Yet increasingly, 
government policy is relaxing any regulation that might secure this infrastructure commons.  
The market, alone, is thought to be a sufficient regulator.”  Lessig, L. (2005). "Re-Marking the 
Progress in Frischmann." Minnesota Law Review 89(4): 1031-1043. 
  
190 That is, unfettered access to the Internet by consumers. 
191 Subject to the legitimate needs of operators to manage their networks and not being 
exposed to theft of service. 
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• Freedom to Access Content – consumers should be allowed to reach the legal 
content of their choice; 
• Freedom to Use Applications – consumers should be able to run applications of 
their choice; 
• Freedom to Attach Personal Devices – consumers should be permitted to 
attach personal devices they choose to the connections they pay for in their 
homes; 
• Freedom to Obtain Service Plan Information – consumers must receive clear 
and meaningful information regarding their service plans and plan limitations. 
 
Preserving ‘Internet Freedom’ in this manner would “serve as an insurance policy 
against the potential rise of abusive market power by vertically integrated providers” 
and promote innovation “by giving developers and service providers confidence to 
develop applications that will reach consumers and run as designed”.192 (Powell 
2004) 
 
However Lessig considered Powell’s principles to be missing one important 
requirement – network providers would still be able to impose restrictions on 
whichever application193 and content providers they desired, in the form of charges 
unrelated to the bandwidth used by those providers. (Lessig 2006) Describing this as 
‘access tiering’, Lessig distinguished such discrimination from that of ‘consumer 
tiering’ which he reckoned should be encouraged as consumers would merely be 
paying for different levels of service.  In other words, any tiering of a service package 
should be neutral – for example, consumers could be offered a connection of higher 
speed or quality for a particular service but not if that service was only from a 
particular content provider. 
 
This distinction proximates with Wu’s proposed anti-discrimination principle, namely, 
“to forbid broadband operators, absent a showing of harm, from restricting what 
users do with their Internet connection, while giving the operator general freedom to 
manage bandwidth consumption and other matters of local concern”. (Wu 2003: Pt. 
IV) Service restrictions imposed by the local network would be allowable whilst those 
of an inter-network nature194 would be ultimately forbidden. 
 
With Internet-based applications in a battle for the attention and interest of end users, 
it was considered important that the delivery platform be neutral to ensure that 
competition remained meritocratic and not stifled by the self-interest of network 
operators. 
 
                                            
192 The FCC, under the following chairman, instead adopted a policy statement outlining four 
principles embodying a set of ‘entitlements’ that consumers should be able to expect from 
the Internet; refer to FCC (2005). FCC Adopts Policy Statement: New Principles Preserve 
and Promote the Open and Interconnected Nature of Public Internet. Media Release. 
Washington, DC 20554, Federal Communications Commission: 1. 
  
193 Voice over IP is an example of an ‘application’. 
194 That is, beyond the local access network – implying the Internet at large. 
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7.3 Issues in Contention 
 
If the opposite of neutral network is one offering services in some form of 
discriminatory manner, what are the arguments for and against neutrality or for and 
against discrimination?  The main issues in contention from the US perspective are 
discussed in the hope that they may offer an insight into the possible application of 
new models for regulating next generation broadband networks in a country such as 
Australia where the competitive and regulatory environment is different.  The issues 
of diversity/differentiation, investment incentive, last-mile competition and vertical 
integration are closely interrelated. 
 
7.3.1 Diversity or Differentiation 
 
Variously described as the principle of network diversity, network differentiation or 
product differentiation, the economic argument is that different groups of end users or 
consumers may derive utility (that is, value) from differentiated goods that are closer 
to their ideal preferences.195 (Yoo 2005: Pt. III) (Yoo 2006) Such differentiation could 
be exploited by a new entrant competitor who, particularly if competing on non-price 
as well as price dimensions, could theoretically generate sufficient revenue to cover 
its upfront costs despite having a turnover much smaller than that of the incumbent 
operator.  Differentiation could occur through adopting a non-standard routing and 
control protocol, that is to say, other than TCP/IP, or by entering into exclusivity 
arrangements with respect to content. (Yoo 2005: Pt. III) Both these practices run 
counter to the principle of network neutrality. 
 
A neutral network would have the intent or effect of commoditising broadband 
transmission and Internet services, resulting in firms only being able to compete on 
price.  In instances where the market is determined by a network with large 
fixed/sunk costs and low marginal costs, such as that of a local broadband network 
and most particularly optical fibre in the CAN, price-only competition exacerbates the 
tendency towards industry monopolies. (Ford, Koutsky et al. 2006) By giving firms 
alternate avenues of rivalry, differentiation allows for entry and gives consumers the 
benefits of not only price competition but also increased choice and innovation.  
According to economic modelling by Yoo (2005: Pt. III), differentiation can ameliorate 
the demand-side economies of scale created by network economic effects196 and 
thereby increase overall economic welfare. 
 
The counter argument is that these economic models fail to address the substantial 
loss in consumer welfare likely to occur should telephone and cable companies 
become gatekeepers and discriminate against Internet services, content, and 
applications considered to be inconsistent with the gatekeepers’ revenue generation 
                                            
195 Though never explicitly stated, differentiated service delivery would more likely arise 
across different delivery networks available to the same group of end users (eg. cable 
modem, DSL, wireless, fibre) rather than within a common network.  This assumption is 
made not only on broad technical grounds but because the opponents of network neutrality 
are also opponents of ‘open access’ which is necessarily implied by having competing 
services delivered over a common network. 
196 That is, by staving off the onset of a natural monopoly. 
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plans. (Roycroft 2006b) The following existing differentiation in services would be 
lost: (Roycroft 2006c) 
 
For example, consumers typically receive e-mail services from their ISP.  
However, numerous other e-mail providers offer services, some for free and 
some for a charge, which allows the consumer to select the e-mail offering 
which best suits their needs.  Similarly, consumers are presented with 
differentiation among e-commerce providers, which allows consumers to benefit 
from market leaders, such as Amazon.com, and niche market providers who 
may offer specialty services better suited to the needs of some customers. 
 
Arguing that network neutrality and differentiated last-mile networks are not 
incompatible, Roycroft (2006c) notes that the cable modem and DSL networks 
currently dominating the market for last-mile broadband are inherently different 
technologies and consumers can take advantage of these differences by way of 
plans involving different download and upload speeds.  Yoo’s suggestion of 
enhancing network diversity by dispensing with current Internet protocol standards 
was dismissed as a recipe for reducing consumer benefits, increasing purchase risks 
and decreasing network effects. (Roycroft 2006a, p. 22-23) The standardisation 
associated with the Internet operates at the logical network layers below the 
‘application level’ which is the platform supporting the wide variety of content, 
applications and services enjoyed by consumers. 
 
7.3.2 Investment Incentive 
 
According to Thierer (2004a, p. 17), network neutrality proposals would discourage 
investment and innovation in broadband networks and services.  He argues that if 
policymakers grant the broader ‘commons’ of Internet users more say about how 
networks operate, they will send a powerful signal to infrastructure operators and 
potential future operators of high-speed networks: “your networks are yours in name 
only and the larger community of Internet users - through the FCC or other regulatory 
bodies - will be free to set the parameters of how your infrastructure will be used in 
the future”.  Why would a current or potential operator who hears that message ever 
want to invest risk capital in such a sector, Thierer asks? 
 
Yoo (2005) further develops the case for incentives, arguing that whilst entry by new 
last-mile providers is ongoing and other last-mile broadband technologies are 
pending then it would be unwise to impede investment.  With the potential for short-
run supracompetitive returns being a primary mechanism upon which markets relied 
to stimulate entry, a reduced incentive to invest could cement any existing last-mile 
oligopoly into place and reinforce the likelihood of market failure. 
 
Network neutrality proponents, also supporters of the end-to-end design philosophy 
as being central to the success of the Internet, argue that innovation derives from the 
‘edge’ of the network rather than inside the network.  From this perspective, network 
neutrality should promote, not retard, broadband deployment for two reasons: 
(Windhausen 2006) 
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• If the consumer can reach any Web site, use any equipment and access any 
service he or she wants, then the value of the connection is more valuable than 
if the consumer can only reach the services and use the equipment that the 
network owner chooses; 
• Innovators of applications and services delivered over the Internet as well as 
devices that attach to end user terminals will gain confidence that, once 
developed, access to the network and hence to consumers will be guaranteed. 
 
Increased consumer demand for broadband networks and services would motivate 
network operators to build or enhance network infrastructure and entrepreneurs 
would be more willing to invest to develop new services and devices.  Adopting a line 
of argument that could also be used by the anti-network neutrality camp, Lessig and 
Wu (2003, p.8) highlight the need for regulatory certainty to stimulate new 
investment: 
 
The question an innovator, or venture capitalist, asks when deciding whether to 
develop some new Internet application is not just whether discrimination is 
occurring today, but whether restrictions might be imposed when the innovation 
is deployed.  If the innovation is likely to excite an incentive to discrimination, 
and such discrimination could occur, then the mere potential imposes a burden 
on innovation today whether or not there is discrimination now.  The possibility 
of discrimination in the future dampens the incentives to invest today. 
 
Crawford (2007) suggests that emotional arguments are at play – US telephone 
companies are beginning to use the figure of the ‘romantic’ or ‘heroic builder’ in their 
debate with government and the public, in that their vision of rolling out optical fibre to 
homes throughout the nation can only be realised if they gain an incentive to build. 
 
Conceding that it remained an open question as to whether network neutrality 
regulation would reduce incentives to deploy network infrastructure below the 
necessary level, van Schewick (2005, p.39) considers that network neutrality 
regulation would not forbid network providers from vertically integrating into 
complementary markets as it only bans them from using discrimination to increase 
their sales at the expense of rivals.  It would also not prevent them from making profit 
in the market for Internet services.  The remaining profit could still be sufficient to 
motivate them to deploy the necessary infrastructure. 
 
But what if there really was justification for infrastructure providers to receive an 
incentive to increase network capacity, to relieve congestion for example?  
Frischmann (2005, p.1021) suggests some viable options as including: 
 
• Direct subsidisation of infrastructure expansion; 
• Tax incentives; 
• Co-operative research and development projects, and 
• Joint ventures. 
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7.3.3 Last-mile Competition 
 
7.3.3.1 The main academic author in favour of network diversity and against 
network neutrality, Christopher Yoo examines the possible relationship with last-mile 
competition in the US.  Perhaps his overall position is best summarised by the 
observation that ‘network neutrality focuses on the wrong policy problem’ which 
should be to address any deficiency with last-mile competition.  His various 
statements are summarized as follows: 
 
Network neutrality will not affect the current makeup of last-mile competition 
 
“The economic relationship between last-mile providers and end users is largely 
determined by the fact that most end users currently only have two options in terms 
of last-mile providers: the cable company and the telephone company.  Mandated 
network neutrality would not change the makeup of this market.” (Yoo 2005, p.72) 
 
Network neutrality should instead focus on last-mile competition 
 
“In the broadband industry, the level of production that is the most concentrated and 
protected by barriers to entry is the ‘last mile’.”  “In directing their efforts towards 
promoting competition in applications and content, network neutrality focuses on the 
wrong policy problem.” (Yoo 2006, p.3) 
 
Last-mile competition is already adequate 
 
“Measured against any of these standards, the overall broadband market is 
sufficiently competitive to protect against anti-competitive harms.” (Yoo 2005, p.60) 
 
Improving last-mile competition will overcome concerns about neutrality 
 
“If 2-3 wireless broadband or broadband over powerline providers emerge so that 
consumers have 4-5 last-mile broadband options (including cable modem and DSL), 
there would be little danger in allowing one of those networks to experiment with 
exclusivity arrangements.” (Yoo and Wu 2006, p.3) 
 
“Once a sufficient number of alternative last-mile providers exist, the danger of anti-
competitive effects disappears, as any attempt to use an exclusivity arrangement to 
harm competition will simply induce consumers to obtain their services from another 
last-mile provider.” (Yoo 2004, p.35) 
 
Network diversity could facilitate three different last-mile networks to co-exist 
 
These would be “one optimized for traditional Internet applications such as e-mail 
and website access, another incorporating security features to facilitate e-commerce 
and to guard against viruses and other hostile aspects of Internet life, and a third that 
prioritizes packets in the manner needed to facilitate time-sensitive applications such 
as streaming media and VoIP.” (Yoo 2005, p.31) 
 
7.3.3.2 In contrast, advocates for network neutrality are resigned to the 
inadequacy of last-mile competition and its inability to protect against discriminatory 
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practices affecting Internet services and applications, as depicted by the following 
views: 
 
Last-mile competition is inadequate now and unlikely to improve 
 
“Chris (Yoo) believes that, at least when it comes to information networks, technology 
is changing the conditions for market entry in physical networking.  He points to fiber 
optics and the potential use of wireless spectrum as examples.  He believes that over 
the next decade we're likely to see vigorous competition among new entrants and 
old, like in any other ‘regular’ market.”  “At the risk of sounding like a dinosaur, I am 
skeptical.  I'd be willing to bet Chris that over the next decade the infrastructure 
market will continue to heavily favor the main incumbents.” (Yoo and Wu 2006, p.4) 
 
Even adequate last-mile competition won’t overcome concerns about neutrality 
 
“A network provider may have the ability and incentive to exclude rival content, 
applications or portals from its network, even if it faces competition in the market for 
Internet services.  Apart from increasing the number of cases in which unaffiliated 
providers of complementary products face a real threat of discrimination, this result 
also implies that neither facilities-based competition nor open access regulation are 
the appropriate tools to mitigate this threat.” (van Schewick 2005, p.26) 
 
Yoo’s three network proposal would be counter-productive 
 
“The three separate networks described by Professor Yoo, according to his vision of 
network diversity, are not delivered over shared facilities … not only must separate 
last-mile broadband networks be built, but they will be built to provide unintegrated 
(and therefore lower value) network services.”  “The existence of ‘separate but 
optimized’ data networks undermines the investment incentives which are critical to 
the network diversity argument.” (Roycroft 2006a, p.17) 
 
Nevertheless, Wu proffered three ‘classic’ solutions to any need to encourage the 
deployment of last-mile broadband infrastructure: (Yoo and Wu 2006, p.3) 
 
• The government spends money and builds the infrastructure itself, in like 
manner as it does for roads; 
• The government subsidises build outs, one way or another; or 
• Do nothing, presuming that the market will ‘now and then get around the 
infrastructure economics problem’. 
 
7.3.4 Vertical Integration 
 
Demands for networks to be neutral are a consequence of the manner in which 
networks are or could be operated and in general these tend to be vertically 
integrated businesses.  The concern is that owners of the physical layer will use their 
control over the logical layer to give preferential treatment to selected applications 
and content. (Yoo 2006, p.11) The intent of network neutrality is to regulate the 
physical layer to preserve competition in the applications and content layers. 
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Yoo (2006, p.14) recounts that, according to Chicago School theory and providing 
the barriers to entry in a particular market segment are low, vertical integration does 
not pose as much of a threat as previously thought.  In fact, it can yield significant 
consumer benefits.  Even in a broadband industry characterised by a duopoly 
structure, Thierer (2004b, p.11) maintains that cable and DSL providers still have a 
strong incentive to carry more content and websites to maximise consumer utility and 
encourage consumers to spend more money for access to the service.  “The platform 
monopolist has a powerful incentive to be a good steward of the applications sector 
for its platform”, say Farrell and Weiser (2002, p.21) 
 
Nevertheless, Yoo (2006, p.4 in his debate with Wu) concedes there may be a case 
for regulatory intervention that prohibits vertically integrated network owners from 
blocking content and applications that directly compete with their own offerings.  
Post-Chicago School literature utilising modern industrial organisation theory to 
analyse more complex market structures has thrown light on how firms with market 
power can raise the costs for potential rivals. (Roycroft 2006a, p.39-41) In the 
business of broadband delivery, incumbent operators with sunk investments in 
optical fibre in the access network are in a powerful position to make price cuts in the 
face of entry, defending their existing customer relationships and market share.  The 
potential for harm to consumers is compounded if the incumbent is also free to 
discriminate in providing applications and content. 
 
The antithesis of a vertically integrated broadband operator is a common carrier in 
that it can have no interest in the content carried, its chief obligation being non-
discrimination.  This led Vint Cerf to comment: “One might think of the notion of 
[network] neutrality as the 21st Century version of common carriage”. (As cited in 
Sandvig 2006, p.19) Perhaps this observation signals the fate of the network 
neutrality movement in the US since the FCC had already removed any vestige of 
common carriage for Internet broadband service delivery via cable modem, DSL or 
optical fibre and the telecommunications industry would never countenance its re-
imposition. 
 
7.4 Settling the Score 
 
The opening question to this chapter was whether the research focus should be on 
‘open access’ or ‘network neutrality’.  The verdict isn’t unanimous: whereas neutrality 
antagonists posit a clear difference between open access and network neutrality, 
neutrality proponents are somewhat ambivalent.  In any case, which arguments or 
issues should be more relevant to the Australian scene? 
 
7.4.1 The Connection with Open Access 
 
Both open access and network neutrality proponents are seeking to address alleged 
discriminatory practices, though in different ways and to differing extents. 
 
The debate was originally framed in terms of open access to cable modem systems 
in that the owners of cable television networks should be required to allow access to 
independent ISPs. (Yoo 2005, p.43) (van Schewick 2005, p.3) In other words, they 
should not be allowed to discriminate against other ISPs with whom they had no 
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commercial affiliation.  If enshrined in law, open access would create a new right for 
ISPs rather than for customers. (Wu 2004, p.89) Although customers would benefit 
through an increased choice of service in broad terms, the debate never laid down 
any prescription as to how such services should then be treated.197  The prime goal 
of open access was to protect competition between ISPs. 
 
But according to the economic modelling of van Schewick (2005, p.40), even the 
threat of such competition may not necessarily impede the ability and incentive of a 
network provider “to discriminate against unaffiliated producers of complementary 
products or exclude them from its network”.  A stronger prescription, that of rules 
favouring network neutrality, would be necessary “to protect competition in 
complementary products such as Internet applications, content and portals from 
anticompetitive behaviour by network operators or ISPs”. (van Schewick 2005, p.3)  
Network neutrality would create the right for users to access the content, applications 
and equipment of their choice. (Wu 2004: Pt.3) The prime goal of network neutrality 
was to protect competition between Internet-based content, applications and 
equipment rather than between ISPs. 
 
Van Schewick’s explanation goes at least part way towards understanding why the 
push for ‘open access’ fell by the wayside in the US by 2002 and ‘network neutrality’ 
became ascendant thereafter.  However, network neutrality was a convenient label 
that belied a complexity of concepts.  Although championed as a founding proponent 
of neutrality, Wu actually argued for a policy of ‘broadband discrimination’ – reflecting 
the realisation that there could be occasions where discrimination against certain 
content and applications was acceptable yet on other occasions it could be 
unacceptable. (Wu 2003) Since open access ran counter to vertical integration, Wu 
envisaged circumstances where the lack of vertical integration could hurt the cause 
of network neutrality.  This led him to conclude that “it is best to understand network 
neutrality as an end, and open access and broadband discrimination as different 
means to that end”.  Simply put, a goal of open access could be inadequate and in 
some instances counterproductive. 
 
Frischmann adopts a different approach by developing a theory of infrastructure that 
better explains why, for some classes of important resources such as the Internet, 
there are strong economic arguments for managing and sustaining the resources in 
an openly accessible manner.  With much more at stake than the current debate 
reflects, he argues that “a new lens is needed”: (Frischmann 2005: 920, 1020 - 1022) 
 
The network neutrality debate is not really about neutrality per se; nor is it about 
innovation alone.  The debate must broaden its focus from the merits of 
sustaining an innovation commons to the merits of sustaining an infrastructure 
commons - that is, of sustaining open, public access to infrastructure.  The 
debate ought to be about optimizing the Internet for society as a whole and it 
ought to take into account the full range of interests at stake.  This type of 
optimization problem raises the familiar issues and choices seen in other 
                                            
197 For example, where two ISPs were accessible via a cable network the unstated 
assumption was that at least one would not discriminate against certain services such as 
voice over IP, though in reality when the movement for open access took root in the US 
around 1999/2000 the opportunity for service-related discrimination was not commonly 
appreciated. 
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debates over open access or restricted access198.  What type of infrastructure 
do we as a society desire?  Do we prefer an Internet infrastructure managed in 
an openly accessible manner?  Or, do we prefer an Internet infrastructure 
managed to maximize the profits of property owners?  There are benefits and 
costs to both types of management regimes that need to be carefully evaluated 
and balanced. 
 
The theory199 brings into focus the social value of sustaining an Internet 
infrastructure commons, and strongly suggests that the benefits of open access 
(costs of restricted access) are significantly greater than reflected in the current 
debate. 
 
In other words, Frischmann elevates the importance of open access well beyond that 
considered by Wu which confirms the ambivalent attitude of some network neutrality 
proponents towards open access. 
 
Commenting on Frischmann’s theory, Lessig observes that the policy debate since 
the late 1990s has bounced between two different strategies: (Lessig 2005) 
 
• The open access strategy, the basis of which was that competition in access 
providers would disrupt the conditions under which it would make sense for 
network providers to interfere with the ‘end-to-end commons’; and 
• Adoption of the four ‘Internet freedoms’ articulated by FCC chairman Michael 
Powell, such that a network provider would not bias or hinder choice provided to 
consumers. (Powell 2004) 
 
In his testimony to a US Senate hearing on ‘network neutrality’, Lessig reiterates his 
long-standing contention that the wide range of innovation inspired by the Internet 
has come primarily from the ‘edge’ or ‘end’ of the network through application 
competition. (Lessig 2006, p.4-5) He had once assumed that competition in 
broadband access would prevent any compromise in end-to-end neutrality, with no 
individual ISP having the market power to successfully restrict the range of Internet 
applications, but now the scholarship of van Schewick had drawn into doubt that 
open access would protect network neutrality – the question of such a linkage was 
“now effectively moot”.  Open access was only an indirect means to preserving the 
main goal of end-to-end neutrality. (Lessig 2005, p.1041) 
 
Since Lessig had invested so much intellectual effort in making the case for a neutral 
Internet, it is understandable he should see the relationship with open access in this 
light.  Perhaps a more independent appreciation is given by Neuchterlein and Weiser 
(2005) who examine instances where a dominant provider of physical layer 
transmission infrastructure exploits its control of bottleneck facilities to stifle 
competition in the adjacent markets for applications and content.  They present the 
three basic regulatory approaches to deal with these monopoly leveraging concerns 
as being non-exclusive: (Nuechterlein and Weiser 2005: Ch.5) 
 
                                            
198 Frischmann coins the phrase ‘restricted access’ as meaning the opposite of ‘open 
access’. 
199 That is, the ‘infrastructure theory’ developed by Frischmann. 
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• Multiple ISP or open access; 
• Network neutrality and preservation of the end-to-end principle; and 
• Unbundling rules for wireline broadband, particularly as applied to new builds of 
optical fibre in the CAN. 
 
Access to such a suite of regulatory tools would be a start in achieving Frischmann’s 
goal of sustaining an infrastructure commons. 
 
7.4.2 Relevance to Australia 
 
The preceding analysis identifies the main debating issues as being those of 
diversity/differentiation, investment incentive, last-mile competition and vertical 
integration.  The first, diversity/differentiation in Internet applications and services, 
appears to be the cause celebre for proponents of network neutrality yet it is primarily 
a consequence of the last two issues: inadequate last-mile competition and vertical 
integration resulting in discriminatory practices.  The matter of investment incentive is 
usually aired when an entrant seeks to counter an incumbent’s last-mile broadband 
infrastructure or an incumbent threatens not to undertake further investment 
considered to be nationally important.  It is generally promoted as a cure for ills 
arising from the last two issues. 
 
The US and Australian telecommunication scenes differ significantly as regards last-
mile competition, Australia being in a much worse situation, and this exacerbates 
problems attributed to vertical integration.  According to the Australian 
telecommunications regulator: (ACCC 2005c, p.4) 
 
The overriding issue in this industry is the dominance of the telecommunications 
sector by just one player - Telstra - by virtue of it being the sole provider of the 
ubiquitous local access network connecting virtually every home and business 
in the country.  This monopoly means that even in the more competitive 
markets, those seeking to compete with Telstra continue to rely on Telstra for 
some form of access to its network. 
 
An assessment of telecommunications infrastructure as at 2004 indicates that Telstra 
held the majority of local access connections, 92.94 per cent, with SingTel Optus 
being the main alternative carrier with 6.54 per cent of connections.  Together they 
held approximately 99 per cent of subscriber connections, confirming a high level of 
concentration in the business of fixed network local access services. (ACCC 2005b)  
Only 15.5 per cent of Telstra’s local access network capacity was being used by third 
party service providers, primarily for the provision of xDSL broadband services. 
 
The extent of concentration in Australian last-mile infrastructure is further 
compounded on realising that the overwhelming amount of HFC network roll-out is 
also owned only by Telstra and SingTel Optus, mostly duplicated in the same streets 
of just the capital cities, and the cable modem capacity of each is monopolised by 
their respective ISPs.  The extent of infrastructure concentration becomes even more 
stark on considering the potential for delivering broadband at ‘next generation’ 
speeds, defined for the sake of this argument as having a symmetric capability in the 
realm of 100 Mb/s but in any case depending on the future deployment of 
D.R.Kelso PhD Thesis, QUT, February 2008: Open Access to Next Generation Broadband {single line spaced version} 
 179
technologies such as DOCSIS 3.0, VDSL, ADSL2+ and/or optical fibre in the 
customer access network. 
 
DOCSIS 3.0 technology can only be deployed on the monopolised and duplicated 
HFC networks, whilst technologies such as VDSL and ADSL2+ are substantially only 
deployable on the paired copper network of Telstra, regardless of whether they are 
operated by Telstra or a third party provider.  As to the roll-out of optical fibre deeper 
into the CAN, a prerequisite for wider availability of VDSL or ADSL2+ delivered 
services, or in the long term for fibre to the premises-based services, the situation of 
Telstra threatening not to invest in its own ‘fibre to the node’ infrastructure is a sign of 
ongoing dominance in the market for next generation broadband services.  
Furthermore, Telstra has strenuously demanded regulatory forbearance for its 
proposed FTTN network, in other words it seeks an investment incentive by way of 
an ‘access holiday’. 
 
Telstra is the lead player in most segments of the Australian telecommunications 
sector, except for free-to-air broadcasting, and is arguably “the most vertically 
integrated telecommunications operator in any member of the OECD”, according to 
Cutler (2001). 
 
Whilst the debate in the US has been quite heated particularly during 2005/06, by 
mid-2006 only whispers were beginning to be heard in Australia.  According to Gans 
(2006), the proponents of network neutrality don’t really hit on the key point: that 
users who choose a high-speed content provider over another do not internalise the 
costs they are causing by this.  He considers the core problem of network neutrality 
to be that it is not neutral for the providers but too neutral for the users and proposes 
a new concept of ‘neutral networkity’ – where the content providers decide the speed 
of their connection, with access given to all users at equal speeds.  Gans says “the 
debate should not be over network neutrality per se but the use of exclusive deals 
offered through particular content providers and integration of content and 
infrastructure providers”, with Telstra’s BigPond, an ISP with the greatest share of the 
Australian market, being a prime example. 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
 
The network neutrality debate has provided the opportunity to appreciate the main 
issues in contention in the US and how they relate to the principle of open access.  It 
is about as traditional a competition policy debate as you can get.  Central to much of 
the debate are concerns about inadequate last-mile infrastructure for the current 
realisation of broadband service delivery and fears about the scope for discriminatory 
practices capable with subsequent technologies. 
 
With the prime focus of this dissertation being on open access to next generation 
broadband infrastructure, the identified issues and the nature of the arguments 
employed should positively inform the new policy questions arising.  Yet, to re-
paraphrase Frischmann (2005), “a new lens is needed”: 
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• What type of next generation broadband infrastructure do we as a society 
desire? 
• Do we prefer such infrastructure managed in an openly accessible manner, or 
do we prefer it to be managed to maximise the profits of property owners? 
 
There are benefits and costs to both types of management regimes which need to be 
carefully evaluated and balanced. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT – DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS 
 
This research is founded on three case studies, each pertaining to a wireline network 
capable of delivering broadband services of a generation more advanced than that 
possible with the paired copper-based PSTN.  Each case study concluded with a set 
of findings.  Chapter Seven then explored the nexus between the concepts of ‘open 
access’ and ‘network neutrality’. 
 
The issues arising from the above are now discussed, common threads gathered and 
matters of distinction highlighted.  The summative response to the research question 
is explicitly addressed in section 8.7, where conclusions are drawn as to the 
implications for regulating access to services from infrastructure more closely 
approximating the delivery of next generation broadband.  Concluding remarks are 
given in section 9.3. 
 
8.1 Rationales for Opening up Access 
 
The debates about ‘open access’ and ‘network neutrality’ have generated a plethora 
of recommended solutions to alleged problems.  Whilst Lessig sees the final goal as 
being end-to-end neutrality, could neutrality in fact be a means to yet a higher 
purpose goal?  This section examines possible raisons d’être for pursuing the 
ultimate goal of achieving and maintaining access to telecommunication networks 
and services – access for end-users and service providers on a non-discriminatory 
basis.  The two prime rationales are those of realising the policy goals of any-to-any 
connectivity and of common carriage. 
 
8.1.1 Any-to-Any Connectivity 
 
For Australia’s converging information and communication industries, 1991 to 1997 
was a period of unprecedented change heralded by new investments, new 
technologies and services and new policy considerations.  The Telstra/Optus duopoly 
since 1991 was heading towards open competition by 1997 (Grant 1997, p.26) and 
competitive pay television services commenced in 1995 (section 4.1 refers).  
Significant reports were finalised on the matters of national competition policy (Hilmer 
1993), broadband services (BSEG 1994), communications futures (BTCE 1995), a 
review of the standard telephone service (DCA 1996) and the possible privatisation 
of Telstra (1996). 
 
Against this background, a group of industry, government, consumer and academic 
representatives assembled in 1996 to consider national objectives for Australia’s 
information and communications services (ICS) sector, including identification of key 
issues, strategies and benefits of promoting competition in ICS. (CIRCIT 1996) After 
three days of deliberation, a new policy concept was born – that of ‘any-to-any 
connectivity’ – which quickly gained formal recognition by being incorporated into 
telecommunication legislation of first Australia and then New Zealand, and adopted 
worldwide into the lexicon of the data communications industry.200  With its original 
                                            
200 The data communications industry was quick to equate “any-to-any connectivity” with 
what it knew as “multipoint-to-multipoint connectivity”. 
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meaning now corrupted in legislation, it is instructive to re-visit what was intended by 
those who framed this concept.201 
 
Discussion was grounded in the context of the emerging ICS industry structure, as 
depicted by Figure 23.  The convergent marketplace was envisaged as an interlinked 
and continuous value chain consisting of content providers, information service 
providers, distribution networks, user interfaces and users.202  With the traditional 
telecommunications sector considered to be constrained largely to the distribution 
component, this new model represented a departure from traditional thinking. 
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Figure 23 – Changing Industry Structure 
 
In the realm of telephony services, carriers are obliged to connect calls from any 
person to any other person connected to the worldwide telecommunications network; 
they are known as ‘common’ carriers.  But in the new era how could this concept be 
extended to include an obligation of distribution providers to connect end users to 
any legitimate information source connected to the same worldwide network, be they 
people, computers, Internet servers, electronic publishers or video servers? 
 
                                            
201 Telephone communications, Ross Kelso/John Burke and Ross Kelso/Peter Gerrand, 19 
January 2007.  The Policy Forum in question was organised by CIRCIT.  John Burke was the 
Director of CIRCIT at the time.  Peter Gerrand, a participant, was instrumental in convincing 
the group of the appropriateness of adopting the policy concept. 
202 Though prepared in 1996, this representation had foreshadowed that users would 
increasingly becoming significant creators of content. 
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Significant barriers to the development of ICS in the Australian context were 
identified in terms of the various instances of access across the prime interfaces of 
the ICS value chain, namely: (CIRCIT 1996, Ch. 6) 
 
• User access to services, that is, at the user interface; 
• Access within distribution, that is, interconnect between carriers; 
• Access of content creators to information service providers and hence to 
distribution; and 
• Access of all industry players, but particularly users, to international distribution 
channels and services. 
 
Discussants were attempting to grapple with these complex access issues arising in 
the era of interactive broadband services, quite likely with the Internet at its core. 
Representing different interest groups, they encountered substantial difficulties in 
seeking to balance economic with social policy goals and the measurement of 
outcomes of market versus non-market strategies.  Ultimately the group adopted the 
more encompassing term ‘any-to-any connectivity’ in preference to that of ‘access’.  
Extending this putative policy concept to include the international importance of ICS 
as an enabler in key information intensive industries, the group further recognised the 
importance of achieving ‘global any-to-any connectivity’. 
 
Nevertheless, the importance was recognised of: (CIRCIT 1996, p.30) 
 
• maintaining incentives to invest in infrastructure and service development; and 
• balancing the costs to consumers of ‘any to any connectivity’ against the 
benefits to them of access to a range of content services. 
 
In summary, the 1996 CIRCIT Policy Forum initiated the high level concept of 
‘(global) any-to-any connectivity’ to imply an obligation of distribution providers “to 
connect end-users to any legitimate information source connected to the same 
worldwide network, be they persons, computers, Internet servers, electronic 
publishers or video servers”.203 (CIRCIT 1996, p.1, 26) Intended to go far beyond the 
obvious technical implications, ‘any-to-any connectivity’ was to be a goal of social 
policy for ensuring that Australia maximises the national benefits of its growing 
information and communications sectors.204  Connecting ‘any’ with ‘any’ necessarily 
implies the absence of discrimination. 
 
Section 8.6 reveals how the concept of ‘any-to-any connectivity’ was subsequently 
adopted into the 1997 Australian telecommunications legislation, but with a less 
precise meaning. 
 
                                            
203 End-user access was interpreted in terms of “control of two-way access to (a) user or 
information source”. 
204 The making of this case in no way implies that the 1996 CIRCIT Policy Forum also 
unveiled the concept of “connectivity”, which of course is fundamental to the very essence of 
telecommunications.  For example, section 53 of the Telecommunications Act 1989 No. 53, 
1989 defined ‘primary communications carriage’ as consisting of arranging, operating and 
managing connectivity across the telecommunications network. 
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8.1.2 Common Carriage 
To preserve some of the policy goals behind common carriage, one 
will therefore have to rely, where market forces result in 
restrictiveness, on other protective legal arrangements, such as 
antitrust law, interconnection and access rules, and non-
discrimination protections. (Noam 1993, p.1) 
 
The principles of common carriage are rooted deeply in English common law. 
(Thorne, Huber et al. 1995: 5.1) Early examples of common or public occupations 
that attracted special obligations included those of “bakers, brewers, cab drivers, 
ferrymen, innkeepers, millers, smiths, surgeons, tailors and wharfingers”. (Noam 
1993, p.3) ‘Common’ in that context meant ‘open to serving the general public’ or 
‘general’. 
 
In more modern times, businesses such as postal services, railways, 
telecommunications, airplanes, taxis, roads and utilities have been treated as 
common carriers.  While each has a different history of attaining such classification, 
they appear to share two dominant characteristics: 
 
Public interest 
 
A business offering service to the general public at rates announced in advance 
could be construed to be a ‘public’ business, even if it were privately owned and 
operated. (Nachbar 2006, pp.9-15) (Thorne, Huber et al. 1995: 5.1) (Noam 1993, 
p.5,7) 
 
Transportation and communication 
 
The public has a strong interest in transportation and communication infrastructure, 
particularly for the delivery of undifferentiated services such as carriage or 
commodities like water or electricity. (Nachbar 2006, pp.31-39) (Noam 1993, p.7,8) 
As long as a tariff is paid that accounts for certain characteristics relevant to the 
carrier (size, weight, speed of delivery, etc.), the carrier usually has no interest in the 
particular content carried. (Frieden 1995, pp.692-693) 
 
Yet another characteristic is that of market power.  According to de Sola Pool (1983, 
p.106): 
 
The law of common carriage rests on the opposite assumption that, in the 
absence of regulation, the carrier will have enough monopoly power to deny 
citizens the right to communicate. 
 
On the other hand Nachbar (2006, p.31, 41), equating open access with common 
carriage, concludes that “market power has been neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
criterion for imposing open access regulation on an industry” but rather 
 
the inherently ‘public’ nature of even privately owned transportation and 
communication networks has generally justified their regulation without the 
benefit of economic reasoning, so long as they have been offered for use by the 
general public. 
D.R.Kelso PhD Thesis, QUT, February 2008: Open Access to Next Generation Broadband {single line spaced version} 
 185
 
Common carriage principles have played an important role in the infrastructure 
services of transportation and communications, aiding telecommunications users' 
access and thereby also stimulating the development of networks.  These principles 
typically implied that: (Noam 1993) 
 
… no customer seeking service upon reasonable demand, willing and able to 
pay the established price, however set, would be denied lawful use of the 
service or would otherwise be discriminated against. 
 
In return for this reduced discretion, a (common) carrier obtained certain benefits, 
including limited liability for the consequences of its own actions.  In some instances, 
governments have also awarded some types of common carriers powers to 
expropriate private property, use public rights-of-way and be protected from 
competition. (Noam 1993, p.2) 
 
From the basic principle of common carriage in telecommunications that all users 
must be served without discrimination, it follows that carriers must also accept 
bilateral interconnection.205  Thorne, Huber, et al. (1995, p.293) argue that the right to 
interconnect is simply a mirror image of the obligation to carry. 
 
The most critical factor in mass adoption of the Internet has been the common 
carriage obligation of telephone companies which permitted dial-up access between 
users and ISPs. (Nuechterlein and Weiser 2005, p.170,171) This non-discriminatory 
connection of modems, using signals that mimic telephony calls, connected 
customers with narrowband ISPs who in turn had established data lines to the public 
Internet. 
 
In summary, Noam (1993, p.1) argues that: 
 
common carriage, after all, is of considerable social value. It extends free 
speech principles to privately-owned carriers.  It is an arrangement that 
promotes interconnection, encourages competition, assists universal service, 
and reduces transaction costs. 
 
The underlying policy goals of common carriage, even if implemented through other 
arrangements, remain central to the realisation of any open access regime. (Nachbar 
2006) 
 
8.1.3 Commentary 
 
These two policy goals persist in contemporary Australian telecommunications 
legislation, though in different ways. 
 
Prior to 1975, network and service access could not be an issue as the Postmaster-
General’s Department was a monopolistic common carrier and competition was 
simply not permitted.  After 1975, the Australian Telecommunications Commission 
(Telecom) continued the national responsibility for providing a standard telephone 
                                            
205 Not surprisingly, the same outcome follows from the principle of any-to-any connectivity. 
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service.  It could only discriminate by refusing such provision on the grounds of 
impracticality or the services not being reasonably required.206  The Minister could 
also direct the Commission as necessary ‘in the public interest’. 
 
During the 1980s, the monopoly powers of Telecom were increasingly brought into 
question by the government, inquiries and embryonic competitors.  By 1989, 
Telecom retained the monopoly to provide services via the PSTN but all services 
other than those ‘reserved’ for Telecom were open to competition, such as the 
provision of value added services and private networks.  Where Telecom refused or 
failed to supply a standard telephone service, the new regulator (AUSTEL) could 
direct Telecom to carry out its community service obligation.  Telecom was also 
obliged to connect to these embryonic competitors and was prohibited from 
discriminating against them.207 
 
This semblance of common carriage continued through the Telecommunication Acts 
of 1991 and 1997, in the form of requirements for all carriers to interconnect and for 
Telstra to be obliged to deliver a standard telephone service to the whole community.  
The key point to note is that this spirit, if not reality of common carriage, has been 
limited to telephony or telephony-like services.  It also encompasses an obligation to 
deliver only low bit-rate data services. 
 
The Telstra/Foxtel and TransACT case studies illuminate the second key point, that 
of the tension between common carriage and resource scarcity – the typical remedy 
being to operate a vertically integrated business that discriminates against 
competitors.  Telstra had resolved to enter the business of delivering pay television 
as a common carrier, but encountered problems in allocating the relatively scarce 
television channel capacity available from the HFC distribution technology it had 
chosen.  It was then confronted by a competitor who argued that whilst Optus Vision 
would be bound by the common carrier requirements of the Telecommunications Act 
1991 for telephony services, the part of the cable being used to supply pay television 
was covered by the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 which did not require open 
access to all comers. 
 
In contrast, the experience of TransACT was the exact opposite.  The TransAct 
project team deliberately chose a switched digital broadband network that would 
accommodate their philosophy of open access service delivery.  Competing service 
providers would not encounter any scarcity of broadband resource in delivering their 
services to customers of the common carriage network.  Furthermore, TransACT 
gained a ‘first-mover’ advantage in that neither Telstra/Foxtel nor Optus Vision rolled 
out their HFC networks in the Australian Capital Territory. 
 
Hence, the implementation of common carriage is strongly favoured by a relative 
abundance of capacity and the closest possible approximation to one-on-one 
connectivity.  From these first two case studies, it is not possible to conclude what 
could have been the outcome if the respective competitive environments had been 
different.  Both Telstra/Foxtel and Optus Vision became vertically integrated 
                                            
206 Sections 6 & 7, Telecommunications Act No. 55 of 1975 
207 Sections 3, 33, 52, 68, 97 & 98, Telecommunications Act No. 53 of 1989 
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businesses, whereas TransACT became a common carrier at least for broadband 
and video services, and arguably also for telephony. 
 
The other policy goal behind opening up access, ‘any-to-any connectivity’, 
succeeded in being incorporated into the 1997 Australian telecommunications 
legislation.  Section 8.6 reveals that this occurred but with a diminished meaning and 
less than satisfactory outcomes. 
 
8.2 Dominance of CAN Fibre 
 
Of all telecommunications media, optical fibre in the customer access network or 
CAN presents the greatest opportunity for dominating the market for delivering to end 
users services that are bandwidth intensive and non-mobile.  This section discusses 
the significance of sunk investments in CAN fibre for facilities-based competition. 
 
8.2.1 Naturally a Monopoly 
 
Chapter Six discussed how optical fibre in the CAN, exhibiting very large economies 
of both scale and scope, exhibits many of the characteristics of a strong natural 
monopoly and as a consequence is likely to attract access regulation.  With the cost 
of civil works (digging trenches, laying conduit, installing manholes and pits, pulling 
cable) comprising some 90 per cent of total capital cost, an asset is created which is 
largely non-recoverable, i.e. it is said to be ‘sunk’. 
 
However for an entrant wishing to compete with an incumbent owner of CAN fibre, 
the nature of this sunk cost poses considerable disadvantage.  An entrant wishing to 
overbuild with the same optical fibre technology must incur at least the same capital 
cost which in turn would become immediately sunk.  If, as in almost all instances, the 
incumbent had exploited an existing copper-based CAN involving in situ and written-
down conduits, then the entrant must incur comparatively greater initial costs to 
replicate the same network design. 
 
With the incumbent also having the advantage of established customer relationships, 
the entrant must create market share from a zero base.  Accordingly the business 
case for investment by an entrant is likely to be much less attractive than for the 
incumbent.  Capital raising is correspondingly more problematical for the entrant. 
 
This adverse situation can only improve somewhat if the entrant adopts a cost-saving 
approach not available to the incumbent, such as by installing aerial cabling as was 
the case when Optus Vision rolled out its HFC network versus the initially 
underground cabling by Telstra (Chapter Four refers).  In any case, the usual market 
behaviour of an incumbent would be to drop prices to a level so low as to generate 
insufficient revenue to cover the entrant’s sunk costs, thereby greatly worsening the 
entrant’s business case. (Roycroft 2006c, p.11) 
 
The first mover, usually the incumbent operator, would be expected to protect its 
market position by warding off facilities-based competition from any access 
technology deemed to be threatening.  Australian experience in this regard has been 
illuminating: 
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• When Optus rolled out an HFC network during 1995/97, it was the first wireline 
access network investment ever to threaten the monopoly position of Telstra’s 
copper-based CAN.  However Telstra countered with an almost identical street-
by-street roll-out also with HFC technology and eventually passed more homes.  
Despite both investments subsequently incurring massive write-offs, Telstra 
enjoyed the greater financial resilience and ultimately achieved dominance in 
the pay television market through its partner Foxtel, with Optus eventually 
agreeing to resell mostly the same content as Foxtel. 
 
The unique outcome of this exercise was that the incumbent overbuilt its own 
CAN as a means of neutralising the impact of being overbuilt by an entrant.  
Noting that Telstra’s initial commercial strategy was one of defending its 
telephony market, Telstra succeeded in also dominating, via Foxtel, the new 
pay television market.  The key message to future competitors was that Telstra 
would fight to protect its dominance in delivering services based on a wireline 
CAN. 
 
• On first examination, what transpired in the Australian Capital Territory belies 
that message.  As discussed in Chapter Five, neither Optus nor Telstra had 
planned to include Canberra in their roll-outs of HFC cabling.  By exploiting the 
aerial right-of-way of its parent company ACTEW, TransACT was able to 
bypass Telstra’s copper-based CAN with a next-generation broadband network, 
however not in suburbs where the ACTEW electricity distribution was already 
underground.  Although denied access to the more commercially attractive 
television content of Foxtel and Optus, TransACT nevertheless survived with 
other video content and Internet access delivered on an open access basis in 
addition to telephony services. 
 
Despite TransACT gaining the first mover advantage, Telstra assessed the 
situation differently on this occasion.208  By the time TransACT commenced 
commercial roll-out in 2000, Telstra had already experienced a massive write-
off of its HFC network investment and the business of pay television had lost its 
commercial lustre.  The TransACT network was seen to be only a threat in 
Canberra yet Telstra continued to retain a dominant share of federal 
government business.  For residential and SME customers Australiawide, the 
future was by now seen to be in providing Internet access and the copper-
based CAN was ideally placed to provide ADSL services.  Telstra’s 
underground pit and pipe network remained capable of accommodating optical 
fibre cable to deliver fibre-to-the-node or home services in the future. 
 
• Telstra’s proposal to roll-out fibre-to-the-node or FTTN infrastructure, first 
floated in 2005, was shelved in 2006 after being unable to gain from the ACCC 
what Telstra called ‘regulatory relief’.  The Minister, ACCC Chairman and 
competitors all publicly referred to such infrastructure becoming a new natural 
monopoly in the CAN.  A consortium of competitors contended it would be 
                                            
208 Similar outcomes resulted from the regional pay television HFC networks rolled out by 
small-scale operators in Darwin (Austar/Windytide), Western Australia (West Coast Radio) 
and Victoria (Neighbourhood Cable) – Table 4 refers. 
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impractical for them to use ‘unbundled’ elements of the FTTN and the 
alternative of resale competition would be much more inferior. (Allen Consulting 
Group and dandalopartners 2006b) 
 
Remembering the fate of the dual HFC infrastructure roll-out, the consortium 
was convinced that any Telstra FTTN access network would become a new 
bottleneck to competition.  They therefore proposed an arrangement for joint 
stakeholder participation in a future nationwide FTTN access network such that 
overall control would be on a non-discriminatory or ‘open access’ basis.209  The 
proposal was summarily rejected by Telstra and as at mid-2007 no FTTN roll-
out was proceeding by any party.  In the meantime, Telstra continued to roll-out 
fibre-to-the-home or FTTH infrastructure in selected new housing estates on a 
closed access basis. 
 
8.2.2 Strategic Capability 
 
Another entrant strategy could be to adopt an access technology with an even more 
attractive cost structure, such as that of wireless.  On encountering competition, the 
incumbent may claim to the regulator that its CAN is no longer monopoly 
infrastructure since the barriers to entry have been lowered; the CAN is no longer an 
“enduring or sustainable bottleneck”. (Telstra 2005d) For example, Telstra has 
submitted that: (Telstra 2006, p.11) 
 
A bottleneck occurs where there are no alternatives to a facility and no 
alternatives could be economically developed such that through ownership of 
the facility the facility owner is able to reduce, distort, harm or hinder 
competition in some other market. 
 
In similar vein but describing the US telecommunications scene, Thierer and Crews 
(2003, Ch. 3) declare that “network proliferation spells the end of the essential 
facilities doctrine”.  Many alternative broadband technologies are “on the proverbial 
drawing board, or even currently at work in today’s marketplace” they claim, citing 
optical fibre, cable television networks, satellite, fixed terrestrial wireless, ‘Wi-Fi’ 
networks, ultra-wideband and free space optics as contenders. (Thierer and Crews 
2003, Ch. 6)  This broad argument could be strengthened if, for example, the 
bandwidth offered by a competing network is comparable to that of the incumbent. 
 
On the other hand, once the incumbent network is upgraded to fibre-to-the-home, the 
inherent economies of scale and scope significantly exceed that of any other 
available access technology for delivering non-mobile services.  Even if the 
incumbent FTTH network is artificially de-rated so as not to cannibalise other 
products of the incumbent, a plausible case can still be made that the strategic 
capability of an appropriately designed fibre-to-the-home network may nevertheless 
create an enduring bottleneck in the market for non-mobile access services.  The 
FTTH network can, for many decades to come, continue to deliver ever-increasing 
levels of bandwidth for almost no added cost to the network provider.  Where this 
infrastructure has exploited an earlier copper-based CAN, the opportunities for 
facilities-based competition are particularly chilled. 
                                            
209 This jointly controlled network would itself be a monopoly but an all-inclusive one. 
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8.3 Open and Shut Design 
 
Drawing upon the three case studies, this section discusses why the network 
architecture and system design of a next generation broadband network can be a 
critical factor in facilitating open access and what the implications could be for the 
regulation of access. 
 
Wireline telecommunication access networks are modern-day behemoths, extensive 
in coverage, expensive to build and slow to change.  When each opportunity for 
change does arise, the occasion could be of national significance as the next 
opportunity may be decades away.  The purpose of generational change is to 
significantly upgrade service capability and this is often effected through a wholesale 
change in network architecture and system design. 
 
Australian telecommunications witnessed a generational change of sorts with the roll-
out by Telstra and Optus of hybrid-fibre coaxial or HFC networks to the major capital 
cities and key regional areas.  The technology deployed was service specific – it was 
good at broadcasting pay television services and considered to be economic at the 
time.  The HFC network architecture and system design also reflected the business 
model of a monopoly operator in each case. 
 
Commencing with analogue transmission, the limited channel capacity posed an 
immediate bottleneck to third party access – particularly since Telstra had contracted 
all of its network capacity to Foxtel.  Digitisation increased the capacity somewhat yet 
most was still contracted to Foxtel for their new Near Video-on-Demand services.  
The combined bottlenecks of channel capacity, integrated conditional access, 
dedicated set top boxes and complex subscriber management interfaces 
emboldened Telstra and Foxtel to obstruct third party access through political 
influence and years of regulatory gaming. 
 
On the other hand, the TransACT network represented a true generational change 
albeit restricted to the national capital of Canberra.  The TransAct project team took a 
conscious decision to first develop their philosophy of open access service delivery 
and then to choose an appropriate technological solution.  The result was a network 
architecture employing fibre-to-the curb or FTTC plus very high rate digital subscriber 
line or VDSL broadband transmission delivered over twisted pairs, with the system 
configured to offer ‘switched digital’ services. 
 
With multiple service providers interfaced to the central gateway, any service 
provider may connect with any customer who requests their particular service without 
impacting on service quality for others.  Designed to satisfy an open access business 
model, the TransACT network has literally set itself apart from the access provisions 
of Australian telecommunications. 
 
With the Optus HFC network no longer an effective competitive threat to Telstra and 
the TransACT network limited to Canberra, only the following wireline 
telecommunication networks remain to serve the vast bulk of Australian end users: 
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• The ubiquitous Telstra public switched telephone network or PSTN, inherently 
designed for open access and thereby facilitating competitive DSL providers, 
yet ultimately incapable of providing symmetric next-generation bandwidth to 
the mass market; 
• The Telstra HFC network, inherently designed for closed access and providing 
only Foxtel pay television and Telstra’s BigPond Internet services, and also 
incapable of providing symmetric next-generation bandwidth to the mass 
market. 
 
Hereafter, the likely scenarios for wireline network development to serve the mass 
market are: 
 
• Telstra-provided FTTH initially only in ‘greenfield’ locations, but subsequently 
deployed in ‘brownfield’ locations as the economics improve; 
• Variants of a re-purposed Telstra HFC and/or Telstra-provided FTTN in 
‘brownfield’ locations, with the prospects of a competitive ‘G-9’ consortium-
provided FTTN rapidly receding. 
 
Whatever the outcome, the inevitable natural monopoly will make facilities-based 
competition infeasible so the key factor will be whether the next generation wireline 
network will permit service-based competition via unbundling to the lowest possible 
network element.  This is the only way end users can experience true innovation 
arising from competition.  Although the concept and practice of competitive access 
through unbundling is well established with the PSTN, such application to fibre to the 
home networks and services continues to be novel.  Incumbent network providers 
can frustrate attempts to unbundle FTTH networks or services through either 
intentional design or merely the adoption of industry designs that just happen to 
assume the network provider to be the sole service provider. 
 
A prime finding of the third case study is that the architecture and design of a given 
FTTH network is the crucial determinant of its ability to accommodate multiple service 
providers in a non-discriminatory manner.  The differentiating factor is the extent to 
which a network architecture and design has been engineered to maintain a ‘one-to-
one’ and symmetrical relationship between service providers and customers.  The 
stronger this relationship, the more readily choice of service providers can be 
supported as well as services delivered that are unique to particular service 
providers.  Conversely, the greater the sharing of resources in the access network, 
the lower the ability to support choice of service providers and the more likely their 
service packages will be replicas of one another – with there being only monopoly 
service provision in the limiting case. 
 
The architectures most amenable to competitive access are those of the Home Run 
and WDM PON designs.  The Active Star architecture is a compromise solution for 
competitive access, situated between the limit cases of the Home Run and PON 
designs.  The architecture least amenable to competitive access is that of the PON 
design – the very design most appealing to incumbent network operators. 
 
The inevitable conclusion is that incumbent network operators can minimise the 
outcomes for competitive access through defensive engineering and that this 
outcome should be factored into regulatory considerations.  Nowadays, such a 
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conclusion is counter-intuitive.  Under the rubric of being ‘technology neutral’ or of 
‘not picking winners’, telecommunication policy makers and regulators traditionally 
decry such market intervention.  This approach may not be appropriate in dealing 
with such future access network technologies. 
 
8.4 The Regulatory Scorecard 
 
This section examines the experience of applying Australian telecommunications 
access regulation to the services of wireline access infrastructure that has succeeded 
the paired copper-based CAN.  The only significant examples of such ‘post-PSTN’ 
infrastructure are that of the hybrid fibre coaxial networks rolled out by Telstra and 
Optus from 1995 to 1997 and the TransACT network rolled out commercially from 
2000.  The Optus HFC network is not discussed as it did not attract regulatory 
attention.  To this actual regulatory experience is added what is known of Telstra’s 
attempt to gain regulatory forbearance for its proposed FTTN investment and the ‘G-
9’ consortium counter-proposal. 
 
8.4.1 Hybrid Fibre Coaxial Network 
 
The process of gaining access to Australia’s dominant cable television network has 
been tortuous and time consuming, and remains unfulfilled.  For the first two years 
from 1995 to 1997, a government mandate denied open access on the promise of 
competition which was never effective and is now basically stymied.  Between 1997 
and 1999, deeming and declaration by the regulator made open access legally 
possible but impractical due to regulatory uncertainty.  That period was followed by 
yet another two years of public legal challenges involving the access providers, 
access seekers and the regulator, running in parallel with private arbitration of the 
access disputes by the regulator.  The end result of these political, regulatory and 
commercial processes has been nine years of delay in the provision of access to 
competitive parties. 
 
The then ACCC Chairman Professor Alan Fels expressed his clear frustration with 
such processes in a speech on 26 March 2001:210 
 
…. potential suppliers of retail programming need to have access to the 
networks if competition is to develop in digital service provision and diverse 
service choices are to be made available to consumers. 
 
Telstra and Foxtel have frustrated every effort to open up access to 
competitors.  They have engaged in a lengthy campaign to prevent access to 
competing pay TV providers and slow down the processes.  They are clearly 
both able and willing to devote considerable energy and resources to such 
activities. 
 
Exploitation of delay in the regulatory process has highly favoured the now dominant 
access providers, Foxtel and Telstra, and conversely highly disadvantaged any third 
                                            
210 Refer to ACCC Press Release “Cable owners put on notice” MR 064/01, issued 26 March 
2001, at http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/87682, accessed 13 May 2007 
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parties wishing to gain access.  The Seven Network foresaw such an outcome in its 
submission to the Senate inquiry into the Telecommunications Competition Bill 2002: 
(Seven Network Supp 2002: 17) 
 
….. in the telecommunications and pay TV industries time is of the essence. 
Access delayed is access denied.  Delays in obtaining access entrench the 
position of incumbents, thereby defeating the purpose of the regime by stripping 
access-seekers of the intended benefits of access and making it difficult, if not 
impossible, to generate competition from access-seekers at a later date. 
 
By itself, delay wouldn’t have been so strategically beneficial if it wasn’t for multiple 
occasions when the telecommunications access legislation was deliberately skewed 
in favour of the HFC network providers and against any access seekers.  Of the three 
instances of access exemptions, one arose from a threat to withhold investment211 
and another was exploited in association with a separate threat.  The relationship 
between these access exemptions and incentives for investment is explored in 
section 8.5. 
 
The first access exemption arose in late 1994 when the Minister for Communications 
was confronted with a dilemma - agree with the Optus proposal to create a new 
broadband cable network for the delivery of pay television, data and telephony 
provided it was closed to other parties, or witness a refusal to invest in a new wireline 
local telephone service that would compete with that of Telecom Australia’s.  If Optus 
was rejected, the government’s policy of encouraging facilities-based (that is, 
infrastructure) competition during the 1992 - 1997 telecommunications duopoly 
phase would be stymied.  The alternative would be duplicated HFC cable 
infrastructure and the exclusion of independent service providers.  The Minister 
relented and legalized the proposed access discrimination through the instrument of 
a Carrier Associates Direction that would operate until 1 July 1997. 
 
The second occasion for an access exemption derived from a right to exclude access 
seekers from utilizing capacity that had been contracted to another party yet not 
taken up.  This became known as a ‘protected contractual right’ and arose from 
Telstra and Foxtel lobbying the incoming Howard coalition government for protection 
from third-party access, insisting that Telstra had already contracted all cable 
capacity to Foxtel.  Accordingly, new provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974 
absolved an access provider of any standard access obligation if there would 
otherwise be an insufficient amount of the service available to meet the ‘reasonably 
anticipated requirements’ and any person would be deprived of a right under a 
contract in force at the beginning of 13 September 1996.  Not surprisingly, Telstra 
and Foxtel had signed their Broadband Cooperation Agreement on 12 July that year. 
 
The third instance arose from an amendment to the Trade Practices Act enabling 
access providers to be exempted from the standard access obligations prior to an 
investment being made in a telecommunications service, i.e. they could seek 
‘anticipatory exemption’.  The sole purpose of the amendment was to promote 
investment in telecommunications infrastructure by reducing the regulatory 
uncertainty.  After threatening not to upgrade to digital working, an outcome that 
                                            
211 Otherwise euphemistically known as a ‘capital strike’. 
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would have perpetuated the inherent shortage of analogue channel capacity, Foxtel 
and Telstra subsequently gained regulatory approval from the ACCC via agreed 
undertakings that permitted third party access to both their analogue and digital pay 
television service infrastructure.  After so many years of delay and lost opportunities 
for access seekers, these undertakings would presage an illusory outcome. 
 
Both Telstra and Optus also exploited their HFC networks to provide data capacity 
via high speed cable modems for their respective ISPs.  Not surprisingly, neither 
voluntarily offered to provide third party access.  Yet it does remain a puzzle as to 
why no Australian ISP ever approached the ACCC to declare a cable modem service 
so that it would become subject to the standard access obligations of the Trade 
Practices Act.  The matter of cable modem access has been the defining one in the 
United States but remains stillborn in Australia. 
 
8.4.2 TransACT Network 
 
Services of the TransACT network are subject to the same standard access 
obligations under Australian telecommunications and competition law as any other.  
However, being intentionally designed to accommodate multiple video and Internet 
access service providers, none of the services were ever declared by the ACCC and 
so there is no access regulatory experience to discuss. 
 
8.4.3 Fibre-to-the-Home Network 
 
In a formal sense, the experience of applying access regulation to fibre-to-the-node 
(FTTN) or fibre-to-the-home (FTTH) networks is presently non-existent.  That is 
simply because Telstra has to date avoided attracting formal regulation of services 
from either network.  Instead, it has opted for applying pressure on the government 
and ACCC through public announcements, coupled with limited confidential 
discussions with the ACCC – seemingly adopting a strategy of ‘regulatory shadow 
boxing’. 
 
Commencing mid-2005, Telstra resolved that any new wireline infrastructure and 
services must be exempted from the standard access obligations under Part XIC of 
the Trade Practices Act, justified on the following grounds: 
 
• Only true bottlenecks should be subject to regulated competitor access and in 
much of the CAN, Telstra was no longer a monopolist; 
• Since any new network would be Telstra’s private property, it could do with it 
what it wished. 
 
Quoting the mantra of “legacy regulation for legacy network, new arrangements for 
new networks”, Telstra further resolved that unless it received this exemption there 
would be no investment in FTTN infrastructure.  If granted such an exemption, 
Telstra would probably agree to third party access provided the price and non-price 
terms of access rewarded their risk and enterprise, i.e. access would be on 
‘commercial terms’. 
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Both the Minister and the ACCC reiterated that the current framework of the Trade 
Practices Act could provide Telstra with regulatory certainty if it submitted an access 
undertaking or sought an exemption from the access regime.  Telstra was clearly 
loathe to do this, recalling the adverse ruling by the Australian Competition Tribunal 
in December 2004 regarding an anticipatory exemption granted by the ACCC to its 
HFC network. 
 
Arguing that any exemption for Telstra would further entrench its CAN monopoly, 
most of Telstra’s competitors banded together and put forward a proposal for 
cooperative investment in new nationwide FTTN infrastructure.  With a more open 
design of the network, participating companies could offer differentiated services to 
customers.  Telstra rejected this proposal which now appears to have been shelved.  
The ‘G-9’ consortium of competitors was well aware that any roll-out without Telstra 
was highly likely to confront an immediate overbuild – reminiscent of the disastrous 
dual HFC roll-out.  In the meantime, Telstra’s own FTTN investment has been 
subject to a ‘capital strike’. 
 
But what of Telstra’s FTTH roll-out in selected ‘greenfield’ or new estates?  Being 
initially trials and clearly evolving on a patchwork basis across Australia for a number 
of years, none of the resulting services have been declared by the ACCC and Telstra 
has not sought exemption.  Hence there is currently no access regulatory experience 
to discuss pertaining to fibre-to-the-home networks. 
 
8.5 Holidays, Harbours & Incentives 
 
The record of Australia’s regulatory experience with ‘post-PSTN’ wireline access 
infrastructure provides salutary lessons: the Telstra/Foxtel HFC network remains 
effectively closed, Telstra’s FTTN investment remains ‘on strike’ and the G-9 co-
operative proposal remains stillborn. 
 
Is there a rational explanation for this impasse?  If nothing changes, Australia is 
unlikely to obtain a fibre-based access network capable of delivering next generation 
broadband and certainly not an ‘open access’ one.  Simply put, the player with the 
greatest market power in the wireline access arena demands exemption from 
standard access obligations.  In the jargon of regulatory economics, Telstra is 
seeking an ‘access holiday’ on the basis that this will give them an incentive to invest 
in the new infrastructure.  Telstra would then regard that infrastructure as being 
parked in a ‘safe harbour’ – safe from the desires of access seekers. 
 
The very term ‘access holiday’ can sound deceptively innocent, yet access holidays 
are antithetical to the principle of open access.  This section explores what is 
conventionally understood with the regulatory vehicle of an ‘access holiday’, whether 
access holidays by another name have already been provided and to what extent 
recent regulatory experience with the HFC network could be construed to have 
provided ‘public benefit’. 
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8.5.1 Access Holidays 
 
The regulation of existing ‘bottleneck’ or ‘essential’ infrastructure, such as Telstra’s 
CAN, taps into quite different industry dynamics than that of new infrastructure.  For a 
start, existing infrastructure can’t go away whilst new infrastructure won’t necessarily 
get built.  Yet the in-situ infrastructure of the existing wireline CAN and the market 
power it creates can have an overwhelming bearing on the regulatory and 
competitive outcomes for new infrastructure. 
 
According to the Productivity Commission, the stated aim of access regulation is to 
promote competition in markets that use the services of bottleneck infrastructure 
facilities, without compromising incentives to develop and maintain such facilities. 
(PC 2001b, p.39) 
 
In the absence of regulation, providers of essential infrastructure services may 
be able to earn monopoly rents through inefficient pricing or denial of access to 
those services.  If access regulation reduces the scope for such practices, 
investment in essential infrastructure will potentially be more efficient.  As well, 
investment in markets that use the services of that infrastructure will be 
facilitated. (PC 2001b, p.279) 
 
In its review of the generic national access regime212, the Productivity Commission 
canvassed some specific measures that could be used to exempt from the purview of 
Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act proposed infrastructure projects expected to be 
only marginally profitable, namely (PC 2001b, p.282) 
 
• ‘Access holidays’; 
• Exemption from the regime for ‘greenfield’ investments; and 
• Provision for a higher regulated rate of return on risky new investments. 
 
The Productivity Commission broadly defined an ‘access holiday’ as a time-limited 
exemption from exposure to any access requirements, and then entertained possible 
variations relating to the length of time and permitted rate of return.  During this time, 
the infrastructure providers would be freely able to charge monopoly prices or deny 
access to competitors. (Gans and King 2003) Third party access could be allowed 
but on terms dictated by the infrastructure provider. 
 
Concurrently, the Productivity Commission examined the impact of access regulation 
on Australia’s telecommunications, highlighting concern that the access regime 
should not overly weaken the incentives for access providers to invest in core 
infrastructure. (PC 2001a: 9.6)  Investments in telecommunications were seen to be 
“fast moving, risky and innovative” and could be put at risk by “fallible regulators” 
through mandated access.  One solution would be to introduce ‘holidays’ from the 
standard access obligations for a period of time, similar to that enjoyed by a patent 
owner.  There could still be scope for the regulator to declare a service after the 
holiday period, if the carrier concerned developed substantial market power. (PC 
2001a: 9.6) 
                                            
212 That is, Part IIIA is generic whereas Part XIC is telecommunications specific. 
D.R.Kelso PhD Thesis, QUT, February 2008: Open Access to Next Generation Broadband {single line spaced version} 
 197
 
The Productivity Commission canvassed industry views and found no consensus – at 
one end of the spectrum Telstra was strongly in favour and at the other end the 
ACCC was strongly against the introduction of access holidays.  That was in 2001, 
yet as has been recounted in section 6.5, by 2006 and continuing at least to mid-
2007 Telstra’s investment in fibre-to-the-node infrastructure remains ‘on strike’ until 
they win an exemption from the obligations under Part XIC of the Trade Practices 
Act. 
 
8.5.2 Exemptions & their Benefits 
 
In Chapter Four, the three instances were considered of access exemptions enjoyed 
by the HFC network providers to give investment certainty at the expense of the 
common carriage/open access principle.  These are now examined from the 
perspectives of whether each was tied to a specific infrastructure deployment 
outcome or failing that, whether some other benefit to the public could be construed.  
A fourth instance is also considered; briefly noted in section 8.6.5, it refers to the 
2005 amendment to the definition of long-term interests of end-users that requires 
the ACCC to place greater weight on incentives for and the risks involved in 
investment in new infrastructure. 
 
As to what could be interpreted by the ‘public benefit’, the obvious response is 
whatever satisfies the ‘long-term interests of end-users’.  However, as discussed in 
section 8.6, this particular test is now framed and interpreted so as to significantly 
elevate the importance of network investment and downplay the relevance of ‘any-to-
any connectivity’.  In particular, the test of satisfying the long-term interests of end-
users is now strongly biased against the provision of access to third parties.  
Although the ‘public benefit’ is not defined by the Trade Practices Act, the ACCC 
accepts a broad understanding which recognises public benefits of an economic and 
non-economic nature. (ACCC 2001) Within the quoted range of possible benefits, the 
following nominal tests are easily encompassed: 
 
• Would any-to-any connectivity be enhanced? 
• Would sustainable competition be more likely? 
• Would end-users benefit in some other manner that otherwise could not be 
possible? 
 
Carrier associates direction of 1995 
 
Effective from 1995 to 1997, this exemption from the standard access obligations 
was granted in return for the roll-out by Optus of an HFC network that, inter alia, gave 
major Australian cities and some regions the first wireline access infrastructure in 
competition to that of Telstra.  Whilst the Ministerial Direction did not prescribe the 
roll-out, there was a strong presumption that a roll-out would immediately occur.  
Despite the investment having been substantially written-off a few years later, the 
infrastructure remains in place and continues to operate.  Though not appreciated at 
the time, the Ministerial Direction did signal the beginning of the end of open access 
to post-PSTN wireline access infrastructure.  On balance, it would be reasonable to 
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conclude that the Optus HFC network had potential to deliver some benefit to the 
Australian public but that this was not realised in the longer term. 
 
Protected contractual right defence of 1997 
 
With a use-by date of 13 September 1996, this defence was effective until 1999/2000 
as a means to thwart legal challenges from access seekers.  The defence failed in 
the courts but the delay in having to provide access was a strategic success in the 
eyes of the access providers.  When this new provision was written into the Trade 
Practices Act, it was not accompanied by any off-setting requirement.  The HFC 
network roll-out had ceased by end-1997 in any case and thereafter each HFC 
network continued to be monopolised by its respective owner.  Unless an argument 
could be put that a vertically integrated monopoly is superior to service-level 
competition via shared infrastructure, it must be concluded that the protected 
contractual right defence has delivered no benefit to the Australian public. 
 
Anticipatory exemption provision of 2002 
 
Effective from 2002 and ongoing, the Trade Practices Act has been amended to 
allow network providers to seek an exemption from the standard access obligations 
prior to the making of an investment or the declaration of a service.  The amendment 
was intended “to provide certainty for potential investors in telecommunications 
infrastructure and services in relation to access to that infrastructure or service in the 
future” by increasing “the level of competition and investment in the tele-
communications market to the benefit of consumers and business” (section 4.6.2 
refers). 
 
Telstra/Foxtel exploited this exemption on the grounds that without it they could not 
justify conversion of their HFC network to digital working.  The Australian Competition 
Tribunal found this to be untrue – digitisation was going to occur regardless as the 
supply of analogue set top boxes was ceasing.  Although the new anticipatory 
exemption provision was generic as to which investments were to be favoured, 
Telstra/Foxtel gave a voluntary undertaking to digitise their HFC network and permit 
third party access on terms that they prescribed.  The exemption provision was also 
intended to increase the level of competition, yet following the successive legal and 
regulatory barriers arising from the carrier associates direction of 1995 and the 
protected contractual right defence of 1997, the strategic and commercial advantage 
remains overwhelmingly with Telstra and Foxtel.  There is still no service-level 
competition. 
 
It is difficult to conceive how the anticipatory exemption provision has benefited the 
Australian public, since the same outcome of digitalisation of the HFC network would 
have arisen without it.  As at mid-2007, no other network providers have attempted to 
exploit this provision. 
 
A key but easily overlooked aspect about the anticipatory exemption regime is that it 
refers to services not infrastructure.  At a Senate Committee hearing, Dr Warren, 
General Manager of Regulatory Affairs, Telstra confirmed that: (ECITA 2006) 
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... we actually do not invest in services but in infrastructure.  The current 
regime as it is written gives exemption for services, so one of the problems we 
have is trying to fully disclose and describe all of the services that we would 
need an exemption for when many of those services have not even been 
thought of yet.  So that is part of the problem with the way the legislation is 
currently drafted. 
 
If access regulation continues to focus only on offered services, then network 
operators are encouraged to ‘de-rate’ the service capability so as to disguise the 
strategic potential of the access fibre infrastructure. 
 
Investment incentive and risk allowance of 2005 
 
Effective from 2005 and ongoing, the ACCC is now required to specifically consider 
incentives for and the risks involved in investment in new network infrastructure when 
assessing the long-term interests of end-users.  This benefit for a network provider 
compounds with that possible from the provision for anticipatory exemption.  The 
import of the allowance is to elevate further the interests of network providers against 
those of access seekers. 
 
When the amendments were made to section 152AB of the Trade Practices Act, 
there was no added requirement to also ascertain whether the investment risk could 
be lowered if the infrastructure in question was to be shared by multiple service 
providers, thereby conceivably increasing network utilisation and growing the overall 
market.  Whilst the jury is still out on the effectiveness of this added allowance in 
favour of investment, there is currently no evidence that decisions based upon the 
amendments will lead to new infrastructure and services that ultimately benefit the 
Australian public. 
 
Of the above four instances actually resulting in or providing scope for access 
exemption, the first two are now expired.  The first was specifically addressed to 
serve the interests of the Optus pay television business, whilst there is strong 
circumstantial evidence that the second and third were specifically addressed to 
serve the pay television interests of Telstra and Foxtel.  As to the likelihood of the 
third and fourth means enhancing the prospects of investment in next generation 
telecommunications infrastructure in the longer term, there is every chance that 
network providers other than Telstra will not exploit these means for fear of being 
overbuilt by Telstra.  In other words, the third and fourth instances for seeking 
regulatory forbearance would appear in practice to primarily serve the interests of 
Telstra, being the player with dominant market power in the arena of wireline access 
infrastructure and services. 
 
8.5.3 A Less Permissive Holiday 
 
In its 2001 report on telecommunications competition regulation, the Productivity 
Commission floated the idea of a “less permissive access holiday”, whereby a 
network investor would enter an “open access regulatory compact” with the ACCC. 
(PC 2001a, pp.292-294) It noted that in telecommunications there is a substantial 
concern that vertically integrated incumbents could lever off upstream (that is, 
D.R.Kelso PhD Thesis, QUT, February 2008: Open Access to Next Generation Broadband {single line spaced version} 
 200
network access) investments to foreclose213 downstream (that is, retail) markets.  
The report only cursorily noted the risks of foreclosure possible with forthcoming 
generations of broadband networks. 
 
Via an “open access regulatory compact”, the network provider would be free to 
establish whatever access price it saw fit, regardless of the infrastructure posing a 
bottleneck.  However, this freedom would be contingent on maintaining a genuine 
open access network – taken to imply that all access seekers agreeing to the price 
and non-price conditions would have to be allowed access, provided those conditions 
also apply to any retail business operated by the network provider. (PC 2001a, 
pp.292-294) The TransACT network, just one year into commercial operation by the 
time of the report, was quoted as an example of such an open access network.214 
 
The Productivity Commission envisaged regulatory compacts applying where the risk 
of foreclosure was high, such as where: 
 
• the competition, market power, national significance and other declaration tests 
are likely to apply; 
• technology and demand is moving rapidly and first mover advantages are 
substantial; and 
• there is substantial scope for new services by entrants based on access that 
might threaten incumbent interests — thus risking foreclosure in the absence of 
a requirement for open access. 
 
A possible area of application of a regulatory compact was suggested to be the 
digitisation of the HFC networks.  In the end, the report made no such 
recommendation to the government – which instead adopted a separate 
recommendation by the Productivity Commission that called for anticipatory 
exemption provisions215, an outcome somewhat antithetical to achieving an open 
access regulatory compact.  Clearly, the Productivity Commission and the 
government ranked the need for investment incentives above that of the adverse 
impacts of foreclosure. 
 
8.5.4 Commentary 
 
Parties such as the Productivity Commission (2001b) and economists Gans and King 
(2003) speak of access holidays as new measures yet to be introduced to promote 
network infrastructure investment.  What they fail to acknowledge is that any 
exemption from the standard access obligations of section 152 of the Trade Practices 
Act is also tantamount to an access holiday and that such measures already exist in 
abundance.  Section 8.5.2 outlines the four holidays impacting on post-PSTN 
telecommunications infrastructure, of which two remain as active measures.  Until 
these have been proved to be ineffective, there is no justification for introducing new 
types of access holidays. 
                                            
213 Foreclosure is the exclusion of other parties by means of strategic behaviour; a denial of 
access. 
214 This wasn’t exactly correct as TransACT saw no need to reach any compact with the 
ACCC yet operated as an open access network regardless (Chapter 5 refers). 
215 As discussed in sections 4.6.2 and 8.5.2 
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Sections 8.5.2 and 8.6.5 have discussed the most recently introduced access holiday 
in the form of a direction to the ACCC to specifically consider incentives for and the 
risks involved in investment in new network infrastructure when assessing the long-
term interests of end-users.  However the 2005 amendment to the Trade Practices 
Act omitted to guide the ACCC as to how to judge a claim that a specific investment 
would entail risk that needed to be ameliorated.  It would be natural for access 
providers to exaggerate their claims of risk. 
 
Perhaps the most glaring omission from section 152 the Trade Practices Act, also not 
identified by the Productivity Commission in its 2001 report (2001a), is the failure to 
appreciate that a vertically integrated telecommunications operator is much more 
likely to seek an access holiday, whereas one whose carriage and content 
businesses are structurally separated (or alternatively a common carriage operator) 
is much less likely to seek a holiday.  An access regime that does not care whether 
an access provider is vertically integrated or structurally separated is blind to a 
significant factor in successfully achieving open access. 
 
8.6 Any-to-Any Connectivity 
 
The origin of the concept of ‘any-to-any connectivity’ was explored in section 8.1.1.  
Here we discuss how the concept was incorporated into Australian 
telecommunications legislation and how its relevance to the policy and practice of 
access regulation has been progressively downgraded. 
 
8.6.1 Connectivity & Access 
 
There is nothing new about ‘connectivity’ - it of course fundamental to the very 
essence of telecommunications.  For example, section 53 of the Telecommunications 
Act 1989 No. 53, 1989 defined ‘primary communications carriage’ as consisting of 
arranging, operating and managing connectivity across the telecommunications 
network.  Yet the addition of ‘any-to-any’ as a qualifier has significant implications for 
regulated access in a competitive environment.  Open competition was introduced 
through the new Telecommunications Act 1997 (No. 47 of 1997) and amendments to 
the Trade Practices Act 1974 (No. 58 of 1997) by way of the new Parts XIB and XIC. 
 
According to Grant (2004, p.89), access refers to the ability of carriers and service 
providers to pass and receive telecommunications traffic over each other’s networks, 
achieving ‘any-to-any connectivity’ whereby all end-users of similar services are able 
to connect with one another irrespective of the particular networks to which they are 
connected.  The legalistic concept of ‘access’ takes its meaning from the nature and 
scope of the rights and obligations created under Part XIC of the Trade Practices Act, 
in particular the ‘standard access obligations’ first discussed here in section 4.3.   
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8.6.2 Long-term Interests of End-users 
 
The main object of the Telecommunications Act 1997 is to provide a regulatory 
framework that promotes:216 
 
(a) the long-term interests of end users of carriage services or of services 
provided by means of carriage services; and 
(b) the efficiency and international competitiveness of the Australian 
telecommunications industry. 
 
This is to be read together with Part XIC of the Trade Practices Act 1974 whose 
object is likewise to promote “the long-term interests of end users of carriage 
services or of services provided by means of carriage services”.217  The 
Telecommunications Act does not define the long-term interests of end-users but 
instead refers to the definition in section 152AB of the Trade Practices Act, where the 
promotion of the long-term interests of end-users would be likely to achieve the 
objectives of: 
 
• the objective of promoting competition in markets for listed services; 
• the objective of achieving any-to-any connectivity in relation to carriage services 
that involve communication between end-users; 
• the objective of encouraging the economically efficient use of, and the 
economically efficient investment in the infrastructure by which listed services 
are supplied, … 
 
For the purposes of section 152AB, the objective of any-to-any connectivity is said to 
be achieved if: 
 
each end-user who is supplied with a carriage service that involves 
communication between end-users is able to communicate, by means of that 
service, with each other end-user who is supplied with the same service or a 
similar service218, whether or not the end-users are connected to the same 
telecommunications network. 
 
                                            
216 Section 3, Telecommunications Act 1997. 
217 Section 152AB, Trade Practices Act 1974. 
218 According to the Explanatory Memorandum to the Trade Practices Amendment 
(Telecommunications) Bill 1996 as noted on page 40 under the proposed section 152AB, 
reference to ‘similar services’ is intended to enable consideration of the need for any-to-any 
connectivity between end-users of services which have similar, but not identical, functional 
characteristics, such as end-users of a fixed voice telephony service and end-users of a 
mobile voice telephony service, or end-users of Internet services which may have differing 
characteristics. 
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8.6.3 End-users 
 
Importantly, the objective of any-to-any connectivity is only to be relevant when 
considering whether a particular service promotes the long-term interests of end-
users of a carriage service that involves communications between end-users.  When 
considering other types of services (such as carriage services which are inputs to an 
end-to-end service or distributive services such as the carriage of pay television), this 
criterion is to be given little, if any, weight compared to the other two criterion (that is, 
of promoting competition and encouraging the economically efficient use, ….).219 
 
The Explanatory Memorandum further reveals that the term ‘end-users’ recognises 
that telecommunications networks and services are used both by customers with a 
direct contractual relationship with a carrier or service provider and other end-users 
of carriage or content services (such as the members of a customer’s household).220  
The most obvious example of a service demanding any-to-any connectivity would 
that of telephony, involving real time communication between two persons.  
Conversely a service that only broadcasts to end-users or is only a sub-set of a more 
communicative service could be deemed to not demand any-to-any connectivity. 
 
8.6.4 Telecommunications Legislation 
 
The prime focus of this research is on any-to-any connectivity rather than the matter 
of the long-term interests of end-users, yet understanding the latter is a means to 
appreciating the former.  The concept of ‘long-term interests of consumers’ was first 
raised as an object of part of the Telecommunications Act 1991 though only with a 
competition-based understanding and no explicit mention of any connectivity-related 
requirement. 221,222  This was the duopoly era of Telecom Australia and Optus as the 
only general carriers. 
 
With the advent of competition heralded by the Telecommunications Act 1997, the 
concept of long-term interests of end-users came into being but seemingly with a 
schizophrenic meaning, according to the relevant Explanatory Memorandum:223 
 
The reference to promoting ‘the long-term interests of end-users’ is intended 
to have a wide meaning, and is not intended to be read down by reference to 
the narrower definition of promoting the long-term interests of end-users in 
                                            
219 Explanatory Memorandum to the Trade Practices Amendment (Telecommunications) Bill 
1996 as noted on page 41 under the proposed section 152AB. 
220 Explanatory Memorandum to the Trade Practices Amendment (Telecommunications) Bill 
1996 as noted on page 41 under the proposed section 152AB. 
221 Section 136(2)(iv) of the Telecommunications Act 1991 No. 98 of 1991, pertaining to the 
right to interconnection between Telecom Australia and Optus as the two general carriers, 
between mobile carriers (Telecom Australia, Optus and Vodafone) and between general and 
mobile carriers. 
222 The only earlier reference of a similar nature was to “the interests of users” in section 
58(2)(a) of the Telecommunications Act No. 53 of 1989, being a requirement placed on the 
regulator, AUSTEL, in making approvals for the supply of incidental services. 
223 Explanatory Memorandum (Volume 1) to the Telecommunications Bill 1996 as noted on 
page 12 in discussing Clause 3 - Objects. 
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proposed section 152AB in the proposed Part XIC of the TPA.  That section 
sets out an object for proposed Part XIC alone. 
 
The Telecommunications Act 1997 then fails to provide any wider meaning other 
than referring to its meaning under the new Part XIC of the Trade Practices Act. 
(Peters 1998) Furthermore, the Telecommunications Act 1997 omits any specific 
reference to a requirement for ‘any-to-any connectivity’ presumably on the basis that, 
as previously noted, a reasonable person could assume this would be implied if one 
carrier is to access the facilities of another. 
 
The importance of end-users connecting to other end-users via services other than 
telephony was apparently not considered central to the Telecommunications Act 
1997 which mentions ‘connectivity’ only once as a requirement of a ‘standard 
telephone service’:224 
 
A service passes the connectivity test if an end-user supplied with the service 
…. is ordinarily able to communicate, by means of the service, with each other 
end-user who is supplied with the same service for the same purpose, 
whether or not the end-users are connected to the same telecommunications 
network. 
 
8.6.5 Trade Practices Legislation 
 
Section 152AB of the Trade Practices Act 1974, from 1997 onwards, is then 
obviously the touchstone for the objective of achieving ‘any-to-any connectivity’ in 
Australian telecommunications, rather than the Telecommunications Act 1997.  Even 
if assessed on a crude arithmetic basis, the ACCC is obliged to consider the 
objective of achieving any-to-any connectivity as but one of three objectives – the 
other two being to promote competition and to encourage efficient use of 
infrastructure.  However, current regulatory interpretation gives less weight to the 
importance of achieving the any-to-any connectivity objective relative to achieving the 
other two objectives. 
 
For a start, any-to-any connectivity is said to imply a communicative rather than a 
distributive or broadcast service.  Barring the subterfuge of creating sub-sets of 
communicative services that interface with end-users only in a single-ended fashion, 
the era of broadcasted services such as pay television is likely to cede dominance in 
next generation broadband networks of the future to a greater demand for end-to-end 
connectivity inherent with non-proprietary Internet access.  Nevertheless, any-to-any 
connectivity will not necessarily be applicable as a valid objective in all cases. 
 
Peters (1998) argues that a ‘principled position’ for the ACCC to adopt in its 
assessment of the long-term interests of end-users should give primacy to the 
purpose and function of competition policy.  She claims that the ACCC interprets 
any-to-any connectivity as being a competition issue: (ACCC 1997b, p.6) 
 
                                            
224 Section 17 of the Telecommunications Act 1997 No. 47 of 1997, in reference to voice 
telephony or its equivalence. 
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Any-to-any connectivity is the ability of end-users of different networks to 
communicate.  In addition to the benefit of allowing users of one network to 
communicate with users of other networks, any-to-any connectivity has 
important implications for competition in the provision of carriage services. 
 
It is a common feature of telecommunications networks that the value of the 
network to an end-user depends on the number of other users that network 
allows the end-user to reach.  For providers of network services to compete 
effectively they will, in most cases, require access to other networks to provide 
services to end-users. In effect, if smaller networks could only offer services to 
their own end-users they would find it difficult to attract new users, regardless 
of their long-term efficiency. 
 
Not all readers would reach this conclusion from the above, but Peters argues that 
once any-to-any connectivity is assigned a pro-competitive characteristic, the 
objective of achieving ‘any-to-any connectivity’ appears to have an “uneven fit” with 
the other two objectives which in any case are synergistically related.  Peters (1998, 
p.9) then substantially reads down the relative merit of achieving any-to-any 
connectivity: 
 
The writer would argue that, in view of this uneven fit and the ancillary 
competition role of any-to-any connectivity (particularly in light of the existence 
of subsection 152AB(2)(c) of the Trade Practices Act), issues of competition 
per se are better left addressed by application of subsection 152AB(2)(c) and 
(e) of the Trade Practices Act and the any-to-any connectivity criterion in 
subsection 152AB(2)(d) treated principally as a technical issue (although, of 
course, with implications for competition).  Hence, in the suggested decision 
tree, any-to-any connectivity is treated, first, as a technical issue, and second, 
as a competition issue (by taking into account any pro-competitive effects from 
any-to-any connectivity in terms of the cost benefit analysis which follows). 
 
Following a reference by the government in June 2000 to conduct a review of all 
telecommunications-specific competition legislation, the Productivity Commission 
reluctantly concluded that an access regime ‘of some sort’ was warranted. (PC 
2001a, p.245) It specifically examined what it called the three ‘sub-tests’ or 
secondary objectives to which the ACCC must have regard when establishing 
whether a service meets the long-term interests of end-users.  Regarding any-to-any 
connectivity, the Productivity Commission viewed the matter substantially in terms of 
only telephony services, both fixed and mobile, and equated it merely to 
interconnection between competing networks. (PC 2001a, pp.264-265) In similar vein 
to Peters, the Productivity Commission concluded that “the any-to-any connectivity 
sub-test would more properly be seen as a matter relevant to the assessment of the 
objective of promoting competition (akin to subsection 152AB(4))” of the Trade 
Practices Act. 
 
Arguing that an explicit focus on preserving incentives for investment and innovation 
may better serve the long-term interests of end-users, the Productivity Commission 
saw any-to-any connectivity as “not always desirable” but perhaps “an important 
aspiration, where it appears likely that market power might frustrate 
interconnectivity”. (PC 2001a, pp.260 & 264) Accordingly, the report of the 
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Productivity Commission recommended that the objects clause in section 152AB(1) 
of Part XIC of the Trade Practices Act be changed from the long-term interests of 
end-users to only reflect the promotion of the economically efficient use of, and 
investment in, telecommunications services.  This would also require sympathetic 
amendments to the relevant sections of the Telecommunications Act 1997. 
 
The government’s response to the Productivity Commissions report on 
telecommunications competition regulation was “not all-embracing” and retained the 
test of long-term interests of end-users with its underlying principles.225 (Grant 2004, 
p.146) Two years later, section 152AB of the Trade Practices Act was further 
amended to ensure that, in determining “whether a particular thing promotes the 
long-term interests of end-users”, the ACCC must also consider the incentives for 
and the risks involved in investment in new network infrastructure.226  The immediate 
impact of this amendment is that, of the three secondary objectives pertinent to the 
ACCC establishing whether a service meets the long-term interests of end-users, the 
objective of promoting competition remains unchanged while the objective of 
encouraging economically efficient investment is greatly strengthened.   It follows that 
the relative weighting awarded to the objective of achieving any-to-any connectivity 
must be correspondingly weakened. 
 
8.6.6 Commentary 
 
When viewed against the backdrop of the ‘regulatory scorecard’ demonstrating an 
incapability for providing effective access to the only current example of post-PSTN 
infrastructure and services, the analysis of section 8.6 presents a rather stark picture.  
It suggests there could be systemic problems in Australia’s telecommunications 
regime encouraging this situation. 
 
Firstly, the Telecommunications Act 1997 defines neither the ‘long-term interests of 
end-users’ nor ‘any-to-any connectivity’, despite the former being a main object of the 
Act.  By leaving these definitions to the Trade Practices Act, the policy makers at the 
time clearly saw both overwhelmingly in competition terms, despite the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Telecommunications Bill 1996 wishing for a wider meaning 
which it did not offer. 
 
Secondly, under the Trade Practices Act, end-users would appear to be only persons 
and not inanimate things such as file servers.  Furthermore, to be relevant to 
promoting the long-term interests of end-users, these end-users must be connected 
by communicative rather than distributive services.  Both these interpretations are far 
narrower than the original CIRCIT conception discussed in section 8.1.1.  It is 
therefore concluded that any-to-any connectivity currently applies only to real time 
communication between two persons via fixed or mobile telephony and perhaps not 
any communication involving data transmission.  Internet-based services such as e-
                                            
225 The Telecommunications Competition Act 2002 No. 140 of 2002 implemented the 
Government’s response to the Productivity Commission’s Inquiry Report on 
Telecommunications Competition Regulation. 
226 Explanatory Memorandum to the Telecommunications Legislation Amendment 
(Competition and Consumer Issues) Bill 2005.  The consequent Act of the same name 
became No. 119 of 2005. 
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mail and the Web involving intermediate file servers and non-real time 
communication, as well as all pay television and video-on-demand services are all 
disqualified. 
 
Thirdly, there has been decreasing tolerance of giving regard to any-to-any 
connectivity as a worthwhile objective.  Commencing 1997 it was, at the most, just 
one of three ‘sub-tests’ for promoting the long-term interests of end-users.  The 
importance of any-to-any connectivity was further diminished by being seen more as 
a proxy for promoting competition, in addition to being restricted solely to 
communicative services.  From 2005, the increased weighting given to the 
investment ‘sub-test’ further sidelined any-to-any connectivity.  The Productivity 
Commission, whose recommendations tend to be followed by governments, is so 
dismissive of any-to-any connectivity that it sought its removal from the test of long-
term interests of end-users. 
 
The prime object of telecommunications legislation should be to empower 
communication between end-users, whether animate or inanimate.  Presently, 
Australia’s telecommunications legislation gives primacy to the welfare of the industry 
rather than to end-users. 
 
8.7 Conclusions 
 
The regulatory, technical and commercial lessons arising from the three case studies 
are salutary, particularly as they relate to the matter of third party access to post-
PSTN infrastructure.  The experience of the TransACT network is a perfect foil to that 
of the HFC network case study, which in turn would appear to be a predictor for the 
fate of fibre-to-the-home networks. 
 
By bringing together the issues arising from the previous discussion, conclusions are 
drawn as they relate to the Research Question: 
 
What are the factors that prevent open access to the broadband services of 
next generation wireline infrastructure?  How can these obstacles be 
overcome? 
 
The conclusions initially address the nature of the problem and then suggest a range 
of solutions of a non-price nature.  Reference is limited to future generation 
broadband telecommunications in Australia delivered by wireline technology.  This 
generation involves significant deployment of optical fibre in the access network, 
where scarcity of capacity should no longer be a factor. 
 
8.7.1 What is preventing open access to next generation broadband 
 
The Telstra/Foxtel and TransACT networks are the only examples of significant 
Australian investments in post-PSTN telecommunications infrastructure.  As such, 
their case studies present the best available opportunities for appreciating the 
lessons to be learned about access to next generation broadband. 
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Section 6.4.1 discussed how the ACCC considers facilities-based competition to be 
more effective in the long term in driving efficiency, and in delivering a wider choice 
of services and more competitive prices to retail users.  Facilities-based competition 
involves the creation of separate infrastructure over which competing service 
providers gain connectivity with nominally the same customer base. 
 
The only instance of such competition via post-PSTN wireline infrastructure, that of 
the Telstra/Foxtel and Optus HFC networks designed primarily to deliver pay 
television services, resulted in a duopoly situation that ultimately delivered only 
minimal benefit to end-users.  Despite the Optus network passing some 2.1 million 
homes, commencing first and adopting a cheaper roll-out of entirely aerial 
construction, it was overbuilt by the incumbent carrier Telstra which passed some 2.4 
million homes. (Budde 1999) 
 
After five years of operation, billions of dollars of value was written off each network.  
By 2002, the Optus threat was strategically neutralised through a content sharing 
agreement with Foxtel, which remains 50 per cent owned by Telstra.  Optus also 
delivers telephony service via their HFC network, yet they failed to challenge the 
Telstra telephony market delivered over the paired copper CAN.  To exacerbate this 
dismal track record for facilities-based competition, each of the two near-parallel HFC 
networks continues to offer monopolised cable modem services – an outcome not 
challenged by the regulated access regime. 
 
In competition policy terms, the next best outcome is access or service-based 
competition requiring a regulatory regime that facilitates access agreements framed 
in the appropriate price and non-price terms.  The following conclusions illuminate 
key non-price considerations based on developments since 1994. 
 
The historical record shows that successive Australian governments have never 
really committed to third party access for services derived from infrastructure beyond 
that of the paired copper PSTN.  Once broadband services deliverable via post-
PSTN ‘access’ infrastructure came into contention from 1994 to at least 2006, the 
telecommunications access regime has been repeatedly compromised by the 
granting of incentives for investment that favoured incumbency.  These government 
interventions have had the practical outcome of being generally anti-competitive, 
effectively killing off open access to the services of post-PSTN infrastructure.  In 
summary, our politicians would appear to have been spellbound by the image (and 
reality) of the ‘romantic’ or ‘heroic’ builder of telecommunications infrastructure 
(Crawford 2006) and have paid only lip service to the importance of competition. 
 
The regulatory regime for access is now labyrinthine and wide open to gaming.  It 
has been exploited by access providers to cause years of delay, wearing down the 
ability of access seekers to ultimately compete.  This conclusion is a derivative of that 
above – the repeated granting of incentives for investment, in reality a series of 
access holidays, has been excessively liberal in favour of access providers.  The 
outcome has been that access providers are encouraged to be obstructive in dealing 
with access seekers. 
 
It is a commonplace practice in many countries that if permitted to do so, a dominant 
provider of physical layer transmission infrastructure will exploit its control of 
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bottleneck facilities to stifle competition in the adjacent markets for applications and 
content.  Once access was sought to the Telstra/Foxtel HFC network, that behaviour 
was fully played out but in this instance there was reasonable technological 
justification – the HFC technology deployed is difficult to unbundle and the television 
channel capacity is inherently scarce.  Both insufficient transmission capacity and an 
architecture that inhibits one-on-one connectivity act as strong impediments to open 
access. 
 
The final conclusion concerns the consequences of significant market power.  
Telstra’s market power derives from three factors – its existing market share and 
financial capability, its ability to exploit natural monopoly elements of the CAN in 
deploying post-PSTN infrastructure and its ability to operate vertically integrated 
businesses.  Of these three, the last serves to magnify the practical impact of the 
other two.  If Telstra had been prohibited from entering the pay television business in 
1995 or had been constrained to do so as a common carrier as suggested by 
government inquiries, the competitive makeup of Australian telecommunications 
would now be arguably significantly different.  Correspondingly, the consequences 
for future next generation broadband infrastructure and services would have been 
profound. 
 
Notwithstanding the above, the TransACT network serves as a shining if not solitary 
example of a successful business operation based on an open access business 
model.  TransACT was established to operate intentionally as an open access 
network and has done so without recourse to access regulation.  There are currently 
no other Australian examples of service-level competition utilising shared 
infrastructure. 
 
The Telstra/Foxtel HFC network is now of a past generation, though in the matter of 
testing Australia’s telecommunications access regime it was a highly educative 
exercise.  The TransACT network, operating since 2000, continues to approximate a 
next generation broadband network but had no need to test the access regime.  Its 
main success factor as an open access business was the absence of competitive 
threat during the critical start-up phase, that is, it was not overbuilt by Telstra or 
Optus HFC infrastructure. 
 
As Australia contemplates the next wave of investment in fibre-to-the-node 
infrastructure, possibly as a prelude to eventual fibre-to-the-home infrastructure, the 
following developments are precursors of the likely outcome if nothing else changes: 
 
• Telstra is threatening not to invest in its own ‘fibre to the node’ infrastructure 
unless it receives further regulatory concessions; rather than illustrating a lack 
of telecommunications investment, this should be interpreted as evidence of the 
unfettered use of market power. 
• Proposals for cooperative investment to create shared fibre-to-the-node 
infrastructure appear to have failed, being forever exposed to the threat of 
overbuilding by the dominant access provider, Telstra. 
• Telstra was not structurally separated prior to the sale of the third tranche of 
shares. 
• Since the inevitable natural monopoly of fibre in the CAN makes facilities-based 
competition infeasible, the key issue then becomes the possibility of service-
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based competition which can only be effective if there is unbundling to the 
lowest possible network element. 
 
8.7.2 How the obstacles to open access could be overcome 
 
The present regulatory regime encourages avoidance of an obligation to provide 
access that creates sustainable retail competition.  Moreover, the preceding analysis 
suggests that the problems are systemic.  Australian telecommunications 
infrastructure and the competitive environment are indeed at another watershed – the 
technology of optical fibre in the access network brings new opportunities for 
competitive access through its potentially abundant capacity but at the same time it 
brings new threats to competitive access by creating an enduring natural monopoly 
and engineered bottlenecks. 
 
The following conclusions, suggestive of ways to overcome obstacles to open access 
of a non-price nature, are grouped under three headings for clarity.  If fully adopted, 
they would represent a substantial reform of the current regime for 
telecommunications access regulation.  Perhaps only a subset might be sufficient to 
make a noticeable difference in opening access to next generation broadband but an 
exercise of that nature is beyond the scope of this study. 
 
8.7.2.1 Make users the primary focus of telecommunications policy 
 
The progressive diminution of the requirement for common carriage from Australian 
telecommunications legislation from 1989 to 1997 effectively removed the protection 
that end-users once had for non-discriminatory connection to other users and non-
discriminatory carriage of content, a matter now of particular significance to next-
generation broadband services.  The telecommunications amendments to the Trade 
Practices Act in 1997 heralding more open competition introduced a regulatory 
regime pitting access seeker against access provider.  The portion of wireline 
infrastructure interfacing with users, the customer access network or CAN, was 
overwhelmingly dominated by one player, Telstra, and the intention of the regime 
was to permit the re-utilisation of this bottleneck facility by competitors.  If an access 
provider didn’t adequately serve the interests of users then an access seeker could 
step in and do so.  The paradigm then was of users utilising relatively dumb customer 
premises equipment to access a relatively intelligent network. 
 
The subsequent decade has witnessed dramatic advances in information technology 
that have reversed this paradigm.  Thanks mainly to non-proprietary Internet 
protocols and affordable personal computing power, there has been a marked shift in 
intelligence towards the ends of any network connection – and at these ends the 
equipment is owned and operated by users.  Users have taken much more control of 
their connectivity and are becoming decidedly more participative, rather than being 
passive recipients.  In comparison, the CAN is relatively dumb, more of a pipeline, 
and the Internet acts in a substantially non-discriminatory manner to packets of 
information sent to and from users. 
 
The spirit of common carriage was in part resurrected in the 1997 Trade Practices 
Act amendments with the insertion of ‘any-to-any connectivity’ as one of three 
objectives under the rubric of promoting the ‘long-term interests of end-users’.  
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Originally conceived as connecting ‘any’ with ‘any’, be they persons, computers or IT 
servers, any-to-any connectivity implied the absence of discrimination and was a 
forerunner of network neutrality.  However from the outset the objective of achieving 
any-to-any connectivity was interpreted more in terms of technical interconnection 
between competing telephony networks and limited only to communicative services 
between persons.  Internet-based services appear to have been excluded. 
 
By 2005, the objective of achieving any-to-any connectivity had been substantially 
eroded by the much greater emphasis on incentives for and the risks involved in 
investment in new network infrastructure.  This bias towards investment at the 
expense of achieving any-to-any connectivity, let alone that of promoting competition, 
becomes particularly insidious when considering the bottleneck nature of fibre in the 
CAN, the technological potential to close access and the propensity for a ‘capital 
strike’ of investment until the regulatory regime submits to closure.  The welfare of 
the telecommunications industry is being promoted ahead of the end-users it is 
supposed to be serving. 
 
It is concluded that communication between users needs to be recognised as the 
prime purpose of telecommunications and that a regulatory regime that rewards 
discriminatory practices detracts from the development of a networked information 
economy.  The objects of the Telecommunications Act and Part XIC of the Trade 
Practices Act should be amended to reflect the achievement of any-to-any 
connectivity as a prime national goal and the meaning of any-to-any connectivity 
should revert to what was originally intended. 
 
8.7.2.2 Do not reward dominant players with access holidays 
 
An access holiday should be called what it is: an exemption from the Standard 
Access Obligations of Part XIC of the Trade Practices Act 1974.  As such, access 
holidays are the antithesis of open access.  They are granted solely as an incentive 
to encourage investment and not to promote competition.  New telecommunications 
infrastructure may well improve connectivity for some users, but since access 
holidays often have the effect of restricting access for third party providers and also 
often restrict access to a closed group of users, it does not follow that any-to-any 
connectivity would always be enhanced – and less likely in a global sense. 
 
If any access holiday were justifiable, it should pass some form of ‘public benefit’ test, 
for instance: 
 
• Would any-to-any connectivity be enhanced? 
• Would sustainable competition be more likely? 
• Would end-users benefit in some other manner that otherwise could not be 
possible? 
 
With the possible exception of the 1995 access holiday leading to roll-out of the 
Optus HFC network, it is difficult to appreciate how the public has benefited from 
access holidays granted so far.  At the very least, exemption from Standard Access 
Obligations should never be granted without a binding requirement to satisfy 
pertinent national objectives.  This could include the roll-out of next generation 
broadband throughout a prescribed geographic area or in accord with a technical 
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design facilitating eventual open access.  Another alternative could be to put all 
awarding of access holidays out to competitive tender.  Yet another could be to 
restrict such benefits only to network providers who lack significant market power. 
 
Claims in favour of access holidays due to a high investment risk need to be 
assessed against the likelihood that such risk is self-fulfilling, that is, it is a 
consequence of monopolisation arising from the closure to third party access, 
whereas shared access could lower risk by increasing infrastructure utilisation, 
overall service demand and return on investment.  There is definite evidence that 
holding out for access holidays promotes adverse behaviour, namely, delays in 
settlement of access agreements, capital strikes and a prolonged threat of 
overbuilding.  Not surprisingly, examples of this nature can be attributed to network 
providers possessing significant market power.  The availability of access holidays 
would appear to encourage potential access providers not to cooperate with access 
seekers. 
 
It is concluded that there is no justification for introducing new types of access 
holidays to encourage investment.  If existing access holidays are to be retained, 
they should be accompanied by roll-out preconditions and not be awarded to 
entrench market dominance through the creation of new bottlenecks.  Greater 
transparency and competition would also result if access holidays were put out to 
tender.  The ACCC should receive guidance as to how to give increased weighting to 
business proposals that are not vertically integrated and how to independently 
assess claims of investment risk.  A more drastic response would be to repeal the 
anticipatory exemption provision of 2002 and the investment incentive and risk 
allowance of 2005. 
 
8.7.2.3 Regulate access to infrastructure, not just services 
 
The architecture and design of a given fibre-to-the-home or FTTH network is the 
crucial determinant of its ability to accommodate multiple service providers in a non-
discriminatory manner.  Incumbent network providers can frustrate attempts to 
unbundle FTTH networks or services through either intentional design or merely the 
adoption of industry designs that just happen to assume the network provider to be 
the sole service provider.  Either way, such actions amount to defensive engineering 
with adverse competitive consequences and the likelihood of this outcome needs to 
be factored into regulatory considerations. 
 
Once the paired copper-based CAN of an incumbent is upgraded to FTTH, the 
inherent economies of scale and scope significantly exceed that of any other 
foreseeable access technology for delivering non-mobile services.  Yet if access 
regulation continues to focus only on offered services, the network operator is 
encouraged to ‘de-rate’ the service capability so as to disguise the strategic potential 
of the access fibre infrastructure.  For example, if competitive service providers offer 
15 Mb/s Internet bandwidth via paired copper-based DSL infrastructure, the fibre 
access provider could simply match that service offering in order to lessen the 
chance of access declaration even though the fibre-based infrastructure is capable of 
subsequently delivering perhaps 100 Mb/s at the flick of a switch.  Existing service-
based access regulation is incapable of dealing with the technological and hence 
market dominance of fibre in the CAN. 
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Network architecture and design taken together are of crucial importance to 
achieving open access, since the implementation of common carriage is strongly 
favoured by a relative abundance of transmission capacity and the closest possible 
approximation to one-on-one connectivity. 
 
There needs to be a regulatory mechanism for facilitating industry arrangements for 
cooperative infrastructure investment where the alternative would otherwise be the 
creation of an enduring natural monopoly by an incumbent.  Shared infrastructure 
lowers commercial risk by encouraging differentiated competition that increases 
infrastructure utilisation and overall market demand.  Even the Productivity 
Commission in its 2001 report on telecommunications competition regulation could 
envisage the need for what it called a ‘regulatory compact’ based on open access 
principles. 
 
It is concluded that the telecommunications access regime will be incapable of 
achieving satisfactory competitive outcomes involving natural monopoly infrastructure 
unless it recognises the strategic potential of infrastructure such as optical fibre in the 
access network as well as its architecture and design characteristics.  There also 
needs to be a regulatory mechanism for facilitating industry arrangements for 
cooperative infrastructure investment where the alternative would otherwise be the 
creation of an enduring natural monopoly by an incumbent. 
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CHAPTER NINE – STUDY LIMITATIONS, FURTHER RESEARCH & CONCLUDING 
REMARKS 
 
9.1 Study Limitations 
 
Whilst the history of Australian telecommunications pre-1991 has many parallels with 
that in Europe, the introduction of competition thereafter took on characteristics more 
in line with US developments.  For this research, academic references were found to 
be almost unknown from Australian sources, uncommon from Europe but relatively 
prolific from the US.  The result may be a bias towards arguments with a US flavour 
but this has been unavoidable. 
 
Most references adopt an economic, legal or policy basis and only a few illuminate 
the technical nature of actual or potential bottlenecks resulting from next generation 
broadband access infrastructure.  This research has striven for a more multi-
disciplinary approach by melding a technical appreciation with strategic, policy, 
commercial and user-oriented perspectives. 
 
Conscious steps were taken to avoid being corralled into the narrative of solely 
economic considerations.  In particular, there is no discussion of price-related 
considerations. 
 
This research does not directly consider the matters of access to content by third 
party service providers or social issues relating to equity of access by consumers or 
users who are unable to gain physical access to next generation broadband 
infrastructure or services.  Nevertheless, an attempt has been made to explore how 
access to next generation broadband can meet the needs of users rather than just 
the commercial requirements of providers. 
 
With the data gathering phase substantially based on the analysis of three case 
studies, their appropriate selection was of vital importance.  The limitations peculiar 
to each of these are documented in sections 4.7.1, 5.6.1 and 6.7.1.  In brief, the 
highlights are as follows: 
 
Telstra/Foxtel Pay TV Network 
 
• Contrary to the well documented attempts by third parties to gain access to the 
data capacity of US cable television systems, in Australia there has been no 
declaration of access to the cable modem service and so this case study 
instead focussed on the matter of access to the television broadcast capacity. 
• Due to the wealth of primary and secondary source material available, this case 
study has been quite detailed.  It could readily have further increased in size by 
analysing the most complex and detailed judgements and determinations 
arising from the many legal and regulatory developments.  Instead, the 
treatment of events and their meanings was restricted to appreciating the nature 
of outcomes rather than the detail of the processes involved in getting there. 
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TransACT Network 
 
• Accessing information about the TransACT network has proved a problematic 
exercise.  No descriptive writings of a substantial and independent nature were 
identified at the outset, which meant that this case study had to cover novel 
ground – although limited to a focus on access and openness. 
• Paradoxically the TransACT network was found to be an ideal candidate for a 
case study on open access next generation networks, raising many positive 
issues and so few negative ones that it can give the appearance of being an 
anticlimax compared to the other two studies. 
 
Fibre to the Home Networks 
 
• Whilst the Telstra/Foxtel network remains effectively closed to third party 
access and the TransACT network remains substantially open, the fate of 
access to next-generation fibre to the home networks has yet to unfold.  At the 
time of writing, FTTH developments in Australia had not generated regulatory 
precedents and hence the case study could not enter this realm. 
• The case study has been focussed on understanding the principles involved in 
enabling third party access to those next generation networks where, at least in 
theory, scarcity of capacity should not pose a restraint on access. 
• Of necessity, the analysis has been somewhat technical with a focus on the 
potential for creating a natural monopoly and the options for unbundling. 
 
9.2 Further Research 
 
The research has raised a plethora of issues but of necessity must focus on those 
that address the chosen Research Question.  Many of the outstanding issues would 
be more suited to examination via a subsequent phase of research that builds upon 
understandings of this dissertation.  Possible areas for future research include the 
following topics: 
 
• Investigate the almost silent demise of common carriage in Australian 
telecommunications law and its replacement by a regime that sanctions, yet 
does not prescribe, a capability for network and service discrimination.  Such a 
study could appreciate how arguments in the US for and against ‘network 
neutrality’ may impact on future reform of the Australian regulatory regime. 
 
• Noting the significant trend towards user-generated content and social 
networking, explore the justification for placing the Internet at the centre of 
future communications policy and detail the necessary changes to the 
Australian regulatory regime.  This study could develop further the concept of 
achieving ‘any-to-any connectivity’ as a prime object of any regulatory regime. 
 
• Australia urgently needs an infrastructure vision of future communications 
networks that secure our future by encouraging innovation and facilitating a 
range of consumer services necessary for ongoing economic re-structuring.  
This calls for fundamental thinking.  We have yet to appreciate the 
consequences for Australia of Lawrence Lessig’s visionary call for an 
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‘innovation commons’, let alone Brett Frischmann’s proposal for sustaining an 
‘infrastructure commons’. 
 
• Regimes for regulated access are traditionally justified where one or more major 
players exert market power to the detriment of the benefits of greater 
competition.  Natural monopolies pose particular opportunities for dominant 
players to set unreasonable price and non-price terms.  Australian 
telecommunications policy and law need to achieve a satisfactory balance 
between the interests of users, competitive access for service providers and 
incentives for investment in infrastructure. 
 
9.3 Concluding Remarks 
 
This research illuminates the field of telecommunications access regulation as it 
applies to infrastructure capable of delivering truly next generation broadband 
services.  Such infrastructure, involving optical fibre in the customer access network, 
creates a natural monopoly of an enduring nature.  It is capable of giving rise to 
complex technical and commercial bottlenecks that strongly encourage anti-
competitive behaviour.  The first optical fibre in any customer access network will be 
the last installed. 
 
A case is made that the access regime is incapable of dealing with this situation.  
With facilities-based competition being infeasible, that is, the ‘stepping stone’ theory 
of investment collapses, the only alternative to monopolistic service delivery of next 
generation broadband services will be effective service-level competition.  
Unfortunately the track record of the access regime as applied to post-PSTN 
infrastructure augers badly for effective service-level competition via optical fibre in 
the customer access network. 
 
The regime is cumbersome and wide open to gaming.  Delay and lobbying become 
prime weapons in preventing third party access.  Experience with unbundling the 
relatively well-known paired copper access network bodes ill for the unbundling of 
future optical fibre.  In any case, competitive access will be stymied if unbundling is 
restricted to incrementally-offered services rather than the underlying optical fibre 
infrastructure.  The regime is now significantly biased in favour of investment by 
network providers and correspondingly against competitive access seekers. 
 
The TransACT network in Canberra is living testimony to the fact that Australia’s next 
generation telecommunications infrastructure can readily be open to competitive 
service provision.  Paradoxically, TransACT made no call upon the access regime.  
There was merely a willingness by the network provider to be open.  In contrast, 
Australia’s telecommunications access regime has been captured by network 
providers whose business plans are predicated on either closure or highly restictive 
openness.  Since 1993, our politicians would appear to have been spellbound by the 
image (and reality) of the ‘romantic’ or ‘heroic’ builder of telecommunications 
infrastructure (Crawford 2006) and have paid only lip service to the importance of 
competition. 
 
It need not be this way.  Whilst this research identifies what I see as being the key 
problems, it is framed to address a specific research question and not necessarily the 
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full gamut of possible solutions.  Realising the economies of scale and scope only 
possible with optical fibre, non-price considerations come to the fore.  The following 
conclusions are reached based upon a detailed assessment of the experience with or 
potential for access to three network types involving post-PSTN infrastructure. 
 
Post-1997 Australian telecommunications policy has effectively removed the 
protection that end-users once had for non-discriminatory connection to other users 
and non-discriminatory carriage of content, a matter now of particular significance to 
next-generation broadband services.  Instead, the interests of end-users have been 
subsumed by the interests of network providers and access seekers.  The spirit of 
common carriage is only poorly enunciated by the legislative concept of ‘any-to-any 
connectivity’ – a concept which in any case was made greatly subordinate to the 
need to provide incentives for investors.  It is concluded that communication between 
users should be recognised as the prime purpose of telecommunications and that the 
regulatory regime should not reward discriminatory practices detracting from the 
development of a networked information economy. 
 
Focussing on specific aspects of the regime, it is further concluded that dominant 
players should never be rewarded with access holidays which could entrench market 
dominance through the creation of new bottlenecks.  Access holidays are the very 
antithesis of open access and experience to date shows them to have been counter-
productive.  The availability of access holidays simply encourages access providers 
not to cooperate with access seekers.  They become a tool for securing market 
dominance. 
 
Finally, the regulatory regime is incapable of dealing with the strategic significance of 
optical fibre extending deeply into the customer access network.  Defensive 
engineering easily prevents effective unbundling and reinforces technical and 
commercial bottlenecks.  Continued focus on access only to services simply 
encourages the squirrelling away of the strategic potential of optical fibre.  There 
particularly needs to be a regulatory mechanism for facilitating industry arrangements 
to invest in a cooperative manner as an alternative to enshrining just one player with 
a natural monopoly.  The conclusion is reached that access regulation is ill-equipped 
to cope with optical fibre in the access network until it also recognizes the strategic 
potential of the infrastructure and its design characteristics. 
 
- - 0 - - 
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